CHRISTIAN THOUGHT

LECTURES AND PAPERS ON

PHILOSOPHY,

CHRISTIAN EVIDENCE,

BIBLICAL ELUCIDATION

TENTH SERIES.

EDITED BY

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CHRISTIAN THOUGHT.

PERCEPTIONALISM: A SYSTEM OF PHILOSOPHY.

[Delivered before the American Institute of Christian Philosophy, August 11th, 1891.]

BY PROF. EDWARD J. HAMILTON, D.D., NEW YORK.

THE word "perception," in its ordinary meaning and widest application, signifies the correct apprehension of fact or truth. On this basis, that philosophy which examines and explains perceptions as such, may be styled PERCEPTIONALISM. Let us discuss this name and give some reasons for the use of it; and let us consider the nature of the philosophy which it designates.

The Latin preposition "per," like its English equivalent "through," often indicates instrumentality, or agency, as in the maxim, "Qui facit per alium, facit per se"; but "per" never has this meaning when used as a prefix in the composition of words. It then signifies either movement through or over some place, as in the verbs *peragro*, *perambulo*, *permitto*, *perrumpo*, or else thoroughness in the performance of some action, as in the verbs *pereo*, *perfero*, *perficio*, *pernego*, *pernosco*. This last thought—thoroughness—is the ordinary signification of "per" as a prefix, and is that belonging to it in the words "perceive" and "perception."

The verb "percipere" and the noun "perceptio" originally meant any thorough taking of a thing, so as to bring it within one's possession. In the seventeenth chapter of Cato Major, Cicero speaks of the "perceptio fructuum," or harvesting of fruits; and, in the same chapter, he says "Themistocles omnium civium perceperat nomina"; that is, Themistocles had learnt, or mastered, the names of all the citizens. These quotations illustrate the transfer of the word from a physical to a psychical

application. But "percipere," as indicating intellectual apprehension, does not always, nor even generally, include memorizing; as it does when Themistocles is said to have learnt the names of his fellow-citizens. Ordinarily with the Romans this word signified simply the cognition of fact or truth; and especially, when they spoke of perceiving a thing by the senses or by the mind, they used language just as we do; they meant that psychical operation by which one comes to know that a thing is, or what it is, or that it would be, or what it would be. And this is a very natural use of language; for when we have gained the knowledge of any fact or truth, we may then be said to have taken something into our possession, whether we retain it afterwards in our memory or not.

In short, perception and cognition are two names for the same process. They differ in that perception emphasizes the thought of the process more than that of the result, while cognition emphasizes the thought of the result more than that of the process. But perception always terminates in knowledge, and is therefore cognition; no act or process is called perceptive except on the assumption that it produces absolute and well-founded conviction.

These statements will be confirmed if we consider the different modes of perception which occur in our daily experience. There are three simple modes of immediate cognition. Men perceive their own bodies and bodily affections and the immediate causes of these affections; and such cognition is the beginning of all sense-perception. They perceive their own souls as in activity, as thinking, feeling or willing; and this we call consciousness, or internal perception. Then, in connection with bodily and mental phenomena, they perceive spacial, temporal, causal and other relations; and, along with these relations, certain fundamenta on which they rest, such as spaces, times and changes. All such cognitions may be distinguished as concomitant perceptions, because they accompany those of sense-perception and consciousness. Thus, there are three simple modes of immediate perception.

We also form compound immediate perceptions, especially of external objects; and these prepare the way for inferential, or

"acquired" perception. The boy born blind, who obtained sight through a surgical operation, could not at first distinguish the cat from the dog visually, though he could tactually. Catching the cat one day he passed his hands over her, and identified what he felt with what he saw. Then he set her down and said, "So, puss, I shall know you another time." Here a concomitant perception compounded the cognitions of sight and touch; and evidently a basis for subsequent inference was secured by means of that compositional cognition. Hereafter, whether puss be seen in the day-time or handled in the dark, the same knowledge will be obtained through one sense which originally resulted from the use of two. All our ordinary sense-perceptions are more or less "acquired"; and some of them, such as determinations by the eye of the distance, size and shape of remote objects, are quite complex judgments.

More evidently, though not more really, inferential than the ordinary discriminations of sense are those rational perceptions by which things are seen as necessarily or probably or possibly consequent upon given antecedents. Here, perhaps, it would be more literal to say that a thing is inferentially perceived when it is necessary, and that, in other cases, we only perceive that it may probably or possibly exist; yet, even in these cases, we speak of perception if the judgment be made correctly. Because we may *know* that a thing is probable or possible.

All rational perceptions are related to our presentational cognitions, and seem consequent upon them. For in the immediate cognitions of fact we perceive, not merely simple fact, but also, by a concomitant cognition, various necessary relations according to which one fact is conditioned upon, or connected with, another. This prepares us for logical inference; so that afterwards, when a necessitant, or a necessary condition, appears, we can infer a necessary or a possible consequent, such as the case calls for.

Then, too, we must mention that important mode of rational perception which takes place even in the absence of any antecedent. For the mind, using that marvellous power of conception which deals with things that are not as if they were, makes inferences from supposed or imaginary premises. Therefore we

recognize hypothetical as well as actualistic perception, and hypothetical as well as actualistic knowledge.

Now, as every mode of perception—whether it be presentational or inferential, whether it be actualistic or hypothetical—claims to be a mode of cognition and to result in knowledge, it is plain that the doctrine which explains perceptions as such must assert and maintain the reliability of our perceptions. In other words, Perceptionalism must teach that what men call their perceptions are true perceptions, and that what men know they truly know, and that these positions are justified by the most thorough examination of both thought and fact.

It may cause astonishment to some that any system should set forth such teaching as distinctively its own. It may be asked, "Do not all philosophers accept the perceptions of mankind as veritable cognitions? Is it not presumptuous in one school to assert that this doctrine is specially and pre-eminently the result of its own investigations?" We reply that the past history of philosophy, and the condition of philosophy at the present time, warrant the statement that all the more celebrated systems, both of ancient and of modern days, conflict more or less with the ordinary convictions of mankind; and by far the greater part of the speculative talent of the existing generation not only rejects the radical idea of Perceptionalism, but considers that idea a mark of intellectual shallowness. The popular philosophies of to-day, while differing from each other, are wonderfully agreed in explaining away various fundamental beliefs. Who are more antagonistic than the Associationalists of England and the Idealists of Germany? Yet both teach that we have no proper knowledge of an external and material world; both declare that space and time are mental products, and not things which have independent natures of their own; and, according to both, substances, powers, the relation of cause and effect, and necessitudinal connections generally, are merely forms of conception.

Then, too, particular schools of philosophy, in their very points of variance from each other, are at variance also with the judgments of mankind. Materialism, in saying that the soul is composed of a multiplicity of molecules, and that its life is the

action of these molecules, denies that unity of the human spirit in which all men believe; on the other hand, Pantheism denies the well-known multiplicity of agents and objects in the universe, asserting that there is one only substance.

In view of the history of speculation, the student of theories might even question whether there is any thorough-going system which maintains the reliability of human cognitions. But, at the same time, if he were convinced that there is such a system, he could not refuse it the name Perceptionalism. In every scheme of metaphysical philosophy, the theory of knowledge is the fundamental part, and that from which it is most expressively designated. We advocate the name "Perceptionalism," not only on the ground that there is a philosophy which should be known under this title, but also because we believe that the system thus distinguished is likely hereafter to receive more prominent consideration than has been accorded to it heretofore.

In ancient times there was no such system. Aristotle asserts that the beginning of all knowledge is that "natural power of judgment which is called perception" (*δύναμιν σύμφυτον κριτικήν ἣν καλοῦσιν αἴσθησιν*); but he did not investigate our first cognitions so as to determine their content and establish their correctness. The Stoics held that *αἴσθησις*, or the immediate perception of fact, is the origin of knowledge and the criterion of truth; and this same doctrine was taught by the Epicureans. Moreover, both these schools, agreeing with the Aristotelians, declared that man's ***rational*** perceptions are reliable; though they allowed that reason may err, and taught that mistakes in perception are to be attributed, not to the senses, but to judgment, or inference. Both also went farther than the Aristotelians in exalting *αἴσθησις*—in this connection signifying specifically presentational perception—as the source of knowledge; and, with this doctrine, they opposed Platonism on the one hand, and Skepticism on the other. Yet neither the Stoic nor the Epicurean system attained a permanent success; neither proved sufficient to resist the Neoplatonism and Mysticism of the first centuries of the Christian era.

In subsequent times Scholasticism, applying Aristotelian ideas to the doctrines of the Church, showed great dialectic power,

but added little to scientific knowledge. Finally, after the theological awakening of the sixteenth century came the speculative activity of the seventeenth; and towards the close of the seventeenth century, in the year 1689, John Locke gave to the world the beginning of a great philosophy.

Locke founds all knowledge on "experience," and has, therefore, been styled the founder of an "empirical," or associationalist, philosophy; but erroneously. By "experience" Locke means simply *presentational perception*—the αἴσθησις * of Aristotle, and of the Stoics; and "sensation and reflection" are the names which he gives to the outward and to the inward modes of this perception. Moreover, he teaches that the perception of necessary relations occurs in connection with the cognition of simple fact, and is absolutely and objectively intuitive. These initial principles of Perceptionalism were obtained by Locke from the critical observation of the phenomena of mind. Yet his "Treatise on Human Understanding," defective in the development and yet more in the expression of its thought, did not save the eighteenth century from the Associationalism of Hartley, the Idealism of Berkeley, and the Skepticism of Hume.

In opposition to these destructive theories, the "Essays" of Thomas Reid, the Glasgow professor, were written towards the close of the eighteenth century. In these the natural force of the ordinary convictions of mankind was powerfully directed against the subtle errors of that day. But the thought of Reid is lacking in theoretic discrimination and construction. He often assumes first principles; sometimes leaves difficulties unexplained; and can scarcely be said to have produced a philosophic system. His excellence and his deficiency are both expressed when he is characterized as "the apostle of common sense." Mightily defending the truth, he left it as he found it, without analysis and without systematization.

*Αἰσθησις with the Greeks referred pre-eminently, but not exclusively, to sense-perception. Aristotle speaks of reason as a higher kind of αἰσθησις; and also of the moral faculty in the same way. Thus, in his Ethics we read: "Τουτο πρὸς τἀλλα ζῶα τὸις ανθρωποις ἰδιον, τὸ μόνον ἀγαθὸν και κακον και δικαίου και ἀδίκου και τῶν ἀλλων αἴσθησιν ἔχειν." The verbs αἰσθανομαι, *sentio* and *percelv* all have about the same significance and the same breadth of application.

During this nineteenth century some advance has been made by eminent philosophers, who have called themselves Intuitionalists. Their writings thoroughly discuss both original (or presentational) and acquired (or inferential) perception; and also throw much light on those immediate cognitions of necessary truth which, because they take place hypothetically as well as actualistically, and in the absence as well as in the presence of objects, have been called "the intuitions of the mind." Nevertheless, so far as we can learn, no teacher of Intuitionalism has succeeded in founding a school in which, like the patriarch, "he will command his children after him." Ambitious pupils, however carefully instructed, do not become permanent disciples. They read and study further—as they ought to do—and then are more or less influenced by some imposing and skillfully constructed system of error.

We ascribe this to the narrowness and incompleteness of Intuitionalism. Correct, so far as it goes, it is but the commencement of a philosophy. Its teachings regarding the immediate perception of fact and the necessary relations of fact should be united with others, equally important, concerning the rational and discursive intellect, and concerning thought and conviction in general. In short, with sincere respect and consideration both for ancient tradition and for modern theory, we assert the need of a new and comprehensive elaboration of mental science.

The name "Intuitionalism" of late years has been very properly abandoned as the designation of a system of philosophy; it is not only confined in its suggestions, but is also affected with an obscurity arising from the ambiguities of the word "intuition." And the name "Realism," which some propose, is yet more unsatisfactory. This title belongs historically to the doctrine of the reality of "universals"—a doctrine rejected by those who would now call themselves Realists. It also furnishes ground for quibbling controversy. For those philosophers who reject the ordinary beliefs of men do not admit that they deny reality. They say, "The question is not, 'Is there reality?' but 'What is it?' and 'How shall we think about it?'" And they protest against the settlement of such questions dogmatically, or in any other way than by a process of critical investigation.

Moreover, it is to be remembered that a most important class of human perceptions—including general judgments, and among these axioms, or the principiated intuitions of necessary sequences—do not, properly speaking, assert reality, but only hypothetical truth.

On the whole, Perceptionalism appears to be the best designation for a philosophy which teaches that man's immediate or intuitive convictions are never mistaken, and that, under certain conditions and limitations, even his inferential conclusions may be relied upon. For us, this name defines a system of doctrines to which scientific method leads, and which, we believe, is destined to be generally accepted by thinking men. At the same time we are far from saying that the doctrines of Perceptionalism have reached perfection or completion; that would be too great a claim. We assert only that many leading positions have been established, and that the future of this system is assured beyond a peradventure.

Some learned professors condemn this confidence of ours as that of "a rustic philosopher who has never adequately studied the deeper phases of the cognitive problem"; and many others regard a system which prefers the views of the vulgar to those of illustrious theorizers to be of very dubious value. It must even be acknowledged that a certain presumption against our philosophy is natural and reasonable. We trust, however, that we shall not be excluded from a candid and attentive hearing while stating some doctrines in the connected assertion of which Perceptionalism may—as we think—not only claim to be a system, but also challenge comparison with other systems. We shall simply state these doctrines, without discussing them at any length.

First of all, we need scarcely say that Perceptionalism agrees with assertive, and differs from skeptical, systems in holding that there is such a thing as knowledge, and that some things are self-evident, or immediately cognizable. For, as Aristotle says, it is folly to seek proof for everything. If there be knowledge at all—if we have absolute and well-founded conviction about anything—some knowledge must be immediate, or "intuitive"; and other knowledge must be consequent upon that. Therefore

earnest thinkers seldom ask, "Is there knowledge?" but "What is knowledge?" and also, "How do we know?" and, "What do we know?"

Again, Perceptionalism teaches that cognition—and, in particular, cognition by the senses—is an extremely different thing from sensation. Cognition is an intellectual operation; sensation is a feeling—a psychical commotion—produced by the action of the nerves upon the spirit. Sense-perception is conditioned on sensation because it involves a cognition of the sensation, but it does not include the sensation. The cognition of the sensation, but not the sensation itself, is an element in sense-perception. In order to perceive the acidity of a lemon, this juicy fruit must be applied to the tongue so as to produce a specific feeling. Thereupon—and in one and the same act—we perceive the sensation and its causal correlative.

The thought, or conception, of a sensation should not be identified with the sensation. The thought of the feeling of sourness, or of the feeling of hunger or thirst, or heat or cold, or hardness or softness, is a different thing from that feeling; so, likewise, the cognition of a sensation is not the sensation. Therefore, the act of sense-perception does not include the sensation, but only the cognition of it, together with that of its cause.

Some corporeal sensibilities—especially the visual—are so delicate and so intellectual in their use that their character as feelings is eclipsed by their service as the instruments of perception; yet, even in such cases, we distinguish the feeling from our cognition of it. For example, the pleasure derived from certain sensations of color arises from feeling rather than from perception.

But if thought and sensation are things radically different, then the teachings of Sensationalism must be rejected; for this doctrine affirms that cognition, memory, conception, imagination, and intellectual activity of every kind, are either bodily feelings or the reproduction and refinement of such feelings. Not only so, we must reject also that more specious theory which speaks of "the sensational elements of knowledge," and according to which sense-perception is the combined action of the reason and the sensibility. The error involved in this theory

is double, and is the beginning of further error. For no one can rightly explain sense-perception if he do not see both that sensation is not, and that the cognition of the sensation is, a constituent part of the perception ; and no one can correctly understand the nature of thought in general who fails to see that sense-perception, though conditioned on sensation, is wholly intellectual, and contains no sensational element whatever.

In the next place, Perceptionalism distinctly recognizes that mode of cognition which we have called concomitant perception. Our bodily parts and things in contact with them become known to us in sense-perception, and this originates our knowledge of material substances and qualities. Consciousness reveals the soul and its powers in various states and operations ; and thus our acquaintance with the spiritual world begins. By concomitant perception we learn of things which are less directly, though not less immediately, perceived than are the objects of sense-perception and consciousness. For example, the relations of both material and spiritual things, and those portions of space and time which are immediately related to one's body and one's soul, are perceived concomitantly.

Neither this mode of perception nor the objects of it can be properly recognized by those who hold that sense-perception and consciousness are the only modes of immediate cognition, and who confine the former of these to things that can be touched or felt, and the latter to the experiences of one's own spirit. But many authors, following Locke, say that space and time, and the relations of space and time—as also quantity and change and their relations—are truly perceived along with the more direct objects of our cognition. These writers teach also that space is known in connection with sense-perception, and time in connection with consciousness. All such should welcome the doctrine of concomitant perception as an improved statement of the truth. For time is not perceived exclusively in connection with consciousness, nor space exclusively in connection with sense-perception. Both are perceived along with both modes of cognition, and by means of a cognition of their own.

This concomitant perception does not differ from that which it accompanies in its nature, but only in its objects and in the

fact that these are viewed, as it were, obliquely. The cognition of these objects, like all other cognition, takes place when we both conceive of them and recognize their reality. For spaces, times, changes, and relations, though insubstantial and powerless things, are objects, or entities; for they exist, and their existence is perceived as truly as that of substantial agents and of the powers and operations of such agents.

Concomitant perception may be easily illustrated. Let a man grasp a warm wooden ball with one hand, and, at the same time or soon after, a cold metallic ball with the other hand. He now perceives, not only the sensations of weight and touch and temperature, and the balls as causative of them, but also each hand and the ball in it as in contact with one another. He perceives, further, that his hands and the balls in them have separate positions in space. He compares and contrasts, as to their points of likeness and unlikeness, the facts given by his right hand with those given by his left. And he recognizes that the parts of this experiment take place contemporaneously or successively, as the case may be. Moreover, not only the hands and the balls, but also all the relations observed, together with the space and time and other relata, are as truly and as surely perceived as are the sensations of weight and touch and temperature. By this perception of those entities and relations which are immediately connected with his own personality, man becomes qualified for the knowledge of the Universe.

Thus, teaching concomitant perception, we oppose the doctrine that space and time and change and relation, and even substance and power, are not entities at all, but merely modes of thinking ; and we challenge the advocates of this doctrine to show either that concomitant cognition is not as much a fact of experience as any other mode of cognition, or that there is any good reason for distrusting its most positive assertions.

In the fourth place, Perceptionalism teaches that every cognition, however simple, contains two elements, which may be distinguished as thought and belief, or as conception and conviction.

Here terms are used technically, though as nearly as possible in conformity with common usage. By thought, or conception,

we mean that intellectual activity in which we have the idea of a thing, and also of its existence or of its non-existence ; and in connection with which we may, or we may not, believe in its existence, or in its non-existence. By belief, or conviction, we mean that confidence in the existence, or in the non-existence, of a thing which, under certain conditions, arises in the mind either intuitively or inferentially.

That there is a radical distinction between thought and belief, as thus described, seems clear enough ; but most philosophers fail to see this distinction. Very often conviction is taken to be either a vivid and persistent mode of conception or a peculiar combination of conceptions. Many, adopting a teaching of Aristotle, make existence to be a conjunction, or a relatedness, of things, and belief a corresponding synthesis of thoughts. The truth is that belief is an intellectual activity wholly *sui generis ;* it is not thought, though it is conditioned on thought ; it is a confidence which may, or may not, accompany an idea or combination of ideas.

This confidence admits of a variety of degrees, but it does not have that marvellous correspondence with the nature, or form, of things which characterizes thought, and which may be styled "the objectivity of thought." The lowest degree of conviction is presumption, or guesswork ; the highest, absolute certainty. Knowledge (of which cognition is the initial act) is absolute and well-grounded certainty.

Moreover, there are two modes of conviction, the actualistic and the hypothetical. The former of these is belief in the primary and literal sense ; the latter is a preparatory and provisional confidence in connection with the thought of a consequent as related to the supposed antecedent. These modes of conviction differ radically. The hypothetical knowledge that a thing would be so is even entirely consistent with the actualistic knowledge that it is not so. Those philosophers who misapprehend the distinction between thought and belief sometimes also fail to distinguish hypothetical from actualistic knowledge.

This brings us to another point in Perceptionalism, namely: the essence of belief lies in the mental assertion of the existence, or of the non-existence, of something. Every belief may

be expressed by a proposition ; and there are two kinds of propositions, the presentential and the inherential. The former asserts the existence, or the non-existence, of the subject of the proposition ; for example, " Bread exists " and " Bread does not exist," or, as we more frequently say, " There is bread," and " There is no bread " ; the latter asserts the existence, or the non-existence, of the predicate. For example, " The bread is sweet " and " the bread is not sweet." For these sentences assume the existence of the subject, and assert the existence, and the non-existence, of the predicate in its relation to the subject.

It is astonishing that this account of propositions, though self-evident in its simplicity, is not to be found in the writings of any authority, whether ancient or modern. All logicians, from Aristotle down, have been inaccurate in their analysis of assertive thought. Their theories have been preparative to this doctrine, which, we think, must be accepted as a final statement.

It should be noticed that existence and non-existence, though not things, or entities, are not mere thoughts, but, in their own way, objects of thought. For if a thing exists, it is a fact that it exists ; and, if it does not exist, it is a fact that it does not exist. This last statement does not mean literally that an entity is ever non-existent ; for in order to be truly the subject of an assertion an entity must exist ; and it would be absurd that what exists is at the same time non-existent. It is only asserted that non-existence may be a fact in a case in which an entity might be supposed to be ; which idea is also expressed occasionally by the term " non-entity."

Let us note also that the word " non-existence " is only a relative designation and does not indicate a compound nature. Non-existence, no less than existence, is an absolutely simple objectuality. It is named " non-existence " because its whole importance lies in its diversity from existence, and not in its own nature.

The definition of belief as the mental assertion of existence or non-existence applies also to our knowledge of fact or truth, knowledge being absolute and well-founded belief. This same definition, also, explains judgment, the initial act of belief, and cognition, the initial act of knowledge. For philosophers necessarily use the words belief and judgment in a very comprehensive sense.

If, now, the essence of belief, judgment, knowledge, and cognition be the assertive use of existential thought, what shall we say of the theory that perceptive judgment, or the cognition of fact, is a synthesis of representations (or appearances) under some category of conception, whereby the experiences of the mind are reduced to this or that mode of unity? What of the definition that "the union of representations in one's consciousness is judgment"? (Mahaffey's Kant.) And of Kant's own words, "So finde ich, dass ein Urtheil nichts Anderes sei, als die Art gegebene Erkenntnisse zur objectiven Einheit der Apperception zu bringen"? Does not this theory miss the point altogether?

A synthesis of thought may often precede judgment; but it is not judgment. A synthesis may be perfected without any judgment asserting that synthesis; and, when such judgment takes place, it is not a uniting of things in thought; it is the assertion that things do—or do not—exist in the combination conceived of. Such is the ordinary perceptive, or cognitive, judgment; and other forms of judgment—the hypothetical and the problematic—are to be explained in a similar way. The essence of all judgment is not synthesis, but assertion.

Another important teaching of Perceptionalism relates specially to inferential judgment, and may be stated as follows: The fundamental principle of inference and reasoning is that of Antecedent and Consequent; and the metaphysical basis of this principle is the Law of Conditions.

By a condition we mean a necessary condition—a *sine qua non*—that without which a thing cannot exist, and which, therefore, is logically necessary if the thing conditioned exist.

Necessary relations—and therefore, also, conditions—belong to the very nature of things, and consequently pervade the constitution of the universe. Conditions are either causal, constitutive, or concomitant. All things within the universe exist both as conditioning and as conditioned. But space, time, and God, which are conditions of the universe, are free from causal conditions.

When any condition of a thing is known to exist, we say that the thing is possible so far as that condition is concerned;

and we call that condition, or whatever may contain it, an antecedent of possibility. Thus if a man be rich, or in any way a man of property, he may own real estate, or personal property, or both.

Necessary conditions, though not necessitative, may be said to have a necessitative force; for logical necessitants are constituted from them. Thus, a coat would certainly be made if there were not only cloth, buttons, thread and other materials, but also a tailor and his implements and proper opportunity and inducement. A logical necessitant, or whatever contains it, is an antecedent of necessity. For example, if a mineral specimen be metallic, of a certain specific gravity, of a certain color, and have certain chemical qualities, we conclude that it is gold.

It matters not, for the purposes of inference, whether a necessity be absolute or relative—whether it belong to the nature of things or to some instituted arrangement. But demonstration from relative necessity presupposes that no adequate power interferes to prevent the sequence; under which state of things the relative becomes the absolute.

Necessity, widely conceived, is of two modes; the necessity to be and the necessity not to be. Each presents a fact unalterably connected with an antecedent fact. But negative necessity is commonly distinguished as impossibility. So also impossibility, widely conceived, is either impossibility to be or impossibility not to be, the latter of these being commonly called necessity.

Probability arises when an antecedent of possibility is certain to be completed into an antecedent of necessity in one or other of a plurality of ways, no one of which can be expected more than another, and when a given proportion of the possible alternative consequents have a common character. The consequent of probability is conceived of and asserted as having that character,

Contingency, as distinguished from possibility, is an indeterminate probability, the ratio of the chances not being settled. Both contingency and probability arise from a combination of necessity with possibility; for there is a general necessary consequent which must be realized in some one of a number of possible forms, called chances.

Let us note, also, that universal propositions respecting logical classes indicate laws of necessary sequence, while particular assertions set forth contingent sequence. Logical classes are creations of the mind, and have their chief use in the statement of laws of inference. Hence, the "quantity" of propositions should be explained as a secondary expression of necessity and contingency—or, as logicians say, of modality.

Our general survey of the doctrine of belief has brought before us a number of fundamental conceptions, each of which should be assigned its proper place in a theory of knowledge. These conceptions mostly present themselves in pairs, and may be expressed antithetically. For example, conviction is either actualistic or hypothetical, the former of these being pre-eminently belief and knowledge, and the latter a preparatory and ministerial kind of confidence. Then, actualistic conviction is either presentational or inferential; and inferential actualistic conviction is either apodeictic or problematic; the problematic being either in possibility or in probability.

Necessity and possibility are the primary bases of inference. Probability and contingency result from a combination of these two bases. Necessity and impossibility are radically of the same nature with each other. and may be regarded as two aspects of the same thing.

Hypothetical conviction is essentially inferential. It differs from actualistic inference in that the antecedent is supposed, and not presented as real; so that the consequent is only hypothetically asserted. The form and the sequence of thought are the same in hypothetical as in actualistic inference. Both modes of conviction alike relate to existence and non-existence; but, in the one, these are merely matters of conception; in the other, they are facts, or realities, or are believed to be such.

An hypothetical sequence becomes actualistic if the antecedent be asserted as real; this takes place in "hypothetical" and "disjunctive" syllogisms, which, therefore, are actualistic in their total operation.

Hypothetical assertion may be either individual or general, according to the character of its antecedent, or subject. All general principles are hypothetical sequences; and they are either nec-

essary or contingent. They are expressed, in categorical assertion, either with the "must" and "may" of the "modal" proposition, or by the "all" and the "some" of the "pure" proposition. "Quantity," universal and particular, is only an expression of modality.

This exposition of the forms of thought employed in judgment seems plain enough. But clearly, if these forms have been rightly presented, they are not so many co-ordinate, independent, and ultimate modes of conception, but the various and variously related factors of a system. They do not lie side by side like the panels of a door or the panes of a window; they resemble rather the unequal branches of a genealogical tree, or the parts of a complicated machine.

Therefore, also, we say that Kant's twelve "categories" cannot be accepted as a tabulation of the ultimate forms of judgment. Had they been proposed as a primary and tentative enumeration of assertive modes of thought, with a view to the commencement of scientific analysis, they might not have been altogether worthless. But as the result of "an analysis of the elements of human reason," that table of categories in four sets of three each is an egregious blunder. It is not only founded on the false theory that judgment is the faculty which gives unity to our ideas by bringing them together under certain general forms of conception, but it miserably fails to classify judgments according to their true differences. Mistaking the superficial for the fundamental, it is defective and misleading in the extreme, and is the beginning of an endless and hopeless confusion.

Yet again, Perceptionalism teaches that general ideas are the product of generalization, and general principles of principiation, and that there is no exception to this rule. Principiation is the generalization of sequences, and it involves more than the generalization of ideas, for it pertains only to illative propositions and is accompanied by an hypothetical belief.

The law according to which principiation takes place is that which justifies "reasoning from example," and may be called the homologic principle. It is that the same (that is, an exactly similar) consequent may be inferred upon the repetition of an antecedent already known to have that consequent. This pre-

supposes that the human mind can perceive, in individual cases, the relation between antecedent and consequent, and also what elements are essential to the antecedent.

Induction, or the generalization of "the laws of nature," is one species of principiation: the formulation of ontological principles is another. Metaphysical and mathematical axioms are generalizations from the perception of absolute necessities in individual cases; and these axioms are called self-evident because they are conceived and asserted with little consciousness of any mental process.

The doctrine that all things which exist are individuals, and that general objects and truths are forms of thought constructed from individual perceptions, was more definitely advocated by Locke than by preceding philosophers; but it has always commended itself to sober-minded thinkers. According to this view Reason is not the birthplace of general notions and principles, but rather the workshop where they are manufactured and stored. It is an endowment of mental strength manifested, first, in the clear penetrative apprehension of individual facts and relations, and then in the analysis, generalization and logical development of the knowledge thus obtained. This conception of the Rational Faculty may be humbler than that of the *Νοῦς* of Plato, or the "Pure Reason" of modern Idealism; yet, if it be the true conception, it is noble enough for us, and to be preferred to even the most venerable philosophical myth.

These views of Reason and its objects consist with that distinction which many make between *φαινόμενα* and *νοῦμενα*, provided the former be taken to signify all observable actualities (including substances, powers, spaces, times, and relations), and the latter to signify all the objects of rational cognition or conception. For then *νοῦμενα*, when they are individual, are simply *φαινόμενα* rationally and clearly understood; and, when they are general, they are merely abstract conceptions derived from the perception of the *φαινόμενα*. But, if by *φαινόμενα* be meant only things which can affect the senses, and the implication be that no other are immediately perceived, and if by *νοῦμενα* be meant the objects of rational conception, and the implication be that these are things of a different description

from objects immediately perceived, then we discard both *νοῦμενα* and *φαινόμενα* as metaphysical fictions and the embodiments of error.

Finally, we claim that Perceptionalism is the basis of a reliable ontology. In other words, it introduces satisfactory theories concerning "the nature of things"—concerning the constitution of the Universe—and concerning God. This success is the result both of the positive, and of the negative, doctrines of this system. Those who find the beginnings of knowledge in immediate presentational cognition build on a firm foundation; and when, in addition to this, they ignore all *a priori* assumptions of every kind, they may be confident that patient investigation will enable them to distinguish truth from falsehood.

Some ontological principles, obtained from our immediate perceptions, have been already mentioned, as, for example, that individuality is the necessary property of everything that exists, generality being ascribable only to certain thought-objects which have no existence. We have seen also that all things are subject to "conditions," so that the Universe is permeated with a network of necessary relations. And we have found that the Law of Conditions is the philosophical basis of possibility and impossibility, of necessity, contingency and probability.

We now add that Perceptionalism necessarily obtains the categories, or supreme genera, of Being from the analysis of our immediate individual cognitions, these being the origin and ground of all human knowledge; and it proposes the following eight Categories, namely, Space and Time, Substance and Power, Action and Change, Quantity and Relation. All these, together with their negations, are perceived in connection with one's own spirit and one's own body; and nothing can be conceived of that is not either one of these or a combination of more than one; nor can anything exist except according to the nature and laws of these eight forms of entity.

Moreover, as these kinds of entity differ from one another, we cannot say that, because each is an entity, therefore there is only one mode of entity, or only one entity. In like manner those who perceive two forms of substance—the spiritual and the material—and many separate individuals of each form, can-

not allow either that there is only one substance or that there is only one kind of substance. When we think, in the general, either of entity or of substance, we think one thought; but the oneness of that thought does not prove that there is only one entity, or only one substance. Yet, ever since the dawn of philosophy, this fallacy has had a wonderful attraction for metaphysical speculators. It has given many the fundamental doctrine of a religious creed, as well as the central teaching of their philosophy. For the old Eleatic identification of the One, the Ex tent, and the All (τὸ ἕν, τὸ ὄν, καὶ τὸ πᾶν), and the demand of modern Pantheists that "the antithesis between the unity and the multiplicity of Being must be reconciled," both rest on the paralogism that Entity is one because the thought of Entity is one.

Perceptionalism, escaping such delusions, recognizes a boundless variety of entities, and at the same time asserts the existence of one all-pervading and eternal Spirit. It finds the Universe arranged and governed by an intellect not its own, and ascribes that intellect to a self-conscious Being.

We have now named a philosophy, and illustrated its doctrines. Our aim in this has been, in the main, expository. But the inculcation of truth is the refutation of error; and the only refutation that can be full and final. Therefore we oppose the principles of Perceptionalism to those of the Sensationalism, the Materialism, the Idealism, and the Pantheism, of our age. For no one grounded in the right doctrine can allow that cognition is merely refined sensation, or that spirit is a development of matter, or that thought can be identified with its objects, or that there is only one substance. We believe that the inadequacy of these views will become more and more apparent as the analyses of Perceptionalism shall be more thoroughly considered. We even venture the hope that certain philosophers, who occasionally suggest that their theories would be accepted universally if only ordinary mortals had the ability to understand them, may be aided, by the teachings of Perceptionalism, to a clearer comprehension of the truth.

THE INFLUENCE OF THE BIBLE ON MODERN JURISPRUDENCE.

[Read before the Institute, August 13th, 1891.]

By Hon. William H. Arnoux, of New York.

IT has been wisely, as well as poetically, said, "The undevout astronomer is mad," for

> The heavens declare the glory of God
> And the firmament showeth His handy work,

and he who can consider those glorious orbs, "on golden pinions burning," and ascribe them to chance or deny their Divine Author, must indeed be bereft of reason.

Still more emphatically can the same sentiment be applied to the legal profession. The unbelieving lawyer is a legal monstrosity. If the contemplation of material things, however magnificent, can lift the soul to God, how much more shall the intellectual things of the Bible convince a logical mind that it proceeds from God. To deny inspiration to Moses is to make him a god. Consider him briefly, historically, as a great lawgiver. He was the son of a bond woman, adopted by the daughter of the mightiest sovereign then reigning in the whole world, and probably the heir-apparent of that throne, educated in all the wisdom of the Egyptians, including all their gorgeous ecclesiastical ritual, imbued thereby with monarchical and idolatrous principles, his wife a princess, and yet he voluntarily forsook and abdicated all the pleasures and emoluments of his position to become the leader of a horde of slaves, whom he brought forth from captivity, to whom he gave their laws, and after forty years' discipline developed into a nation. Where can history afford a parallel? He endured their murmurings, destroyed their idols, quelled their rebellions, organized their army, instituted their priesthood, prepared their laws, both ecclesiastical and civil, administered justice, wrote their history. He was statesman, general, ruler, prophet, poet, historian. Greatest of all, he was the lawgiver. He prepared, in ten brief sections, the

moral code, which includes man's duty to God and to humanity, so brief that it can be legibly written on the palm of one hand, so complete that it has never been amended, so lasting that it has endured four thousand years and has outlived all the codes and kingdoms then in existence. Monuments have crumbled into dust, dynasties have perished from the recollection of men, while this indestructible code has been a living, vital force in every age. We are filled with admiration for, and proudly boast of, our incomparable Constitution, which many reverently deem an inspired document, but, notwithstanding all the light of history and experience our forefathers had in its preparation, in one century it has required seventeen amendments. Our codes of practice, conceived with consummate skill, require yearly tinkering. And yet the atheist believes that this man, toiling in the Arabian desert, harassed by multitudinous cares, removed from all intercourse with the learned, or men of affairs, was able out of his own inner, unaided consciousness to evolve this absolutely perfect code! They create a greater miracle than they deny. Moses, himself, was indeed a man of extraordinary intellectual capacity, free from all fanaticism and characterized by that mental balance that we designate level-headed, and he was also a man of undoubted truthfulness. He declared that he received that code from God. He had no purpose to serve as Mahomet had to ingratiate himself with his people by claiming to be the servant of God. He was then their leader and there was none other. By this declaration he abased rather than exalted himself. If he had been its author, ambition, that last infirmity of noble minds, would have impelled him to claim such authorship, and to reap the glory. Thus his testimony, humanly speaking, was against interest and is entitled to the highest credit. So we repeat, to the lawyer, the perfectness, the unchangeableness, the vitality of this code demonstrates more convincingly than the heavenly host, that it was the work of God.

But not to the lawyer alone is this demonstration absolutely convincing. Everyone who investigates and reflects must reach the same conclusion. The inculcation of monotheism, and the abolition of idolatry brought a new religion in the world. The hebdomidal day of rest has, as a civic measure, just begun to be

appreciated. But, without dwelling upon those provisions that most impress themselves upon Christian minds, reflect upon the last five commands and see how completely they indicate all that is needed in human affairs. First, the outward life is regulated, and the provisions proceed in order of importance; the sanctity of human life, the preservation of the family and personal virtue, the rights of property, the value of reputation. Secondly, the governing motive. It is not sufficient to regard these commands outwardly; we must set our hearts to obey these commands. The hand and the heart must be actuated by the same impulse.

Upon this foundation Moses builded the laws for the Jewish community. He decreed that all should be equal before the law and, as Dean Milman says, he "annihilated at once the artificial and tyrannical distinction of caste and established political equality as one of the fundamental principles of the State." This great lawgiver prepared three distinct codes of law:

Political,
Ecclesiastical,
Juristical.

Church and State were necessarily combined, for Jehovah was the ultimate sovereign of His people, and all the codes were closely intertwined.

How enlightened the civil and criminal law of Moses was we only comprehend as we advance in the science of jurisprudence. Wherein we depart from it, we are inferior, and as we ameliorate the barbarity of the common law, we approach nearer and nearer to the Mosaic law. This is the model, the ideal, which is influencing and shaping our laws, rough hew them as we may, and in some of our theories, ill-considered, and as yet impracticable, we are blindly groping toward the light that Moses set before us.

In the most compact form of expression possible, in four short monosyllables, "Thou shalt not kill," God, in the Ten Commandments, forbade murder. At that time warfare was the chronic condition of mankind, and "woe to the vanquished" was the universal cry. It was death or slavery, and slavery then gave absolute right of life, limb, and liberty. Human life was

awfully cheap. Out of the flames of Sinai thundered that Voice, declaring with the simplicity and the severity of an axiom, the sacredness of that life which God had bestowed upon man. How should its infraction be punished? "Whoso sheddeth man's blood by man shall his blood be shed." But even the State could not take human life without sufficient cause. It must set the example of obedience to that command. Treason, crimes against parents, and murder alone, could be punished with death. The slaying of a robber in the night time was justifiable homocide, and killing in self-defence was permissible.

Contrast this noble simplicity, this high estimate of life, with the abominable condition of the law of England in the beginning of this century. Then, forty-four distinct crimes were punishable with death. In the scales of English justice, the life of a sheep outweighed the life of a man! Property was more highly valued than that divine spark that God had created! Incredible as it may appear it was not worth a farthing! Sir William Meredith, in a speech delivered in the House of Commons, near the close of the last century, narrated the following fact:

"There lies at this moment at Newgate, under sentence to be burned alive, a girl just turned of fourteen. At her master's bidding she hid some whitewashed farthings behind her stays, on which the jury found her guilty, as an accomplice with her master in the treason. The master was hanged last Wednesday; and the faggots all lay ready—no reprieve came till just as the court was setting out—and the girl would have been burned alive on the same day, had it not been for the humane but casual interference of Lord Weymouth. Good God! Sir, we are taught to execrate the fires of Smithfield and we are lighting them now to burn a poor harmless child for hiding a whitewashed farthing! And yet this barbarous sentence, which ought to make men shudder at the thought of shedding blood for such trivial causes, is brought as a reason for more hanging and burning. It was recommended to me, not many days ago, to bring in a bill to make it treason to coin copper as well as gold and silver. Yet, in the formation of these sanguinary laws, humanity, religion and policy are thrown out of the question."

Nor was this an isolated case. A clergyman was executed

for forgery. Others for smuggling. And a young mother was hanged for an attempt to steal, impelled by want. There were circumstances of such incredible atrocity attending this execution that an irresponsible statement might well be treated as possibly fictitious and probably exaggerated. In the course of the same speech the statement is made from which we quote again :

"Under this act, one Mary Jones was executed, whose case I shall just mention. It was at a time when press warrants were issued on the alarm about Falkland Islands. The woman's husband was pressed, their goods seized for some debt of his, and she, with two small children, turned into the streets a-begging. It is a circumstance not to be forgotten that she was very young (under nineteen), and most remarkably handsome. She went into a linen-draper's shop, took some coarse linen off the counter, and slipped it under her cloak. The shopman saw her and she laid it down. *For this she was hanged.* Her defence was (I have the trial in my pocket), ' that she had lived in credit and wanted for nothing till the press gang came and stole her husband from her, but since then she had no bed to lie on, nothing to give her children to eat, and they were almost naked, and perhaps she might have done something wrong, for she hardly knew what she did.' The parish officers testified to the truth of this story, but it seems there had been a good deal of shop-lifting about Ludgate, and this woman was hanged for the comfort and satisfaction of the shop-keepers in Ludgate Street. When brought to receive sentence, she behaved in such a frantic manner as proved her mind to be in a frantic and despondent state, and the child was sucking at her breast when she set out for Tyburn."

If such barbarities had been committed by Hottentots or Sioux, instead of Christian England, humanity would have been disgraced and degraded. The State could steal her husband with impunity ; when she followed its example and attempted to take a few rags to cover her children's nakedness, she was hanged. What a depth of pathos there was in her defence. God be thanked that if such a law existed to-day it could not be enforced in such a case. These instances have been selected because individual suffering impresses itself more deeply on the

mind than statistical information of the thousands who were the victims of judicial murder could. For these were murders unquestionably, as violating the law of God; committed, it is true, by the State, which no earthly power could punish, but this consideration does not diminish the crime.

Happily the day when such tragedies could be enacted in England is past never to return. The magnificent progress of that country in criminal jurisprudence is measured by its regard for human life and by its approximation to the Mosaic law. In thirty-four years succeeding 1810, the death penalty was repealed, as the punishment of thirty-four crimes, so that in 1844 only ten crimes remained upon the statute book, punishable with death.

Not alone in the punishment of murder did the Mosaic law ennoble the dignity of human life; the same tender regard was shown for the accused in the constitution of the court by which he was tried. We all have a superficial knowledge of the Jewish Sanhedrim in the Gospel narratives of the trial of our Lord, but that does not do justice to the subject. There, an implacable hatred on the part of the rulers toward their divine prisoner made His conviction a foregone conclusion, and yet all the forms of law were outwardly observed.

In the Jewish state there were two general courts that had jurisdiction in capital cases, and they were greatly revered by the Jews. There was the local Sanhedrim in the provinces and in Jerusalem, and the great Sanhedrim which was limited to Jerusalem, and which latter had both original and appellate jurisdiction. Every citizen was eligible to membership, but to be an actual member was an honor highly prized; and it secured the ablest men of the land. Many precautions were adopted to make the service honorable and to maintain its dignity and to preserve its purity. To this end, gamblers, slave-traders, usurers, dealers in the fruits of the seventh year, and persons without fixed occupations were ineligible. If our jurors were selected on these lines, how much greater would the confidence of the community be in the justice of their verdicts. In all cases no person within certain prescribed degrees of consanguinity with the prisoner and no person interested in the result could sit in the trial.

and in capital cases the following were also excluded: old men, because years and infirmities might warp their judgment; men who never had had any children, because a childless condition was a disgrace, and such men had no proper appreciation of the welfare and needs of the commonwealth; and those who had ever exhibited any animosity towards the accused.

Thus, every man of disreputable character was excluded in every case, civil or criminal, and every man who had special disqualification was excluded in every criminal case.

The procedure was also carefully guarded. Great pains were taken to prevent any perjury or bias on the part of the witnesses. Before they could testify they were taken aside by the judges, cautioned against giving any hearsay testimony, instructed in regard to the solemnity of their oath, impressed with the gravity of their responsibility in testifying against the accused, reminded that if an error was committed by which the prisoner suffered it was irreparable, and finally informed that perjury would subject them to the same death that should be inflicted upon the accused if found guilty. Compare this with the heartless and mechanical utterance of the oath so often heard in our courts, with its clipped "S'elp yo' Gawd," and we may realize that there is much to learn from their example of that reverence which solemnizes the mind of the witness and induces him to speak the truth. Furthermore, no one could be condemned except on the testimony of two witnesses to the same transaction unless he confessed in open court, and, as an additional incentive to mercy and prevention of perjury, the first witness was compelled to be the executioner and the second his assistant in case the accused was found guilty.

Equally important was the attitude and action of the court itself. It was composed of twenty-three members, three of whom were judges, and its sessions were held at the gate of the city in the presence of all the people. Each judge, at the conclusion of the trial, as he gave his vote, was required to state his reasons therefor. A bare majority, in favor of the accused, secured his immediate acquittal. It required a majority of two for a conviction. If such a majority was secured, the court adjourned to the next day for reflection and deliberation, and in

the meantime all its members were compelled to fast. When they re-assembled a new vote was taken, when those, who on the previous day had voted for conviction, might change their vote, but those who had voted for acquittal could not change. Their action was irrevocable. If such changes took place that the number for conviction was reduced to less than two majority, the prisoner was freed and the court was dissolved. If, however, the requisite number still voted to convict, then the prisoner was sentenced to be put to death at sunset and the court remained in session until the hour of execution, until which time any member voting for conviction might change his vote, and in such case the prisoner was remanded for a further hearing.

The Jewish rabbis have a proverb that "the world stands on three pillars—law, worship, and charity"; on these their criminal procedure stood, and with them the quality of mercy was not strained. How solemn, and even august, must these trials have appeared to the Sanhedrim itself and to the surrounding multitude, and how greatly must they have impressed upon all the sanctity of human life. It was to a people so reverently taught that Christ addressed the question, "Is not the body more than meat, and the life more than raiment?" And they were fitted to receive and acknowledge that momentous truth explaining and underlying the sacredness of life—"What shall a man give in exchange for his soul? What shall it profit a man if he should gain the whole world and lose his own soul?"

We are just beginning to discern, dimly as yet, the eternal truth that human life is a sacred thing of such inestimable value that it is comparable to nothing else, and that that is so because into it God breathed a living, an immortal soul. With this recognition our progress is bringing us nearer to the standards of the Bible.

Passing over all other crimes against the person which are so interesting and instructive that it is to be hoped that the foregoing may induce some to investigate the provisions relating thereto for themselves, we desire to occupy a few moments with some reference to the rights of property.

The most crying evil of our social organization is the great disparity that exists in wealth. The accumulation of gigantic

fortunes necessitates the impoverishment of the many. As the rich grow richer the poor grow poorer. This is not, as is generally supposed, a modern evil. The salt tax and the window tax of bygone centuries show the misery of the poor when dark and unventilated hovels with insufficient and unseasoned food made the life of the laborer a burden for the benefit of idle and dissolute masters. But the masses are becoming more intelligent and demand a larger share of the general prosperity. Anarchism, nihilism, communism are the unreasoning and unreasonable protest against the present order of things. And modern statesmen are unable to grapple with the problem. Moses alone provided a scientific and sufficient method to insure the general financial equality of all his people. The promised land, which was to be the permanent home of the children of Israel, he divided into provinces for the separate tribes, and these were subdivided among the families with this wonderful provision, that no individual or tribal owner could alienate his landed possessions for a term exceeding fifty years, or until the year of jubilee. Then there was to be a new distribution, and all were to start on an equality anew. As the land constituted the bulk of the wealth, personal property being, compared with modern times, almost insignificant, except in flocks and herds, this semicentennial distribution restored the people to their original inheritance, a true communism. May not some such scheme be the outcome of the present agitation for liberty, equality, and fraternity? The prohibition against removing the ancient landmarks becomes intelligible when this jubilee return is remembered. No question could arise on the surrender of the property as to its proper limits if these had been properly preserved. To ensure this preservation such removal was a crime. If we had adopted in the beginning of the settlement of this country a similar system it might have been thus arranged. The nation could have transferred the title of its property to the state, and by it the ownership have been conferred upon the county, which, instead of granting the fee-simple, might have leased the real property for a long term of years with the reversion of the leasehold with all its improvements at the end of the term, like the Sailors' Snug Harbor leases and the leases of Columbia College

and Trinity Church in the city of New York. This plan has been pursued in relation to its dock property by New York; and in one of the cities of England as to all its corporate property with such success that at no distant time the municipality will be self-sustaining. This might have been the case in New York. The Dougan charter vested the title to the common lands in the Mayor and Aldermen. These lands embraced a large portion of the city in area, and a still larger portion in value, but this magnificent patrimony has been wasted for a mess of pottage. If it had been retained with the spirit that governed Trinity Church, its value to-day would have far exceeded the city debt. While it cannot be said that the jubilee system is the pattern of such ownership, it in spirit reaches to the same result, for the whole community are benefited by the enhanced value that commerce, manufactures, and the increase of wealth and population gives to the property. In such a community, anarchy would have no place.

The Jews had laws against fraud, forgery, usury, false weights and measures, and other crimes and evils, many of which have been enacted in our statutes. While many of these enactments deserve special mention, one is so pre-eminent for its enlightened superiority over all modern treatment of the same subject that it cannot be passed over.

In cases of simple theft, as in other crimes, the wrong done to the individual is swallowed up in the injury to society. Punishment is the end of our law and prevention through punishment its object. If the thief is arrested with the stolen article in his possession it is restored to the owner; but if it cannot be found, the State offers no redress. The thief may be rich, the victim poor, but to his sufferings the State is practically indifferent. He may use the courts as any other suitor at his own expense and risk without any special aid or consideration. Under such circumstances, the natural instinct is to obtain redress in the simplest manner possible. Few are patriotic enough to accept their loss voluntarily for the sake of society or the public welfare. So the law steps in again and makes the compounding of a felony a crime. As if it were a hungry monster which baulked of its prey in one direction seeks it in another. The

reason, of course, is obvious. Cupidity or necessity causes theft. The same passions must be repressed in both the thief and the loser, or else the deterrent power of punishment will cease to influence the dishonest.

Opposed to this fundamental principle of punishment is the biblical principle of reparation. You remember the beautiful parable of the one ewe lamb that Nathan related to David, and how the indignant monarch, touched with the pathetic story, decreed that the felon should make five-fold reparation. Under this law, there was no need of enacting that felonies should not be compounded. Under this law, no such spectacle could be afforded as is possible with us, where the thief goes scot free, and the man who has lost his property is imprisoned. He loses property, liberty and reputation. As fire can be made to fight fire, this biblical law makes cupidity fight cupidity. The owner prosecutes because he may be a gainer by his loss. The thief is restrained by the deterrent power of reparation. In case he was unable to make restitution, the thief might be sold into a modified form of slavery for a term not exceeding seven years, and his master was compelled to provide him with food and raiment. The price paid went to the loser. We incarcerate the thief and thus deprive him of his liberty, which is a modified form of slavery, and we make him work, as his Jewish master did, but we are not just. However large his earnings may be, the State pockets them and leaves the loser in the lurch. Restitution is the law of love; punishment is the gospel of hate.

As the great millennial day draws near, when the fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man shall be universally recognized and practically enforced, love will be the controlling power on earth as it is in Heaven.

REMARKS ON "THE MISTAKES OF MOSES."

[Delivered before the American Institute of Christian Philosophy, August 22, 1886.*]

By Rev. H. L. Hastings, Editor of "The Christian," Boston.

SOME skeptics have much to say about "the mistakes of Moses." Let us refer to a few facts which they in their researches seem to have overlooked.

Moses, after he was eighty years of age, emancipated and organized a captive nation, leading an army of six hundred thousand men for forty years through the wilderness of Sinai to the borders of their inheritance, giving them a law so full of these so-called "mistakes" that this one nation, which has partly observed it, has existed for more than thirty-three centuries in a warring and tumultuous world, outliving all the empires, nations, and tongues which then existed on the face of the earth, witnessing the downfall of Egypt, Assyria, Babylon, Persia, Greece, and Rome; and though scattered for ages, because of their sins, among all nations, from one end of the earth to the other, finding neither ease nor rest, but having a trembling heart, and fainting of eyes, and sorrow of mind, and fearing day and night, having none assurance of life (Deut. xxviii.), yet this nation still exists, as numerous, perhaps, as in its palmiest days; and though without a country, a city, a government, a priesthood, or a temple, it yet wields on earth an influence greater than that exercised by all the empires and nations of antiquity, combined. Is such a result due to Moses' "mistakes"?

The investigators of "the mistakes of Moses" might well consider the system of sanitary science embodied in Moses' law, so unlike anything which the world had ever seen, and which

* It is not necessary to explain the reasons which have delayed the publication of this paper in Christian Thought. It may be procured from the author, 47 Cornhill, Boston.

the civilization of the nineteenth century is still too ignorant to appreciate, though observers begin to note its results as indicated in the superior

HEALTH AND LONGEVITY OF THE JEWISH NATION.

If we take a thousand Jews and a thousand Gentiles, as a basis of computation, we may divide them into four parts; one-fourth of them comprehending those who die in early years; one-half, those who attain to middle life; and one-fourth, those who reach advanced age. But among the Gentiles, the first two hundred and fifty that die, will reach an average age of six years and eleven months; while among the Jews, the first quarter will die at an average age of twenty-eight years and three months. Among the Gentiles the one-half who attain to middle age, will die at an average age of twenty-six years and six months; among the Jews the same portion will reach an average age of fifty-three years and one month. Among the Gentiles, the last quarter, who live longest, will die at an average age of fifty-nine years and ten months; while the same class among the Jews will live to an average age of seventy-one years.

Further, not only is the death rate less among "the scattered nation," but the birth rate is greater. Dr. Pressel states that, in his district, the number of Jewish births reached an annual average of fifty-five per thousand, while the Gentile births were only thirty-eight per thousand; and the ecclesiastical registers of Prussia also show, that among one hundred thousand Gentile births one hundred and forty-three children were still-born, while among an equal number of Jews the still-born were only eighty-nine.

Carefully prepared statistics show that the infant mortality is nearly twice as great among Gentiles as among the Jews; and that while among the adult Gentiles the period of the greatest frequency of deaths comes between the ages of twenty and twenty-four, during which time, 6.2 per cent., or sixty-two out of every thousand, die; among adult Jews the period of the greatest mortality occurs between the ages of seventy and seventy-four; during which time 11.4 per cent., or one hundred and fourteen out of every thousand, die. The next largest death rate among

the Gentiles, falls between the years of xty-five and sixty-n ine, when, out of the little remnant of the original thousand taken as a basis of computation, sixty persons, or six per cent., die ; while from the much larger body of Jews yet remaining, an average of seventy-two die during the corresponding period. The previous period, between the years of sixty and sixty-four, shows a still more marked contrast, for while the deaths among the Gentiles are only fifty-four out of the original thousand, the mortality among the Jews is ninety-five. Thus it appears that of the Gentiles, far more die in early life, while of the Jews, far more die in old age.

According to the statistics of Frankfort, Germany, the death rate of infants under four years old, is, among the Gentiles 241 per thousand, among the Jews 129 per thousand. Passing to the other extreme of life we find that between the ages of sixty and seventy-nine, of the original thousand Gentiles two hundred and eleven died ; while during the same period, of the original thousand Jews, three hundred and seventy-two deaths occur. Hence it appears that while the number of premature deaths among the Gentiles, is vastly larger than among the Jews, the number of those who die at "a good old age" is much greater among the Jews than it is among the Gentiles.

These computations are borne out by the ecclesiastical registers of Prussia, between the years 1823 and 1841. From these it appears that there died on an average, annually, one in thirty-four Gentiles, and only one in forty-six Jews. Of the childre born among the Gentiles, forty-four and a half per cent. reached the age of fourteen, but among the Jews fifty per cent. reached that age. Among the Gentiles only twelve per cent. reached the age of seventy, while among the Jews twenty per cent. reached that age. These conclusions are carefully drawn from reliable statistics, and accord with the statements of Dr. Pressel, and show that the learned French physician, Dr. M. Levy, is abundantly justified in concluding that while the average term of life among the Gentiles is twenty-six years, among the Jews it is thirty-seven.

Hence, while the beer-drinking, whiskey-loving, pork-eating Gentile dies, on an average, at the age of twenty-six, the Jew,

giving heed to the teachings of Moses, adds nearly one-half to the length of his days, having an average of eleven years longer to enjoy life, attend to business, and acquire property. Is it any wonder that, as a rule, Jews excel the Gentiles in whatever they undertake ?

Dr. Gibbon, a health officer of London, reports that the life of the Jew in London is, on an average, twice as long as the life of the Gentile. The medical officer of one of their large schools has remarked that Jewish children do not die in anything like the same ratio as the children of the Gentiles. In the district of Whitechapel, the medical officer in his report states that on the north side of High Street, which is occupied by Jews, the average death rate is twenty-seven per thousand ; while on the south side, occupied by English and Irish, the average death rate is forty-three per thousand.

In drawing our conclusions from the statistics of Jewish and Gentile longevity, certain facts should be kept in mind. First, among the Gentiles are included all true Christians, who as a rule live much longer than the people around them ; showing that the influence of the Christian religion is decidedly promotive of longevity. In the case of the Jews, multitudes of whom are far gone in apostasy from God, and void of spiritual life, the external and ceremonial rites of the law have special influence. In the case of Christians, the life-promoting influences are more specially spiritual and internal. Hence to form a true estimate of the influence of divine revelation upon human life, we should combine with the Jewish statistics, the statistics of all communities and individuals distinctively and really Christian, and we should thus still further depress the Gentile average of life, and show that the law of Moses and the Gospel of Christ are both favorable to longevity.

We may take, for example, the statistics of the Society of Friends. While the average length of human life in all countries is about twenty-eight years, and one-fourth of all who die do not reach the age of seven, one-half dying before they reach the age of seventeen, yet the average life of the Friends living in Great Britain, in 1860, was fifty-nine years. A few years since, the dram-sellers of Great Britain, indignant at their failure to

obtain life-insurance at ordinary rates, organized a company of their own, and insured themselves; but such was the enormous death rate among their membership, that the concern was soon forced into bankruptcy. On the other hand, in the Society of Friends, who, in the simplicity of their ordinary life, may be supposed to conform more closely to Christian precepts than most religious bodies, insurance companies exist whose tables show that the average life-time, or "expectation of life" at birth, is, in the case of a male Friend, 45.34 years, the mean amount of the general public being 40.86 years. In the case of females, the difference was less, that of the Friends being 45.72 and that of the general public, 42.16. But the average age of Friends proves to be higher than this, it having varied in recent years from slightly over fifty-one years to fifty-eight years. A summary and analysis of the ages of deceased members, extending for more than thirty years, show that out of 940 deaths there were 163 persons under the age of thirty at death; 224 deaths between the ages of thirty and sixty; 517 who died between the ages of sixty and ninety; and thirty-nine who died at the age of ninety or above, five being reputed centenarians.

Such facts seem to indicate that however the racial energy of the Israelites tends to prolong life, results equally marked can be reached in people of other lineage, by observance of the principles contained in the Gospel, through successive generations.

In the case of the Friends, it may be said that thrift and sobriety have resulted in a state of temporal prosperity, which is favorable to longevity; and this is admitted, for obedience to God tends to temporal prosperity; but no such considerations affect the question of Jewish longevity, for they have labored under great temporal disabilities and disadvantages, and in this respect have been less favorably situated than their Gentile neighbors.

Righteousness tendeth to life. It is the "hoary head" which "is a crown of glory if it be found in the way of righteousness." The scenes of revelry, profanity, and vice are thronged by the young. There are very few "old fogies" there; there are very few there who ever will be old. Look over an old and long-

established church, and see how many gray-headed and aged men and women are scattered through it. Then look over a crowd of skeptics and blasphemers, and see how many faces bear the marks of youth, or of that premature old age produced by vice and sin. Not every infidel dies young, for there are many who inherit the constitutional vigor and the Christian training of parents who feared God. But as a rule, men who reject divine restraint, never see old age; they go down to the grave in their brown hair. Skeptics may mock at the Scripture which declares that the "wicked shall not live out half their days," that they are "like the chaff which the wind driveth away"; but the pitiless death rate which shows that the average term of life among Gentiles is only twenty-six years, tells a story which may well cause candid people to pause and ponder their ways. And the fact that the Jews, with their partial obedience to divine law, extend the period of human life one-third, while a still higher average is reached by people who seek to live in obedience to the precepts of the Gospel, should convince candid men that "the fear of the Lord tendeth to life," and that He who made man, also made that Book which teaches him how to live, and which by its teachings, promotes both health and prosperity wherever it is observed.

The Jew was commanded to abstain from swine's flesh, and was strong, pure-blooded, and healthful. The Gentile eats it, and finds himself saturated with humors, infested with tapeworms, and permeated with myriads of wriggling trichinæ, which perforate his flesh and destroy his life.

The Jew was forbidden to mar even the corners of his beard, and as a race, consumption is unknown among them; while the Gentile, year after year, scrapes his face with a razor, removing the protection which God gave for his respiratory and vocal organs, and then, after years of feebleness and distress, dies of laryngitis, bronchitis, or pulmonary consumption.

The more we study the law of Moses, in its relation to health, and in its various provisions which long ago anticipated the sanitary science of our day—in its system of dietetics, in its convocations and feasts, in its purifications and its varied restrictions which touch the social life at every point—we shall be

amazed at the wisdom manifested in that ancient law, as exhibited in its safeguards against vice, disorder, and disease.

From its initiatory rite, the seal of the covenant, which was in itself a protection against self-abuse and disease, down to the close of life, the Jewish law sedulously guarded the physical health of the people; and even the laws concerning the dead exhibit the same divine wisdom. Modern times have afforded instances where persons in their misguided affection, have pressed the cold lips of the dead, and taken thence disease which has laid them in the grave; and it is well known that the slightest wound inflicted by a dissecting instrument almost inevitably produces death. Against such sad consequences, the Mosaic law most carefully guarded the Israelites. Contrary to the usages of the Eastern world, where the dead were sometimes embalmed and preserved, or where the living and the dead were consumed together in the flames, the Jews were taught that death was a curse, that its presence was defiling, that the living were to be carefully separated from the dead, and that any person who touched a dead body thereby became unclean, and was not allowed to touch any other person or thing until he had passed a period of separation, and had been thoroughly bathed. Modern science cannot fail to recognize the utility of such restrictions; and many precious lives might have been saved by paying attention to the sanitary instructions which are embodied in the Mosaic law.

THE WORLD'S FIRST REPUBLIC.

We are indebted to Moses, a native of Egypt, brought up amid the splendors of the court of the Pharaohs, and inheriting only traditions of tyranny on the part of the rulers, and slavery on the part of the ruled, for the world's first example of a "government of the people, by the people, and for the people." This first republic known to history, consisting of the Twelve United States of Israel, established and organized in the desert, on the basis of universal suffrage, the election of officers by the people, representation by elders, or aldermen, selected from the people, with inferior judges, and courts of last appeal, was finally planted in Canaan, the land being divided in fee-simple among all the

people, one-twelfth of whom were selected and appointed to care for the education and enlightenment of the nation; one-tenth of their increase and of the produce of the land being set apart for their support in their educational and religious work.

This federated nation, thus established, with an organic law, a written constitution, and a form of government wiser and more humane than any which the world had known; which guarded the rights of rich and poor, small and great, servants and masters, rulers and people, wives and husbands, captives and conquerors, protecting even the beasts of the field and the birds of the air, and providing for the proper tillage of the soil, and the preservation of trees, seeds, and fruits,—was the pattern upon which all stable popular governments have been based. And in its sedulous care for the moral and religious character of the people, who were brought under personal subjection to a holy God, whose presence was ever near them, and to a righteous law, in which they were to meditate day and night, and which they were commanded to diligently teach to their children, by the fireside and by the wayside, this law of Moses provided for that moral training, and developed that personal character, which, fitting men for liberty by the exercise of self-government, furnished the only alternative between tyranny and oppression on the one hand, and anarchy and misrule on the other.

The germs and types of all successful popular governments are found in the commonwealth of Israel, which exhibits, first a republic, and later a constitutional monarchy, the two most desirable forms of government known; just as the basis of all civilized common law is found in the commandments written on tables of stone, and in the book of law which God gave to Israel. Was the organization of such a government, based upon such law, another of "the mistakes of Moses"?

One of the peculiarities of the law of Moses was that provision which prohibited the priestly tribe from possessing real estate. They might have a house and garden, but no more. Vast possessions and broad acres were not for them. It is a curious fact that Moses' law, which is supposed to be at the bottom of all the priestcraft in creation, should contain this pro-

vision. Such a law never was concocted by priests. Priests, in the nature of things, have great influence over men; and when a priesthood becomes corrupt it exercises this influence for selfish ends. So, great hierarchies are continually accumulating wealth and lands. Indeed, allow them to work unchecked for a few generations, and they would possess a large share of the property of a nation; and in more than one instance revolutions and sweeping confiscations have been necessary to rescue the property of the people from the grasp of the priesthood. To-day, enormous amounts of wealth are in the hands of priests and ecclesiastics. They have not only the spiritual power which would naturally attach to them by virtue of their office, but also the power of enormous wealth, which, under the guise of religion, they have succeeded in accumulating. Vast buildings and immense estates, in various countries, belong to priestly orders; and these immense properties, protected by government and yet contributing nothing to defray its expenses, virtually impose a heavy tax upon the long-suffering people.

Under Moses' law no such abuses were practicable. Corrupt as the Jewish priesthood became, they never were, as a body, accused of acquiring vast wealth. The law which made them dependent for their subsistence upon tithes and offerings which were voluntarily brought, and which they had no legal means of collecting, in its operation precluded the possibility of ecclesiastics acquiring vast possessions, and caused them to depend for their influence and their support upon the virtue of their lives, and the generosity which they might be able to inspire in the hearts of those around them. Was this provision another of "the mistakes of Moses"?

One of the great occasions of complaint among the skeptics of to-day, is the vast accumulation of wealth in the hands of the few, the poor being meanwhile trodden down, oppressed, and impoverished. Modern civilization presents us with these evils:

First, men accumulate, inherit, and possess in perpetuity vast areas of land, for which they have no earthly use; while multitudes of poor men are landless and homeless, and never, until they are laid in the grave, have a foot of soil which they can call their own.

Secondly, men who possess wealth, by exacting interest or usury largely increase their possessions, the rich growing richer and the poor growing poorer, until one class are ruined through luxury and arrogant ungodliness, while the other class, through poverty and oppression, are ground in the very dust.

Neither of these evils could exist where the law of Moses was faithfully administered. The land of Israel was divided by lot among the twelve tribes, and this land was inalienable. "The land shall not be sold forever, for the land is Mine, saith the Lord." The Almighty claimed the land for His own. Every family had a portion of it sufficient for their own sustenance; the priestly tribes alone being excluded from this provision. Every child born in the land of Israel was born heir to land, and no unfortunate, improvident, or thriftless father could permanently alienate their inheritance. In case an Israelite waxed poor, he might temporarily dispose of his land, but no transfer which he effected could extend beyond the next year of jubilee, which might be ten or twenty or thirty years away, but which could not be more than fifty years distant. Consequently, no Israelite lived to be fifty years old without being the possessor of landed property.

This redistribution of lands under Jewish law, occurring in the jubilee year, furnished the only effective safeguard against the accumulation of wealth, and the absorption of land in great estates, which has become the bane and curse of modern civilization. Those reformers who cry out against the great accumulations of wealth, and clamor about the right of the landless multitudes to a portion of the soil from which to win their bread, act with strange inconsistency when they deride the law of Moses, which afforded the only practical and effective method of securing that result,—the taking of usury from among their brethren being expressly forbidden, and the accumulation of lands being prevented by their periodic redistribution. The very results which many of them profess to be seeking, were attained with perfect ease under the exercise of that law which they despise, and in obedience to the command of that God whom they blaspheme.

Another occasion of complaint is the accumulation of wealth by means of usury; the rich increasing their wealth without

labor, and the poor in their poverty being burdened to produce and provide for this increase. But under the law of Moses, Israelites were strictly commanded to lend to their brethren when they were in need, but they were to lend without usury. No Jew was allowed to refuse his needy brother assistance, but he was strictly prohibited from exacting interest on any loan made to one of his brethren. The man who was to abide in God's tabernacle, and dwell in his holy hill, was one who "putteth not out his money to usury, nor taketh reward against the innocent."

The whole law of Moses was opposed to vast accumulations, and the effect of it was to produce a diligent, thrifty, healthful, and contented people. It is true that the Israelites were allowed to exact usury from the Gentiles around them, but never from their brethren, the Jews. This prohibition of usury, coupled with the periodic re-distribution of lands, and the woe of God pronounced upon those who added house to house and field to field (Isa. v., 8), tended to preserve among the people of Israel a freedom, independence, industry, and self-reliance such as many who find fault with the law of Moses would be very glad to enjoy.

REST DAYS AND JUBILEES.

Divine ordinances are adapted to human needs. If winter lasted two years, the world would perish with hunger; protracted summer would cause enervation, drought, and disease. But at brief intervals God gives us summer and winter, seed-time and harvest, enabling us to live and prosper. So God ordained the weekly rest day; and man's physical, mental, and moral well-being largely depends upon his observing it. He who gives his mind no rest, brings up in the mad-house or in the grave. He who gives his body no repose, breaks down beneath the strain, and dies. And a man who habitually overworks, at last comes down with a typhoid fever, and that fever runs seven, fourteen, twenty-one or twenty-eight days, changing every seventh day, as do other diseases which result from physical exhaustion. Why is this? It is because man is built on that plan. His system changes every seventh day. He needs a weekly rest as much as an eight-day clock needs a weekly winding. He who winds such a clock once a month, finds it useless. He who

neglects his weekly rest, lays the foundation for physical and mental disaster. Man cannot escape the rule of universal law, nor the eye of the one Lawgiver. This law of sevens seems inwrought in our very nature, and holds us in health and sickness, from life's earliest origin to its end. Neither Jew nor Christian, skeptic nor heathen can escape its power. And when worn-out nature frantically struggles to bring man back to health again, he must come around upon the seventh-day scale; his fever must turn on a seventh day or he dies. Men may scoff at Sabbaths and mock at Moses, but neither doctors nor infidels can make a typhoid fever turn except on the seventh day. Was Moses mistaken when he prescribed a rest day so in accordance with universal law?

The London costermongers told Lord Shaftesbury that their donkeys which rested one day in seven could travel thirty miles a day with their loads, while those donkeys that worked seven days in a week could only travel fifteen miles in a day. Such facts as these, and numerous others which abound on every hand, show that the law of sevens is a divine law. And He who made both man and the donkey, knew what was good for them and so put both man and donkey into the commandment, and said: "The seventh day is the Sabbath of the Lord thy God: in it thou shalt not do any work, thou, nor thy son, nor thy daughter, nor thy man-servant, nor thy maid-servant, nor thine ox, nor thine ass, nor any of thy cattle, nor thy stranger that is within thy gates" (Deut. v., 14).

In addition to the weekly rest day, every seventh year was a sabbatic year. We have outgrown all that, and we hurry, rush, and travel on until health breaks, business stagnates, and panic and disaster close the scene. Statistics show that for the last one hundred and fifty years, at least, panics and financial crises have occurred as often as once in ten years. Perhaps a restful observance of a sabbatic year, affording time to adjust affairs, and clear the troubled currents of business, might have prevented these periodic calamities, by which so many are both physically and financially ruined.

But whether we regard this divine arrangement of sabbatic years or not, we cannot eradicate from our constitutions the ne-

cessity for such periodic relaxation, nor can we free ourselves from this septennial law. We may hold what opinions we will, nevertheless infancy will end about the seventh year; childhood will terminate with the fourteenth; manhood will come with the twenty-first; the thirty-fifth year will find man in his prime; the forty-ninth will show the commencement of decay; the sixty-third will still be a critical period, when man should exercise great care over his physical health; and the seventieth year will mark the bounds of ordinary, normal life.

Now, whatever theories we may hold, we cannot alter these facts. Nor can any reasonable man deny that the human constitution is built upon this plan, and that now, as in the days of "Moses, the man of God," "The days of our years are threescore years and ten; and if by reason of strength they be fourscore years, yet is their strength labor and sorrow: for it is soon cut off, and we fly away" (Ps. xc., 10). We may abridge our own existence; and the wicked, by doing violence to nature's laws, may not live out half their days; but by conforming our lives to the divine order, we may approximate the period of existence ordained of God.

It may be noted that the fiftieth year, the conclusion of the seven sabbatic periods, was also a year of jubilee—two years, instead of one, being then passed without labor; and it will be remembered that from the age of fifty, all priests and Levites were discharged from further active service in the temple of the Lord. This peculiar crisis in human life, at the forty-ninth and fiftieth years, seems particularly adapted to profit by such an arrangement. It brings us to a period when special care is requisite to avoid breaking down, and to insure a green old age. Many a man, neglecting to take rest at this crisis in his life, breaks beneath the constant strain, and dies suddenly at an age when he should have years of vigor and usefulness before him.

ISRAELITES A LAW-ABIDING PEOPLE.

Another fact may be observed. The law of Moses is the basis of civil law among all civilized nations, and whoever obeys the law of Moses, and gives heed to its teachings, will, as a rule, be a law-abiding citizen in any civilized land. And this is the

explanation of the peculiar position occupied by the Jews in this respect. Governor Vance, of North Carolina, when pardoning the only Hebrew in the North Carolina penitentiary, who was serving a ten years' sentence for manslaughter, endorsed on the document these words, "I take pleasure in saying that I sign the pardon in part recognition of the good and law-abiding character of our Jewish citizens, this being the first serious case brought to my notice on the part of that people."

Judge Briggs, of Philadelphia, in sentencing a Jew to prison for burglary, in December, 1879, said, "You are the first Israelite I have ever seen convicted of crime." No Jew was convicted of murder in the United States during the first century of the nation's existence. In a speech delivered at the Hebrew Fair, in Boston, General B. F. Butler said, "For forty years save one I have been conversant with the criminal courts of Massachusetts and many other States, and I have never yet had a Hebrew client as a criminal. But, you may say, that was because the Hebrews did not choose you for their lawyer. But this is not the true answer; for I never yet saw a veritable Israelite in the prisoner's box, for crime, in my life. And, thinking of this matter as I was coming here, I met a learned judge in one of the highest courts of the commonwealth, of more than forty years' experience at the bar and bench, and I put the same question to him, and he said he bore witness with me to the same effect. He neither at the bar nor the bench had ever seen any Hebrew arraigned for crime."

The most prolific source of vice, crime, violence, disease, insanity, and pauperism among civilized nations s the use of intoxicating drinks. Against this crying evil various remedies are proposed, such as total abstinence from all intoxicants, and legal enactments to discourage and prevent their use.

Among his other "mistakes," Moses anticipated these measures for the prevention of crime, for we are indebted to Moses for the establishment of the

FIRST TOTAL-ABSTINENCE SOCIETY

of which history makes record, the Nazarites, who, in separating themselves unto the Lord, separated themselves from wine and strong drink, and everything connected therewith (Num. vi., 1–4);

a body of men among whom may be counted Samson the athlete, Samuel the righteous judge, and John the Baptist, than whom, of those that are born of women, no greater teacher has arisen.

Moses also furnishes us the first example of stringent legislation against intemperance, and presents to our view a nation which, under his rule, for forty years trod the wilderness, neither drinking wine nor strong drink. And by making habitual drunkenness a capital offence, he expressed a vivid sense of the terrible enormity of this madness, which is a fountain of all evils, iniquities, and crimes. And the results of this legislation still abide in the temperate and orderly character of the Jewish people (Deut. xxi., 18–21; Deut. xxix., 5, 6, 18, 19).

Why are not our prisons crowded with Jewish criminals, our streets thronged with Jewish beggars, our almshouses filled with Jewish drunkards and paupers? Everyone knows that they are filled with people from whom the Bible has been withheld, or who have never been permitted to peruse and study the law of Moses and the teachings of the Prophets and Apostles. Surely the thousands of criminals who have no Bibles to read, or who have been unable to read them, have not found their way to prison by following "the mistakes of Moses."

Why did not the Jews in the dark ages die of the plagues and epidemics, as other people did? Why was it that the ignorant multitudes, from whom the Bible was withheld, slaughtered the Jews, falsely charging them with practising enchantment to ward off disease from themselves and poisoning the wells to kill off their Gentile neighbors? Why are the Jews almost entirely exempt from consumption, cholera, croup, typhus, scrofula, and all immoral diseases? Do they owe this immunity to "the mistakes of Moses"? If so, would not other people be profited by accepting some of these "mistakes"?

Such are some of the results of a partial observance of the law of Moses, even by a rebellious and apostate people, who for their sins have been dispersed as exiles and wanderers in all the earth, a perpetual monument of the displeasure of the Most High. And it appears that this nation, apostate as it is through the rejection of its own Messiah and of the prophets who foretold His coming; though destitute of spiritual life, and sev-

ered from the blessings of the covenant, finds, even in its very imperfect observance of this law, such benefits as place it at the head of all nations, in physical, mental, and moral vigor. And if there be such vigor in the sapless branches of the Jewish olive-tree, what would they have been had they still continued to partake of the strength and fatness of the living root? (Rom. vii., 17–24).

And if, in their apostasy and affliction and covetousness and sin, while they are a hissing and a by-word in the earth, they yet exhibit such wonderful qualities, what might have been their characteristics had they walked in all the commandments and ordinances of God, blameless? Should not their peace then have been like a river, and their righteousness like the waves of the sea? and should they not have become in truth a holy nation, a kingdom of priests, honored and blessed above all the nations and peoples of the earth? (Exod. xix., 5, 6).

If the law of Moses will diminish crime, reduce pauperism, empty prisons, and extend the average period of life from one-third to one-half, is it not worth the attention of people who are suffering, dosing, doctoring, and sickening and dying on every hand, while the Jews are living on in health and strength and prosperity?

In Great Britain, where skepticism prevails widely among the masses, and where the "mistakes of Moses" are discussed in club-rooms, beer-shops, gin-palaces, and public halls, it is said that one person in every eleven is a lunatic, a criminal, a pauper, or a drunkard. Would not these modern skeptics do well to study Moses' law? They might find that "the fear of the Lord" is, indeed, "the beginning of wisdom"; that the law against which they rail and blaspheme was one of the choicest gifts that God ever bestowed upon man; and that it was no idle question which Moses asked when he said, "What nation is there so great, who hath God so nigh unto them, as the Lord our God is in all things that we call upon Him for? And what nation is there so great that hath statutes and judgments so righteous as all this law which I set before you this day?" (Deut. iv., 78). And they might see that there was the truest wisdom in the counsel of the wise man, who said, "My son, forget not my law; but let thine heart keep my commandments: for length of days and long life, and peace shall they add to thee" (Prov. iii., 1, 2).

METAPHYSICAL ASSUMPTIONS.

[Read before the American Institute of Christian Philosophy, June 7, 1892.]

By Prof. Edgar Dubs Shimer, Ph.D., University City New York.

"THE kind of a philosophy a man has depends upon what kind of a man he is," said Fichte. Captivating as this may sound, it often fails to secure immediate assent, and excites the answer, "As a man thinketh in his heart, so is he."

If the latter statement is not interpreted to mean that the "thinketh" precedes and supports the "is he," both statements are consistent with the same principle, "as a man thinketh" is the fruitage by which the kind and vitality of the rootage can be told. In so far as any mentality *is* at all, in so far it enfolds in its conscious life every power, element or factor in the processes that result in the later product, explicitly set forth by analysis in systematic form. It was for this reason that Jonathan Edwards carefully considered his dreams and traced the lines of association as far as possible to get at the true inwardness of his being. There is a dialectic unity in all mental operations, and in any one all are to be found. "*As* a man thinketh so *is* he," indeed; "out of the abundance of the heart the mouth speaketh."

In my pedagogical work I have met not a few agnostics who have good-naturedly patronized me for "pretending to know" what I do not know at all, as they say, but "only believe" because of a fancied security in "metaphysical assumptions." This has led me to attempt to show that the agnostic "knows" a great deal in the same way, that he not only believes what he knows, but that his belief is at the very core of his knowledge; that he is no less dependent on metaphysics and cannot help himself; that metaphysics is as "natural" as mineralogy; that every one has his system of metaphysics underlying all his reasoning, even if he has not consciously set it forth; that the

kind of a philosophy a man has, depends on what kind of a man he *is*, and never the reverse ; that the theory of how a nerve acts always depends on what a physiologist thinks a nerve is, and that in every science what anything *is*, more than anything else, determines what it *does ;* in short, that " Faith is the *evidence* of things not seen " in every province and that the " things not seen " in physics, legion by number, are established in precisely the same way that the so-called " supernatural " and metaphysical are built up. In my spiritual life I have as much justification for the faith that is in me as any material scientist can have in physics, where his faith is, often, the only " substance of the things hoped for." Facts are as easily come at in spiritual as in material sciences, and the assumptions necessary are no more metaphysical in the one line of argument than in the other. No science has ever been built up by induction pure and simple. A few facts have sufficed to point toward a conclusion immediately leaped at and afterward verified if possible, but in every case the greatest impulse has come out of the scientist's own consciousness, and boldness in leaping after has been more frequent than later analysis has been correct.

Men may malign the queen of sciences and repudiate all dependence upon what they sneeringly call metaphysical, but this does not change the fact that in every science the determination of what anything *does* always rests ultimately upon what the scientist thinks the thing is. Fechner's psycho-physical explanation of Weber's law " as stating the relations between the organic and spiritual activities " . . . " confessedly grew out of his speculation that body and mind are only two phenomenal aspects, as it were, of one and the same underlying reality. It has been defended by him with a great amount of mathematical science and experimental research." Wundt says, " In the imperfect condition of cerebral physiology we are not seldom in a position to recognize the psychological formulating of certain laws, the physiological meaning of which still lies in obscurity or belongs to the domains of hypothesis."

In the former case we find metaphysics underneath psychologic analysis ; in the latter we find psychology giving the impulse to physiology.

However, surely knowing is logically and chronologically preceded by being, there can be no theory of being until a theory of knowing has been settled upon. Before we can even enter upon any inquiry into the nature of what we are or anything else is, it becomes necessary first to investigate the nature of how we come to know. We see, therefore, the grand importance of having a consistent theory of perception and of holding to it before we can safely meet the dogmatic utterance that we can know nothing absolutely, except of course the surreptitious assumption that we do know absolutely the law of relativity. As to the absoluteness of the basis from which the agnostic dogma is pronounced—it is anything but relative.

This need not, however, restrict the meaning of the term metaphysics to the narrow range of solving the problem of perception of an external world, as Ferrier would have us think. In addition to a description and arrangement of the phenomena and laws of our mental operations, the nature of the human mind itself becomes a legitimate object of search, and inner perception and experience are part of the problem as well. The history of philosophy, which according to Carus is the natural history of the human reason, its pursuits and products, gives ample testimony to the practical adoption of this truth in that every attempt to explain the universe begins with psychology before undertaking ontology; though Harris has well shown that ancient philosophy had an ontological tendency and sought mainly to discover the objective factor, whereas all modern philosophy in general has for its problem the exploration of the subjective factor in knowledge and has therefore a psychological tendency.

"Aristotle began his metaphysics too soon; the facts were not all in," says a Kantian. Did he, indeed! Are the facts all in now? Will they ever all be in? How long must we wait until we may begin? One is tempted to ask this gentleman's permission to breathe. Men cry out in the same way against religion, because it is a structure based on faith, assuming that therefore in it there is no knowledge. They fling at any psychology which is not physiological or psycho-physical because, as they say, it is "metaphysical." They demand that it shall

be empirical *utterly*, as if such a thing were at all possible. There is no science that can free itself from metaphysical assumptions. What these men probably mean is that we shall not forever be pointing our efforts toward these assumptions in the vain effort to catch ourselves by the neck and hold ourselves out at arm's length. But why inveigh against the proper use of an instrument, or the instrument itself, because of its abuse? The father of the law of relativity was more consistent, at least in this. He could strike at an opponent with effect without denying the entire use of metaphysics simply because he scouted its abuse, *e.g.*, he says:

"Thus the refusal of philosophers to accept the fact of the duality of consciousness is virtually an act of philosophical suicide. Their various systems are only so many empty spectres —so many enchanted corpses which the first exorcism of the skeptic reduces to their natural nothingness. The mutual polemic of these systems is like the warfare of shadows, as the heroes in Valhalla, they hew each other into pieces, only in a twinkling to be reunited, and again to amuse themselves in other bloodless and indecisive contests."

Let metaphysics be, then, what it may, if we begin to think at all it must be somewhere and with something. Where shall this starting-point be found and how can it be reached? Shall it be viewed logically or psychologically, gnostically or agnostically or metagnostically? Because we cannot comprehend, may we not apprehend or at least prehend?

In the first chapter of "Daniel Deronda" may be found this sentiment: "Men can do nothing without the make-believe of a beginning. Even science, the strict measurer, is obliged to start with a make-believe unit, and must fix on a point in the star's unceasing journey when his sidereal clock shall pretend that time is at naught." This presents the issue candidly and represents the agnostic mind in one direction fairly. We can make-believe; we may not know. But how do men make-believe? What impels them? Is not make-believe based on some power to believe? Can no basis be found for anything but conjecture? if not, must there not be a basis at least to conjecture from, implicitly, if not explicitly, rested on and trusted in? Even to disbe-

lieve there must be belief in the disbelief itself, and before that in the disbeliever, so that in the last resort there is an indemonstrable belief, a metaphysical assumption, a something not in explicit consciousness, but only to be reached by analysis, just as any scientist gets at probable cause by subtraction or addition, the method of differencing. There must be some starting-point, or some goal, to guide in the process of explaining gathered facts, if they are to be explained at all. How shall we understand the word phenomenon if there is to be nothing to which the phenomenon may appear? If "no inductive or deductive method can establish a self," neither can any skeptical or critical method destroy this necessity of our thinking. Des Cartes' position is impregnable. I am, and everyone who begins at all is bound to assume that he is, no matter how metaphysical the notion of I, or of existence, may seem. I cannot doubt that I am without having some basis from which to doubt. How else could I be sure that I were doubting? Would I not then have to doubt that I doubt? "But how," says Kirkham, "can I say 'I am and know that I am' doubting that I am, and demanding proof that I doubt? It would be the raving of a lunatic pretending to caper about himself in a circle without a radius. The grand proof that my 'I am' is true is the evident absurdity of my every pretence to doubt or deny it. However foolish my thoughts may be, I know that I am thinking. I may be thinking that I have squared the circle or that I shall wear a cardinal's hat; still I am quite certain that I am a thinker."

Sully says in his outlines, "The question as to the substance of mind is a philosophical or metaphysical one, and the solution of it does not seem necessary to psychology. It can be left over till the phenomena of mind are studied. It may, however, be said that some idea of mind as a unity which holds together and combines the several states which we call psychical phenomena, is a necessary assumption or presupposition in psychology. Popular psychology clearly implies this idea. We speak of the mind as thinking, feeling, and so on. And it may be said that the language of scientific psychology, such as 'state of mind,' 'mental activity,' and so on, necessarily implies this idea. Psychology may then take up and adopt the idea of a phenomenal or

'empirical,' as distinguished by Kant from a noumenal or 'intelligible,' mind, self, or ego. That is to say, we may assume the existence of minds in some sense or another, leaving it to philosophy to explain what exactly is implied in this assumption." Now, in all candor, if this is not a metaphysical assumption, in spite of the struggle to escape making it, what is ?

The associationist accuses me of unwarrantably assuming a self-active subject while at the same time he silently or unwittingly assumes not one, but as many different active selves as he has mental states summating the consciousness which he claims to be at the same time but a series of successive states. How else can he get the states associated ? A column of figures does not add itself up. Ordinary material tests cannot be imported among mental states, and such terms as cohesion are here misleading. Whatever consciousness is, the law of conservation of energy has sufficiently established the fact that it cannot be interpolated among the physiological processes as one of them, but that it is something in addition—something *sui generis*—not to be derived under any tenable theory from material causes. Consciousness has in it more than a mere succession of ideas ; there is also the idea of succession. A relation among perceptions is surely not yet a perception of that relation. If it is too metaphysical to assume one self, one unitizing and associating power, how much more metaphysical does the associationist, who flings this gratuitous charge, himself become. Höffding says for him :

"The theory of indissoluble association is the most powerful weapon of the English school against the appeal to *a priori* and original forms of consciousness and ideas. This theory is founded on the just assumption that that which presents itself to us as a unity and as necessarily coherent may yet have arisen from the fusing of different elements." But still there is "the fusing" and beneath that the fuser and the "elements." Prof. James, who is keen to scent any conception of a soul, evolved or evolvable, shows that this theory is "unworkable without secretly summoning to its help some unifying principle, some psychic synthesis, or postulated 'deeper lying entity.'" In attacking this theory he shows anew his animus towards the

spiritualistic theory by asserting that in no case is there need of a soul, and that "thought is itself the thinker." As to transcendentalism he speaks of its ego as a cheap and nasty edition of the soul. Yet he favors Mr. D. G. Thompson's statement: "All states of consciousness imply and postulate a subject ego, whose substance is unknown and unknowable, to which states of consciousness are referred as attributes, but which in the process of reference becomes objectified and becomes itself an attribute of a subject ego which lies still beyond, and which ever eludes cognition, though ever postulated for cognition." Prof. James says, "This is our judging and remembering present 'thought' described in less simple terms."

I am forsooth to be the victim of belief and stand on metaphysical assumption because a self alone meets the necessity of my thinking; what, pray, shall we say of Prof. James' word "our" or of this wonderful "thought" that does his thinking? It strikes me that he has not kept free from the "make-believe of a beginning" that contains in it a very strong if hidden belief in a "deeper lying entity" below his "thought." We shall defer for a moment the consideration of how much he knows of what he believes. In the meantime let us reverse the picture. Acknowledging or establishing the necessity of a self is by no means asserting its all-sufficiency, or proving that "man is the measure of all things." I think it is Fleming who says that if any one entrenches himself in subjective idealism, he cannot be dislodged. Höffding says, after making a close analysis of what we mean by "truth" and "reality," that "we cannot directly disprove the doctrine of Berkeley, Fichte, and Stuart Mill, that the not-self is a product of mental activity." He admits that an account must be given of the source of the qualities with which we endow reality, but charges pure idealism with being dogmatic when it maintains that consciousness produces the whole picture of the universe from itself, and insists that there must be something given to serve as a motive for consciousness. This something he postulates as an x outside the subject without which we should have an absolute production contrary to the law of relativity. What this x is no experience can tell; every answer, he says, is a metaphysical hypothesis, yet the subjective

systems, as a rule, assume an x and propound, in accord with their other assumptions, some hypothesis as to its nature.

This looks very much like dislodgment, at least of such idealists as Berkeley, Fichte, and Schopenhauer, for however much our cognition presupposes an inner activity, in equal degree is the presupposition of something given necessary.

Grant Allen, in "The Mortal Coil," has happily hit off this assumption that the external world is nothing but our percepts. The skit runs thus :

"MARINE PHILOSOPHY IN SILLY SUFFOLK."

A jelly-fish swam an East Anglican Sea,
And he said, " This world it consists of me.
There's nothing above, and there's nothing below,
That a jelly-fish ever can possibly know—
Since we've got no sight, or hearing or smell—
Beyond what our single sense can tell.
Now all we can learn from the sense of touch
Is the fact of our feelings, viewed as such ;
But to think they have any external cause
Is an inference clean against logical laws.
Again, to suppose, as I've hitherto done,
There are other jelly-fish under the sun
Is a pure assumption that can't be backed
By one jot of proof or one single fact ;
And being a bit of a submarine poet,
I've written some amateur lines to show it.
In fact (like Hume) I distinctly doubt
If there's anything else at all about :
For the universe simply centres in me,
And if I were not, why nothing would be !"
Just then, a shark, who was passing by,
Gobbled him down, in the twink of an eye ;
And he died, with a few convulsive twists :
—But, somehow, the universe still exists.

—*The "Mortal Coil," p.* 226, *Appleton's Town and Country Library No.* 18.

Dualist, or monist, materialist, or spiritualist, realist or idealist, every one who thinks at all has at the core of his thought a belief or assumption without which knowledge would not be knowledge, not even the agnostic's "knowledge" that he has no knowledge, because he has not all comprehensive knowledge.

That we should affirm likeness between two things that have

never stood in juxtaposition with each other, and rest upon the affirmation—this is the very essence of memory, the mystery before which Scaliger stood in awe, as did Herschel when he looked into the abyss of the heavens. This belief is the very centre of every judgment. To insist that there can be knowledge in any degree without belief is absurd, but to affirm that belief can exist without its proper degree of knowledge, is equally absurd.

Because there is a tendency in early mental life to place credence in the memories of past experiences and by imagination to project these memories into the future, as realities to come, why prate about primitive credulity as if it had no right or use in mental development, and insinuate that he who does not, like a child, swallow agnosticism without a grimace, has merely not yet clarified his mental states by enough experience to show that his first belief is only *a* belief, but not *the* belief necessary to dignify his culture as scientific? There is first the assumption of the law of relativity, absolute enough by the way in itself, to prove the impossibility of anything's existing *per se*, but always *per me*, and then the open sneer that I do not know, but only believe that what is true in epistemology must also be true in ontology. This may be so, but why punish belief so savagely because it is not at first what it is at last, when every other mental power is in like fashion evolved into greater and greater strength and perfectness? Why not insist that men only know, when they begin cognizing? They do not know adequately and never will; therefore, according to agnostic logic, the beginning of knowing is useless altogether even as a process toward higher attainments, and as a product is not to be trusted. The agnostic has no use for babes, because he sees in them merely babes. He does not "see" the possibilities. If he did would he "believe" in them or "know" them, or both, as gradually realizable, or would they have to be actualized with a bound, as Minerva sprang forth? Grant that we do begin with a belief which is not adequate as a product; as a process or an element of power in a process it is surely the same in kind as believing is in the higher forms of mental life, and it is not therefore to be ruled out of court because in its rudimentary degree it is not yet fully developed, any more than is the agnostic's disbelief.

Concomitant with its exercise is the fundamental apperceptive working of the mind in discrimination, assimilation and other relation finding, the primary functions of intellect. A first discrimination cannot justly be expected to be the final discrimination of less obvious relations, but it is no less necessary than the last act. A wood-chopper's fiftieth blow may in a certain sense be said to cleave the knot, but the first stroke was equally important.

Do not all our concepts begin with the vague and indefinite, sufficiently adequate for the immediate purposes, in immediate circumstances, however inadequate they may appear to another or to ourselves in later life when we look back and analyze logically what was fused psychologically? As experience advances we analyze the content of the concept and drop from its intension or content such characteristics as are not necessary to save the concept from destruction. Thus we gradually lessen the content but increase the range or extent of our concepts, making them more exact and far-reaching, giving us a deeper insight by successive analyses. Not infrequently the reverse process takes place and our concepts are revised by being widened in intent and narrowed in extent. It cannot be too strongly insisted upon that we do not voluntarily drop out all individual differences at once in order to turn our attention to, or better, because we have focused our attention upon, selected similarities that go to make up the true concept. However logical this may seem, it is not psychological. This would argue that we were in possession of the finished concept before the process began. The logical view of this process is by no means the psychological. Psychologically there is a unity of mental process, with one golden thread of apperception throughout, and no form of intellection is anything else than discrimination, assimilation, and other relation finding. The robe of mental life is seamless throughout. We advance from simple beginnings to greater and greater complexities, why then should anyone despise the day of beginnings and lay to the charge of kind a want of degree? Grant the inadequate primitive belief as a psychological fact, and the stubborn fact confronting us becomes an ultimate principle, as inexplicable as the origin of the first organic cell in the light of the biological principle, *omnis cellula e cellula.*

If mind acts at all, then, we believe at the start in order to know anything. We find that men in all ranges of scientific culture have thus by their very nature been compelled to work from this basis in securing their intellectual furthering. Whenever a sufficient number of facts has been gathered, men seek to explain them, and systems of philosophy arise, developed either by analytic or synthetic processes. No science has ever waited until all the facts were in before it began to grow scientific by trying to establish relations. Oftener a single fact has sufficed to excite the natural impulse to suppose a reason, or to leap to a hypothesis which has guided the conduct of experiment in further analytical observation. Thus an assumption becomes the goal of a verification for the establishment, if possible, of a universal judgment. On the other hand, an assumption may mean not only something that demands proof, but an affirmation of self-evident truth which needs no proof. In this case a postulate or an axiom is taken as the basis for a synthetic process of reaching a conclusion which shall be legitimate and of equal strength with the axiomatic premise. These two methods are counterparts. All knowledge is based, therefore, on some kind of an assumption or belief. The kind which results from analysis and stands as hypothetical assumption or would-be universal judgment, midway in the process of scientific induction, deduction, and verification, does not have the validity that the axiom or the postulate possesses, for the reason that it needs the light of other truth to illuminate it.

Indeed, the whole scientific method of inquiry is based on the assumptions that every cause has an effect, and that the same causes will always produce the same effects. The assertion cannot be justified that our universal judgments are derived entirely from inductions without the use of any assumptions, or that our universal judgments are merely the experience of the past transmitted to the present. Any experience, to be experience, presupposes the very thing in question, and the argument becomes a *petitio principii* when it is urged that judgments are universal because never contradicted by experience. Of course they are not. How could they be, and at the same time be universal? Let men evade the issue if they can. Experience in the last re-

sort must flee before the logical and the psychological necessity of a primordial. As Masson says, "If empiricism, fugitive till then, can then turn at bay and conquer, it can only be because its back is against zero, against nihilism, against a wall of absolute blackness. If transcendentalism is still courageous and sure of victory, it can only be because it sees in the middle of the wall of blackness a blazing gate and knows it to be the gate whence the chariots issued and issue of an eternal *a priori*. And here perspective is as nothing. Wherever we stand, it is either the wall of absolute blackness that terminates our view, or the blazing gate shoots its radiance to where we are."

If men can claim to know anything at all it must be claimed on the basis of a universal judgment, but out of experience pure and simple, if there could be such a thing, no universality can rise. If I begin with "I am," I know that I am. I believe it and cannot doubt or demand proof that I doubt. But my knowing to-day that "I am" is different in degree from my knowing it when I was two months or two years old. This knowing has grown clearer and more exact. In the same way belief as a power necessary for knowing has grown. We cannot believe first without knowing and then come to know. We cannot know first without believing and then come to believe. Psychologically these two are co-existent and no logical analysis can divorce them, though by abstraction we can talk of them separately as we talk of the whiteness of this sheet of paper. Men sneer at belief as if the whole trouble lay in belief. It, too, has degrees of power and different objects. The hypothesis, meant by one kind of assumption, is no more believed in than it it is known, neither first nor last. Although generalized or induced from only a certain number of facts, it always reaches out beyond these facts, and thus furnishes impulse for deduction and verification. The conclusions deduced are compared with the facts started from to complete, if possible, the circle. The assumption is then said to be proved and we do what—know or believe? Plainly both, if either, only more of each and not less of either. It is peculiar doctrine that the more we know the less we believe, or that the more we believe the less we know.

A hypothesis is a kind of belief, but is it not also at the same

time a scientific imagination, and is not this a kind of knowing, an element of knowledge? As Goethe says, imagination is *die Vorschule des Denkens.* Certainly no one will insist that, whereas before I believed but did not know, now I know but do not believe? Why, then, not admit at once that to believe in any degree implies an equal degree of knowing, and *vice versa?* Is there any knowing of any kind anywhere that is not at the same time believing and dependent on this belief-factor as so necessary a part of the product that without it the knowing would not be knowing? If anywhere believing is anterior to knowing it is in the use of the hypothesis. We need not discuss its superiority. In one sense, at least, belief is fundamental; it is at the core of every judgment. Let us, then, for a moment, suppose there can be believing without at the same time correspondingly adequate knowing, does this furnish any reason for sneering at the use of a power without which no science can have a scaffolding from which to work at the rising structure? When one of Aristotle's pupils flung at him the charge that he had no right to use the word "all," since no one had ever seen all of any class of things, or of any single individual, Aristotle's answer was that nevertheless we do have the notion of totality, no matter whence it springs, and that we must either use the notion to reason with or stop reasoning altogether. I can think of no more apt answer to the empiricist's demand that I commit philosophical suicide because I cannot get out of experience a universality from which experience itself flows. As well ask the fountain to feed the reservoir.

The law of inertia cannot be dispensed with by physics. It is a fundamental assumption, but it cannot be verified. It cannot be established by experience. It is not a "fact" that any body of matter has ever been preserved from external influence. The law cannot be deduced from causality. How in the world has it then been got? This is what Mr. Spencer calls an ideal truth, because it is "involved" in experience but never actually seen in it, being always more or less completely frustrated. Mr. Mill, in his defence of Comte, says: "Of what consequence is it that the law of inertia (considered as an exact truth) is not generalized from our direct perceptions,

but inferred by combining with the movements which we see, those which we should see if it were not for the disturbing causes? In either case we are equally certain that it is an exact truth; for every dynamical law is perfectly fulfilled, even when it seems to be counteracted."

Modern chemistry is based on the assumption that matter and energy persist. However widely experiment has ranged, yet this law has "only hypothetical validity," and cannot rigidly be proven or verified. Is the agnostic ever worried about these assumptions because he does not "know," or does he see with Mill that we do know, and that "we are certain that it is an exact truth," though no one has really ascertained. We may examine the principles of any science and we shall always find a fundamental metaphysical assumption, not to speak of the hypotheses which may or may not be metaphysical.

It is self-evident that an hypothesis does go beyond the facts. There is no proof needed for this. It carries its own proof. As well try to show off the electric light with a two-penny dip as to bring extraneous proof to bear on this self-evident fact. Therefore it is necessarily so. The necessity is carried by the self-evidence, but it is a logical, not a fatalistic necessity, inherent in the truth and not to be derived from that philosophical chimera, a pure and unmixed experience. No kind of necessity or universality can arise out of such experience, for it is a presupposition of "experience," and in the last analysis "experience" becomes a fugitive until it is driven back to zero, out of which, according to its own doctrine, nothing can come. Rather the golden gate in the black wall.

Standing at the threshold of self-evident, necessary and universal truths, or facts, we can all have our backs turned upon the ultimate, and appear to construct our experience genetically, but if we undertake to gather the individuals of experience, and by scientific method enter upon experiment to get more than a natural history of psychological development, and to attempt an explanation by causes, we must turn about and direct our vision toward the ultimate for one point of direction. If now we refuse, in our logical efforts, to recognize the endowment of first truths, indemonstrable beliefs, native powers of mind, the

roots out of which all experience blossoms, we shall not be able to get a correct orientation. If, however, we take the one point of "experience" and the other of native endowment, or possibility inherent and under any analysis, anterior if not superior, to "experience," we can project or retroject ourselves metaphysically into the ontological world. In this all men are children of a larger growth, perpetually asking how and why anything is what it is.

It is not strange, then, that the advocate of relativity should pronounce against the possibility of an absolute by basing himself unawares on an absolute dictum; that the agnostic, to establish the incognoscibility of things, should base himself on some cognoscibility; and that the bitter critic of metaphysical assumptions in the study of mind, should base himself on metaphysical assumptions, not to mention a "vast amount of conjectural metaphysics of physics." Prof. James, in "The Principles of Psychology," assumes "a physical world in time and space with which" thoughts and feelings "coexist and which they know." What is this but assuming the "deeper lying entity," matter, instead of only the phenomena? Is not this decidedly metaphysical? Does he only believe? Then why say know? It is no more difficult to know in this sense that mind is than that matter is, and it does not follow that because we do not know adequately what an entity is, that it is dangerously metaphysical to postulate that it is, and that it is somewhat, somewhere, somehow, and somewho. Prof. Ladd, in his trenchant and thoroughly admirable criticism of Prof. James' book, in *The Philosophical Review* for January, 1892, says of Prof. James' diatribes against metaphysics: "Let it not be supposed that Prof. James himself remains faithful to this extremely contracted conception of psychology as a natural science. On the contrary, by far the larger and better portions of his two large volumes are those where he feels irresistibly impelled to introduce some metaphysics."

Further: "But may we pursue psychology as a natural science without postulate of a soul and without any metaphysical implicate or postulate whatsoever? Possibly; I am not prepared to say that we cannot, but the way is straight and narrow,

and there are few, if any, who succeed in finding it. Formally to abjure all metaphysics and then really to admit no end of doubtful metaphysics of physics, as Mr. Huxley and Dr. Maudsley, and so many others are constantly doing, is scarcely consistent with adherence to the principles of pure science. No one has pointed this out more clearly than Prof. James. In a royal passage he declares: 'As in the night all cats are gray, so in the darkness of metaphysical criticism all causes are obscure. But one has no right to pull the pall over the psychic half of the subject only, as the automatists do, and to say that that causation is unintelligible whilst in the same breath one dogmatizes about material causation as if Hume, Kant, and Lotze had never been born. One cannot thus blow hot and cold. One must be impartially *naïf* or impartially critical.'"

Read where we will there is no escape from the use of metaphysical or semi-metaphysical truths even by those who deride so flippantly the "old psychology" because it was not what it no doubt would have been if then had been now. "The greater portion incomparably of mental phenomena," says Prof. James Mark Baldwin, "can only be approached by the methods of the old psychology, and in no case has experiment contradicted its established principles." It is arrogance gone to seed that claims for the word "natural" an exclusion of metaphysics, as if it were unnatural to postulate, to assume, and to set up these postulates or assumptions as the goals toward which we shall direct our steps, or the guiding points from which we take our departure. If one wishes to be scientific this is the only way in which any advance can scientifically be made. What then can be more unscientific than the cry of a conflict between science and religion? If men did not believe that all truths are reconcilable and that there can be no surds, all science would be estopped, and the impulse to search for unity would be lost. That two and two make four and must make four, here and everywhere, now and forever, is as much a miracle as the spiritual regeneration of which Christ spoke to Nicodemus. That a grain of wheat should sprout and head and increase is no less wonderful than the feeding of the five thousand. That spiritual things are spiritually discerned is as fundamental a fact in apperception and no more inexplicable

or metaphysical than that intellectual things are intellectually discerned, or that pains and pleasures in others are to be appreciated by us only through previous experiences of our own. This fact will not down at the mere cry of the agnostic that my knowledge does not go beyond the facts within my command, and that when it seems to, it is to be expressed only in negatives. Negatives! What can be more positive than my knowledge, however feeble and inadequate, of an infinite and absolute personal Being? Let the limits be set where they may, the mind refuses to be bound by such limitations. It leaps over and posits a beyond as surely as the physicist passes beyond the facts from which his hypothesis had been induced.

There are higher as well as lower impulses; there is a logical impulse as well as an impulse to pursue pleasure and to shrink from pain. There is an intellectual, an emotional, and an ethical impulse toward the ideals, truth, beauty, and goodness, and beyond and above these there is an impulse to idealize all our ideals in the completest effort of the human mind, the religious impulse. These impulses cannot by any sort of analysis be reduced to the single one of self-preservation—they are springs of action and without them no amount of intellectual trace would suffice to form the reflective motives of later development.

Shall I then refuse to say that I know the buoying influence of the Spirit of God, simply because I do not have an all comprehensive connotation? Denotation is a very solid foundation stone in knowledge, and knowledge is knowledge at every stage of its growth. Though we see as through a glass darkly, still we see and believe and know there is a God, if we know anything. The want of degree is not a want of kind. Schopenhauer to the contrary notwithstanding, knowing and believing can agree together in the same mind, and they are not like wolf and sheep in one cage, the wolf knowledge threatening to devour his neighbor belief.

> The "owlet Atheism,
> Sailing on obscene wings athwart the moon,
> Drops his blue-fringed lids, and holds them close,
> And hooting at the glorious sun in heaven,
> Cries out, 'Where is it?'"

Shall we put out our eyes to join the doleful cry?

Dr. T. S. O'Brien, of New York, followed the reading of the paper by saying, substantially :

The attempt to deny to knowledge any attribute of belief may lead to a logomachy. Of what use will it be to tell a man that he knows he is alive but does not believe it? The terms knowledge and belief have each covered a vast field of objects, varying in intensity from the clearest conviction to the faintest suspicion. These fields are concentric circles, of which faith covers the larger ; knowledge the smaller. The latter is the common ground of both. We believe all that we know. I would venture further and assert that in some small measure—we know what we believe. To the question can there be belief without knowledge, the answer will then be qualified. Belief, without adequate knowledge, there certainly is. As to our metaphysical assumptions we may be said to both know and believe them. If it is contended that we only know them, the name, but not the thought, has been changed ; and the solitary term "know" will cover the territory which it formerly occupied in partnership with its neighbor, belief. The fact that in the Divine mind there was no room for a distinction between them, probably led St. Anselm to an effort to identify them in his famous *Credo ut intelligam.* The distinction between them cannot, however, be obliterated. Native conviction, egoistic activity with assent are their common characteristics. But, once we leave the common starting point of both, whether it be the synthetic cognitions *a priori* of Kant, or the mind-intuitions as expressed by McCosh, or the *cogito* of Descartes, or the *dubito* of the skeptic, all of which are metaphysical assumptions (at least they are assumptions that it is possible for the ego to make them) belief and knowledge become more and more distinct, the elaborative feature accompanying the latter. The former overwhelms Saul on the road to Damascus, or shines a "kindly light amid the encircling gloom." Faith and reason are twin gifts. Faith is encumbered with no greater difficulties than those that beset knowledge itself. Each rests ultimately on mental activities, unique and assumed as indubitable. Does faith rest on assumptions? So does knowledge. Does faith conflict with reason? Faith may be above reason, but is never opposed to it.

Hence Christian philosophers need have no fears as to the outcome of the myriad quests of science. The sooner we reach them, and the more we know of science, the better will it be. We warmly accept all the science that agnostics can give us. But is it scientific in them to ignore the widespread phenomena of religious belief, and to dogmatically reject it? Even miracles would not convince the agnostic. He would say such suspensions of nature's laws were not really suspensions of law but expressive of higher forms of law. In such a view miracles are impossible, and knowledge, being always incomplete, is useless. This is as senseless as to refuse the half loaf; it is the cry of Lucifer.

As the glory of Plato's ideal state lay in the harmonious cooperation of its several departments, so will the noblest development of man, and the best results of metaphysical science be attained through the harmonized work of faith and reason.

SOCIOLOGICAL SCIENCE.

[See Rev. W. F. Blackman's Article, CHRISTIAN THOUGHT, Vol. IX., No. 5, pp. 362.]

BY SAMUEL W. DIKE, D.D., AUBURNDALE, MASS.

I AM delighted every time social science is brought forward. For it has been a favorite one with me for many years. Within a decade, beginning almost simultaneously at Johns Hopkins, Cornell, Harvard, and Andover, and very recently taken up by the others, lies nearly all that has been done in our country directly in these lines. When, at the request of Prof. Tucker, I opened in March, 1886, the department of Sociological Notes in the Andover *Review*—a feature since adopted in many publications—the first thing I did was to make a plea in the very direction of Mr. Blackman's paper. I have continually lectured upon the work in colleges, universities, and theological seminaries, and assisted many teachers in beginning the work, besides writing and speaking about it on many other occasions.

Mr. Blackman's paper shows that the project of study in theological seminaries is not in the air as a coming institution.

His plea puts the subject none too forcibly, and his statement of advantages is not exaggerated. He well says the work cannot be done as it should unless it is made the work of a special chair. And I would emphasize his second reason for this by saying that much of the work now done under the name of sociology, and even a good deal of that done by theological professors under the head of Social Science, falls short of being scientific study. It is the rather practical, with too little of the scientific methods of the science that is studied.

But this opens very many and different questions, which I have not space to consider, and some of which Mr. Blackman hardly seems to have touched. I can only note two or three points: The training of the minister in social subjects is one thing, and the question of doing it in the theological seminary is quite another. The question of the proper division of the subjects in Mr. Blackman's list between the other institutions and the theological seminaries, meets one at the outset. Some of the subjects are now, and long have been, better taught elsewhere than is possible in the theological seminaries, and some of them are taught in every respectable college. I have given the matter of a sociological chair in our theological seminaries a good deal of thought, but I am not yet clear as to what it should attempt to teach. A pretty definite line needs to be drawn somewhere, so that college, university, and seminary do not waste or overlap needlessly.

I think also that Mr. Blackman is wisely cautious against attempting too much. For here lies a common and serious danger in this field. The experience of a pretty large correspondence with those who have sought suggestions in sociological study, together with that of an examination of the work done in this field, convinces me that almost as much harm as good comes of a large part of this kind of study, because of crude ideas of it and wrong methods in practice. Students run over too much ground for one thing. Still worse, they do not give enough attention to the mastery of the methods of the science they study and especially of sociology and its fundamental institutions, principles, etc. If a professor of sociology should take a theological student in the time that can be allotted to this

work over a considerable part of the topics in the thirty-one classes Mr. Blackman has made, I should expect small results, because the work would be necessarily that of mere cramming. On the other hand, if nine-tenths of the topics were left absolutely untouched, and the single tenth remaining taken and carefully subordinated to the dominating purpose of developing and guiding the scientific sense and the scientific method in dealing with social subjects, the real educational work would be vastly greater. For an orderly view of the field as a whole, of its chief institutions, history and principles of life and development, with some practice in the best methods of studying in the use of one or two subjects, will make it comparatively easy to carry on work in any other part of it.

This leads to the suggestion that it is important that we clearly discriminate between the mere practical study of social problems, or of the social science in a general way, and the pursuit of sociology as a science. We must soon learn to abandon the use of the terms sociology and social science as if they were interchangeable terms. For one may study almost any subject in the field of the latter, and that in a scientific way, yet not do it in a sociological way. Our literature abounds in studies of social topics which are of little use, even when they are not positively misleading, because they do not approach their subjects from the sociological point of view. And it is out of the second and third rate followers of this class of writers that we are getting a deal of social quackery and cranks. A lot of social material and information is a poor substitute for sociological training.

I think, therefore, that in ministerial education we need most of all training in sociology as the indispensable condition of the best work in the social sciences; that the study of the latter needs to be kept well in subordination to the former; that the wide field needs careful division between the theological seminaries and colleges and universities; and that the more that can be done before the seminary is reached the better it will be for all concerned; and that we *do* need a good deal of it in the seminaries themselves.

THE ANNUAL MEETING OF THE INSTITUTE.

This was held July 15. We have not space for the proceedings until next number. The following extracts are taken from the President's speech:

Recently a very intelligent manufacturer asked whether there is any organized movement to antagonize materialism and other forms of false philosophy. There is, and the following is an account of its origin and progress:

To ascertain whether there was enough interest in the subject to justify an attempt to form a society specially devoted to the creation and distribution of a literature illustrating the relations between science and religion, in the summer of 1881, at Warwick Woodlands, on Greenwood Lake, in New Jersey, there was delivered a course of lectures, beginning on the 12th and closing on the 22d of July. The following were the lecturers: the Rev. Dr. Deems, of the Church of the Strangers; President Noah Porter, of Yale College; Prof. Bowen P. Bowne, of Boston University; Prof. Stephen Alexander and Prof. Charles A. Young, of Princeton; the Rev. Dr. A. H. Bradford, of Montclair; Prof. Alexander Winchell, of the University of Michigan; the Rev. Dr. Lyman Abbott, of the *Christian Union*; the Rev. Dr. J. H. McIlvaine, of Newark, N. J.; Prof. B. N. Martin, of the University of New York, and Prof. John Bascom, of the University of Wisconsin; in the order of their names.

The whole expense of this course, which was liberally maintained, was borne by Mr. William O. McDowell, of New York.

It was so successful that on the 21st of July a meeting was called for the purpose of organizing the American Institute of Christian Philosophy. At its organization I named three gentlemen, one of whom should, in my judgment, be the first President, namely, Dr. McCosh of Princeton, Dr. Barnard of Columbia and Dr. Porter of Yale. Gentlemen representing these three colleges said that if the first were elected it might be supposed that the Institute would have a Presbyterian, if the second an Episcopalian, and if the third a Congregational, color. I was urged to take the provisional Presidency because I was the pastor of a catholic, inde-

pendent church in a northern State, had been born in the South and educated in one of the Middle States. I consented, until the movement could be inaugurated, and I have held the office ever since with a most sincere and *annual* willingness and desire to make way for another President. The Rev. Dr. Bradford was elected Provisional Secretary, and Mr. Wm. O. McDowell, Provisional Treasurer. President McCosh, of Princeton, and President Battle, of North Carolina; Bishop Cheney, of Illinois, and Bishop McTyeire, of Tennessee; Prof. Bascom, of Wisconsin, and Gen. G. W. Custis Lee, of Virginia, were the first Vice-Presidents. The first monthly meeting was held at Warwick Woodlands on the 28th of August, 1881. The second was held on the 29th of September, 1881, in the parlor of the Church of the Strangers, 4 Winthrop Place, New York. The officers of that church generously provided an office and a place of meeting for the Institute from the second monthly meeting until November, 1889, when the meetings were held for a few months in Association Hall, 23d Street and Fourth Avenue. Since June, 1890, they have been held in Hamilton Hall, Columbia College. The number of members to-day exceeds 500, including many of the most distinguished thinkers in Europe and America.

During the first ten years monthly meetings have been held regularly except in the summer months. At those meetings there have been seventy-seven (77) papers read. Two sermons have been delivered before the Institute in New York, one by the late Rt. Rev. Bishop Harris, of the Diocese of Michigan, on January 18, 1885, in St. Thomas's Church, Fifth Avenue, and another by the Rev. James R. Day, D.D., on February 21, 1886, in the Madison Avenue Methodist Episcopal Church. Two courses of lectures were delivered in the Broadway Tabernacle Church in the winters of 1882–83 and 1883–84.

At the delivery of Bishop Harris's sermon Bishop Potter presided and followed the sermon with remarks expressing his interest in the Institute and its work and his hearty co-operation with it. He thanked the preacher for his admirable address and said that the Institute of Christian Philosophy had been organized to get at those fundamental truths which more especially concerned society and men. Its members were not confined to

any denomination, but embraced, in addition to various bishops of the Episcopal Church, eminent scholars and professors throughout the country.

The Institute has held fifteen summer schools, the first and second at Warwick Woodlands, the third at Atlantic Highlands, the fourth, sixth and eighth at Richfield Springs ; the eleventh at Round Lake, and the seventh at Asbury Park and Key East, and the others at Avon-by-the-Sea, N. J. At these schools 177 lectures have been delivered, also four sermons.

These 177 lectures have been prepared with great care, and many of them by our foremost thinkers. The lecturers have represented the following colleges, namely, Bowdoin, City of New York, Columbia, Dickinson, Emory, Hamilton, Lafayette, Rutgers, Trinity, Tuft's, Smith and St. Stephen's, and the following universities, namely, Boston, Cornell, Harvard, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Princeton, Texas, Vanderbilt, Virginia, Wisconsin, and Yale. In addition to the presidents and professors from these colleges, other gentlemen of other learned professions and intellectual men in business circles have contributed to the literature called forth by the Institute, among them the distinguished explorer, Hormuzd Rassam, of England, and the acute thinker, Ram Chandra Bose, of India, just deceased.

These valuable productions of the Institute have been issued periodically and now constitute nine large octavo volumes, of which Dr. MacCracken, Chancellor of the University of the City of New York and Professor of Philosophy, says: "The lectures and magazines it [the Institute] gives each year are themselves almost a Faculty of graduate philosophy for the whole country." The lectures and other papers and the transactions are issued in a bi-monthly called CHRISTIAN THOUGHT, a copy of which is sent to all members. It has also a large list of subscribers among those who are not members of the Institute.

Attention is called to the fact that its officers serve the Institute without salary. There are no honorary members. There are no expenses for rent. No other institute can be managed more economically. All the income from membership fees and other sources is employed in meeting the expenses of the

monthly meetings and summer schools which produce the papers and lectures, and in printing and distributing this literature. There are schools and colleges and mission stations making appeals to which the Institute cannot respond. An Endowment Fund has been begun which now amounts to over $15,000. It is wisely invested. The gift of $100 to this fund makes the giver a life-member, and he thereafter receives all the publications. One thousand dollars will establish a lectureship to bear the donor's name; and he may annually nominate the person he wishes to deliver the lecture. Thus will be created a fountain of blessing which will continue to flow when those living now shall have passed from the work on earth. It is desired to make this fund sufficiently large and productive to meet all expenses of the Institute, so that every donation, together with the regular membership fees, may be devoted to the distribution of our literature in all lands.

The work of this Institute cannot be computed in figures. It has made a noble stand against materialism and all other forms of false philosophy. It has presented an array of talent which shows the world that all the brains are not on the side of those who scorn or neglect our holy faith, but that the very best intellects of the world, the most competent judges among men, are on the side of the truth as it is in Jesus. It has strengthened the faith and courage of the young men of colleges, among whom its publications have been distributed. A physician who cures many patients can make a resounding reputation, while almost none but the most thoughtful, place proper value on sanitary prevention. Thus the Institute has not attracted the attention of the masses, and has none of the aid which comes to other institutions by reason of the conspicuousness of results. It must, therefore, appeal for its support more to the few who are able to value the solidity of a foundation than to the many who casually admire the beautiful outlines of a structure and the brilliant frescoes on its ceilings.

MONTHLY MEETING.

By the Secretary.

June.—The Institute met in Hamilton Hall, Columbia College, the President being in the chair. After the devotional exercises, which were conducted by Rev. Henry S. Dows, and the approval of the minutes of the last meeting, Prof. E. D. Shimer, of the University of New York, read a paper on "Metaphysical Assumptions."

A criticism of the paper was read by Dr. O'Brien, of New York, and the discussion was conducted by Prof. E. J. Hamilton, the President, and other gentlemen. A vote of thanks was presented to the lecturer for his admirable paper and a copy requested for publication in CHRISTIAN THOUGHT. The President called attention to the Summer School which will be held on Staten Island from July 12th to the 19th, and urged a full attendance.

The Institute then adjourned, to meet in October.

CHRISTIAN THOUGHT IN FOREIGN LANDS.

In response to our appeal in the April number (p. 391) to supply missionaries and others in foreign lands who apply for the publications of the Institute of Christian Philosophy, the following receipts are acknowledged: Mr. Lemuel W. Serrell, Plainfield, N. J., $5; Prof. J. H. Deems, Baltimore, Md., $5; Prof. Charles C. Rhinelander, $25.

ABOUT BOOKS.

[In this department we shall make mention of recent publications, especially those in the line of our studies. There will not be space for extended review. The name of the book, its publisher, and its price when known, together with a brief statement of its drift, will probably meet the demands of our readers. Any book mentioned will be sent post-paid, on receipt of price, by WILBUR B. KETCHAM, 2 Cooper Union, New York.]

—In 1888 the Institute of Christian Philosophy lost one of its most active and valued vice-presidents in the death of the Right Rev. Samuel Harris, of Michigan, who contributed to our literature a paper read before one of our summer schools, and an anniversary sermon in St. Thomas's Church, in this city. Bishop Harris was fortunate in having for his friend Mrs. Charlotte

Wood Slocum, who, in grateful memory of his life and labors, in 1890 endowed a lectureship on Christian evidences. The lectureship has also been fortunate in having for its first occupant John Fulton, D.D., LL.D. Mr. Whittaker, Bible House, New York, has published Dr. Fulton's six lectures, the title of which is "The Chalcedonian Decree; or, Historical Christianity Misrepresented by Modern Theology, Confirmed by Modern Science, and Untouched by Modern Criticism."

The title-page is comprehensive and suggestive of the whole argument. Dr. Fulton finds the Decree of Chalcedon as settling whatever is to be taken for original Christianity. In other words, whatever is not in the Nicene Creed may or may not be true, but for it Christianity is not to be held responsible—it is to be held responsible for all that is therein. The attacks of modern infidelity have always been directed at something which has been supposed to be Christianity, but is not really so, but is rather a misrepresentation of historical Christianity. He also finds that modern criticism touches adversely only something which is outside of the Nicene Creed. He finds also that modern science confirms the Christianity which is set forth in the Nicene Creed, especially the doctrine of the Trinity. He holds that the God of science is the triune God of Christianity. The book shows rare ability, extensive scholarship and conscientious effort at entire fairness. We have read few books in the last decade of which we can so confidently say that here is something which ought to be read by every theologian, every student of physical science, and every scholar who desires to be thoroughly grounded.

—"Evolution in Religion," by Wm. W. McLane, D.D., is a very admirable book. Dr. McLane thinks clearly and writes charmingly. No reader need be scared from this book because he is unlearned in science. The scholarship will be recognized by scholars, but it is used as it ought always to be used, to make science plain to those who do not know it. The book is written for the purpose of showing that it is entirely possible to admit all the facts claimed by evolutionists, though not giving up the thought of a divine Creator. We think the other does this to the destruction of the theory of evolution. That theory does

not need a Creator as the definitions of it given by such men as Hæckel, Tyndall, Huxley, Darwin, and Spencer show. If they do not know how to define evolution, who can? Spencer says: "Evolution is an integration of matter and concomitant dissipation of motion, during which the matter passes from an indefinite, incoherent homogeneity to a definite, coherent heterogeneity, and during which the retained motion undergoes a parallel transformation." Orthodox evolutionists hold that it is matter which does all. Matter *passes*. The same is employed also in the definition of Darwin. He says "Forms *struggle*." Mr. Tyndall holds that matter contains in itself a promise and potency. Evolution of necessity teaches that mind is the product of matter, and that if there be any God, He is the product and not the Creator of matter. No wonder then that evolution and real evolutionists pay no regard to the facts of man's spiritual nature and the existence of a God as Dr. McLane complains, because if these things exist evolution regards each as a mere integration of matter. The theory of development accepts all the facts discovered by science and accepted by the evolutionist, and goes beyond, and believes that nothing comes out of matter which was not originally put into matter, and that matter does not integrate itself; does not "struggle," does not "select," but that there is a personal will-power which integrates matter and dissipates motion, and causes matter to pass from an indefinite, incoherent homogeneity to a definite, coherent heterogeneity. It teaches that matter is the product of mind, that the seen is the product of the unseen, that what appears to be a natural selection is a selection by a personal mind. The theory of evolution can exist without a God, but a God is the prime necessity of the theory of development. Evolution must leave out all accounting for a large number of the facts of the universe, and it is therefore unscientific; but development accounts for every fact yet known to man. So far as evolution leans on fact one may hold to it without giving up the thoughts of a divine Creator, but no further. Dr. McLane's excellent book is well worth the publishing if for nothing else than his masterly handling of Spencer's theory of religion. But it must be borne in mind that Mr. Spencer is consistent as an evo-

lutionist. If he be wrong it is not in the persistence of his logic, but in the untruthfulness of the evolution theory. Dr. McLane shows clearly these four things in regard to Mr. Spencer's theory of religion: (*a*) It is unscientific in its method, being in reality deductive rather than inductive. (*b*) It is unphilosophic; for it ignores the best known facts of the greatest religions. (*c*) It is unhistoric; for it ignores the process and the fact of moral advancement which has taken place under the influence of some religions. (*d*) It is sophistical; for it attempts to account for the existence and action of spiritual nature without any appropriate environment within which actual correspondence may exist. But in treating of religion, Mr. Spencer was bound to lay himself open to these four charges, for evolution has been shown over and over to be unscientific, unphilosophic, unhistoric, and sophistical.

We commend this stimulating book to our readers, and refer them to Dr. McLane's admirable article in CHRISTIAN THOUGHT for October, 1891, p. 81, on the "Scientific and Social Law of Survival."

—The most disappointing little book that we have seen in a long while is entitled "Not on Calvary," published by Charles T. Dillingham & Co. (35 cents.) It professes to be written by a layman. It is well written as to style, and is so reverential in spirit that one would not wish to speak disparagingly of it; but it had been trumpeted so widely as such a new and wonderful thing, that we have been greatly disappointed. In the first place, the title "Not on Calvary" not only fails to represent the book, but actually misrepresents it. The object of the booklet —it is only forty-six pages—seems to be to set forth the thought that the redemption of mankind by our Lord Jesus Christ was accomplished not only on Calvary but by His whole life, including His incarnation, but especially in the scene on the Mount of Temptation. The author's theory is that man's spiritual freedom had passed from the original possession of God into that of the Prince of this world, who was its lawful holder when Jesus came, and that the price demanded by its lawful holder in return for its transfer to its original possessor was to be at the price of Satan's anticipated dominion over our Lord by His sub-

jection through the weakness of the flesh. That is the author's theory, and he asks: "Is not this a more tenable theory than that a loving Father demanded the sacrifice of His Son to appease His anger toward a race that had been drawn into sin by a superior sinful being whom He had created and still maintained in all his seductive and debasing power?" This theory, for which the author offers his as a substitute, is, as he states it, entirely absurd and unscriptural, and has no standing amongst thoughtful men. The word translated redemption, in the New Testament scripture, is never used in the sense of buying back, but always in the sense of loosing away from, setting free from, something else. In Eph. i. 7 our version has it, "In whom (Christ) we have redemption through his blood." The word there is the same which is everywhere used in the New Testament, which means a loosening away from, a being set free from, the power of sin, is here said to be through His blood. Paul thinks it *was* "on Calvary" that the redemption came and intimates in that verse how it was accomplished, namely, "through the riches of his grace"; that is, the love of God manifested by His incarnation in Jesus and His suffering for love's sake, is that which is to break the power of sin over us. It seems evident that the excellent layman who wrote this booklet, and with whom we should esteem it a pleasure to be personally acquainted, had not consulted the original before he wrote his book. That part of the work of "redemption" was done on the Mount of Temptation, as well as in the stable of Bethlehem and on the hill of Golgotha, has long been held. In the Litany of the Book of Common Prayer, the "temptation" is in category with the "incarnation" and with the "bloody sweat" and with the great "passion." There does not seem to be any very hurtful error in the book, and there are portions which may be helpful to some souls.

—A vigorous thinker and pleasing writer is Dr. J. W. Lowber, of Texas. He has written several books popularizing his learning. Perhaps the best of his productions is the last. It is enti tled "Cultura; or, the Relationship of Culture to Christianity." It is divided into four parts: (1) "The Highest Culture in the Study of Nature"; (2) "The Highest Culture in the Study of Revelation"; (3) "The Highest Culture and the Bible"; (4)

"The Tendencies of Men of Culture." The last part is a popular sketch of the progress of culture from the days of Plato to our own. The book is good reading for men at any time of life, but we should think it would be specially stimulating to the minds of young people. He dedicates his books to the members of the American Institute of Christian Philosophy on account of the contributions of this Institute to the highest, truest culture, and in his preface acknowledges himself to be greatly benefited by his studies in the Institute. We could wish this book a large circulation.

—Funk & Wagnalls Company have commenced publishing "The Preacher's Complete Homiletic Commentary on the Old Testament." The list of its editors contains the names of a number of the most accomplished homilists. The editors claim that the work opens up for homiletic use every available verse or paragraph of the Old Testament that can be turned to homiletic advantage, and that every effort has been made to store the volumes with the best of the homiletic study of all ages and of all countries. Having examined the first volume, we believe that they can make good their claim. The whole work will occupy twenty volumes. An imported set costs $60, but the Funk & Wagnalls Company propose to put the price at about half that of the English edition, if they can secure sufficiently large advance orders. We trust they may do so, because we can see the great use that these publications will be to young men just entering the Christian ministry. It will be a library in itself.

—"A Crowning Sin of the Age" is a book which, as the author, the Rev. B. D. Sinclair, says, was born, not made. It grew out of a sermon preached by the author, "On the Perversion of Marriage," and is levelled at a sin which the author thinks is so prevalent in New England that he devotes one chapter to the decay of New England. It is a startling thought that probably there were more unborn white children killed in New England for four years preceding the late Civil War than there were of colored people of all ages in all the South. The subject of marriage lying at the foundation of all society, and right views thereon being very important for the material and moral progress

of society, too much attention cannot be paid to it, and this booklet of Mr. Sinclair ought to have a wide circulation. (Published by H. L. Hastings, Boston, Mass.)

—A remarkable book in several ways is a small volume entitled the "Ethics and Etiquette of the Pulpit, Pew, Parish, Press and Platform." It is from the pen of Howard Henderson, D.D., LL.D. In its sub-title it is set forth as a "Manual of Manners for Ministers and Members." The alliteration of the title page gives a hint as to the style. The book is full of very wise sayings. The style is epigrammatic, antithetical, illustrative. There is not a dull page in it. It would be a healthy thing for any congregation to spend an evening at least once a month, with a copy of this book in the hands of each, all reading its paragraphs in course until finished. Perhaps more good would be done to any church that way than by an ordinary so-called protracted meeting. (George P. Houston, Cincinnati.)

—It is a comfort to be able to speak without reserve of a book on a subject generally discussed, controversially or superficially. This we can do of "The New Womanhood," by James C. Fernald. The author discusses almost every question that has a relation to womanhood, and he has done it with an insight, a tenderness, and a comprehension which ought to commend his book to men as well as to women. A woman could not have done any better. Marion Harland has well said of it, "From the first to the last line there is not a touch of prejudice or of the flippant flattery with which the average masculine critic greets woman's efforts to fill the generous sphere to which an enlightened age has called her." The book is published by D. Lothrop Company, Boston.

—Chancellor MacCracken, of the University of the City of New York, recently delivered a speech before the Nineteenth Century Club entitled "A Metropolitan University." It is reprinted from the *Christian at Work* in a pamphlet which in one hundred years from now will probably be of more importance than one-half the books published this year in the City of New York. It is profoundly interesting now and most timely.

—Mr. Thomas Nolan, of the New York bar, has printed in a neat volume, the books "Proverbs," "Ecclesiastes," "Wisdom" and "Ecclesiasticus." The reason he assigns for the publication is the number and beauty of the many wise maxims taught in these books and because the Hebrew Bible contains but three and our Common Version only two. Mr. Nolan is a Roman

Catholic. He thinks the indiscriminate reading of the Bible by the young is not proper and that the Sacred Volume should be taught only by authorized persons, but he thinks that these four books are so entirely safe that even children of any age may read them. He is a lawyer and recommends the study of the Bible as more important than the study of Blackstone. The book has the *imprimatur* of Michael Augustine, Archbishop of New York.

—A. W. Hall, Syracuse, New York, publishes a third edition of "Christian Science Unmasked" by the Rev. W. T. Hogg. It ought to have a very large circulation and do much toward neutralizing the teaching of that most insidious and hurtful form of atheism called "Christian Science," a system that is totally devoid of all claim to any connection with science whatever, and is contrary to the most accepted teaching of Christianity. Price 15 cents.

—The same publishers issue "Church Entertainments: Twenty Objections," by Rev. B. Carradine, D.D. It is a small book of great power, which we are glad to see is selling rapidly. Its tendency will be to correct certain evils which have grown up in the modern Church.

—We acknowledge from the Howard Association of London a book of very great value to all students of sociological questions, prepared by Mr. Wm. Tallack, Secretary of the Association, and of very high authority in this department. The title page of this book with the name of its author is sufficient to commend it: "Penological and Preventive Principles with Special References to Europe and America, and to the Diminution of Crime, Pauperism, Intemperance, and their Substitutes, Habitual Offenders Sentenced, Neglected Youth, Education, Police Statistics, etc."

—A very valuable volume entitled "Christendom from the Standpoint of Italy." Proceedings of the Ninth General Conference of the Evangelical Alliance held in Florence, 1891; published by authority of the Consul of the British Organization of the Alliance; edited by the Rev. R. A. Redford, A.M., L.B.

—For a detailed presentation of the doctrines of Prof. Hamilton's paper in this number the reader is referred to his published works, especially to "The Modalist," recently issued by Ginn & Co. This book discusses the nature and laws of rational perception as held by its distinguished author.

CHRISTIAN THOUGHT.

RECENT MODIFICATIONS OF DARWINISM.

[A paper read at the Meeting of the American Institute of Christian Philosophy, July 12, 1892.]

BY JOSEPH COOK, LL.D., OF BOSTON.

I.

WITHOUT definition, the word evolution is a fog bank; and any theory built on it is a plank nailed on a fog. Very few popular writers really understand the system of thought known in general as the doctrine of evolution; so that the masses of the people are often frightened by spectres in the mist, which disappear when confronted with alert, piercing attention.

Darwinism means the doctrine of the derivative origin of species, or the near or remote blood relationship of all animals, including man. It is important to notice, however, that Darwin himself never admitted that living beings can have been developed from less than four sets of original germs representing mollusks, radiates, articulates, and vertebrates. He traced the lines of life back to these four types and the germs of these he supposed were supernaturally created ("Origin of Species," last chapter). He asserted the blood relationship of all descendants from each germ, but did not teach that any member of either had ever been developed into a member of any other of these four classes.

On the majestic elms in front of my study windows at the side of Boston Common are many branches. No one branch can be developed into any other, but far back down the tree the branches one and all really came from a single stem. Evolution does not mean that to-day an ape can be developed into a man or a man into an ape, but that far back in the history

of the tree of descent both came from one stem. Many so-called Darwinians run back the four great branches themselves to one origin, and teach that life all came from a single germ. Materialistic evolutionists teach that this one germ originated by spontaneous generation, and is explained simply by the chemical and mechanical properties of matter.

Evolution, then, means the doctrine that the various kinds of animals have succeeded each other in genetic order, and that their variations are accounted for by the survival of the fittest in the struggle for existence and not by special creation.

In the field of philosophy at large, evolution means that all things are derived from their antecedents according to the law of casual continuity. Antitheistic evolution asserts that all things are derived from their physical antecedents by means of forces resident in the antecedents themselves. Theistic evolution asserts that all things are derived from their physical and spiritual antecedents by means of forces resident in the antecedents and their environment.

Ex-President McCosh defines evolution as simply organized causation. Mr. Gladstone, with great felicity of phrase, says: "Evolution to me is series with development." Prof. Joseph La Conte defines evolution as "continuous progressive change according to certain laws by means of resident forces" ("Evolution and Religious Thought," p. 8). But natural law itself needs definition.

II.

John Stuart Mill said that natural laws do not account for their own origin. Evolution, even if it be the correct explanation of the processes of nature, is only a natural law and does not account for its own beginning. Prof. Agassiz was accustomed to say that natural laws are only the methods of the omnipresent divine action. The natural forces which we call heat, light, electricity, gravitation, are, as he taught, only the pens with which the divine hand writes, and he would exclaim: "Away with your worship of the feather! Worship the Hand that makes the universe its autograph."

Among the famous sayings of Hermann Lotze, the greatest of modern philosophers, none are more timely than these central

ones : "Nature never works without the concourse of God. The nature of things and their capacity for action are a nonentity without God. All the laws of mechanism and nature are but the very will of the universal soul. Whatever mode of creation God may have chosen, none avails to lessen the dependence of the universe on Him, none to bind it more closely to Him. The unsearchable wisdom of God is the source of all finite forms." This is a philosophy as old as Kant and Leibnitz and Plato. In the highest circle of thought it has really not been shaken for two thousand years.

Let us, then, begin all our reflections on evolution by accepting as established these two principles : First, a natural law without God behind it is no more than a glove without a hand in it ; secondly, all that is done by the gloved hand of God in nature is done by the hand and not by the glove. It will be seen that these principles pierce the fog, and that they are rays of light proceeding from the philosophic sun which has dominated in the heavens of man's freest and loftiest research for many crowded and tumultuous centuries.

A serious man need have no hesitancy in accepting these principles, for they are themselves specimens of the law of the survival of the fittest in the struggle for existence. Evolution, therefore, must be defined to be a process, not a power ; a method of operation, not an operator. Like any other natural law, if it be a natural law, it indicates the constant method of the divine operations and no more obscures our faith in God's existence than does the law of gravitation, which is simply the constant method of the divine activity in the physical world.

When Sir Isaac Newton first promulgated the law of gravitation, no less a man than Leibnitz taught that it overthrew any natural religion and, inferentially, any revealed religion. A period of alarm ensued. It was feared that atheism and materialism would find support in Newton's positions. MacLaurin wrote a trenchant and powerful work to prove that this apprehension was unfounded. The entire alarm has now passed away.

If evolution should be established as clearly as gravitation has been, there is no reason why, when understood only as a

process and not a power, a method of operation and not an operator, it should disturb faith any more than the doctrine of gravitation has done.

We have no right to say that the universe is governed by natural laws. All we have a right to affirm is that it is governed according to natural laws. So all philosophers have been assuring us in all the places of the highest instruction for centuries. If I were to say that a book is written by the laws of spelling and grammar I should be uttering an absurdity. All that I have a right to say is, that a book is written according to the laws of spelling and grammar. What is the law of spelling or of grammar? Simply the method which intelligence follows in arranging the letters of words and the words of sentences. Just so, the book of the universe is not written by the laws of heat, light, electricity, gravitation, evolution. It is simply written according to those laws by the omnipresent Intelligence whose methods of action they reveal. Evolution, therefore, must be explained by involution. There can be nothing developed which has not first been enveloped in nature. Evolution teaches that after a bud is set it develops into a branch. But what sets the bud?

All is change. But who makes changes?
All arranged. But who arranges?

If one may adopt the metaphor of our Norse forefathers, evolution is simply the process of the growth of the tree of the universe. As a philosophy, it does not discuss the question as to who originated the seed of that tree and ordained the laws of its colossal and minute ramifications. The theory of evolution might be metaphorically defined as a description of the methods of the ramifications of life. Darwinism, strictly so-called, admits distinctly the supernatural origin of the earliest germs of life, and, therefore, is entirely inconsistent with any antitheistic theory of the structure of the universe.

It is very true that Darwin has many imitators who out-Darwin Darwin. But among the changes introduced into the theory of evolution in the last twenty-five or thirty years, have been many specifications which show, not only the justice of Darwin's theism, but the insufficiency of evolution, understood as he defined it, to explain the ramifications of life.

III.

What are some of the important events in the history of the doctrine of evolution for the last quarter of a century ?

1. The defeat of the materialistic hypothesis of evolution. No standard authority in the world of science now champions an atheistic hypothesis of development. So thoroughly is mere materialism outgrown that a man is regarded as poorly educated who holds the materialistic hypothesis as to the origin of life. Any man who asserts that spontaneous generation is a fact, makes himself a laughing stock in circles of men of science.

2. The defeat of the monistic, or, as it is sometimes called, the mystical hypothesis of development, is a marked event of recent times.

But the monistic theory is that all things come from an intermediate, somewhat combining the qualities of both matter and mind. This indescribable substance, with its perfectly self-contradictory qualities, has existed from eternity, according to the monistic theory. And out of it all things in the world of matter and of mind have been developed. This theory has no standing beyond the circles of a few eccentrics who are possibly authorities in physiology and chemistry, but are mere amateurs in philosophy. The qualities of matter and mind can no more go together in one and the same substance than a door can be opened and shut at one and the same time, or than a revolving shaft can have opposite sides uppermost at the same instant.

3. The theistic theory of evolution has come to be held in a cautious way by many who are devout champions of Christian truth. Asa Gray, for instance, who lies buried at Mt. Auburn, called himself both a theistic evolutionist and a firm believer in the Nicene Creed. He was an intimate correspondent of Darwin, and was recognized by the latter as the best expounder of the philosophy of evolution. President McCosh is another theistic evolutionist, Prof. Henry Drummond another ; and each of these men, one representing the older and the other the more recent Scotch philosophy, is a devout evangelical believer.

Prof. St. George Mivart is a Roman Catholic, but a theistic evolutionist. Prof. Alfred Russel Wallace, although he denies

that the origin of man's intellectual and moral faculties can be accounted for by evolution, admits that man's body may have been developed from some type found among the lower animals. So Richard Owen taught, and it is not to be supposed that these men are unfamiliar with any of the details of the evolutionary theory. Wallace was the co-discoverer with Darwin of the principle of natural selection.

4. It is to be noticed, however, that even in the modified form in which Wallace holds the theory of evolution, it has not been supported by the exact observations of anthropologists and cannot be said to be a settled part of the teachings of science.

Darwinism has been subjected to severe criticism very recently at the Anthropological Congress in Vienna. About a year ago Prof. Virchow, the great Berlin biologist, made an attack upon the theory of man's descent from animal ancestors, and has just renewed his attack. His long address at the Vienna convention is an important sign of the times. "For a quarter of a century," he says, "we have in vain sought for the intermediate stages which were supposed to connect man with the ape. The proto-man, the pro-anthropos, is not yet discovered. For anthropological science the pro-anthropos is not even a subject of discussion. The anthropologist may perhaps see him in a dream, but as soon as he awakes he cannot see that he has made any approach toward him. At this moment we are able to say that among the peoples of antiquity no single one was any nearer to the apes than we are. At this moment I can affirm that there is not upon earth any absolutely unknown race of men. It can be positively demonstrated that in the course of 5000 years no change of type worthy of mention has taken place. If you ask me whether the first man was white or black, I can only say I do not know. Twenty years ago the leaders of our science asserted that they knew many things which, as a matter of fact, they did not know." (See *Our Day* for February, 1892, p. 153.)

Prof. Sir G. G. Stokes became President of the Royal Society in England on the retirement of Prof. Huxley in 1885. There is no position of higher honor in scientific circles in the British Islands than the presidency of this famous association. But Prof. Stokes, in his "Gifford Lectures," delivered before the

University of Edinburgh in 1891, distinctly repudiates the theory of man's derivation from animal ancestors. (See his volume entitled "Natural Theology," Adam & Charles Black, London and Edinburgh, 1891, pp. 73, 74.) He says: "The evidence appears to be utterly insufficient to establish, on scientific grounds, the derivation of man by continuous natural transmutation from some different form of living thing. And as to a continuous development of mind leading up to the mind of man, of direct evidence we seem to have absolutely none. The theory of evolution is rather weighted with the necessity for supposing that there must have been such a thing than assisted by any evidence that there was. The little evidence that we have seems rather the other way."

5. Prof. Huxley himself says, "Variations we call spontaneous, because we are ignorant of their causation. When Darwin uses the word spontaneous concerning the origin of variations, he simply means that he is ignorant of the cause of them which is there dormant." What the new generation is insisting on is that the obscurity which Prof. Huxley here confesses hangs over the cause of variation, shall be cleared up. As Prof. Schurman, of Cornell University, has said, "The survival of the fittest does not explain the arrival of the fittest." As Asa Gray taught years ago, "A sufficient cause, a rational explanation of organic forms, must include that inscrutable something which produces, as well as that which results in the survival of the fittest."

6. The last remarkable phenomenon in the discussions of the closing portion of this century concerning evolution is that the factors or causes of evolution are now much more clearly perceived than they were at first, and have been so broadened as to take away entirely the atheistic and materialistic aspects of the theory in its scholarly form. Prof. La Conte, for instance, a pupil of Agassiz, but a theistic evolutionist, says that there must be at least six factors of evolution: pressure of the environment, use and disuse of parts, natural selection, sexual selection, physiological selection, reason. He asserts in the most emphatic terms the doctrine of the divine immanency in natural law. He is not an idealist. He does not deny the existence of matter, but he asserts that it is inert

and never the efficient agency among natural forces. He calls for a frank return to the old idea of direct divine agency, but in a new, more rational, less anthropomorphic form. He asks us to believe in "a God not far away beyond our reach, who once, long ago, enacted laws and created forces which continue in themselves to run the machine we call nature; but a God immanent, a God resident in nature at all times and in all places, directing every event and determining every phenomenon; a God in whom, in the most literal sense, not only we, but all things, have their being, in whom all things consist, through whom all things exist, and without whom there would be and could be nothing.

"According to this view the phenomena of nature are not laws, but objectified modes of divine thought; the forces of nature are not laws, but different forms of one omnipresent divine energy or will; the laws of nature are no less than the regular modes of operation of that divine will, invariable because He is unchangeable. There is no really efficient force but spirit, and no real independent existence but God" ("Evolution in Its Relation to Religious Thought," by Joseph La Conte, pp. 300–303).

It is impossible to admit, in face of these events of the last quarter of a century of discussion, that the theory of evolution is established even in its modified form as held by Wallace. But it is also evident that even if this modified form of the cautious theistic evolutionary theory were established, no fundamental revolution would be called for in theistic or Christian thought. If the ideas of this theory were to prevail, the divinity of Christ would yet be asserted. He would not be in His divine nature the product, but the omnipresent originator and sustainer of the evolutionary process.

IV.

It will not be understood that materialistic or monistic theories of evolution, as ordinarily held in crude circles, are consistent with a sound theistic philosophy or the Christian faith. But these unscholarly forms of the theory are held now only by half-educated minds. They are not obsolete, as our popular discussions too often show; but they are obsolescent, and intelligent

men should be ashamed to allow themselves to be influenced by them. It is, however, precisely these unauthorized forms of the evolutionary theory which dispose many skeptics to attack Christianity as inconsistent with modern philosophical thought.

A law of the ascent of life does pervade the geological ages. Crude thought makes this fact the basis of a crude optimism. It rushes to the conclusion that everything modern must be better than anything ancient. And so the popular mind is too often prone to underrate the wisdom of experience. Those who are in the fog of the crude view of evolution speak of the creeds of the past as of course outgrown, because they originated in the past. The multiplication table is not outgrown, however, and it is very old. It is not likely to be superseded. The fog bank is the chief mischief in the call for a revolution in theology in the name of evolution. Our fathers were not all fools. If they were, what are we? He who has no respect for yesterday, simply because it was yesterday, can have no true respect for to-day, because to-morrow to-day will be yesterday. Nor can he have a true respect for to-morrow, because the day after it will also be a thing of the outgrown past.

The crude discussions of theology by those who do not understand the theory of evolution often forget that this theory itself contains the doctrine that there may be degeneration as well as ascent in the course of development. Prof. Huxley has called sharp attention to the misstatement of the theory by rash optimists who forget that the doctrine of the survival of the fittest means the inexorable destruction of the unfittest, and that evil as well as good may increase in power along the line of natural development. There should be nothing conceded to such crudity, and yet investigation is to be pushed to the thirty-two points of the compass, in both science and philosophy, with the utmost freedom.

V.

It is now demonstrable from the settled facts of science, not only that the divine omnipresence conducts the whole evolutionary process, but also that God intervenes from time to time to lift life to a higher level.

The principle of life in the dead world of matter cannot be accounted for by any of the powers of matter. So the principles of sensation, of intelligence, of conscience in the world of life are to be accounted for only by divine intervention. We know that man exists as a free agent. We have no philosophical right, therefore, to doubt that the being who created him is a free agent. In spite of man's environment by unchanging natural forces, he can exercise his freedom within the natural scope of his powers. We have no philosophical right, therefore, to deny that God can interfere with His own ordinary methods of action as He chooses.

> What, my soul! see thus far and no farther? when doors great and small,
> Nine and ninety fly ope at our touch, should the hundredth appall?
> Would I fain in my impotent yearning do all for this man,
> And doubt He alone shall not help him, who yet alone can?
>
> —ROBERT BROWNING, "Saul."

A fountain does not rise higher than its source; but man is a person, that is, a being possessed of intellect, will and conscience, and therefore he cannot have been produced by a being without intellect, will and conscience. Involution must equal evolution. And involution is explained only by the divine omnipresence.

Jonathan Edwards taught that as the image of an object in a mirror is sustained by a flow of rays precisely like the rays which originally brought it into existence, so the universe is sustained by a flow of acts of the divine will precisely like the acts which originally brought it into existence. This famous metaphor of the greatest American theologian and metaphysician exactly represents the attitude of the best philosophy of our day. Second causes may exist and be distinguishable in thought from the first cause. But they are not distinguishable from it as things. There is no razor sharp enough to shave off the image from the ends of the rays that produce it.

And so there is no analysis keen enough to separate God from the universe which He saturates and sustains. While we assert the divine immanency, we assert at the same time the divine transcendency, and so avoid pantheistic errors, as well as materialistic. The light of the sun is in the rainbow, but the rainbow

is not the whole of light. No weapon keen enough to cut the rainbow off from the rays of the sun can possibly be fashioned. The light fills the bow and is the substance of all its colors, and yet the light billows away to all parts of the heavens. It transcends the rainbow as well as fills it. The doctrine of the divine immanency, and that of the divine transcendency, standing side by side, constitute scientific theism. And this means only what Robert Browning teaches in his famous words,

> I have gone the whole round of creation. I spake as I saw :
> I report as a man may of God's work : All's love, yet all's law.

And this, too, is Tennyson's meaning when he sings,

> God is law, say the wise. O soul, and let us rejoice ;
> For if He thunder by law the thunder is yet His voice:
> Speak to Him, thou, for He hears, and spirit with spirit may meet—
> Closer is He than breathing, and nearer than hands and feet.

RICHARD ROTHE AND SOCIAL THEOLOGY.*

[Contributed to CHRISTIAN THOUGHT.]

BY PROF. A. B. CURTIS, TUFTS COLLEGE.

RICHARD ROTHE (1799–1867) is called the most distinguished theologian of the school of reconciliation, and the most original thinker since Schleiermacher. The story of his life is interesting and inspiring. He possessed both the outward and the inner characteristics of a Christian. He was an only but not a spoiled child. Frail and subjective in temper, and an idealist by nature, while still a child he constructed for himself an ideal world, because the real world did not satisfy him. He was more fond of solitude than of companions and preferred the theatre to the church. The bald intellectualism in the sermons of the rationalists repelled him. He refused to admit that Christianity could be fitly comprehended in any system of thought; he looked upon it as a great spiritual power. Yet in his early manhood he criticised more as an outsider than as an avowed member of the Church. Like many of the unchurched in all ages his faith was more nearly akin to that of the early Christians than was that of many inside the Church itself. "When all were rationalists Rothe preserved his faith in the supernatural." Religion he looked upon as an enigma given us for solution, and he believed that it was the duty of each to work out an answer as he best could. It was this rather than a thirst for knowledge as such, it appears, that led him to cultivate his intellectual powers. In 1811 he went to Breslau, where he studied without trouble until the events of 1813 awoke him from his dreams. Here the opposition to Napoleon was very strong, and patriotic fires were kindled in the breast of the young idealist. About this time religion became to him a real and positive possession. He experienced great quickening of the spiritual life. The real

* Lichtenberger's "German Theology in the Nineteenth Century." Pfleiderer's "Development of Theology."

value of life as a moral and spiritual force in the world began to dawn upon him. He began to feel that the real purpose of life could not be satisfied by merely choosing a vocation, however lofty. There must be a life aim, a special, personal work. He began to read with eagerness the works of the master minds who were shaping society—Goethe, Richter, Schlegel, Tieck and Novalis. Strangely enough, this led him closer to Christianity and theism. He began to feel as never before the "need of immediate, personal contact with God." Prayer became a "sweetest enjoyment," and he addressed it to the Saviour. An overwhelming sense of sin took possession of him. He looked upon it as positive and real. He began to loathe it and abhor it, to oppose it with all his powers. He worked against it, he prayed against it. And in this, no doubt, was laid the foundation for his later logical tenets. Coupled with the religious palingenesis was a desire for more thorough and sympathetic, æsthetic and scientific culture. Rationalism, as such, had no charms for him. Neither was his attitude toward it one of opposition. His was one of those rare natures that was able, without effort, to set this question aside as of minor importance. The lofty spiritual ideals of the rationalists charmed him. Their enthusiasm for the results of culture were fast becoming his, but their positions in matters of theology and criticism he never thoroughly adopted.

At the age of eighteen he is in Heidelberg studying theology. He is worried at times about conflicts, but his faith towers above them. He feels assured that nothing in Scripture can be contrary to reason. Faith and freest scientific inquiry are not at all incompatible. Faith opens a new world; it is the key to the highest knowledge. The true object of this faith is the person of the Christ. So the young divinity student reasoned, and the mysticism of the school strengthened him in his ideas and fascinated him with his work. Politics he could not understand. Like our own Hawthorne he could not understand history till it had grown old and musty. The newspapers he never read.

Hegel's lectures he attended with interest, but the writings of Schelling attracted him more. Theology began to trouble him. Its rationalism repelled and its Biblical criticism was dis-

tasteful. As to dogma it seemed unassailable enough, but was it worth defending? Its content did not satisfy him. The thought was growing in him that Jesus brought into the world not a new doctrine but a new life.

He remained at Heidelberg but two years, then went to Berlin. Schleiermacher failed to interest him. Rothe was still immature and the critical element in Schleiermacher repelled him. He took a lively interest in Neander and received from him impressions and ideals which he afterwards utilized. He about this time began to study Zinzendorf, and went so far as to join the Pietists, but he was not happy with their company or their ideas. Here, too, he confessed that he found a kind of rationalism, a dryness and infertility, where Christianity had promised life.

At the age of twenty-four he married, was appointed chaplain to a Prussian embassy and with them set out for Rome. Though in Rome he was not of it. He did not mingle with its life, but shut himself away from it. His subjective tendencies gained the mastery over him, and he gave himself up to thought. This was not without its good results, for he now cast aside all useless dogmas, and retained only the core of Christianity. This was a great relief to him. He no longer felt himself called upon to defend the merely accidental and subsidiary in his religion. Inconsistencies no longer troubled him, for he held lightly to those things which would not reconcile with the basic principles of the Christian system. It was now that his taste for art and literature returned. Rothe was laboriously working his way through a maze of contradictory opinions and profound religious experiences to a most interesting theological position. The intense ethical consciousness which had so early asserted itself again gains possession of him. He begins to feel germinating thoughts of his own in religious matters.

In 1828 Rothe was called to Wittemberg, where he lectured upon the history of Christianity. He won at once the affection and esteem of the students. Eleven years later he was called to Heidelberg, where he taught the major part of the remainder of his life.

Prof. Rothe's pen was a busy one. And his writings have

wielded a wide and healthful influence. Many of his thoughts have reappeared in recent years in the writings of honored American scholars, notably those of the lamented Elisha Mulford.

Rothe's principal work is his "Theological Ethics." This includes ethics, theology and politics. The title indicates the point of view, and the biographical sketch has already hinted at it. Rothe identifies religion and ethics. There is no true ethics without religion. Ethics must have their ground and ideal in religion. On the other hand, a religion that is not steeped in morality is no religion. The basal principle of religion is righteousness, and the goal of religion is a righteous life, individual, political and social. Rothe refuses to be satisfied with the salvation of individuals. He urges and pleads for the salvation of society as an organic, personal unit. He believes, with the Hebrew poet, that "righteousness exalteth a nation." And in an organic people righteousness is ethical religion. Religion can no more be torn asunder and studied in isolation, or dogmatized upon, than can separate powers of a human spirit, as, for example, memory and imagination, or feeling and willing. Rothe's starting point is the idea of God. This he finds revealed in consciousness. As to the attributes of God, he regards them as positive and real. They are not due to the mere analytic power of the religious soul. He says somewhere, "They are not simply the product of our intellect in reflecting on God, but have existed in essential objectivity in God, and will exist, though the activity of the distinguishing human intellect exist not." Lichtenberger says of him that he does not belong to any one school, but "moves in a plane at once above orthodoxy and heterodoxy." He has had numerous followers, one of the most prominent being Baron Bunsen.

It is with Rothe's scheme of social regeneration that this article is chiefly concerned. This is developed with most fulness in the first part of his "Beginnings of the Christian Church," though the same ideas permeate all his works.

The most intense religious life is the Christian life. But Christianity, as we know it, is but a germ, it possesses powers of infinite expansion. The goal, the dream of this system of ab-

solute religion is a realized kingdom of God. What is the form of this kingdom? Is it a Church or a State? We naturally conclude that it is a Church. In this we err. The Psalms and Prophets combat this idea. The very expression "kingdom of God" is a rebuke to it. The Christian life is not an abstract, narrow, specialist's life, but it consists in a complete and full realization of all mental and moral powers. The office of the Church, as usually conceived, is to satisfy the religious wants of man. As such the work of the Church is narrow and special. It is really then but a part of the State, for the State embraces the whole moral activity of man. The State thus becomes broader than the Church and includes interests that it does not, and touches life at various points where the attitude of the Church is wholly apathetic. Such a thought Rothe will not admit. Indeed, it contradicts the fundamental principle of his theology. With him moral and religious functions coalesce. Moral activity cannot be different from religious activity. Only as inspired by God does human activity have a truly moral character. The fundamental tenets of theism compel this view. That which embraces, therefore, the whole moral activity of man may be the State, as Hegel maintains, but it is also religion, for religion is coextensive with morals. Religion cannot be defined, cannot be discussed, without reverting at once to facts which belong to the moral law. In view of these considerations the matter presents itself to Rothe in this way: Either the purpose of Christianity is a theocracy, an ecclesiastical society, using all moral forces for the glorification of a resplendent priesthood and a profuse ritual, or else the Gospel has in view the regeneration of the State and civil society. Rothe pronounces unequivocally in favor of the latter alternative. The aim of the Gospel is not to save individuals only, but nations and communities as well. The best results of religion must be cut off from the individual so long as the State with which he is organically united is unreligious or immoral.

What then is the mission of the Church? In general, the answer given includes too little. Rothe says it is the office of the Church to use the religious forces of man for the reformation of the social relations imposed by nature. The Church, as such,

is too narrow to give full expression to Christianity. Christ Himself organized no church. No institution goes back to Him as its founder. The ecclesiastical organization with which Christianity early developed itself was purely accidental and temporary. It has been a valued tool. But it has been no more than this. It is a means to an end. The Church's mission is to dissolve itself insensibly into the State. "The State," argues Rothe, "has a right to feel that it is not an ungodly institution, that it is not unchristian, and to claim for itself also the position of being a training school for Christian piety and Christian virtue." Again he says: "The only completion of the State is in the Christian State."

To a certain extent all agree with these theses of the Heidelberg professor. It is a common article of faith that the Church will finally pass into the "kingdom of God." But, so far, no one has set about explaining how this is all to come about. The Christian State, argues Rothe, must, by its very name, draw into itself the whole domain of which the Church has taken possession. All the elements and functions of the Church are, in the last resort, elements and functions of political society. "Christianity is essentially a political principle and a political power. It is constructive of the State and bears in itself the power of forming the State and of developing it in its full completeness." This conception Rothe applies alike to the discipline, doctrine, and worship of the Church. When all the discipline the Church gives is truly religious, that is, purely ethical and spiritual, not technical and formal, it will coalesce with the State. So of instruction; it is confessedly the State's duty to furnish its citizens with the opportunities for scientific training. But in a Christian State this instruction will be religion's abettor, not its opponent. The (always false) distinction between sacred and profane will disappear. Theology and philosophy will be one.

That it is also the State's duty to cultivate proper forms of worship is at first sight not so clear. But if the principle stated is correct, and if worship is really a helpful exercise of human faculty, edification is not a function alien to the State. Indeed the State already cultivates it by means of art and the theatre.

All normal exercise of the feelings, all that appeals to them and woos them out into noble expression, belongs to religion. "The theatre regenerated and purified will be the temple of the future. And there the multitude, as in the fair days of Greece, will draw lessons of virtue and moral power from the contemplation of human life caught in the moments of its greatness." It was Schleiermacher who said, "We know nothing of an antithesis between the moral and the political. The State in which the Christian is to live must be bound by the same divine will that binds him."

Rothe's idealism seems extreme. There are not many who are willing to follow him in all his conclusions. It seems too much like a complete surrender of Christianity. But so it was not understood by its founder. It was rather a surrender of the nations of the world to Christ. Moreover, it was recognized as a remote ideal. All this applies to the religious and moral life at its perfection.

Meanwhile, the Church has an important and well-defined place in society. It prepares and fashions individuals in view of this future age. It proclaims righteousness, and strives to implant the spiritual life. It quickens the spiritual side of man's nature and purifies his moral sense. Though the function of the Church is essentially educational, it is not abstractly so. It must not only teach the truth, but persuade men to accept it and live it. The great obstacle in the way of advance is not that men are ignorant of their duty, but that they lack the will-power to take their stand always and unequivocally on the side of right. It is the office of the Church to create an environment and a power of sympathy that will overcome this organized power of sin. In paganism there is complete subjection to environment. In Judaism there is dualism, man is ever engaged in internecine conflict with his surroundings. Early Christianity likewise regarded nature as an enemy. "The world, the flesh and the devil" are man's bitter foes. But manifestly the world becomes a friend in exact proportion to the Church's successes. A regenerate world, a Christian world, is not an enemy. The Jew could not rise above dualism because he had no conception of a saved world. But Christianity is not national but uni-

versal. It looks for the regeneration of the world as a single organic unit, a united brotherhood. "The world," in such a thought, ceases to be the synonym of "the devil." It becomes the environment, when once it gains the victory for morality and religion, the healthful, stimulating environment of those still below the line in moral and spiritual gifts. There is thus an organized kingdom of righteousness inside the State, and represented by the visible Church, which is ever urging the State on to the full limits of its heaven-ordained capabilities. The Church will manifestly have its reason for being, as long as the State contains mundane elements, or elements not permeated with the religious idea. Rothe wisely holds, that a mere majority is not sufficient to establish an ideal State. The Church organization is not to be given up for a price, nor set aside by the vote of a majority. The victory for righteousness will be won, if won at all, by organized and united effort. The idea of an invisible Church was distasteful to him. "An invisible Church is not a Church, a purely spiritual community is not a community at all, it has no organs and no functions."

On the other hand, he opposed ecclesiasticism with all his powers. The religious element and the clerical element in the Church, as such, have nothing in common. In their relations to the State they are wholly distinct. Clericalism is constantly clashing with the machinery of the State. Religion does not meddle here, but slowly moulds and directs the State's ideals. In proportion as the Church adopts the State's ideals, it sells its birthright, becomes denaturalized, and is itself transformed into a State, and that a most imperfect one. On the other hand, if a Church isolates itself from the State, looks upon the State as unrighteous and unholy, and raises great barriers between the secular and the religious, it has sounded its own death-knell. There is for Rothe but one alternative: The Church must efface itself by dissolving itself, gradually, into the State. This will be brought about when "Christianity becomes absolutely moral and human, and humanity absolutely religious and Christian."

He foresaw that there would be violent opposition to all this and he himself called it a "nest of paradoxes." We are far enough from the coalition of Church and State according to

Rothe's plan. As yet neither Church nor State is "absolutely moral" or "absolutely Christian." A State like Dr. Mulford's "Nation" and a Church like his "Republic of God" might easily enough coalesce. But Mulford's "Nation" on the moral-religious side is as far from being realized as any socialist's dream, and his "Republic of God" contains only regenerate souls. But after all, are not these worthy ideals, and will not a thorough knowledge of them encourage us, inspire us, and give us helpful and effective plans for our immediate effort? Mulford says somewhere, "the goal of history is in the fulfilment of the highest political ideal. It is the holy city, it is the new Jerusalem, the end of the toil and conflict of humanity." And he has dared to quote in this connection the words of the Revelator, "I saw no temple there."

Dr. Lichtenberger thinks that Rothe's theory, apart from its paradoxes, is quite just, and settles the actual and final relations between Church and State. But it would be dangerous as yet to affirm often that the Church is to coalesce in the State.

Rothe published a series of lectures and articles in which he urged the necessity of reconciling modern civilization with Christianity. "The Christian," he says, "stands in a real relation to that part of the world which is not Christian." The formal element in Christianity has reared barriers that have served to keep out of the Church some of the noblest and purest souls. Great poets, prophets and artists are often repelled by the accidental forms of the Church. Thus it is that the available spiritual force of the nation works at cross purpose. How shall these unconscious Christians be thrown into co-operation with those akin to them? His own religious experience had pointed to an answer. The profession of faith must be so simple that even the most modest will not be offended. The doctrines must be so rational and religious that no scholar nor bigot can take offence.

In this Rothe was not altogether happy. It is not mainly because of intellectual difficulties that men are kept out of the churches and isolated from its influences. In the great majority of cases it is the moral indifference or moral looseness of men. And this is often aggravated by social wrongs. The Church,

however, ought not to put unnecessary restraints before its door. It requires all the forces at hand to overcome the hindrances that are real and unavoidable. It was no doubt in the hope of removing opposition to pure religion that Rothe late in life became so intimately associated with the aims and ideals of the Protestant Union. Creed, as such, could find little favor with one who insisted that "Christian piety is absolutely identical with pure and complete morality." In justice to Rothe, however, it must be said that he knew of no morality but Christian morality. He taught that any morality that is not essentially Christian is self-destructive. This must be taken into account when we attempt to formulate his ideas as to the secondary importance of the creeds. He believed as firmly as either of the Cairds, who have done so much to interpret the best of German idealism to the English-speaking world, that mere liberty is anarchy.

Rothe felt assured that there was a certain amount of the individual, subjective and transient in religion, and for this reason he was induced to join the Protestant Union. And with this in view he urged that the Church should require of its members assent to a creed that embraced only the essential and universal in religion and morals.

This seems all to point towards individualism and, perhaps, to some it will seem an extreme individualism. But as Rothe conceived it the reverse is true. His object was not primarily to give unlimited liberty to all, but to break down artificial barriers in order that society as a whole might be saved. Any "plan of salvation" which centres the worshipper's thoughts upon the salvation of his own soul, which makes the future condition of himself the all-absorbing thought, is so far selfish and irreligious. There was a time when the egoistic motive was the only one available. But now, Rothe believes, it becomes the duty of the Church to make use of higher motives. If society is an organism, as Spencer, Mulford and Rothe alike argue, Paul is right in saying that we are members one of another. But the question of the truth-seeker must not be passed by when he asks, "Can the individual be saved if society of which he is a member be lost?" This question perplexed Rothe. Canon Freemantle



has wrestled with it in a most Christly way, and he writes upon the "World as the Subject of Redemption." Hugh Price Hughs has tried to solve it and has given us many manly hints in his "Social Christianity." Many others are busily engaged in the effort to solve this problem. Opponents, on either side, have cut the knot. One, insisting upon the unity of the human family, has argued that all must be saved regardless of the demands of justice and the methods of salvation. The other, insisting with equal force upon the absolute necessity of the new birth, has torn humanity asunder and consigned a part to utter annihilation or to infinite ruin.

Rothe has pointed out another way than that of cutting the knot. And whatever we may say as to his system, his writings are by no means to be judged by their logical outcome. We may gather much from him without accepting his conclusions as to the ultimatum.

Again, and lastly, has not Rothe told us the best way to secure our own individual salvation? We can best work out our own salvation by saving the communities of which we are members. To teach by precept and example the law of righteousness, to fulfil the law of Christ, "bear ye one another's burdens," this is to save not the selfish self but the unselfish self. Rothe's gospel is by no means new; indeed, it is very old. "Pure religion and undefiled before our God and Father" always consisted in this, "to visit the fatherless and widows in their affliction, and to keep oneself unspotted from the world."

THE TENEMENT-HOUSE EVIL.

[Read before the American Institute of Christian Philosophy, 13 July, 1892.]

By R. Fulton Cutting, Esq., New York.

IN the report of the Hand-loom Weavers' Association for the year 1842, there is found the following statement:

"A man who dines for sixpence and spends five pounds per year upon his clothing, is probably as healthily fed and healthily clothed as he whose dinner cost five guineas, and who spends two hundred pounds annually upon his dress. But this is not the case with respect to habitation; for every increase in accommodation from the corner of a cellar to a mansion improves the healthfulness of the abode; and to a considerable degree, the size and goodness of the dwelling affects the civilization of the residents."

Certainly the sociological studies of the past fifty years have not tended to rob this remark of its intelligence and gravity, as we have probably never before felt so keenly as to-day the importance of a proper habitation as an element in the progress of civilization. There are indeed certain features of modern life that tend to give this question of habitation a peculiar gravity. The industrial revolution of the past century, the centralization of capital invested in manufacturing industries in localities where the greatest advantages are obtained for transportation, and the development of the railroads and steam navigation, have built up the vast aggregation of inhabitants that we call the modern city. The great city is no novel element in the history of the world; and in every epoch and every locality it has played a preponderating part in human progress. There is a direct succession between the Babylon of the Ancients and the Chicago of to-day; and yet the great American municipalities present issues with which the ancient and mediæval cities were wholly unfamiliar. In the first place, every male American s to-day a voter, and the welfare of the poorest is a matter of much greater importance to the whole State than that of a hundred Helots in

Sparta, or the same number of serfs in the Middle Ages. The working classes of to-day are also measurably, intellectually and morally educated, and politically taught [we can hardly say educated] to a very great degree. Again, our cities have grown too fast for both statesmanship and philanthrophy, and the social issues arising, from the pressure of an increasing population, for which no proper provision has been made, complicate the situation. In addition to these general difficulties, which are common to all our great cities, New York possesses one peculiar disadvantage.

Bounded on three sides by broad water-courses, and without any adequate system of rapid transit, its expansion is limited to one direction. This, of course, makes land exceedingly valuable, and has given the landlord a monopoly which he has largely abused. In well nigh every respect except habitation, there has been unquestionably an improvement in the general condition of the classes. The increased longevity of the race itself would be sufficient evidence of that fact even if there were not many other local and particular proofs. The working people are surely better fed, better clothed, and even in a measure better housed to-day than they were fifty years ago, but it is in the latter respect that we discover the least evidences of progress. It is true that, since 1867, we have no more cellar dwellings; and since 1880, no more rear-building tenements, but the land lord yields only to pressure, and slowly then.

It must be confessed that the workman of to-day cannot alto gether appreciate his advantage over preceding generations because the standard of life has been raised, and, inasmuch as his self-respect demands that he keep up with that standard, he discovers that his expenditures are by so much increased, he cannot save more than his forefathers, and still marches a great deal too near that dead line that marks the actual necessities of life requisite in every epoch.

There is also no feature of improvement in his material condi tion that can operate so largely to elevate him morally as the improvement of his home. But this, he has not been able to do for himself, and cannot without encouragement from the landlord. There are in New York to-day about 37,000 tenement-

houses. A few of these are quite unfit for habitation ; while, in a vast majority the tenements are so insufficiently lighted and ventilated, so limited in space and devoid of comfort, as to make well nigh impossible the realization in them of the ideal of home. We need make no reference to the evercrowding and filth of habitations in the slums. There is already sufficient literature dealing with the exaggerated features of this question. It is enough for us to consider the system as embodied in the representative tenement.

An ordinary tenement-house (so called) is erected on a common city lot 25 ft. by 100 ft. in depth. It consists of a single building containing four three-room tenements upon each floor. In each of these, one room only opens upon the external air, the other two being inner rooms, one behind the other ; and, at the best, habitations inferior to most stables. Mr. Riis, in his excellent book "How the Other Half Live," has appropriately characterized the residents in these tenements as the "cave-dwellers of the nineteenth century." Formerly it was the custom to erect upon each lot a rear building separated only by a narrow court from the one in front, but the law of 1879 restricted the erection of a tenement house, upon interior lots, to 65 per cent. of the superficial area, and abolished rear buildings. It is interesting to note here that the passage of this amendment to the Building Act, considered at that time a great advance in the effort to improve the homes of the working people, somewhat overshot the mark, as within the last few years a plan for a tenement house building has been devised, by which four tenements can be arranged on each floor—two of them four rooms each, and the other two, three rooms each, and in which every room opens on the external air, and is fairly well lighted and ventilated. These new houses, however, cover 78 per cent. of the superficial area, and are therefore erected in defiance of the law. The Board of Health of course places no obstacle in the way of their erection, as they are really model houses.

But, to return to the representative tenement.

It is in this three-room habitation that the New York workingman is born. It is there he takes his first view of this world, finding his visions circumscribed by the four narrow walls of one

of the inner rooms measuring 10 by 8 ft., and in a gloom so dense that he can scarcely do more than distinguish the passing to and fro of those who enter without being able to recognize their faces. It is in this apartment that he passes his childhood. It is there he reaches adolescence; and often in families of three, four and five children, who, with their parents, are crowded together under circumstances that practically banish the growth of delicacy of sentiment. It is in the living room of this abode he eats, drinks, entertains his friends and enjoys his family life, but inasmuch as the floor space is about 110 square feet, and when the cooking stove, table, three or four chairs and a trunk or bureau are introduced, the proprietor has not much room left for the exercise of a generous hospitality.

How can we expect our adolescent youth, our young men and young women, to grow up intelligent, virtuous, pure and high-minded? How can we expect otherwise than that the ordinary workingman, with no better place of recreation than such a home, will rapidly degenerate into a frequenter of a saloon? However much we may deplore the degrading influence of the latter institution, it is certainly a very attractive place to the ordinary workman, and, with its brilliant illumination, freedom from restraint, comparative purity of atmosphere and congenial association, meets a need of his humanity that cannot be ignored. We must not, therefore, condemn the workman for his fondness for the saloon until we have made some earnest effort to provide a better home than that which he is now obliged to occupy.

The whole question of recreation for the working classes is commencing to obtain a much more reasonable consideration than has heretofore been given to it, and since we have learned to appreciate its importance as an element in adolescent life, we must see to it that young men and young women are not positively driven upon the streets in search of some means for the gratification of an inherent characteristic by reason of the utter insufficiency of home to provide anything more than the barest opportunity for shelter.

There would seem to be little reason for enlarging upon the manifest connection between the morals of the people and the

character of their homes; but inasmuch as one study of this relation has been made, some of the conclusions derived from it may be interesting.

In the years 1847 and 1849, and again in 1860, the French Chambers instituted a thorough and careful inquiry with respect to the habits, character, morals and dwellings of the Parisian workman. It was some years before the real significance of the statistics gathered at that time was pointed out. Prof. Etienne Laspeyres, a professor in the University of Dorpadt, studying the voluminous tables of statistics presented in the report of this inquiry, drew attention to the deductions from it relative to the influence of dwelling upon conduct. His study, prosecuted with great industry and ingenuity and with an amount of reiteration valuable chiefly for its corroborative importance, is made up in a variety of tables showing the relative percentages of good and bad morals to the quality of dwellings inhabited by the workmen. The professor thoroughly appreciated the objection that could be offered to the apparent significance of his deductions in the well known fact that the immoral naturally gravitate to the poorer habitations, and that the nature of the tenant would indicate the character of the lodging rather than *vice versa*.

Inasmuch, however, as the original inquiry was made among workmen actually employed in the various industries and trades, such as piano and furniture making, painting, bricklaying, carpentering, and all the other principal industrial pursuits, no cognizance is taken of the unemployed or naturally vicious classes. The men and women whose lives and environments were studied were at the time enjoying steady employment, and were therefore of the class whose morals were not contaminated by idleness or criminal intention.

The professor's general deductions may be represented by three or four of his tables. He discovered that in the six arrondissements containing the smallest number of habitations classed as "good," the percentage of working people of bad morals was about 10, whereas in the six arrondissements containing the *largest* number of similar habitations, the percentage of working people of bad morals was only 2 1-2. Again, he found that in districts where but 5 per cent. of the working peo-

ple inhabited the apartments classified as "bad," the percentage of bad morals among them was only 3; where 14 per cent. lived in apartments of this kind, the percentage of bad morals was 9, and when 28 per cent. occupied similar houses, the percentage of bad morals among them was as high as 12.

Upon the women, the influence of habitation seems to have been still more pernicious. In districts where 14 per cent. of them were found living in the apartments classified as "bad," the percentage of bad morals among them was as high as 15. In another table he gives figures to show the influence of those living in lodgings classified as "bad" upon the moral character of the whole arrondissement. In the sections containing the largest number of people occupying the "bad" tenements, the percentage of good morals was about 30, whereas in districts containing the smallest number thus domiciled, the percentage of good morals was about 60 per cent.

Of course there are many other sources from which we may inform ourselves relative to the malevolent influence of improper dwellings upon morals, and it is perhaps worth while to indicate a few of them. A few years since an important inquiry was made in Paris on the subject of prostitution, and the subsequent report declares the primary cause to have been not so much poverty and misery, as the want of a proper home and maternal care.

In the latest study in criminology, Mr. Morrison has pointed out that destitution is not nearly to as large an extent as we have generally supposed, the source of crime, and he also directs our attention to the influence of the tenement house.

In the report of our own Labor Department at Washington, dealing with the condition of the working women in large cities, Mr. Carroll Wright has declared that the influence of the tenement house in New York upon the morals of young women is immeasurably bad. But we hardly need any further substantiation of this theory, and we must pass on to the principal difficulty that confronts the efforts to improve our tenement-house district, and that is the peculiar topography of New York City, with the consequent costliness of building area which has led to the construction of unusually high tenement houses and produced unequalled overcrowding. It is well known that in cer-

tain wards we house more people to the acre than any other civilized city in the world—more than twice as many as the most densely settled section of London.

This overcrowding has a significance that has not been generally recognized, and no sympathetic study of the tenement-house question can ignore a certain peculiar importance arising from it owing to the insufficient water supply. In nine-tenths of our regular tenement houses, the water supply is limited to a sink and faucet on the landing of each floor at the head of the stairs. In many of the old houses, there is nothing better than a hydrant in the yard, and inasmuch as the Board of Health has been recently defeated in the courts in an effort to compel the introduction of water to every floor, the court holding that water is a luxury and not a necessity, this system will probably remain uncorrected for many years. Since, however, there is no further plumbing in the houses than the above described faucet, the members of the families occupying these tenement houses, and they contain often from twelve to twenty families, are compelled continually to meet in the contracted yards of the buildings under circumstances that would seem to preclude the existence of a refined sentiment, essential to self-respect, and to open wide the door for future impurity of life.

In the newest variety of tenement houses above referred to a full system of plumbing is introduced, providing two closets upon each floor. That this advantage is appreciated by our working people was recently indicated by the remark of a police sergeant in the Twentieth Precinct. Referring to a recent improvement in the morals of that precinct he ascribed it to the erection of a large number of these improved houses. "They give a man a chance to live decent," he said.

To return to the difficulty arising from the costliness of land and the consequent burden of rent charge, some idea of the disadvantage under which the working men of this city labor in this particular, as compared with their brethren in other parts of the country, may be indicated by the following information derived from a report of the Bureau of Labor dealing with the subject of the iron-making industry.

The average earnings of the pig iron worker throughout this

country is $513 a year, and he pays for rent in localities other than New York for an apartment of four-rooms (3.9 are the actual figures) $65 per annum or $5.50 a month; but in New York City, the workmen cannot rent a four-room apartment anywhere for less than $12 a month, or $144 a year, which is equivalent to a tax of $80 a year for the privilege of living in New York City. The bar iron worker, receiving about $15 a week, or $784 a year, pays for an apartment of five rooms $107 a year. In New York City such an apartment would cost not less than $175 a year. In comparison with those employed in similar industries in England, the disadvantage of our workmen is still more striking. While our iron workers throughout the country pay an average of 13 per cent. of their earnings for rent, and the residents in this city pay from 20 to 25 per cent. of their earnings for the same purpose, the British iron worker pays but 8¾ per cent. Even in the City of Naples, where the topographical conditions are not altogether unlike those of New York, and where the city, confined between the mountains and the bay, is exceedingly cramped for room, the average proportion of earnings expended in rent probably does not rise above 15 per cent.

Of course, there can be no improvement in the tenement-house district in this city until this obstacle of excessive rent-charge be overcome. It is useless to provide model buildings, which of necessity must be more expensive in construction than those ordinarily erected, if in so doing we are compelled to increase the rent-charge to those who already groan under the weight of the present necessary expenditure on this account. New buildings erected in Naples upon the site of the slums recently destroyed by municipal ordinance are an entire failure in this respect. They provide comfortable and sanitary homes, but at a rate altogether beyond the reach of any but skilled mechanics.

It is true that the supply of proper habitations in New York for those who can afford to pay more than the present rates is altogether insufficient, and there are very many self-respecting people who would gladly add to their rent-charge for the sake of obtaining better accommodations. This need is being rapidly supplied by the erection of the new style of buildings before described.

How then can this first and greatest obstacle to tenement-house reform be overcome? One method, of course, suggests itself immediately, and that is the employment of an extensive building plan. The old houses are all erected on the ordinary city lot, 25 by 100 feet in dimensions, and it is evident that great economy in construction can be effected by the erection of single buildings covering at least three lots. This is an essential step in the right direction, but it will not wholly overcome the difficulty. The old house contains four three-room apartments on each floor of the 25 by 100 feet building, and where provision is made for sufficient light, ventilation and plumbing, not more than 3½ similar apartments can be arranged upon each plot of land of this size. This loss of productive space practically nullifies the advantage obtained by building on a large scale, and the model house when completed will be found to represent a capitalization as large as that of the old structures.

If, then, any reasonable return is to be expected from the capital invested, the rent-charge cannot be reduced, and inasmuch as the poorer property usually makes the rate, the model buildings are in danger of disastrous competition. Some additional features of economic management must therefore be employed to attain success.

First of all, it must be noted that in the computation of income derived from tenement-house property, a certain percentage of loss, arising from vacancies, must always be allowed. To overcome this loss, and at the same time establish a basis for other economies of domestic life, the writer would propose the following scheme.

That tenement houses should be built and in due time owned by the workmen themselves, this end to be obtained by the aid of a co-operative nucleus proceeding upon some such basis as the following:

Let us suppose that fifty or sixty men belonging to some large union or industrial organization, and who have reason to favor a particular section of the city as a place of residence, organize themselves into a building association. Let them determine just what character of tenements they desire (and it may here be noticed that in construction it is probable that greater econ-

omy can be practised if the tenements contain four rooms each than if they are of a smaller size) and select a suitable locality for the proposed building. An architect will then prepare a building plan from which the separate tenements may be appropriated by the members of the association by auction. The rentals must of course be regulated by location as in other similar buildings. Having selected their apartments, the members of the association shall pay, in the shape of a subscription to the association stock, an amount equal to 10 per cent. of the appraised value of the particular tenement which they have chosen; but there is still 90 per cent. of the cost of the structure to be provided for. The members of the association have largely exhausted their capital in making the 10 per cent. payment. How then can we overcome their characteristic disability and transform the proletarian into the proprietor. To accomplish this end, the following suggestions are offered, but with great diffidence, as the writer is not aware of any precedent for the scheme from which the lessons of experience may be learned. Under these circumstances, for the initiation of the plan, philanthropy must certainly be called upon, but it is hoped that the business features of the enterprise will very soon eliminate any dependence upon the philanthropic spirit.

Let us organize a species of trust company with a capital, nominally, of $500,000, of which $100,000 shall be at once paid in and invested in some well known and reliable security, the balance of the stock to be purchased as needed by the promoters of the enterprise. From its cash capital, this company will provide the 90 per cent. necessary to erect the building in the following manner. It will issue its debenture bonds to the extent of 50 per cent. of the cost of the completed property in question, and the balance, 40 per cent., will be supplied by an investment in the stock of the building association, 10 per cent. having been originally subscribed by the members. The building will then be capitalized at 50 per cent. of its value in stock, and bearing a mortgage for the other 50 per cent. The debenture bonds above mentioned being secured by a first mortgage on the land and building, to the extent of only one-half its value, and additionally protected by the paid up capital of the trust company,

should be readily negotiated at 4 1-2 per cent., and, if the enterprise should take any extended shape, would doubtless become a favorite investment.

If, then, the building in question, erected, let us say, upon a plot 75 by 100 feet, should cost $80,000, the building association stock would be issued for $40,000, $4000 of which would be paid for in advance by the members of the association, and $36,000 by the trust company. This would be subject, of course, to a mortgage debt represented by the debenture bonds, running for fifty years or even a longer time; the stock in the hands of the trust company to be at all times subject to purchase by the tenants at 100 per cent. and interest, but no individual tenant should be allowed to become interested in the stock to a greater extent than $1000.

The financial control of the building should be located with the trust company, as the representatives of the bondholders, and the local management entrusted to a committee of the tenants. It would seem that, with the advantage obtained by overcoming the loss from vacant apartments, as well as by the lessening in the annual item of repairs, arising from the better care of the apartments resulting from the proprietary interest, that such a building could be made to net 6 per cent. on the investment. But if one-half the cost of the building represented by the mortgage demanded an annual payment of only 4 1-2 per cent. on the principal, the other 50 per cent., represented by the stock of the association, would earn dividends at the rate of 7 1-2 per cent. This dividend, in the first place, would, as the business developed, cover the cost of operation by the trust company, and leave them a profit of 6 per cent. upon their investment in the building association stock. If the business should become very large, 1½ per cent. would probably much more than cover the cost of operation.

In the second place, the tempting rate of interest would encourage the tenants to invest their earnings in the association stock. If the income was as above stated, the final result to the tenant would be as follows:

Having possessed himself of an interest of $1000 in the stock of the association, he would draw dividends to the extent of $75

a year, whereas the same investment in savings banks' deposits would yield him but $30, and he would find himself with a surplus of $45. This amount deducted from his rent of, say, $13 a month—supposing him to occupy a four-room apartment—would reduce his rent about 30 per cent. If, then, any plan based upon this very rough foundation is at all feasible, it would accomplish the following most desirable ends.

First. It would supply apartments, healthful, decent and measurably commodious.

Second. It would reduce the present burden of rent charge.

Third. By creating a proprietary interest it would tend to encourage good citizenship and the development of a lively zeal for honest government.

To render the scheme feasible in operation, several practical details must be supplied. Provision must be made to prevent the permanent alienation from the tenants of the building association stocks, and proper restriction placed upon the occupancy and use of the tenements. Doubtless, other regulations and restrictions would be found necessary after actual experiment. Probably some unforeseen difficulties will then appear ; but the advantages to be derived from the success of some such plan are so great as to warrant the attempt to put it into operation.

Before dismissing this subject attention should be drawn to the certainty of the indirect benefits. In the first place, the plan, if at all successful, would supply intelligent and well-intentioned employers with a practical and feasible method of providing homes for their employés, and, secondly, the establishment of the co-operative nucleus, under the conditions of mutual proprietorship, would afford an unusually advantageous opportunity for the initiation of such enterprises as co-operative stores and club rooms. It is thus possible to indicate several of the very great material advantages to wage-earners consequent upon their personal proprietorship ; but the writer is persuaded that the moral fruits of this enterprise would be still more significant, and the tenemennt proprietor of the future a very different man from the mere tenant of to-day.

HUMANITY OF THE SPIRITUAL LIFE.

[Contributed to CHRISTIAN THOUGHT.]

BY THOMAS P. BAILEY, JR., PH.D., SOUTH CAROLINA COLLEGE.

ALMOST every Christian will tell you, if you ask him, that there is unfathomable mystery in the Christian life, that the communion of the soul with Christ is a unique something that transcends all other human experience. Those who are not Christians of course fail to comprehend such assertions, and are prone to look upon them as mystical if not superstitious. They mistrust psychical phenomena thus isolated from their experience; their human relationships seem worthier and more real, and they sometimes suspect their Christian friends of being dupes of their own subjective states. The "I am holier than thou" seems always implicit in the assertions of those claiming special experiences inaccessible to ordinary mankind, however much the Christian may exhibit humility and charity in his daily life. No one believes more firmly than the present writer in the reality of the Spiritual Life; yet no one is more loath to shut off from spiritual sympathy with Christians those who have not sought communion with God, through Christ, and yet are conscious of those spiritual needs the germs of which are latent in every man. Given moral earnestness and a capacity for loving, and some form or other of the spiritual life is in sight. I have some dear friends who are not Christians, but in whose spirituality I have firm confidence. They are not far from the kingdom of God. But they abhor the mystic, distrust appeals to feeling, are violently prejudiced against evangelical theology, and yet they are conscious of the True, the Right and the Beautiful in human character. Seeing and feeling the absolutely Right and True and Harmonious in personality, they see no necessity for a re-forming of the soul, they cannot understand the new birth.

While one cannot even touch all these difficulties in a brief paper, perhaps what follows may clear the ground somewhat for somebody who really wants to understand the Spiritual Life.

This, then, is my thesis : The spiritual life is the perfection of the True, the Beautiful, and the Right in the natural life ; it results from the need of the absolute in human experience ; it is initiated by an intrinsic appreciation of Christ's character, and by a subordinating of the will unto that of the Father, "even as did Jesus, by searching for and striving to exemplify Truth, Harmony, and Right."

We are all familiar with Faith, Hope and Love in human life and character ; from the scientific or philosophic standpoint we do not call them mysteries, but psychological phenomena. Nowadays it ought to be a truism to say that all phenomena are mysterious.

We have faith in the persistence in character of the Worthy —Truth, Beauty, Right. This faith leads to hope in the development and fruition of that character wherein we have seen the Worthy. In order that we may have this Faith and this Hope, we must love. Now love is the satisfaction of a need, of an impulse. Love is active. It is the opposite of self-satisfaction. It leads to an enlargement of the self, often to a remoulding of the character. Look around you for examples. Perhaps you have one in yourself. So much the better. Love is the spiritually æsthetic. I mean by this, that the beloved person affects you in an inexplicable way just as mysteriously as the manner in which a wonderful harmony touches you. You observe this definition may rule out much of so-called love. A person's self must affect me if I am to love him or her. Were I sufficiently large-hearted and spiritual, could I realize how valuable a human soul is, could I sympathize fully with the human spirits around me—I would love every human being. Only One Person has done that. You see what I mean. I must feel the character, the personality ; it may strike me as ugly and not beautiful, but I would know that the ugliness was beauty marred, and I would love the poor, distorted soul as the mother loves its maimed offspring. "Beauty marred," I say, for everyone has been a little child.

All love, you say, is not so unselfish. True; no love, for instance, is more personal, less to be shared, than the love of husband and wife. When a person gains a hold on our hearts, there is a personal love-phase which no one can share. Yet St. Paul's "charity" that "suffereth long, and is kind, vaunteth not itself; is not puffed up," must be there if the love is to be worth anything. Let us hold, then, that there is a peculiarly personal, intrinsic phase in all deep love; the more the character fills a spiritually æsthetic need, the deeper our love for the person, whether man or woman or child.

We believe in a person we love, even though there be much that is contradictory in him. We admit the contradiction, but we trust the reality of what is good. We believe in the persistence of the True, the Right, the Beautiful in character, despite the human inconsistencies, imperfections, distortions. Though it is often covered up, we believe that the good was there, and if we love the person with the best love, we know that the good may at least rule his life. We hope for the triumph of the absolutely worthy, and our hope is that vital hope which doubts not its realization. Our hope swerves not, though everything seems dark; we know what we know. If you have never had faith and hope of this kind, you have never really loved.

We remember and believe in the sun's light and warmth and beauty, though his face be hid; we look for his return though the night becomes the month. Even should he not return, his beauty, light and warmth were real; are real, if he exists at all.

The realest love is clear-sighted while intense, if need be it feels and knows all the phases of the loved one's personality. A dearly beloved friend impresses his personality upon us in a way that ordinary knowledge and insight know nothing of. The faith that comes of such internal, spiritual love-knowledge is such as cannot be shattered, be the loved one wife, or mother, or father, or sister, or brother, or friend. Passion, even when pure, is often blind; but the more real the love, the more perfect its knowledge of its beloved. The more we love a friend, the more he reveals himself to us. He uncovers the secrets of his heart; so do we. Such friendships are not developed in a day, with us ordinary folk; but I think you will find love at first sight,

whether for friend or sweetheart, just as you will find true instances of sudden religious "change of heart."

Although imperfect in character ourselves, we all appreciate perfection ; we long for absolute worth and value and certainty, in order that our characters may not droop and wither when our own and others' imperfections scorch and blast us. We recognize our own wretched imperfection and sin ; we feel sure that others see them, even though we are beloved ; if we are true men and women, we would not appear what we are not. Oh ! where shall help be found ? Human nature that lives above the plane of mere physical satisfaction has need of perfection in Truth, Beauty, Right. And these in abstraction satisfy only the strong souls of earth ; but they are not the loving souls, and thus not the helpful ones, not the truly living characters. For there is no true living without true loving.

What, then, do we need ? Heroes. We are all hero-worshippers. But it is not the hero of the battlefield or of the forum that will satisfy our want. Such are imperfect, like ourselves ; even our noblest moral heroes are imperfect ; at one moment strong, at another, frail. We may be sure of their intrinsic nobility of character ; we may love and trust them. But they themselves continually need help from us—perhaps sympathy from only one of us ; or else they are hard, and we cannot love them. We cannot love the self-sufficient hero. He is not of us. We want our hero to be of us and yet above us. He must feel and think and suffer and enjoy as we do. Yet he must not sin and fall, or drift, as we are ever doing. We long for a "physical" hero, an intellectual hero, a moral hero, a religious hero—one whose spirit can at once delight and sustain and ennoble us. Above all, he must be a religious hero ; he must grasp the unity and harmony of the world in thought and feeling, and show that unity and harmony in his life and example, so that he will draw all men unto him, as beauty draws our eyes to itself. He must think and feel and do all that the Universe asks of him. The Universe ! Ah, we need our hero to tell us of it ! Is it relentless fate ? Does it care for its children ? Are we its children, or must we say that our bodies and brains are we, and they are its products ? Is it but force and we but dust ?

or shall we trust the love and faith and hope which its modes have developed in us? Are we organic spirits, relative souls, to turn to atoms and motion diffused, instead of organized? or is our relativity—our necessary thought about, and feeling of, the absolute—a sign that there is an absolute environment of spiritual beauty, truth and goodness? Are we deceived in thinking ourselves self-conscious in recognizing within ourselves the germs, the potentialities of the absolute? Self-conscious phenomena! Will our hero tell us if we have a place in the spiritual kosmos? if we have one, will he tell us how to take it?

We want, do we not, such a hero—one for all, so that all may be harmony. When will our hero come? He has come. His love includes us all, and yet there may be a sacred personal relationship between each one of us and Himself. The Christ, our Lord Jesus, came, has come, is come! He was tried, and failed not. He never fails now. He was not conscious of sin. No one convinced Him of sin. No one can. All acknowledge Him to be a perfect hero in truth, in right, in beauty. Whom shall we trust? Where is certainty? Our Lord, our Hero answers: "Follow me." He trusts a Father in Heaven; Him He represents. Thus we can know the inner Universe, the Spirit, through the Son of Man, as He oftenest calls Himself. And, lo! this Spirit, our Hero's Father it is, and our Father!

Study Christ, whoever you are, before you attempt to discuss the "mysteries of religion." Try to realize Him. The mysteries of religion are the mysteries of character.

If you love Christ, you may hope all things He tells you to hope, because to love Him is to trust Him. Our Hero has fulfilled His mission, and is yet ever with us in spirit. He has answered all the questions that earnest men and women have asked. He has told us, He has proved to us, that we are absolutely valuable to our Father and His Father; that there is need of each one of us; that there is always room in the Infinity of Love; that there is work for each one of us; that we have an absolute Guide—one who perfectly and exactly did the Father's will. The children can but strive to do what their Elder Brother, the Holy One, has done. We can, all of us, know the Father's will; we can all

find out His will by striving to do what we already know to be His will as told us by our Elder Brother.

If a beloved friend loves me, I can fight the world if need be. Then if the Absolute Friend (absolute because having perfect communion with our Father), if my Helper whom I can love and reverence and worship as the express image of His Father and our Father—I say, if the Lord Jesus, my Friend and Brother, loves me, surely I can fight and vanquish the world, the flesh and the devil. Know, then, He loves all but those who are self-righteous—the Pharisees of yesterday and of to-day.

This union of the Christian with Christ, this peace in doing the Father's will—truly, it is a mystery! But all love, all spiritual union, all soul-peace—are mysterious! You do not call it a mystery when you love your friend and unswervingly trust him or her—when perfect love brings perfect peace; and yet you see something mystic (some say superstitious!) in this union with God through Christ—the knowledge of the Unknown through the Known. An absolute spiritual friendship, a sacred communion with Christ, childlike obedience to a Father He reveals; love and gratitude because of the Gift—our Elder Brother! All these we find implicit in "ordinary" human experience.

There is mystery in Christianity, but it is a mystery of the absolute; just as the mystery in human, "natural" love and faith and hope is a mystery of the relative that we believe to partake of the nature of the absolute. In Christ's union with the Father we find the relative become wholly absolute.

We need a Saviour to save us from sin—from the loathsome, the false, the wrong. Our Saviour will be "of us and yet above us." Only the Perfect One can give us childlike spirits. We cannot cast our sin upon our fellow-creatures; they cannot bear it; they ought not to bear it. We cannot cast it upon Christ; He can bear our burdens of care, but sin flees from Him. But our loving Saviour took the consequences of the world's sin; He felt the oppression of other men's evil, as all good men feel it, except that His infinitely more sensitive and holy nature suffered in an unimaginable way, when He felt the horrors of the sickeningly awful depths of sin yawning at His feet. And He loved the humanity that had sunk into those depths. He

knew that the germ of the Absolute was in man; He knew that man could be saved if he would; but it must have seemed, at times, to Jesus, that the evil would triumph—and He had come to save the world. You may a little realize what He suffered, when you think of the infinity of His love, the immensity of His responsibility, the apparent certainty of His failure. Imagine your loved ones perishing forever; though you alone can rescue them, they spurn you from them! Do you not think that Jesus must be grieved whenever we sin?

If any thoughtful and right-minded man will try to understand this sad earth's history, and the frightful moral rottenness all about him, even in his own heart—if he can gain a glimpse of the moral hell around him, and if he will let that understanding and that sight sink deep into his heart, he may begin to slightly feel what our gentle Hero suffered, when even God seemed shut out by the foulness and stench of sin. Let your brother or your sister sin deeply, and you will know what it is to suffer. We turn aside from others' suffering, we can stand but little of it; Christ felt it all; Christ did His Father's will, though His Father's face seemed blotted from existence. Jesus, the suffering, the loving, the victorious: He can help us.

There is no use for metaphor and mysticism: a clear realization of the present, past and future wrong and guilt and sin and misery of this grey world would blot out of every one of us all light and hope, all faith and love. "Shut it out of my eyes, O God, if there be a God," each one of us would cry; even now, if God did not have mercy on us, the sin we see around us and in our own hearts would haunt us to madness. You can realize what I say, if you will.

Why can we not see that the mysteries of religion are the mysteries of life; that our spiritual communion with each other is the imperfect likeness of our union with the Father through a realization of the spirit of Jesus? He felt that all but sin was right, because all but sin was God's; He was sure that sin would be vanquished; He puzzled not over God's purposes, but did His will. He feared, and suffered, as we ever will on earth, but He asked for strength, as we must ask; He claimed to be nothing of Himself, as we are nothing; His prayers were always an-

swered ; He was strengthened, and He was calm in His strength. God will give us strength and calm and peace if we ask while doing His will. Let us begin by loving one another, even as Christ loves us, so that the world will see that we are Christ's ; that Christ is God's. Let us take to heart the truth : that our relations to our fellow-men are sacred ; that the human love, not including in itself faith and hope, is not true love at all. Your love to your fellows is as much a part, a vital part, of your religion as your communion with the Father through the Son. Like Peter, we must learn that nothing is common : our every-day life cannot be split off from our religion. Once-a-week religion is a fraud.

We can begin the spiritual life by loving and trusting whatever is worthy in character. Let us not be skeptical about the absolute in man ; let us search out and believe in the good that is in our brother ; let us help him to make the right, the true, and the beautiful arise in their might within him, so that they may rule his heart and character. Then will he listen to us when we tell him of Christ and the kingdom. Love your fellow-man, help him ; and Christ will come to you. "If a man say, I love God, and hateth his brother, he is a liar ; for he that loveth not his brother whom he hath seen, how can he love God whom he hath not seen ?"

Let us carry this purpose and prayer into our lives: "I will find the mustard-seed of good in my brother's character ; I will strive to make it grow. I need help as well as my brother : if Christ comes to me, Him will I gladly receive. Father, help me to open my soul's window that the sunlight of Thy Son's righteousness may stream into my heart. And I ask the same for my brother."

ETHICAL TEACHING OF THE BOOK OF JOB CONCERNING THE CONDUCT OF GOD TOWARDS MAN.

[Contributed to CHRISTIAN THOUGHT.]

BY REV. ANSON P. ATTERBURY, NEW YORK.

THE subject of ethics is commonly treated as applying only to man's conduct. But God's conduct is properly included; indeed, necessarily so in the study of this book. It is the main question involved—presented by the Holy Spirit. The Book of Job is an inspired ethical examination into the conduct of God with man.

It is a concession involved in the whole argument of the Book, indeed, in its very existence and inspiration, that certain obligations rest upon God, and certain rights are vested in man. The Great Ruler of the Universe must conform to these obligations and rights. Job asserts this with an insistence that is almost passionate, and at that point of his argument at which he is evidently and rapidly rising highest in his inspired understanding of his afflictions. Eliphaz the Temanite had for the second time asserted the sad fate of the wicked man, intimating that Job was such, and echoing the suggestions ef Bildad and Zophar. The sufferer remonstrates indignantly: "Miserable comforters are ye all" (xvi. 2). God has forsaken him, he thinks; man, even his closest friends, have turned against him. But see how he rises to a lofty assurance. He knows his innocence. Something within him tells him that he has rights which God must recognize, and that somewhere, in spiritual if not physical sphere, there is a witness who will stand for him and assert these rights which he, though mortal, possesses, and to which God, though Almighty, must yield. Hear his high assertion (xvi. 19 and 21):

> Even now, behold, my witness is in heaven,
> And he that voucheth for me is on high.
> That he would maintain the right of a man with God
> And of a son of man with his neighbor.

This seems at first thought a startling idea, that God is subject to duty, that man has rights which God is bound to respect. Yet this is suggested in the Book of Job in entire harmony with a presentation of the majesty of God which is so sublime that perhaps nothing else in all literature, inspired and uninspired, can compare with it. Eliphaz the Temanite simply speaks what the soul of man instinctively says as he represents the ghostly image saying to him (iv. 17),

> Shall mortal man be more just than God?
> Shall a man be more pure than his Maker?

Our consciences tell us that righteousness and purity are due from man. Our intuitions assert that mortal man cannot be more just or pure than God, his Maker. The high thinkers of all times and nations find themselves thus lifted to this conception of God as pure and righteous—under obligation to be such to man.

1. This ethical obligation, resting on God, as taught in the Book of Job, may be termed in general the duty of justice. Over and over again we have the assertion or implication that God will be, should be, must be, just towards man. Hear Bildad indignantly ask (viii. 3),

> Doth God pervert judgment?
> Or doth the Almighty pervert justice?

Elihu assumes it as impossible that there should be injustice with the Almighty (xxxiv. 10–12):

> Therefore hearken unto me, ye men of understanding:
> Far be it from God, that he should do wickedness;
> And from the Almighty, that he should commit iniquity.
> For the work of a man shall he render unto him,
> And cause every man to find according to his ways.
> Yea, of a surety, God will not do wickedly,
> Neither will the Almighty pervert judgment.

God is, God must be just; but what is all this that He does upon earth? There is a strange contradiction. Many another has cried with Job (xxiv. 1),

> Why are times not laid up by the Almighty?
> And why do not they which know him see his days?

It is the utterance of the sorely-troubled soul—it means, why does not God appoint court days in which to punish wickedness, to right innocence? Why is it that those who know Him do not see such righteous assertion of Himself by God among men? "When he complains that God does not make visible His righteous rule, his meaning is that God does not exercise such rule."

But particularly in God's dealings concerning Himself does Job wonder at apparent injustice on God's part—yea, he asserts such injustice (vi. 4):

> For the arrows of the Almighty are within me,
> The poison whereof my spirit drinketh up:
> The terrors of God do set themselves in array against me.

Emphatically in xix. 6–12:

> Know now that God hath subverted me in my cause,
> And hath compassed me with his net.
> Behold I cry out of wrong, but I am not heard:
> I cry for help, but there is no judgment.
> He hath fenced up my way that I cannot pass,
> And hath set darkness in my paths;
> He hath stripped me of my glory,
> And taken the crown from my head.
> He hath broken me down on every side, and I am gone:
> And mine hope hath he plucked up like a tree.
> He hath also kindled his wrath against me,
> And he counteth me unto him as one of his adversaries.
> His troops come on together, and cast up their way against me,
> And encamp round about my tent.

At times Job seems to be driven almost to fatalism (vii. 1):

> Is there not a warfare to man upon earth?
> And are not his days like the days of an hireling?

As if there were a fated service and destiny for man, without possibility of change or relief. And we can hardly wonder that, in the intensity of his anguish, in reaction from the cold theology of his friends who were urging upon him the thought that he must be deeply sinful, he should begin to think that inexorable destiny was holding him with iron grasp—and that the justice of God had nothing to do with this inexplainable suffering. Elihu had been an attentive listener to Job's utterances, and thus he summarizes the charges made by the sufferer against his God (xxxiii. 8–12):

Surely thou hast spoken in mine hearing,
And I have heard the voice of my words, saying,
I am clean without transgression;
I am innocent, neither is there iniquity in me:
Behold He findeth occasions against me,
He counteth me for his enemy;
He putteth my feet in the stocks,
He marketh all my paths.
Behold, I will answer thee, in this thou art not just.

This leads the youthful champion of divine justice to a magnificent argument on behalf of the righteousness of God (xxxiv. 10–12):

Therefore hearken unto me, ye men of understanding:
Far be it from God that he should do wickedness;
And from the Almighty that he should commit iniquity.
For the work of a man shall he render unto him,
And cause every man to find according to his ways.
Yea, of a surety, God will not do wickedly,
Neither will the Almighty pervert judgment.

2. In general, then, we have the duty of justice as resting upon God; but more specifically—this justice involves prosperity for the righteous and punishment for the wicked.

How emphatically this is upheld by the three friends who thereby vainly attempt to console Job. Thus Eliphaz says (iv. 7–9):

Remember, I pray thee, who ever perished, being innocent?
Or where were the upright cut off?
According as I have seen, they that plow iniquity,
And sow trouble, reap the same.
By the breath of God they perish,
And by the blast of his anger they are consumed.

And Bildad rubs in some of this theological salt, as he asks (viii. 3–6 and 20),

Doth God pervert judgment?
Or doth the Almighty pervert justice?
If thy children have sinned against him
And he hath delivered them into the hand of their trangression:
If thou wouldst seek diligently unto God,
And make thy supplication to the Almighty;
If thou wert pure and upright;
Surely now he would awake for thee,

And make the habitation of thy righteousness prosperous.
Behold, God will not cast away a perfect man,
Neither will he uphold the evil doers.

And Zophar will not be left out; but cries (xx. 4, 5 and 27–29):

Knowest thou not this of old time,
Since man was placed upon earth,
That the triumphing of the wicked is short,
And the joy of the godless but for a moment?

* * * * * * *

The heavens shall reveal his iniquity,
And the earth shall rise up against him.
The increase of his house shall depart,
His goods shall flow away in the day of his wrath.
This is the portion of a wicked man from God,
And the heritage appointed unto him by God.

And Elihu, although from a higher standpoint, and with much truer vision, asserts the same (xxxvi. 11, 12):

If they hearken and serve him
They shall spend their days in prosperity
And their years in pleasure.
And if they hearken not they shall perish by the sword,
And they shall die without knowledge.

For awhile Job, in his agony, attempts to controvert this position. He succeeds in modifying the statement greatly—his friends, the enemy, cannot answer his arguments. At first he attempts to say, "No! God is not just. For justice does imply that prosperity shall come to the righteous, and anguish to the wicked. But that is not what really happens in human experience. Instead, trouble comes to the righteous and prosperity to the wicked. Therefore God is unjust." But after the first, intensest outbreak of his agony he seems somewhat to modify his assertions. He guards his statements a little, and what he now claims is that divine justice does not invariably, though usually it does, involve pleasure for the righteous and pain for the wicked (xxi. 7–15):

Wherefore do the wicked live,
Become old, yea, wax mighty in power?
Their seed is established with them in their sight

And their offspring before their eyes.
Their houses are safe from fear,
Neither is the rod of God upon them.
Their bull gendereth and faileth not;
Their cow calveth and casteth not her calf.
They send forth their little ones like a flock,
And their children dance.
They sing to the timbrel and harp,
And rejoice at the sound of the pipe.
They spend their days in prosperity,
And in a moment they go down to Sheol.
Yet they said unto God, Depart from us;
For we desire not the knowledge of thy ways.
What is the Almighty that we should serve him?
And what profit should we have if we pray unto him?

But later on we find what seems to be a contradiction. In the 27th chapter Job apparently accepts fully the claim made by his three friends earlier in the dialogue. It is a part of the contradictoriness of the whole of the 27th and 28th chapters of the book. One cannot read these chapters carefully without feeling that it is hard to bring them into poem. It has been suggested that from xxvii. 7 through xxviii. may be a later addition and by another hand. But whether or not interpolated, the ethical teaching in it we gladly accept as inspired; it is for us to seek the true ethical instruction that may be contained. Accepting the passage as it stands, we see Job in reaction from his former and wild assertions that God is not just, that the righteous are not prospered and the wicked are not punished, now swinging into line with his accusers and asserting as positively as any of them that divine justice does involve punishment of the wicked, and by inference the prosperity of the righteous. This is certainly an ethical teaching in this passage, for hear the speaker say (xxvii. 13–23):

This is the portion of a wicked man with God.
And the heritage of oppressors, which they receive from the Almighty.
If his children be multiplied, it is for the sword,
And his offspring shall not be satisfied with bread.
Those that remain of him shall be buried in death,
And his widows shall make no lamentation.
Though we heap up silver as the dust,
And prepare raiment as the clay;
He may prepare it, but the just shall put it on,

And the innocent shall divide the silver.
He buildeth his house as the moth,
And as a booth which the keeper maketh.
He lieth down rich, but he shall not be gathered:
He openeth his eyes, and he is not.
Terrors overtake him like waters;
A tempest stealeth him away in the night.
The east wind carrieth him away, and he departeth;
And it sweepeth him out of his place.
For God shall hurl at him, and not spare.
He would fain flee out of his hand.
Men shall clap their hands at him,
And shall hiss him out of his place.

But this unqualified assertion we must modify somewhat by the element of truth in Job's former statements. Theoretically, prosperity and punishment should be thus apportioned; practically they are, usually, but not always. A dark problem still remains to be solved; but we shall find that the ethical teaching of this book covers even the exceptions to the rule.

3. But let us next notice that in connection with the teaching concerning the obligation of justice in the conduct of God towards man, there is at least a suggestion of forgiveness (vii. 21). Job cries:

And why dost thou not pardon my transgression and take away mine iniquity?
For now shall I lie down in the dust;
And thou shalt seek me diligently, but I shall not be.

This is not taught as obligatory upon God. Elihu presents another glimpse of this same possibility (xxxiii. 27, 28).

He singeth before men and saith,
I have sinned, and perverted that which was right,
And it profited me not;
He hath redeemed my soul from going into the pit,
And my life shall behold the light.

It all suggests simply that the justice under which God finds Himself called to act may be somewhat tempered. It does not excuse the Almighty from the duty of sending prosperity to the righteous; but it may relieve Him to some degree from the obligation of sending punishment upon the wicked, at least when repentant.

4. Let us go a step farther. We have been taught that the duty of justice in His dealings with man rests upon God, and that this involves prosperity for the righteous and punishment for the wicked. But this book lifts us to the thought that this justice may not be fulfilled in this life, but may possibly be delayed until the future life. God is obligated to the fulfilment of this justice; if not here, then hereafter.

Nothing about the ethical teaching of this book is clearer than that the apparent injustice of God's dealings with man led the Hebrew to a vague sense of the other, the ghostly life. It may be that the belief in the immortality of the soul arises almost spontaneously in the mind of man, under the promptings of the Holy Spirit; and a belief in God, such as the Hebrews possessed necessarily and logically, in time, leads to the conception of a spiritual life. But in the earlier period of their history, whether or not clearly grasped by some of the greater minds of the race, it was not generally understood; at least, it did not play any large part in the hope and anticipation of the majority of the race. But this sense of the unfulfilled justice of God acted as an inspiration to the writer of the book of Job. See how he represents Job as thus advancing in his thought.

For the sufferer cannot and will not get away from the assurance that this justice, obligatory upon God, is not accomplished in this life. He has the surest of all proof in his own terrible experience. For a short time, in the wildness and confusion of his agony, he seems to assert that God is unjust. But soon he returns to the calmer view—God must be right and just, and in the end recognize innocence and reward righteousness and punish wickedness. But evidently he gives up hope of reaching this fulfilment in life, at least for himself; he cries (xvi. 18),

> Oh earth, cover not my blood,
> And let my cry have no resting-place.

Appealing to the earth not to bury him and his claim eternally. And again (xix. 23, 24),

> Oh that my words were now written!
> Oh that they were inscribed in a book!
> That with an iron pen and lead
> They were graven in the rock forever!

He assumes his death in unacknowledged innocence; longing, however, that his assertions and anticipations should be so recorded that future generations might compare them with the justification then to be accomplished. No hope for him here—there must be some for him hereafter. For God is and must be just. See the steps through which he struggles to his somewhat vague conception of the truth of reward and punishment after this life. At first he seems to conceive of death as virtually ending all (x. 20–22):

> Are not my days few? cease then,
> And let me alone, that I may take comfort a little
> Before I go whence I shall not return,
> Even to the land of darkness, and to the shadow of death;
> A land of thick darkness, as darkness itself,
> A land of the shadow of death, without any order,
> And where the light is darkness.

Soon he rises to a higher consideration (xiv. 13–15):

> Oh, that thou wouldst hide me in Sheol,
> That thou wouldst keep me secret, till thy wrath be past,
> That thou wouldst appoint me a set time, and remember me.
> If a man die, shall he live again?
> All the days of my warfare would I wait
> Till my release should come.
> Thou shouldst call, and I would answer thee:
> Thou wouldst have a desire to the work of thine hand.

In this passage Job ventures at least to pray for a second life. But how vaguely he conceives! Suffering is, however, a fast educator. The mystery of unfulfilled justice drives him onward. See how soon and magnificently he rises to that positive assertion which blazes like a jewel, for which the whole book is merely the setting (xix. 25–27):

> But I know that my redeemer liveth,
> And that he shall stand up at the last upon the earth:
> And after my skin hath been thus destroyed,
> Yet from the flesh shall I see God.
> Whom I shall see for myself,
> And mine eyes shall behold, and not another.
> My reins are consumed within me.

Men may say that this is vague—yes, but it is positive. Job now becomes profoundly convinced of the fulfilment of divine justice towards himself, the recognition of his innocence by the Divine Being, as God, after the death of the sufferer, but under such conditions as that the soul, then actually living, shall see and delight in the just God. He has little idea as to the where and the how; but he has seized a truth to which only his sufferings could have brought him. The poet presents an ethical teaching that only personal and national suffering, despair, could have revealed to individuals or nations. But it would reward a soul, even after passing through such sufferings as those that Job experienced, to reach this truth, that divine justice, apparently unfulfilled at times in this life, can and shall be accomplished in the life beyond.

5. But God has the right to send suffering upon man for disciplinary purposes. Human experiences are something more than merely the reward of righteousness in pleasure and the punishment of sin in pain. The Almighty has the right and desire to train men. God not only rewards and punishes, but He teaches and trains, in His dealings with men upon earth.

It was a great addition to human understanding of God, and to the ethical teaching concerning the conduct of God with man, when the poet represented Job as rising to this thought, that suffering may not simply be a punishment of sin, but a discipline of righteousness. Clearly Job grasps it, as he gets to the end of his vain discussion with his friends. Hear his luminous assertion concerning God, not simply confidence in the Almighty's justice and care, but assurance that it is only a process of discipline through which he is passing (xxxiii. 10):

> But he knoweth the way that I take :
> When he hath tried me I shall come forth as gold.

Elihu presents this same thought forcibly. Indeed, in this is one chief point in which he evidences his superiority to the three friends, though he seems to side with them in the great argument (xxxiii. 29, 30) :

> Lo, all these things doth God work,
> Twice, yea, thrice with a man,
> To bring back his soul from the pit,
> That he may be enlightened with the light of the living.

This thought, indeed, largely or entirely covers the hitherto unexplained problems of human suffering. The three friends, and Job and Elihu, have agreed that God is just, and that justice involves prosperity for the righteous and punishment for the sinner. Job has asserted that there are some exceptions to the rule, and has been led to the deep thought that this fulfilment of justice may be in the after life rather than in this. And as now we reach this deep assurance that God's infliction may be remedial and disciplinary, we have heard enough to satisfy even a suffering Job, much more the unquiet souls of those who have followed him at a distance along that dark pathway. The justice of God is established, in spite of the obscure problems of human experience.

6. But the ethical teaching of the book of Job concerning the conduct of God towards man goes still further. Infliction of suffering upon human creatures may be also for purposes broader than mere human interests. For, in the prologue, we have a glimpse of a court scene in heaven. We know not whether the description is merely imaginary and poetic, or an earthly picture of something actual, though heavenly. It may be that there are times and occasions when the sons of God come to present themselves before the Lord. And it may be that Satan also comes among them. And it may be that reports are then made concerning definite individuals on earth. On the other hand, this may be a flight of the poet's imagination. But in any case we may take what ethical teaching it contains as by inspiration. Whatever else may be properly inferred from the interview between the Lord and Satan, surely this comes—that God allowed suffering to come to his upright servant Job, partly at least, to prove to Satan and the spiritual universe around the great white throne, that it is possible for a man to love and trust God in spite of any amount of disaster and suffering. God says to Satan, "Behold, he is in thine hand, only spare his life." Why does God thus commit Job into the adversary's hand? We answer—because Satan had said, "put forth thine hand now and touch his bone and his flesh, and he will renounce thee to thy face." God lets Satan inflict disaster upon Job to make proof to the spiritual universe that Job would not renounce thereby his confidence in the all-just One.

This is new, strange, important, ethical teaching. We have it intimated, but not generally or clearly revealed, elsewhere in the Bible. Perhaps nowhere more clearly than here is the truth made manifest that God sometimes deals with men, having directly in view the influence thereby exerted upon interests higher and broader than the merely human. This is indeed an ennobling view of human suffering. To know that, perhaps, when God sends on man affliction it may be because God wants that human being to illustrate divine grace in the sight of spiritual onlookers is indeed a lofty and inspiring conception. Well might Job be willing to suffer even to death itself, if thereby he could prove to Satan, to devils, to angels, to God Himself, that man can hold to God throughout all.

7. Lastly, we find the ethical teaching that the end of divine dealings with men is always to reach mercy.

Eliphaz, in his opening argement, says that, were he in Job's place, he "would seek unto God, all whose ways are marked by one purpose, to do good, and whose chastisements, therefore, but open the way to a richer blessing" (Cambridge Bible, 38). This is a summary of the argument in the fifth chapter (v. 15–19):

> But he saveth from the sword of their mouth,
> Even the needy from the hand of the mighty.
> So the poor hath hope,
> And iniquity stoppeth her mouth.
> Behold, happy is the man whom God correcteth;
> Therefore, despise not thou the chastening of the Almighty.
> For he maketh sore and bindeth up;
> He woundeth, and his hands make whole.
> He shall deliver thee in six troubles;
> Yea, in seven there shall no evil touch thee.

And thus Dr. Cox summarizes a part of Elihu's argument: "He hath also learned what some of us are still slow to see, that the goal and end of all divine judgments is mercy; that God strikes down the lawless oppressor, whether of the family or of the nation, from love to the oppressed, and brings successful evil to a sudden end out of compassion for the unthinking multitude who might be dazzled and corrupted by it were its triumphs to endure."

But this teaching that mercy is the end of God's dealings with man is made the more clear as we reach the dramatic conclusion of the poem. What a happy ending is presented (xlii. 11–13):

> Then came there unto him all his brethren, and all his sisters and all that had been of the acquaintance before, and did eat bread with him in his house: and they bemoaned him, and comforted him concerning all the evil that the Lord had brought upon him; every man also gave him a piece of money, and every one a ring of gold.
>
> So the Lord blessed the latter end of Job more than the beginning: and he had fourteen thousand sheep, and six thousand camels, and a thousand yoke of oxen and a thousand she asses.
>
> He had also seven sons and three daughters.

Our sense of poetic justice leads us to demand some such conclusion. It may be that this ending is so satisfactory as to be proved thereby artificial. But whether or not Job really got his double portion of property and his ten children again, the fact that inspiration leads to such a conclusion of this investigation into the ethics of God's dealings with man gives us warrant for the assertion that such merciful return, here or hereafter, is what God always aims for in His dealings with man.

So we have endeavored to see the ethical teachings of this book concerning the conduct of God with man. And yet we cannot help even now asking the question, Has God a right to make a man suffer so much, even for such purposes? Job's moan will not be quieted (iii. 20–23).

> Wherefore is light given to him that is in misery,
> And life unto the bitter in soul,
> Which long for death, but it cometh not;
> And dig for it more than for hid treasures;
> Which rejoice exceedingly,
> And are glad when they can find the grave?
> Why is light given to a man whose way is hid,
> And whom God hath hedged in?

The great ethical teaching of this book, under this head, is assuredly "yes." Yet even thus our souls will not be quiet. Are we sure that we are right in our interpretation of God's dealings with men? May we not be committing the very mistake that Job and his three friends and Elihu made—in trying to measure the Infinite and Almighty by human standards? We must not hold Him too closely to our weak human thoughts.

The explanations which we have endeavored to make in defence of God's justice in dealing with man did not fully satisfy Job, and will fully satisfy but few men while under the disciplining touch of the Almighty. Humbly and reverently, yet fearlessly, we assert these teachings that thus far we have drawn from the inspired book. Yet nothing will really satisfy the soul, all human deductions of logic will fail of their due force, until God answers our questioning hearts as He answered Job the sufferer—out of the whirlwind, and by the immediate and overwhelming presentation to man of the majestic greatness of the Divine Being. That, only that, will finally answer the soul that asks how God can be just in His conduct with man.

RELATION OF INVENTIONS AND PATENTS TO CIVILIZATION.

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The hope of gain has no doubt had its stimulating influence upon inventors, but probably to a less extent than upon others engaged in different pursuits. This, however, is not the prominent feature of consideration.

Attention is desired briefly to the origin of the Patent System of the United States and its prominent features, and its effect upon the industries of the country and of the world, and then we may take a glance at the relations between inventions and creation as it is manifested in the world around us.

Patents for inventions are of comparatively modern origin; they are the outgrowth of despotism, singularly transformed by the benignant touch of law and justice into the most useful and righteous of human enactments, and I hope to show that the principles underlying inventions and patents are in harmony with those of creation and the Great Law Giver Himself.

The student of history finds that the discoverer of islands, continents, and unknown lands took possession of the same in the name of his sovereign, and the sovereign parcelled out the land to his favored subjects, or to those, sometimes, whom he desired to get rid of; thus the grants f certain portions of our own country from the reigning monarchs of the old world were written as letters to the individual or colony and sealed with an official seal and called *patent*, meaning an open grant. In this manner an arbitrary royal assumption and gift or grant became a recognized foundation for a title, and all the property in the United States and most other countries is based on the action of some one in authority at the time, in giving away or deeding for a small consideration vast tracts of land, either conquered or stolen from the aborigines. A few notable exceptions exist where land was purchased from the Indians, but almost all titles to land are traceable back to Letters Patent from the authorities first claiming ownership by discovery or conquest, and to the present day our Government grants to

settlers or purchasers what are known as Patents for sections or portions of the public domain.

It, however, is not this class of patents to which attention is to be directed.

In the progress of absolutism, the various sovereigns of England used their power for the benefit of their friends and for the enrichment of their own exchequer. Back as far as the days of the Saxon and Norman kings of England one of the royal privileges was to grant portions of the public domain or unoccupied lands to individuals, because it was rightly considered that the nation was benefited by the land being cultivated. These kings were also accustomed, in the exercise of their arbitrary powers, to grant monopolies to private individuals for any trade or manufacture not known or worked in the realm, as a means of promoting the introduction of new trade and industries. Royalty, having the power, was not slow in exercising it by rewarding its favorites by granting monopolies for particular trades, whether they were new or not in the realm, until the most lucrative businesses were confined to the few, and the many were made to suffer extortion. Queen Elizabeth was a great offender in this matter, and so were many others. When Magna Charta was extorted from King John, it contained these words:

"All merchants, if they were not openly prohibited before, shall have their safe and sure conduct to depart out of England, to come into England, to tarry in and go through England, as well by land as by water, to buy and sell without any manner of evil tolls by the old and rightful customs except in time of war."

This expression, "if they were not openly prohibited before," still allowed the grant and maintenance of monopolies to royal favorities; and so odious did these become that Parliament, in 1623, in the twenty-first year of the reign of James I., passed the celebrated Statute of Monopolies and compelled him to sign the same. This act forms the basis of the Patent System of Great Britain. Amendments and modifications in its mode of execution have been made, but the rights in letters patent remain substantially unchanged.

This Statute of Monopolies declares that all monopolies except such as are therein provided for shall be null and void, and says,

"Provided also, and be it declared and enacted, that any declaration before mentioned shall not extend to any letters patents and grants of privilege for the term of fourteen years or under, hereafter to be made, of the sole working or making of any manner of new manufactures within this realm to the true and first inventor and inventors of such manufactures, which others at the time of making such letters patent and grants shall not use, so as they be not contrary to the law, nor mischievous to the state, by raising prices of commodities at home, or hurt of trade, or generally inconvenient; the said fourteen years to be accounted from the date of the first letters patent or grant of such privilege hereafter to be made, but that the same shall be of such force as they should be if this act had never been made, and of none other."

The word inventor, as used in this statute, has a different meaning from that with us. The word had its derivation from *invenire* to come in, hence the inventor at that time and ever since in England has been legally regarded as the introducer or bringer in of a new trade or discovery, and the law has been administered with that understanding. One of the early cases tried was that of Sir William Petty, who, in the guise of a half-witted fiddler, went to Sweden and learned the secret of slitting iron up into bands, and returned to England and patented the same and his patent was sustained.

The English patent system was the foundation of our own, but yet there are many radical and important differences.

In England a patent is regarded as a monopoly, in this country as a right.

The circumstances before mentioned indicate the origin of the system to have been simply an arbitrary favor from royalty and that idea has clung to patents in foreign countries, especially in Great Britain.

In our own land different and just enactments prevail; a patent is not a monopoly, it is simply an inherent right, and the framers of the Constitution of the United States in 1790 built better than they knew or realized when power was conferred upon Congress to "promote the progress of science and the useful arts by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries."

Property in houses, lands, goods and tangible things, that the eye could see or the hands handle, had before been recognized, but here was a constitutional provision, acknowledging that an author's thoughts expressed in words were his property and entitled to protection, and that an inventor was the owner of the improvement or device that he created.

Following out the provisions of the Constitution the first patent law was enacted in 1790, and the centennial of its passage was celebrated in Washington in June, 1890.

It would not be interesting to go over the modifications of the Patent Law and to point out its various peculiarities and the difficulties that have been experienced in rendering its administration equitable and in preventing unscrupulous persons from defrauding the public by pretending to own that which did not belong to them.

In most foreign countries certain forms have to be complied with and payments made, and the patent is granted without examination as to novelty or utility. The inventor or patentee has no assurance that his invention is new or that his patent will be sustained in court should litigation arise on the same. The public does not know whether to respect a patent or to infringe it with impunity.

Our American patent system seeks to remedy both these evils by determining beforehand whether the invention for which a patent is sought is new and useful. If it is not new a patent must not be granted, as the public must be protected as far as possible against invalid patents being in existence, to be used as scare-crows to the detriment of legitimate business, and on the other hand, the inventor and capitalist must have a reasonable assurance that the patent, if granted, will be valid.

To determine the question of novely and utility is a difficult task, requiring careful investigation to ascertain whether the invention has been patented or described in any publication in any country.

To provide for this being done, the Patent Office has been constituted and equipped with an extensive library and the different branches of arts and manufactures are classified and subclassified, and copies of drawings of domestic and foreign patents

are correspondingly assorted and classified in folios and boxes, and a force is provided of thirty examiners and their assistants, copyists, type-writers, etc., and every application for patent is sent to the examiner of the particular class to determine whether the invention is new or old.

At this point the greatest skill and care have to be exercised in distinguishing between the old and new. The most important inventions ever made have been but a small step in advance of what had been done before; and in obtaining a patent that will properly protect the invention, the inventor and the attorney are often sorely puzzled to know how to employ such words and expressions as will clearly point out that which is new from that which is old, and many inventors are constantly finding out to their sorrow that their patents are utterly insufficient to protect them in that which has often cost them untold labor and ingenuity and often hundreds or thousands of dollars in money.

The responsibility generally rests, and properly so, on the solicitor, for the inventor is often inexperienced in patent matters, and the examiners in the patent office frequently consider it their duty to object to the grant of the patent and not to aid in ascertaining wherein there is merit, and these points often have to be forced upon their notice.

Space will not permit the introduction of illustrations on these points. For instance, Howe was not the inventor of an eye-pointed needle. The sewing-machine required something more than an eye-pointed needle; it required a work-holding bed and means for concatenating the thread carried through the cloth by the eye-pointed needle, and the specification had to bring out these points.

An electric lamp had been made of carbon in a glass globe, but Mr. Edison's patent had to bring out the difference between the prior devices and a carbon filament of high resistance that became luminous by a current passed over a comparatively small wire.

The magnetic telephone was not an entirely new invention. Reiss made a musical telephone in 1861 that sometimes reproduced speech, and to distinguish between his instrument and that invented by Bell was very difficult, and many persons have

believed there was no real difference, but one was a success and the other was not; and the courts properly sustained the patent for that which was really useful, even though the specification did not properly distinguish between the old and the new.

Difficulties of this character are of constant occurrence, and the merits of an invention and the essential matters requiring protection are often not understood until after the original patent has been granted for several years. Hence, a patent solicitor is often expected to know more than the inventor and to provide for contingencies that are not thought of until several years afterwards, and it is not placing undue honor on the profession to say that there is no business on the face of the earth that is so difficult to manage properly as that of a patent solicitor. He is importuned often by the inventor to get a broader patent than he is really entitled to; thwarted on the other hand by foolish and unreasonable objections in the Patent Office, and expected to make a specification and claim to anticipate the ingenuity of other inventors, so as to prevent them from accomplishing the same object by changes that might evade the claims of the patent.

To sum up this part of the subject it may be said that:

First. A patent is only to be granted in this country for that which is new and useful.

Second. It can only be granted upon a proper application executed by the inventor if alive, or by his representative if he has died.

Third. The application must properly describe the invention and claim only that which is new, so as to distinguish between the old and the new.

Fourth. The patent will fail to give the proper protection unless the claims are as broad as the invention.

Fifth. A patent does not lessen the rights previously held by the public, and it is granted not as a favor or monopoly, but as a right, and for the encouragement of the useful arts by giving a protection for a limited time (seventeen years), so that thereafter the public may freely enjoy the invention.

Sixth. The description in the patent, being a matter of public record, prevents the invention or discovery becoming a lost art, as it is liable to do when practised in secret.

Prejudices have arisen in the minds of many persons against patents for inventions; the old idea of a monopoly derived from an arbitrary grant by royalty, as before mentioned, has been handed down to us from the old English practice, and it has taken a century to begin to efface the misapprehension, and there is nothing worse to deal with than prejudice, which persistently will not understand; and where a patent stands in the way of the thief who has no ideas of his own and wants to make money out of other people's brains, the outcry against patents has been loud, persistent and unreasonable, and often those are the most benefited who cry out the loudest. Take, for instance, the patents on barbed wire fences. The farmers made great outcry of extortion, but in many places these fences cost only about one-quarter as much as the ordinary post-and-rail fences. Why did not the farmers continue to use the old style? Simply because the new style was the cheaper, and yet, in their blindness, they cursed the men who had saved them half to three-quarters of the former cost of fencing.

To all grumblers about patents it may be said, no person will hinder your using the old devices; you are not compelled to take the new ones, but if the new is preferred, the man that has invented the new has as much ownership in that which his thoughts have created as the farmer has in that which grows in his fields, nay, more so; the farmer labors, sows his seed and cultivates his crop, but he does not make it grow; the inventor has to make his invention grow; he has to furnish ideas and create what had not before had an existence, and the Constitution of the United States makes that his property for a limited time; and if people do not want to pay the inventor reasonably for that which is his property, they must wait the expiration of the patent, and then it becomes the property of the public.

Running the eye back over the rise of modern civilization we notice the alchemist who, in his greed for gold, pried into the secrets of nature and laid the foundation of chemistry. Before that time architecture and the crude implements of husbandry and of war might be said to make up the arts of the ancients. Law, literature, painting, sculpture had made great advancements, but the stand-still of the Dark Ages was broken by the invention of

printing, and a new era was ushered in; but the discoverer sought to keep his inventions secret as the only way to reap any benefit therefrom, and many valuable discoveries were lost by the death of their originators, and it was only by holding out inducements that led men to put a knowledge of their inventions on record; that inducement was a promise of ownership for a limited time by the grant of letters patent.

China and many Eastern nations have not protected inventions, and they have remained stationary for thousands of years.

Nothing has been a more potent lever to lift the world up to a higher plane of civilization and happiness than inventions and patents.

The foundation of the system is improvement. Who ever heard of a man trying to invent something worse than that which had preceded it? Each invention becomes but a stepping-stone to something better, and the success of one is a goad to urge another to further attainments.

It cannot be denied that many useless devices have been made and patented, and that inventors and enthusiasts have run wild after perpetual motions and Keely motors and kindred impossibilities, but even these presented a hope of something higher and better.

There is an element of the Divine connected with inventions that may not have received its share of thought. The Great Artificer has made this beautiful world and filled it with flowers and trees. He has spread abroad the blue sky, dotted the landscape with hills and the expanse of waters with islands; He has filled the earth with minerals and inorganic substances innumerable; He has made the giant elephant and the tiny insect, and each possesses the powers necessary for its existence. The same thing may be said of the savage as he roams his native forests in the undress of nature, and lives on the things that come to his hand; he possesses the faculties necessary for his situation.

In the inventive faculty of man we see a spark of divinity, a desire to make, to create, to bring into existence that which before was not, and that divine spark has kindled into a flame in the century of inventions that has passed.

Do not consider these remarks irreverent. In the spread of Christianity in the world man is made to work together with God, as laborers together with Him. Angelic beings do not come to earth to preach the Gospel, to clothe the naked, to feed the hungry, or to shelter the homeless; they do not build railways or locomotives or forge our iron or plant our fields. The rough materials are furnished in nature around us, and to man is given the power and the privilege of making things, as it were—of carrying on the work of creation by bringing the crude materials together in the forms and devices calculated to elevate mankind and promote his comfort and happiness.

We do not question or belittle the divine power by believing that God never made a steamboat or a loom or a watch, but we magnify it by the belief that, having made the crude materials, He put into man the power to carry on, as it were, the work intended to be done for mankind in raising up and elevating the standard of comfort, convenience and human attainments.

If grumblers belittle inventors and improvements, if they want to return to the ignorance and discomforts of even fifty years ago, let them be frank and say so, otherwise let them acknowledge the debt of gratitude by acting with reason and common-sense in promoting progress; let them recognize in inventions a divinely given creative power, and remember that the inventor is one who is seeking to pry humanity up to a higher level; to give something better; to promote some pleasure and to make the world better and happier.

One of the pleasing signs of the time is the universal desire to help. The hand of sympathy is extended to raise the down-trodden, to shield the tempted, to clothe the naked, to heal the sick, to lessen the burdens of life, to promote intercourse, to lift men out of themselves, to bring the whole world of knowledge to our doors, to pass over mountains, to drive the smoking chariot through the seas, to take away the drudgery of life's necessary duties, to pierce the skies and bring to man a knowledge of distant worlds.

Man could not exist without the farmer; he must plant the seed and carefully tend his crops; there is, however, nothing in his calling that lifts the world to a higher plane; useful and nec-

essary as his labors are, they have been the same ever since man had an existence.

The merchant buys and sells to get gain; he, too, is a necessary factor in society, but buying and selling have never contributed an iota to the world's progress. The manufacturer makes that which had before been made, and had it not been for the inventor, who improved upon primitive fig-leaf garments, we might still appear in the undress of our first parents. It is the inventor who helps all other trades and callings by the creation of that which is better. But do not inventors have the mighty dollar before their eyes to stimulate their efforts? Is not sordid gold at the bottom of the so-called improvements of the age? Perhaps so; but does the farmer, the merchant, the manufacturer, have any higher motive? Is not necessity or a laudable desire to accumulate, the mainspring of all effort and the foundation of civilization?

The motive for inventing should be higher than to make money; there should be a real desire to make something better, to supply some want, to do what has not been done before, or to do it in a better manner. If remuneration is the result, all the better; if not, there is a satisfaction in knowing that the motive has been good, and perhaps the world will afterwards recognize that you were ahead of the age.

I have referred to the Chinese as a stand-still nation because they lack originality. They are very dexterous, and their carvings and other displays of handicraft are marvellous. Young men should cultivate dexterity; no person is ever sorry for knowing how to drive a nail, saw a piece of wood, or use a file or plane. Young men expect their mothers and sisters to know how to sew on buttons and mend garments, and why should not mother, sister or wife properly expect the son, brother or husband to know how to repair the little breaks that are constantly occurring around the home?

Dexterity in the handling of tools is much more useful than proficiency as an athlete, and recreation can be obtained thereby and the happiness of others promoted.

Do not think there is nothing left in the world that needs to be improved; thirty or forty years ago many people supposed

that science had almost reached perfection, but the strides that have since been made bring almost a smile of contempt upon the attainments of that period; so, in the future, those that live fifty years hence will no doubt be amused by the crudeness of the devices and knowledge of the present day.

Only a few years ago the stage-coach or carriage and the saddle-horse were the only means of transportation on land. The sailing-vessel was but little different from that used three or four thousand years ago. Clothing was always made to order. The life of the woman was one of drudgery—the household duties being increased by spinning, weaving and hand-sewing. Communication from place to place was slow and fatiguing. The change was gradual, but it has all been brought about within the last century. The palatial steamers of to-day give convenience and luxury almost equal to the most elegant homes. The lightning-express trains are like hotels on wheels; the telegraph and telephone bring the news of the world to the breakfast table. All these changes and progress can be traced in the records of the Patent Office, and modern civilization is but the every-day use of patented devices. In fact, there is scarcely an article of manufacture that has not had the mark of patent upon the thing itself or upon the machinery by which it was made.

Few inventors become rich; many die in poverty while the world is made rich by their efforts. The author is entitled to protection for the grouping together of words that may stimulate to noble deeds and glowing mental attainments, or he may curse the world with unholy thoughts and word-pollution. But the inventor can do no one any harm; if his creation is a useless foible it will sink into oblivion, but his aim is good; it is always for something new and better; it is not for other worlds to conquer by fire and sword, but it is to build, to produce, to evolve something not before in existence; to place, as it were, a new star in the glorious canopy of existence, and to carry on the great purpose of elevating humanity to the very zenith of its earthly existence.

In all the operations in the world there is a balancing of forces. If the merchant hears of higher prices in a distant city, hither he sends his goods; others do the same and prices fall. So during

the present century the introduction of inventions disturbed the tread-mill round of former ages. Machinery has taken the place of animals and of men, and at the same time new and larger demands have been made for men and beasts of burden. The busy hive of human activity is larger than ever before; the wants of the world are more easily supplied than at any former period; food, clothing and shelter have been rendered cheaper, and pay for labor has largely increased, and although many wrongs remain in the world, and suffering, privation and sickness still exist, the length of human life has been largely increased, men are learning to think more clearly and to act more intelligently. Eyes that were closed by ignorance, superstition and prejudice are being opened; freedom of thought that would not have been tolerated fifty years ago receives candid and careful consideration. Public discussion is leading to a more clear distinction between right and wrong, and the hope may be indulged that during the coming century still greater blessings are in store for the world.

There are indications that the necessities of life will be more easily obtained; that capital, no longer needed as the sinews of war, will be used for the benefit and elevation of the race, and that an almost universal language will facilitate the exchange of ideas and the full understanding of public and private rights; and while dependence upon divine aid and guidance must not be overlooked, each one has his and her part in the advancement of peace on earth, good will to men.

REMARKABLE DISCOVERIES.

In the year 1889 an address by Prof. Sayce was delivered at the Victoria Institute, in which he reviewed the results of his examination of the tablets which had been discovered at Tel el-Amarna, and of which the museums at Berlin and at Gizeh have secured most, about 240. In describing these he showed how great a light they threw on the relations of Egypt and Assyria about 3400 years ago. Among these tablets he found one, a letter from a certain Zimrida, the Governor of Lachish, in the south of Canaan. In concluding his address, he said: "The discovery of the tablets at Tel el-Amarna has a lesson for us of momentous interest. The collection cannot be the only one of its kind. Elsewhere, in Palestine and Syria, similar collections must be lying under the soil. Burnt clay is not injured by rain and moisture, and even the climate of Palestine will have preserved uninjured its libraries of clay. Such libraries must still be awaiting the spade of the excavator. Why should Palestine, the sacred land of our faith, remain unexcavated? The tablets of Tel el-Amarna are an earnest that they will yet be found, if they are properly searched for." Three years have passed since then. In the meantime Dr. Petrie went to Syria, and the site of Tell el-Hesy struck him as a desirable spot to excavate; moreover, he believed it to be the site of Lachish. Dr. Sayce was also much impressed with the importance of excavating it, and used his utmost endeavors to encourage the Palestine Exploration Fund to continue the work. After some time it became apparent that Tell el-Hesy was actually the site of Lachish, but it was only on the last day of the third season, this spring, when the workmen's tools were being gathered in and they were being paid off, that the excavators came on the remains of the Amorite Lachish; some Egyptian beads, scarabs, and Babylonian seal cylinders were disinterred, on one of the beads being the name of Queen Teie, mother of Amenophis IV., to whom most of the Tel el-Amarna

correspondence is addressed. But the discovery of all others that morning was a tablet; on Dr. Sayce deciphering it, he found it not only identical in style with the Tel el-Amarna tablets, but that it was a letter addressed to Zimrida; in fact, the other half of the correspondence, or answer to the tablet referred to at the beginning of this article; and, to quote the words of Dr. Sayce, we have, therefore, "the two halves of a correspondence, which was already past in the time of the Exodus, again joined together." The value of such discoveries as illustrating the truth of the Old Testament and the correctness of the view of those who claim that it is not a compilation of the days of the Jewish captivity, has been urged by many scholars, notably by the late Canon Liddon; and Dr. Sayce says: "The Tel el-Amarna tablets have overthrown the primary foundation on which much of the criticism of writers like Stade was built." And in referring to the value of this year's excavations he again writes: "To dig up the sources of Genesis is a better occupation than to spin theories and dissect the scriptural narrative in the name of the 'higher criticism.' A single blow of the excavator's pick has before now shattered the most ingenious conclusions of the Western critic."

Prof. Heckler, the Chaplain of the British Embassy at Vienna, presented to the International Oriental Congress a papyrus manuscript of an alleged Greek translation of portions of Old Testament Scriptures, supposed to be the Septuagint. It will interest scholars and elicit close criticism. We may have something to say about it in a later number of CHRISTIAN THOUGHT.

SUMMER SCHOOL OF 1892.

By Charles M. Davis, Secretary.

THE Sixteenth Summer School of the American Institute of Christian Philosophy was held in the University Temple, Prohibition Park, S. I., from July 12 to July 19, 1892. The President, Charles F. Deems, D.D., LL.D., presided at all the meetings, and these were held at 3:30 P.M. and 8 P.M.

First Day, Tuesday, July 12. Afternoon. The school was opened with reading of Scripture and prayer by the President.

Rev. Joseph Cook, of Boston, then read a paper on "Fast and Loose Theories of Evolution; or, Recent Definitions of Darwinism." The subject and paper were discussed in the evening by Rev. Dr. M. B. Chapman, editor of *The Christian Advocate*, St. Louis, Mo.; Rev. Thomas Elliott, Madolin, N. Y.; Mr. Charles W. Kennedy, Staten Island; Rev. Dr. J. H. Crum, Terre Haute, Ind.; Mr. C. N. Bliss, Staten Island; Rev. Granville R. Pike, Fargo, N. D.; Dr. Daniel S. Gregory, and Mr. S. N. Wilder, of New York.

Second Day, Wednesday, July 13. Afternoon. Devotional exercises were led by Rev. A. L. Morse, Chicago, Ill.

The paper of the day was by Rev. Dr. G. R. W. Scott, Andover, Mass., whose subject was "Man's Responsibility for his Beliefs." The discussion was conducted by Rev. Dr. Robert B. Fairbairn, President of St. Stephen's College, Annandale, N. Y.; Mr. W. T. Brown, Rev. Dr. J. H. Crum, Rev. G. R. Pike, Rev. Dr. Sylvester F. Scovel, President of the University of Wooster, O.

Evening. After prayer by Rev. Dr. J. H. Crum, the President announced that R. Fulton Cutting, Esq., of New York City, who was expected to read a paper this evening, had been called to Europe. His paper was read by Rev. Granville R. Pike, the subject being "The Tenement-House Evil." The subject and paper were discussed by Miss E. B. Bradley and Mr. Zenas W. Bliss, Staten Island; Dr. Scott, Mr. Pike, Dr. Scovel, Dr. Crum and Dr. Deems.

Third Day, Thursday, July 14. Afternoon. After prayer by Prof. Edward J. Hamilton, of New York, the President appointed

as Committee on Nominations, to report at the annual meeting, Rev. Dr. Daniel S. Gregory, Rev. Granville R. Pike, Prof. Joseph A. Hallock.

Daniel S. Gregory, D.D., of New York, read a paper on "The Modern Aristotle *versus* the First Cause," an examination of the teachings of John Stuart Mill. In the evening, after singing and prayer, Dr. Deems read a paper entitled, "What was Man before He Was?" This was written for the Summer School by Rev. Dr. Richard Abbey, of Mississippi. Dr. Abbey died suddenly last October, but had previously sent his paper to the President. In the discussion which followed Mr. Z. W. Bliss and Drs. Gregory, Crum and Scovel took part.

Fourth Day, Friday, July 15. Afternoon. The devotional exercises were led by Rev. J. H. Edwards, of New York. Dr. William Leroy Broun, President of the Alabama Polytechnic Institute, Auburn, Ala., read a paper on "The Progress of Education of the Colored Race in the South." The paper and subject were broadly discussed by Rev. Dr. J. H. Crum, Mr. Marion J. Verdery, Mr. Joseph Wright, Rev. Dr. Jesse W. Brooks, Rev. Dr. S. F. Scovel and Prof. Joseph A. Hallock.

On motion of Dr. Brooks, seconded by the Secretary, it was

Resolved, That the special thanks of the Institute and of the audience are due to President Broun for the highly interesting and instructive message he has brought to us from the South.

ANNUAL MEETING.

Friday, July 15. Evening. The meeting was opened with prayer by Rev. Dr. J. H. Crum, pastor of the Congregational Church in Terre Haute, Ind.

The Secretary reported that during the year the Institute had held a Summer School in Avon-by-the-Sea, and nine monthly meetings in Columbia College, New York.

The membership consists of

Patrons (by gift of $500 or more for endowment)	2
Endowment members (by donation of $100 or more)	61
Life " (" " $50 or more for expenses)	61
Annual "	431
Total	555

He also read the following names of members who had passed away during the year:

Noah Porter, D.D., LL.D., ex-President of Yale University, New Haven, Conn.; Jabez R. Jacques, A.M., Ph.D., F.S.Sc., Vice-President Hedding College, Illinois; ex-Gov. W. W. Holden, Raleigh, N. C.; Mrs. Elisha Riggs, New York; Rt. Rev. Bishop Bedell, of Ohio; Rev. Samuel W. Clark, Paterson, N. J.; Dr. Albert L. Turner, Bloomsburgh, Pa.; Ram Chandra Bose, India; Gen. Samuel S. Ellsworth, Pen Yan, N. Y.; Rev. Dr. Richard Abbey, Mississippi.

TREASURER'S REPORT.

The Treasurer presented his report, which showed that there had been received:

From Donations	$550 00
" Interest from Endowment Fund	600 00
" Membership Fees	1779 00
" Sale of Books	5 00
	$2934 00

There has been expended for CHRISTIAN THOUGHT for members and distribution	$1042 99
Summer School (1891)	455 88
Return of Moneys Advanced by Dr. Deems	895 43
Clerical Services	277 87
Monthly Meetings	106 00
Postage	150 27
Printing	45 68
	$2974 12

There is a balance due the Treasurer of $40.12.

The President delivered his annual address. The principal facts stated have been printed in CHRISTIAN THOUGHT for August, pp. 69–72.

A number of other gentlemen contributed to the interest of the meeting.

The Rev. Granville R. Pike, the Vice-President for North Dakota, said of the Institute:

One hopeful feature of the work of the Institute is that it is steadily exerting a marked influence, through its printed lectures and other matter, upon those who are moulding the thought of the rising generation. I know a scholarly young minister in North Dakota, a graduate in high standing from one of the Scottish universities, who has read from cover to cover the set of bound volumes of CHRISTIAN THOUGHT, which, through the liberality of a friend of this Institute, stands upon the shelves of a struggling college in that State. One minor result of this reading was an interest

in the Institute's work and an expressed desire to join in it. The students also in many colleges besides this read these lectures, or they are on the tables of numerous Christian associations. The numbers of CHRISTIAN THOUGHT are borrowed and their arguments and statements wrought into sermons by far more clergymen than are on the list of subscribers. Should the Institute of Christian Philosophy now rest from its labors, the healthful influence and stimulus of the body of literature which it has already produced would continue, as the great Bridgewater treatises have continued, to be helpful to successive generations.

THE CORRESPONDING SECRETARY.

The Rev. John B. Devins, the Corresponding Secretary of the Institute, read letters from Auburn Prison, one from a prisoner asking for a copy of CHRISTIAN THOUGHT, as a copy borrowed from a fellow prisoner had been a great help to him, and the other from the chaplain of the prison, telling what a blessing a complete set of the bound volumes of the magazine would be to the prison library. Letters from Turkey, India and Japan were read, in which the writers pleaded for the literature published by the Institute, especially for the college libraries in these lands. Reference was made to other letters, equally commendatory, received from missionaries on the frontier of our own country, but containing in many cases the postscript: "My small salary prevents me, however, from enjoying longer this feast which has come to me for a year."

Mr. Devins added that through the generosity of a member of the Institute, the magazine had been sent free to a dozen home missionaries of different denominations, and from the special fund for sending it abroad complete sets and bound volumes were on their way to Turkey, India and Japan. Several other pressing calls will receive attention as soon as the fund will warrant the outlay.

The Committee on Nominations then made its report through the Chairman, Dr. Gregory, who was instructed to cast the ballot with the following result:

OFFICERS.

Charles F. Deems, D.D., LL.D., President.

Vice-Presidents.—Alabama, John M. P. Otts, D.D., LL.D.; California, Rev. F. M. Dimmick; Colorado, Chancellor William F. McDowell, S.T.B.; Connecticut, W. W. McLane, D.D., LL.D.; District of Columbia, Bishop J. F. Hurst, D.D., LL.D.; Delaware, Hon. Thomas F. Bayard; England, Prof. G. G. Stokes, D.C.L., LL.D., F.R.S.; Florida, Hon. Augustus E. Maxwell; France, Edward Warren-Bey, M.D., C.M., LL.D.; Georgia, Hon. Walter B. Hill; Germany, John H. W. Stuckenberg, D.D.; Idaho, Rev. Charles J. Godsman; Illinois, Bishop Samuel M. Fallows, D.D., LL.D.; India, Thomas J. Scott, D.D.; Indiana, Prof. S. L. Bowman, D.D., S.T.D.; Iowa, Thomas E. Fleming, D.D., Ph.D.; Japan, Jon Kanzo Uchimura; Kentucky, Hon. W. C. P. Breckenridge, M.C.; Louisiana, Rev. J. W. McLaurin; Maine, President Martyn Summerbell, D.D., Ph.D.; Maryland, Charles J. Baker, Esq.; Michigan, Rev. Joseph M. Gelston; Minnesota, Prof. George Huntington; Missis-

sippi, Bishop Hugh Miller Thompson, LL.D.; Missouri, Bishop Eugene R. Hendrix, D.D.; Montana, Hon. John E. Rickards; Nebraska, Rev. D. W. C. Huntington; New Brunswick (Canada), James R. Inch, LL.D.; North Carolina, Hon. Kemp P. Battle, LL.D.; New Hampshire, Rev. Henry E. Cooke; New Jersey, President Francis L. Patton, D.D., LL.D.; Nova Scotia (Canada), Rev. William Ainley; New York, Archdeacon Alex. Mackey-Smith, S.T.D.; North Dakota, Rev. Granville R. Pike; Ontario (Canada), Rev. Donald G. Sutherland; Oregon, Rev. G. M. Travis, Ph.D.; Pennsylvania, Wilbur F. Watkins, D.D., Ph D.; Quebec (Canada), Alexander B. Mackay, D.D.; Rhode Island, Miss Mary A. Greene; Scotland, the Duke of Argyll; South Carolina, Gilbert R. Brackett, D.D.; Tennessee, James A. Orman, D.D.; Texas, Rev. James W. Lowber, Ph.D., Sc.D., LL.D.; Turkey, Rev. L. O. Lee; Virginia, Prof. Francis H. Smith, LL.D.; Vermont, William J. Van Patten.

Trustees.—Robert L. Crawford, William P. St. John, James Talcott, Cornelius Vanderbilt, Marion J. Verdery.

Treasurer.—William Harman Brown, 45 Exchange Place, New York.

Secretary.—Charles M. Davis, 4 Winthrop Place, New York.

Corresponding Secretary.—Rev. John B. Devins, 4 Winthrop Place, New York.

Fifth Day, Saturday, July 16. At the afternoon session the devotional exercises were led by the President.

In the absence of Prof. Sneath, of Yale College, on account of illness, Rev. Sidney G. Law, of New York, read a paper on "The True Evolution of Christian Doctrine." Rev. Drs. D. S. Gregory, James H. Lightburn, Sylvester F. Scovel, J. H. Crum and the President took part in the discussion which followed the reading of the paper. In the evening, after prayer by Rev. Mr. Johnson, of Port Richmond, W. M. F. Round, Esq., read a paper on "The Criminal, and What Shall our Prisons do for Him?" Rev. Drs. Crum and Scovel discussed the paper.

Sixth Day, Sunday, July 17. The annual sermon before the Institute was preached by Carlos Martyn, D.D., of Newark, N. J., from the text "Our Father." In the evening Prof. Theodore F. Seward read a paper on "The Brotherhood of Christian Unity."

Seventh Day, Monday, July 18. The devotional exercises were led by Rev. Mr. Randolph, of Port Richmond. The paper of the day was written for the Institute by Hon. Walter B. Hill, of Georgia. Mr. Hill having been ordered to Europe on account of his health, the paper was read by his friend and classmate, Marion J. Verdery, Esq., of New York City. The subject was "Anarchy, Socialism and the Labor Movement." The

President read from a paper on the same subject by Wm. O. McDowell, Esq., of Newark, N. J. The discussion engaged a large number of participants: Rev. Charles D'W. Browe, of Michigan; Mr. Buckle, of Elizabeth; Rev. Arthur Fulsom, of Brooklyn; Messrs. Marion J. Verdery, of New York; F. C. Graves, of Hartford; W. Hawes, of Staten Island; Rev. Dr. Hayes, of Georgia; Prof. Hyslop, and Rev. Henry L. Myrick, of Sing Sing, N. Y.

In the evening Prof. Hyslop, of Columbia College, read a paper on "Our Shop-Girls," which was discussed by most of the gentlemen who spoke at the afternoon meeting.

On Tuesday, July 19th, the eighth and last day of the Summer School, after prayer by Rev. Wm. W. Knox, of Bayonne, N. J., Ethelbert D. Warfield, LL.D., President of Lafayette College, Easton, Pa., read a paper on "The Philosophy of Education." Remarks were made by Prof. Daniel S. Martin and Rev. J. H. Edwards, of New York City.

After prayer by Rev. Dr. G. W. F. Birch, of New York, the President pronounced the benediction and declared the Summer School closed.

THE DISTRIBUTION OF "CHRISTIAN THOUGHT."

APPEALS have come from time to time to the American Institute of Christian Philosophy from missionaries in foreign lands soliciting volumes and separate numbers of CHRISTIAN THOUGHT for schools and colleges. These appeals came from those who had seen this magazine and knew how it was adapted to those whose attention was turned to the Christian religion. At the same time, similar applications came from the missionaries on the frontier. An appeal was made for donations to supply these demands. In response the following sums have been acknowledged by the Institute: Mr. L. W. Serrell, Plainfield, N. J., $5; Prof. J. H. Deems, Baltimore, Md., $5; Prof. Charles C. Rhinelander, New York, $25; "A Californian," $10. Sets of the first eight volumes—a valuable philosophical library—have been sent to the following institutions: Marash College, Turkey; Dorisha College, Japan; Perumalai Seminary, India; Arcot Mission (Reformed

Dutch Church), India. Four volumes have been donated to Northfield Seminary (Mr. Moody's) to complete the set forming there. One hundred copies of single numbers are sent to as many different missionaries of the American Home Missionary Society. Dr. Clapp, the Treasurer, says that "in the selection of the names an eye has been had to two things: the naming of the men who would be likely to read and profit by the magazine, and next those who perhaps would be least likely to procure it for themselves." The Presbyterian Foreign Board would be glad to receive sets for its institutions in Japan and elsewhere. Make remittances to Charles F. Deems, President, 4 Winthrop Place; or, Wm. Harman Brown, Treasurer, 45 Exchange Place, New York.

ABOUT BOOKS.

[In this department we shall make mention of recent publications, especially those in the line of our studies. There will not be space for extended review. The name of the book, its publisher, and its price when known, together with a brief statement of its drift, will probably meet the demands of our readers. Any book mentioned will be sent post-paid, on receipt of price, by WILBUR B. KETCHAM, 2 Cooper Union, New York.]

—If you wish to present a very appropriate, small volume to a young Christian friend or to a young person whom you desire to be a Christian, give "Safe Counsel and Sweet Comfort," by Rev. C. C. Albertson, published by the Fleming H. Revell Company. It will be wholesomely instructive, entertaining and stimulating.

—The leading article in the fifth volume of CHRISTIAN THOUGHT, August, 1887, is a lecture delivered before the Institute in August, 1886, by Rev. Dr. J. W. Lee, of Atlanta, Ga. and entitled "The Conservation of Spiritual Force." It attracted great attention at the time of its delivery and publication. It has since grown. It has become a book of unusual ability and attractiveness. It puts old truths to new uses and new discoveries to the service of the most venerable truths. It is accurate in dealing with facts and scientific matters, while it is opulent in the distribution of them. Under the titles "Bread," "Power," "Truth," "Righteousness," "Beauty," "Love," and "Immortality," it discusses the provision made for the physical, the social, the intellectual, the moral, the æsthetic, and spiritual na-

ture of man, and the permanence of the completed life of man. The whole of this deeply interesting book is summed up in the attractive title "The Making of Man," and is issued by the Cassell Publishing Co., New York.

—The Vice-President of the Institute for Alabama, the Rev. Dr. Otts, is the author of several books, "Laconisms," "Nicodemus with Jesus," etc. Now he gives us a new volume, "The Fifth Gospel: the Land where Christ Lived" (published by the Fleming H. Revell Co.). Very true is what Canon Liddon says: "Not to be interested in the land and Life of Jesus is to be, I do not say irreligious, but unintelligent," and Dr. Otts will have the assent of all who have travelled in Palestine to his assertion that "the land of Jesus so harmonizes with the four written Gospels, and so unfolds and enlarges their meaning, that it forms around them a fifth Gospel." This is not a book of travel, but one who reads it will travel very pleasantly and very profitably with a wide-awake and agreeable companion. Those who have been over the ground will have the pictures of memory retouched, and those who have had no Oriental travel will derive the double benefit of having a vivid presentation of Bible scenery and a safe and sound thinker's illumination of many Scripture texts by the light of travel. There are passages of superior writing in this unpretentious book; for instance, the single paragraph on the Jordan, pp. 119, 120, deserves to take place with real literature.

—"The Schoolmaster in Literature" is the title of a book which describes the contents thereof. It is a compilation, made by some skilful hand, showing the part played by the schoolmaster in English literature from the days of Roger Ascham (1515–1568) to those of D'Arcy Wentworth Thompson (1829). It is an uncommonly rich and attractive book. Although in the course of our life we have read probably all that is in this handsome volume, we intend to go over it all again and revive old Ascham's "Scholemaster" and Shenstone's "Schoolmistress" and Pestalozzi's "Gertrude at Home" and Goethe's "Wilhelm Meister" and Thackeray's and Dickens's and George Eliot's and Charlotte Bronte's school sketches. This excellent volume has a very interesting introduction by the American schoolmaster, Edward Eggleston. It is issued by the American Book Company.

—A very pleasant and profitable little book by Rev. Jesse S. Gilbert is entitled "Blessed are They." It contains well-expressed, devout thoughts on the Beatitudes of the Sermon on the Mount. Mr. Gilbert's pen is not unpractised. His other book, "The Old Paths," has been found edifying to readers, who will be glad to welcome his new volume. (Paterson, N. J.: Carleton M. Herrick.)

—We have received from the Johns Hopkins Press a valuable contribution to historical and political science in a monograph by Prof. Stephen Beauregard Weeks, of Trinity College, N. C., entitled "The Religious Development in the Province of North Carolina." The theory of the earlier historians of North Carolina, including Dr. Hawks, was that the State was settled by Baptists and Quakers, fleeing from the persecutions which they endured in Virginia because of their non-conformity to the Established Church. The editor of CHRISTIAN THOUGHT acknowledges that he has inclined to that opinion; but Prof. Weeks now comes forward to show that the first settlers were not religious refugees, that they came to the State from purely economic reasons, that religious freedom was a development in North Carolina just as it was in other States, that there was as much of an Established Church in North Carolina as in Virginia, and that it was considered by many inhabitants as more oppressive than the Stamp Act. The work of Prof. Weeks is done carefully, thoroughly and fairly. If he can do such work in his youth what may we not expect of the riper years of this young professor?

—Funk & Wagnalls publish the "Cyclopædia of Temperance and Prohibition." It is 8vo, 671 pp. of valuable, well considered, well digested matter, prepared by a number of able scholars and Christians, and edited by a very competent hand. It is a reference book of facts, statistics, and general information on all phases of the drink question, the temperance movement, and the prohibition agitation. The article on legislation for reference purposes is worth much more than the price of the book. By far the most transcendent question in political economy is the drink traffic. It involves more money, more lives, and more happiness than all other questions put together. Every scholar,

every statesman, every preacher, every writer for the press, needs this volume and can trust it not only for its thoroughness and accuracy but also for its impartiality.

—The sound and serviceable address by G. Henry Mandeville, D.D., at the commencement of Hope College, Michigan, on the 22d of June, 1892, was on "Man's Dominion and How to Win It." It has been brought out beautifully.

—The Cassell Publishing Co. are about to issue a volume of over 200 pages, elegantly printed and beautifully bound, entitled, "My Septuagint, by Charles F. Deems." It is so called because it contains articles written since the author's LXX birthday. It has a leading article on "What it is to be Seventy." It contains a number of papers that have been commended, including one on the religious life of George Washington, the "Present Outlook of Theology," the address of welcome to the Y. P. S. C. E. Convention of 1892 in New York, two stories, an Ascension discourse before the Knights Templar, a poem on Howard Crosby, several hymns, and divers other articles—it will not do to say "too tedious to mention," else you may not want the book—which the editor of CHRISTIAN THOUGHT cannot characterize, as he is the author of the book. Its price is $1.25.

—Perhaps, also, he may be permitted to mention that the Home Publishing Co., 4 Winthrop Place, issue his prize essay on "How to Manage a Wife," with the history of the production of that paper. Price 10 cents; $1.00 a dozen.

CHRISTIAN THOUGHT.

OUR "MODERN ARISTOTLE" AND THE THEISTIC ARGUMENT.

[Read before the American Institute of Christian Philosophy, July 14th, 1892.]

BY D. S. GREGORY, D.D., NEW YORK.

TWO intimately related movements of religious or anti-religious thought have been going forward for half a century and more in the English world—one having as its aim the destruction of theism, and the other the construction of an imposing and comprehensive system of anti-theism, or atheism. In the former, John Stuart Mill has been the leading spirit; in the latter, Herbert Spencer; and to these two men, more than to all others combined, the present atheistic trend of English thought in the more pretentious circles is, in the opinion of the best judges, to be ascribed. The fact that they have done their work in the name of science and philosophy has doubtless added very largely to their influence.

Twenty years ago Mr. Mill ruled with absolute despotism a large proportion of the so-called educated and thinking men in Great Britain. Indiscriminate laudation of his logic, his philosophy, his high motives, etc., was the order of the day to such an extent that it was safer to find fault with the sun itself than with this great philosophic light. His agnostic conclusions were widely accepted without question; his flings at theism were voted worth more than solid arguments in favor of it; his reticence in the statement of his atheistic views, though it had alienated Comte, had made such an impression of reserve force upon his worshippers, that faith in Mill seemed with them to have already superseded faith in God.

But English thought, so far as Mr. Mill is its subject, has undergone a most remarkable change since his death. It is interesting to trace the growing sense of fear on the one side and of freedom on the other.

Immediately after his death, one of his most enthusiastic admirers, Miss Edith Simcox, a lady who holds a prominent place in the present English rationalistic literature for reasons similar to those which have given Mr. Mill his influence, came before the public with what she was pleased to style—

> An attempt to show not only that Mr. Mill's influence on the ordinary thought of the day is still undiminished, but also that it would indeed be a national calamity for that influence to become either weakened, warped or forgotten.

After the publication of the *Autobiography*, Lord Blachford, an able writer of an opposite school, ventured to express his opinion with some degree of confidence, as follows :

> If the intellect of our universities (as I understand to be the case) is being moulded into accordance with this philosophy, it appears to me that we may expect some startling conclusions from the rising generation. Whether these conclusions will be long maintained, either by the thinking or the unthinking part of the world outside, is another matter.

Upon the publication of "The Three Essays," the *Pall Mall Budget*, declared that Mill's followers in England received them "with mingled feelings of surprise, disappointment, and of something closely bordering on irritation."

The truth was evidently beginning to dawn on the minds of some of the "thinkers" and "philosophers." Three years more passed, and the growing sense of light and freedom so increased that the late Prof. W. Stanley Jevons, of University College, London, the man perhaps best fitted to dissect Mr. Mill and his logic, rose to protest against the despotism which compelled him for twenty years to use Mill's works as text-books in his college instruction. So intricate is the sophistry of these works, that ten years of study passed before he "began to detect their fundamental unsoundness." But during the last ten years the conviction had been growing upon his mind, "that Mill's authority is doing immense injury to the cause of philosophy and good intellectual training in England." Professor Jevons, in the open-

ing essay in a series in review of special points in Mill's logic and philosophy, wrote :

> But for my part, I will no longer consent to live silently under the incubus of bad logic and bad philosophy which Mill's works have laid upon us. On almost every subject of social importance—religion, morals, political economy, metaphysics, logic—he has expressed unhesitating opinions, and his sayings are quoted by his admirers as if they were the oracles of a perfectly wise and logical mind. Nobody questions, or at least ought to question, the force of Mill's style, the persuasive power of his words, the candor of his discussions, and the perfect goodness of his motives. If to all his other great qualities had been happily added logical accurateness, his writings would indeed have been a source of light for generations to come. But in one way or another Mill's intellect was wrecked. The cause of injury may have been the ruthless training imposed upon him in tender years ; it may have been Mill's own life-long attempt to reconcile a false empirical philosophy with conflicting truth. But, however it arose, Mill's mind was essentially illogical.

These plain words clearly indicated a radical revolution in the mind of Prof. Jevons. That he did not at all underestimate Mr. Mill's logical acumen will be made to appear from a careful examination of a portion of that logician's criticism and supposed refutation of the theistic argument for a First Cause, found in the essay on "Theism," one of his latest productions, professedly written in the name of exact science. It is far from clear, however, that Prof. Jevons does not overestimate Mr. Mill's "candor," as well as the "goodness of his motives."

Mill's argument is undoubtedly one of the most dangerous ever constructed in opposition to Theism. There are those of his own party who are inclined to underestimate its strength, but until they furnish a stronger, it may fairly be considered as the best that can be done from the destructive side. Moreover, it cannot justly be claimed that it omits any considerations of essential importance on the anti-theistic side. It even takes in, by anticipation, the latest conclusion of Huxley and Tyndall, that man is a mere *automaton*, a machine run by necessary forces, so that the last vestige of the anthropomorphic basis for argument to a First Cause is apparently swept away.

But the danger from the argument does not lie in its strength, so much as in the marvellous combination of intricate sophistry and utter confusion of thought with an extraordinary show of candor and fairness, and a tone of supreme confidence such as is ordinarily begotten only by a certain and infallible grasp of

truth. It is this element in Mill's writings that enabled them for ten years to dazzle so clear an eye as that of the distinguished professor in University College, and it is this that enables them to pass for little less than philosophic inspiration with multitudes of less discerning minds. As soon as this feature can be clearly exposed, Mill's works will cease to be dangerous.

Passing over the rationalistic platitudes of the introduction, concerning the present changed moral and intellectual attitude of the opponents of Christianity towards that effete system, and the irrepressible conflict between science and religion, there is one thing in which all sound theists will agree with the great logician :

> The most important quality of an opinion on any momentous subject is its truth or falsity, which to us resolves itself into the sufficiency of the evidence on which it rests.*

By this standard every fair mind would have Christian theism tried. There is, by Mill's own admission, one form of theism which is consistent with science, " the conception of a God governing the world by invariable laws." † Mr. Mill takes the proofs commonly adduced of this view, and applies his scientific standard to them. The results arrived at may be briefly stated.

In Part I. of the essay, the arguments for theism are isolated from one another and considered in detail. The argument from the universe to a First Cause is first tested by the standard of experience and found wanting. That from the General Consent of Mankind is then taken up, misstated, and found equally worthless. That from Consciousness, including the metaphysical argument of Descartes and an emasculated form of the moral argument, is declared to have no positive value. The Design argument considered next in order, is weakly stated, and pronounced able to give no more than a slight probability of creation, which would be greatly attenuated if the theory of Evolution should be shown to be true. In the next three Parts are considered the " sort of a Deity to which these weak evidences of a design point, the absence of all evidence of a future life, and the worthlessness of the evidences proposed to establish a rev-

* Three Essays, p. 128. † Idem, p. 135.

elation." Part V. contains the "General Result," the sum of which is :

> The rational attitude of a thinking mind towards the supernatural, whether in natural or revealed religion, is that of skepticism as distinguished from belief on the one hand, and from atheism on the other.

The God of Creation and Providence is practically dismissed from the universe, and the entire domain of the supernatural relegated to a region of mere imagination, and confined to the indulgence of hope rather than the cherishing of belief. Such hope in such region of imagination may philosophically be cherished because of its beneficent effects. The only "real, though purely human, religion" is that which sometimes calls itself "the Religion of Humanity and sometimes that of Duty." This is undoubtedly destined, with or without supernatural sanction, to be the religion of the future, and is to rest "its due ascendancy over the human mind" upon "supernatural hopes in the degree and kind in which what I have called rational skepticism does not refuse to sanction them."

Now if Mr. Mill has really given us in his arguments the conclusions of exact science, and these compel us to part either with the truth or with a God in whom we irrationally believe, however terrible the alternative may appear, it ought to be known in order that we may let go our superstition and embrace the truth. If, on the contrary, he has given us inexact and worthless dogmatism in the name of science, then that ought to be known, in order that it may be repudiated with all the emphasis of a righteous moral indignation. If it be seen that Mill, in its very statement, deliberately prejudices the argument for theism, or that he blinks or falsifies the facts at the basis of his so-called inductions, or that he is constantly making unwarranted assumptions, or that he habitually uses obscure, ambiguous, and improper terms to represent his capital conceptions, or that he is either an adept or a silly blunderer in illegitimate inference, any of these things must so far attenuate the force of his argument. If, as can be shown, his so-called scientific argument is absolutely made up of them, then it ought to be rejected with an intensity of moral indignation such as has scarcely ever been visited upon any other infidel production.

The first count is against this general method of this man of eminent candor. It is the method of the sophist and not of the fair reasoner. The evidence of theism, whether natural or revealed, is cumulative, or, better than that, converging. The doctrine does not rest on a single line of proof but on several converging lines. This has been admirably shown by Canon Barry in his "Boyle Lectures." * The universal consent of mankind, the principle of causation, the infinite, the voice of conscience, and the yearnings of the affections, all converge towards one common centre, and the strength of the argument lies in this. When we find this to be the case with the six or more distinct lines of proof, we are able to conclude with something approaching to certainty that this centre is a personal God. Now Mill conveniently and entirely ignores this essential feature in the argument, isolates the various proofs, and disposes of each in his summary way, scarcely, if at all, alluding to its connection with the others. It is an easy matter to cut up a hostile force in detail, division by division, even though that force in solid column would be absolutely overwhelming. This is Mill's general method. Or rather, it is the same method as that of proving that a table cannot stand upon four or six legs because, forsooth, it is found that it cannot stand upon any one of the legs alone! We ask Mill's admirers, was the candid logician aware of this? Or, was he not? They are welcome to either horn of the dilemma. If they choose the first, what becomes of his candor? If the second, what of his logical acumen?

And in his conclusion, from the review of the entire argument, that "the rational attitude of a thinking mind towards the supernatural is that of skepticism," Mill goes equally astray. Logically considered that is a most *irrational* attitude. The case is one of those calling for practical decision—one which, as Cardinal Newman has shown in the "Grammar of Assent," it is *our duty to decide* one way or the other:

> Where only two ways of alternative action are possible, the practical decision may be the same, whether on demonstrative or probable evidence, whether on low

* Boyle Lectures, 1876. What is Natural Theology? An Attempt to Estimate the Cumulative Evidence of Many Witnesses to God.

or high probability. The difference will lie in the amount of enthusiasm we can throw into our action and the amount of sacrifice we are ready to make for it.

Now, Mill admits that even after the application of his utterly illogical method to the examination of the proofs of theism, "there is evidence . . . amounting . . . to one of the lower degrees of probability," which points to the creation of the present order of things by an intelligent mind (pp. 242, 243). If that be so what is one's duty? The case is a practical one involving eternal interests. In any such case, involving even the most unimportant interests of his daily life, this same skeptic would, as Bishop Butler has shown, unhesitatingly act upon just such probabilities as this. In fact, the great successes of life are often attained by action based on just such data. In a practical case, like that under consideration, involving interests beyond possible estimate, conscience utters its imperative with tremendous emphasis. The "rational attitude" is undoubtedly that presented by Chalmers, in his "Natural Theology," that the bare imagination "there may be a God," brings along with it an instant sense of duty to inquire if there really be a God; and the slightest whisper from that God, telling of His existence as a fact, places every one of His rational creatures under the most solemn obligation to seek after and find Him.

Mill's general method in the entire conduct of his so-called scientific test of the proofs of theism is, therefore, entirely illogical and unfair, and his practical conclusion supremely irrational.

Mr. Mill's logical method in the parts of his argument will be illustrated by an examination of the details of his attempted scientific refutation of the theistic argument for a First Cause. There are two stages in his criticism,—in the first of which he attempts to show that experience teaches that the material universe needs no First Cause except blind force; in the second, that the spiritual universe needs no other cause. By this appeal to experience he claims to have annihilated the argument from the universe for an intelligent First Cause, the God of the theist. If his argumentation be valid, he has most certainly accounted for everything in the universe, which has henceforth no more need for a divine First Cause than the man in the moon has for an atmosphere to breathe. But is it valid?

Mill's Opening Statement.—The argument for a First Cause admits of being, and is presented as a conclusion from the whole of human experience. Everything that we know (it is argued) had a cause and owed its existence to that cause. How then can it but be that the world, which is but a name for the aggregate of all that we know, has a cause to which it is indebted for its existence? *

By whom is it so presented? By Mr. Mill. How many sound advocates of theism would acknowledge that the argument on which they rest their case admits of being presented as a mere conclusion from experience in Mill's sense of that word? Not one. In other words, the candid and logical Mr. Mill starts out with a radical misstatement of the argument, which renders it worthless. Just how worthless will appear from the character and grounds of experience, as Mill understands and uses the term.

Mill has three senses in which he uses "experience." In the narrow sense it includes only what has come under one's own observation by the senses. "Human experience" is then confined to what has come under the observation of the race in this way. In a wider sense, it adds to this narrower experience all inductions or generalizations from it, while excluding all intuitive principles or necessary laws of thought. When the great logician plays the complete role of the sophist, he covertly includes under the term "experience," as among the inductions from experience, any or all of the absurd and unverifiable speculations of the so-called scientists and philosophers of his favorite school.

Now in whatever sense he may use "experience" in the present argument, the position is one from which no sound, not to say sane, theist would think of arguing to a First Cause. The theist bases his argument on the principle of causality—in other words, on a necessity of all human thinking, by virtue of which a man, when he sees something occur or begin to be, cannot help judging that it must have had a cause. He shows that this principle of causality is an original, self-evident, necessary, and catholic principle, without the presupposition of which there can be no warrant for believing either that all past events have had causes, or that any future events will have causes. In short, no

* Three Essays, p. 142.

valid induction from experience is possible without assuming this as the starting point. His fundamental position is, "Every event must have a cause"; and not, as Mill puts it, "Everything that we know had a cause."

The logical value of the experiential basis for theism proposed by this great destroyer is best shown by the success of his own elaborate attempt to construct an inductive theory without the principle of causality. He puts the matter thus: "If it be asked, What ground have we, from the fact that in ten thousand cases events have had causes, for the expectation that the next event will have a cause? the answer is that our warrant is found in a 'universal fact,' which he expresses in the proposition that "the course of nature is uniform." It is obvious even to himself, that in this first step he starts from a very limited premise and reaches an absolutely universal conclusion. He is, therefore, forced to attempt to answer * the further question, How (in the absence of the intuitive principle of causality) are we to know that the course of nature has been or will be thus uniform in all that part of the universal range which lies beyond our experience? He answers that this is an induction of the largest kind, a generalization from an experience almost limitless. Barely calling attention to the patent fact, that no such "almost limitless experience" is either actual or possible, and that even if it were so it would not help Mr. Mill to the universal conclusion, the philosophy and logic of what has claimed to be one of the great achievements of modern thought may be lucidly presented as follows:

Why are we to believe that any given event has a cause?
Because experience assures us of it.
Why are we to believe experience?
Because the course of nature is uniform.
Why are we to believe that the course of nature is uniform?
Because of (a larger) experience.
Why are we to believe (a larger) experience?
Because the course of nature is uniform, etc., etc.

The logical circle is apparent. But this is not the worst of it. The same fallacy pervades every part of the entire system.

* See Logic, Book III. Ch. III.

Even that great modern discovery of the four Experimental Methods is utterly vitiated by it. Professor Jevons has clearly brought out the beautiful logical cosmogony of this experiential system:

> The universal law of causation is represented by the world resting upon the elephant—that is, upon inductive inquiry—and the four legs of that quadruped may correspond to the four pillars of Mill's edifice, the four celebrated experimental methods. But upon what do the elephant's legs rest? Upon the world—which is already resting on the elephant's back! *

Upon such a logical quicksand this man of wonderful logic and sublime candor would invite the unsuspecting advocates of theism to build their argument for a First Cause. Now it is a pertinent question, Did he state the case in this way consciously or unconsciously—*i. e.*, did he play the part of the sharper in logic, or of the man practically ignorant of logic? His friends may have their choice between keeping his candor or his logical acumen. The fact that in a later chapter of his "Logic" Mill shows that he is at least partially conscious of the illogical character of his system, inclines us to think it an instance of the invitation of the spider to the fly, "Will you walk into my parlor?" Once for all, the fly respectfully declines.

This paper will be confined to the criticism of the first stages of the discussion.

Mr. Mill undertakes to establish that no other First Cause than force is needed for the material universe. His order is:

1. The unchangeable element, or matter, needs no First Cause, for it is eternal.

2. The changeable element needs no First Cause, for the prior event observed in each case is sufficient to account for the changes.

3. Or, if there be a First Cause needed, Force is all-sufficient.

These will be considered in their order.

I. Mill's first point is that the unchangeable element in nature needs no First Cause:

> The fact of experience, however, when correctly stated, turns out to be, not that everything which we know derives its existence from a cause, but only every event of change. There is in nature a permanent element, and also a changeable; the

*Jevons, The Experimental Methods.

changes are always the effects of previous changes, the permanent existences, so far as we know, are not effects at all. . . . There is in every object . . . a permanent element, viz., the specific elementary substance or substances of which it consists and their inherent properties. These are not known to us as beginning to exist: within the range of human knowledge they had no beginning, consequently no cause, though they themselves are causes or con-causes of everything that takes place. Experience, therefore, affords no evidences, not even analogies, to justify our extending to the apparently immutable a generalization grounded only on our observation of the changeable.*

The reader will note the opening correction of the form of statement which Mill himself put into the mouth of the theist. Did he mistake the theistic position in order to gain prestige in the eyes of the uninformed, by the superior precision of thought shown in the *ad captandum* correction? But why not make the further correction, demanded by candor and fairness, and state his opponent's true position: "Every event must have a cause?"

His argument may be best dealt with when thrown into syllogistic form:

Every thing that has had a beginning requires a cause.

Matter, or the permanent element in nature, has not had a beginning within the range of human experience.

Therefore matter does not require a cause.

The fallacy comes to light at once. Different middle terms are used in the premises. In one, "had a beginning" is used absolutely; in the other, there is covertly substituted for this the expression, "had a beginning within the range of human experience." It would be just as logical and conclusive for an ignorant Philadelphian, if there be such a one, who has never been beyond the city limits, standing in the depot of the Pennsylvania Railway, to reason thus: Whatever has no end is infinite; this railway has no end within the range of experience; therefore it is infinite.

The truth is that here is just the point where Mill makes the leap across the narrow limits of human experience to the eternity of matter. It is the same kind of feat which Professor Tyndall performed in his Belfast Address, in which, by experience (which, according to the view of these men, is the limiter, or extreme limit, of all knowledge), he prolonged his vision "beyond

*Three Essays, pp. 142, 143.

the bounds of experience" until he was able to "discern in matter the promise and potency of all life,"—a feat compared with which—whether performed by Mill or Tyndall—lifting himself to the moon by his boot-straps, or shooting himself to Sirius with his own breath, would have been mere child's play. The baselessness of the covert assumption in the argument and the fallacy in the inference are patent the instant it is thrown into logical form, as follows:

If experience shows that matter had a beginning, then it needs a cause, and the idea of causation must be extended to it; but experience does not so show; therefore matter needs no cause, and the idea of causation is not to be extended to it.

The conclusion is reached by denying the antecedent, and then, on the ground of this, denying the consequent; thus violating one of the simplest canons of conditional reasoning. Suppose experience does not show that matter had a beginning; may not something else show it? Or, may not experience plus something else show it? The logic of the reasoning may be readily illustrated so as to make it clear beyond misunderstanding: If there is a fire in the furnace the rooms in the house will be warm; but there is no fire in the furnace, therefore the rooms are not warm. But suppose there be heated stoves in the rooms? Or, that it be a hot day in mid-summer? Or, that the house be on fire?

Now let the pertinent question be asked: Whose experience is the basis of the reasoning in this case? Is it Mr. Mill's? Evidently he is quite too modern a character to know by experience what has been true from eternity. It would certainly be impossible to prove matter eternal, even if it were actually so, from his experience. Or is it collective human experience? Even that affords little logical aid in reaching back to eternity, for it is itself at once brief and narrow in its range; brief, inasmuch as all human experience reaches back over only an infinitesimal part of eternity; and narrow, since it only reaches the surface of things on this atom world, and any one man can only command a knowledge of the smallest portion of it at that. Mill attempts to leap the boundless and bottomless chasm between this relatively infinitesimal human experience of the present and the ab

solutely limitless eternity of the past, by his scheme of induction, and he would fain confine his theistic opponent to the same method. He takes his position on the perfect globe of exact science to manage this greatest of logical enterprises—the exclusion of a First Cause from the universe of matter. His world rests securely on the back of the elephant of induction; the elephant is supported by his four legs—the four experimental methods. But where is the tortoise, from whose back the elephant is to take his leap and bear the great philosopher into the infinities and eternities in order to rout the First Cause?

But it is far from being the whole truth that experience cannot possibly prove the eternity of matter. Taking the view of some of the ablest and best physicists, it does what is vastly easier,—it absolutely disproves it. They hold that in the present age it has become capable of strictly scientific proof that the universe had a beginning in time.

According to Sir William Thomson's deductions from Fourier's "Theory of Heat," the dissipation of heat can be traced down to a time when all things will be uniformly cold. If we attempt similarly to trace the heat-history of the universe backward we reach an impassable limit. As stated in the "Principles of Science":

> For a certain negative value of the time the formulæ give impossible values, indicating that there was some initial distribution of heat which could not have resulted, according to the known laws of nature, from any previous distribution. . . . Now, the theory of heat places us in the dilemma either of believing in creation at an assignable date in the past, or else of supposing that some inexplicable change in the working of natural laws then took place. Physical science gives no countenance to the notion of infinite duration of matter in one continuous course of existence. And if in time past there has been a discontinuity of law, why may there not be a similar event awaiting the world in the future?*

Clerk Maxwell, in his "Theory of Heat," and Professor Tait, in his "Lectures on the Recent Advances in Physical Science," urge other considerations in favor of the same view. Professors Stewart and Tait, in that extraordinary book, "The Unseen Universe," making use of the investigations of Helmholtz, Struve, Thomson, Clerk Maxwell, and others, have pushed their inductions still further.

*See Jevons' Principles of Science.

The voice of the latest and best science, in the form of mathematical physics, is therefore raised in opposition to the eternity of matter, and the argument is altogether against Mill's assumption. If the results of the best inductive science are to be included in human experience, it requires nothing more than experience to overturn this argument based upon the assumed eternity of matter. What then becomes of his conclusion,—carried with him from this point onward as if it were an established principle,—that matter is a cause or con-cause of every thing, and itself apparently immutable?

In the last analysis, all there is of the argument is one vast conclusion from the great logician's ignorance. It takes but little science or logic to show that what one does not know about a thing is not a very firm basis for argumentation. Were Mill's mighty "Ignoramus" a little greater or a thousand-fold less, it would hardly help him to the knowledge that there is no First Cause.

II. Mill's second point is that the changeable element in nature needs no First Cause:

> As a fact of experience, then, causation cannot legitimately be extended to the material universe itself, but only to its changeable phenomena; of these, indeed, causes may be affirmed without any exception. But what causes? The cause of every change is a prior change; and such it cannot but be; for if there were no new antecedent there would not be a new consequent. If the state of facts which brings the phenomenon into existence had existed always or for an indefinite duration, the effect also would have existed or been produced an indefinite time ago. It is thus a necessary part of the fact of causation, within the sphere of our experience, that the causes as well as the effects had a beginning in time, and were themselves caused. It would seem, therefore, that our experience, instead of furnishing an argument for a First Cause, is repugnant to it; and that the very essence of causation, as it exists within the limits of our knowledge, is incompatible with a First Cause.*

The main points in the argumentation may be brought out, as follows:

No changes which can be traced by experience to prior changes, or antecedents, need a First Cause.

All the changes in nature can be so traced, since experience reveals, as an essential part of the fact of causation, that causes

* Three Essays, pp. 143, 144.

as well as effects have a beginning, and, therefore, have antecedents—the antecedents extending back without limit.

Therefore no changes in nature require a First Cause to account for them.

The validity of this reasoning depends upon three apparently very plausible assumptions:

1. Experience reveals a prior change as cause of every event.

2. Cause and effect are simply the relation of antecedent and consequent.

3. An infinite regression of antecedent and consequent events will take the place of an efficient cause, and satisfy the demands of reason.

Is any one of these assumptions in accordance with truth?

1. It cannot for one moment be admitted that experience reveals a prior change as cause for every subsequent change. Take experience in the narrow sense even, and this is a monstrous assumption. There are myriads of changes within the experience of the most philosophic of thinkers which he has never traced to any prior changes. Professor Jevons puts the case thus:

> Will any one deny that there are whole regions of effects familiarly known to us where we cannot detect the action of causation? What determines the sex of young animals? What produces unexpected forms and diseases, monstrous births, *lusus naturæ*, as they are significantly called? All kinds of tumors, ulcers, and local diseases spring up in various parts of the human body, and medical science can usually give no explanation of them.

But the use of experience here demanded is manifestly the wider one. Mill's claims are, in case of this wider experience, still more absurd.

There is, moreover, a glittering and deceptive generality in the expressions, "change" and "changeable element." What do they mean? Apparently not very much; really pretty much everything worth mentioning. They are intended to cover up a tremendous assumption, which if stated in full would be rejected instantly by every man of sense, not to say, of science. They at least cover everything material in the universe except matter itself—all special forms and collocations of matter and force. These vague words cover all vegetable life, all animal life, and possibly all rational life!

Now, it is positively certain that experience, in the only sense of that word here logically available, gives a flat denial to Mill's assertion. To set aside all revelation, tradition, and history, geology and the kindred sciences, in connection with the theories of heat and life, make it scientifically clear that when plant life, animal life and human life are carried back to certain stages in the history of the globe, points are reached where it can be said, "That was the first plant;" "That was the first animal;" "That was the first man." The capital assumption of fact in Mill's argument has, therefore, not the slightest support from experience, or, rather, experience gives the lie to it.

Whence came all these gigantic changes, these multitudinous and instantaneous "apparitions" of living beings, if not from the First Cause?

2. The second assumption is the fundamental lie of positivism: There is no such thing as efficient cause, or, if there be, we cannot know it. There is only the relation of before and after, of antecedent and consequent. This exhausts our idea of causation.

Mr. Mill assumes that in the relation there is always a sequence, the cause being before the effect in time. Now most certainly there are cases in which the relation looks very much more like that of simultaneity. If I hurl a stone with my hand the force acts contemporaneously with the effect perceived. Nor is there any truth in the view that a cause is in every case a prior phenomenon. A phenomenon, in the positivist meaning at least, appears to the sense, and can be described by its appearance. The impelling force of the will is the cause of the movement of the stone hurled from the hand; the modifying force of gravitation comes in as another cause to decide the curve described by the projectile; but neither the force of will nor of gravitation was ever directly apparent to sense. No force was ever thus apparent to human sense.

But Mr. Mill's chief error is, that he positively excludes the one essential element in causation, viz., efficiency. A cause—both in the common sense and in the metaphysical sense—is that which has power to produce change.

Mr. Mill's definition of cause is one of his most wonderful performances. He remarks that,—

> The notion of cause being the root of the whole theory of induction, it is indispensable that this idea should, at the very outset of our inquiry, be with the utmost practicable degree of precision fixed and determined.*

That is certainly a very commendable view of the matter. How does he carry it out? He proceeds at once to distinguish between efficient causes or such as actually produce effects, and physical causes or those which do not involve such production of effects. He will have only to do with the latter; in other words, in his treatment of "The Universal Law of Causation," he will have nothing to say of cause in the sense in which both the common people and the philosophers have always understood the word. It is to be the play of Hamlet with the Prince of Denmark left out.

We follow him as he proceeds to find, fix, and determine "with the utmost practicable degree of precision," the notion of causes:

> The law of causation, the recognition of which is the main pillar of inductive philosophy, is but the familiar truth that invariability of succession is found by observation to obtain between every fact in nature and some other fact which has preceded it, independently of all consideration respecting the ultimate mode of production of phenomena, and of every other question regarding the nature of things in themselves.

It is manifest that Mill would teach that our knowledge of the cause of a thing comes from our experience, and from our observation of facts occurring and of facts preceding. Of course, experience in which we have had no share, and which we can never verify, would furnish no foundation for a philosopher. It is plain, too, that he discards all obscure metaphysics. But, unfortunately for the logician, he comes upon the objection of Reid, that if this doctrine is correct, "night must be the cause of day, and day of night, since these phenomena have invariably succeeded one another from the beginning of the world." We shall not attempt to follow through the paragraph which treats of this, and which one has aptly called the "Laocoon of Logic."

The definition must of course be modified so as to get in something besides invariability of succession. It then reads as follows:

*See Logic, Book III., Ch. V., On the Law of Universal Causation.

We may defi e, therefore, the cause of a phenomenon to be the antecedent, or the concurrence of antecedents, upon which it is invariably and unconditionally consequent. Or if we accept the convenient modification of the meaning of the word cause, which confines it to the assemblage of positive conditions, without the negative, then instead of "unconditionally," we must say, "subject to no other than negative conditions."

But our author is not yet done. He must explain what is meant by this expression, "negative conditions," which furnishes the tail which is to fly this wonderful logical kite :

The negative conditions of any phenomenon, a special enumeration of which would generally be rather prolix, may be all summed up under one head—namely, the absence of preventing or counteracting causes.

This is an amazing relief. We are now prepared for his construction of the final notion of cause "fixed and determined" "with the utmost practicable degree of precision" :

We may define, therefore, the cause of a phenomenon, to be the antecedent, or concurrence of antecedents on which it is consequent invariably, and subject only to the absence of preventing or counteracting causes.

We have at length reached the triumph of logic, in a conditional unconditionality, and a variable invariability, and have found that the last and perhaps most emphatic word in the definition of a cause is the word "causes"! If we can understand that, the definition is all plain !

This is certainly one of the curiosities of literature, surpassing Hume's celebrated chapter on the same subject. Besides defining cause by causes, and treating of causation without efficiency, the author perpetually contradicts himself in his logical jargon, eats up his own first principles and definitions, and in his straits makes constant appeals to necessity, or, as one has phrased it, to "the grand old tortoise, whose mustbeity and perseity are at the bottom of the understanding of all sham science."

But while the prince of logicians had the ability "to fix and determine" the notion of cause with such "precision," we shall find that he was scarcely able to use the term with as much precision. The truth is that Mr. Mill was an admirable illustration of the prodigy who thinks differently with the two sides of the brain. It was necessary that with one side he should think as a positivist, and so root out of logic all idea of real causal efficiency, or he could not get rid of God, the author and upholder

of the universe, and in that event his argument would come to grief. It was equally necessary that with the other side he should think with a little common-sense, and so furtively bring in here and there this hated and exorcised spirit of causation, lest he should utterly wreck all his writings. He is constantly performing the feat of the man trying to ride two horses in precisely opposite directions at the same time, and striving to conceal the fact from himself and others. After devoting half his Logic to proving that there is no causal force, no active power in matter, he turns squarely about and, in his treatment of Fallacies, insists that matter can not only act, but that it can act through absolutely void space, and without any media whatever, and thinks Newton and his scientific adherents a pack of fools for denying it! This is but a single illustration of what is to be found everywhere in his writings, in which consistency is certainly a very rare jewel. In fine, whenever a man of common-sense and clear thought comes, in Mill's writings, upon this unlucky word in *ation* he feels the same perplexity as the Irishman, of whom Miss Edgeworth tells us, who accosted an acquaintance thus: "When first I saw you, I thought it was you; but now I see it's your brother"!

3. But what of the third covert assumption of the argument? Is it true that this regress of antecedents, or prior events, no one of which has any causal efficiency, can satisfy the demands of reason for a cause and a First Cause?

The point of Mill, when fully stated, is reduced to the old form of an eternal series of effects, with the causal efficiency taken out of each and all in the series. There is the less necessity for dwelling upon it, since it has been so often answered. What the mind demands is a sufficient cause for the last consequent and for every antecedent in the series. If a chain of ten links cannot support itself in the air, much less can one of a million links, infinitely less can one of an infinite number of links.

But with Mill's view the case for the anti-theist is even worse. The causal power being left out by his very definition, no link has any support from its immediate antecedent even, the only connection being that of sequence in time. There are in fact no links. The position is, therefore, utterly absurd. The principle

of sufficient reason compels the assumption of a self-existent cause to account for all these dependent phenomena. Accordingly, the great thinkers of all ages, from Plato and Aristotle down to Hamilton and Ulrici, have acknowledged this as a thought-necessity. No rational being can be satisfied without it. No science can be constructed without it. No thinking can be carried on without it.

Mr. Mill's argument for excluding a First Cause from what he calls the "changeable element" of the material universe is therefore even less successful than that for excluding such cause from the so-called "unchangeable element."

III. Mill's third point is, that if there be any First Cause needed for the material universe, force is all-sufficient.

The author now takes it for granted that experience has shown —evidently not quite satisfactorily to himself, however—that all causes have a beginning; but if anything is still needed to satisfy the demands of reason for a First Cause, it is readily to be found without resorting to the threadbare and unscientific hypothesis of theism. His line of argument, given in abridged form, is substantially as follows:

(1) If, however, there be in all causes a permanent element which had no beginning, then this may, with some justice, be termed the First or Universal Cause, though not a sufficient cause, of the material universe and its changes, since it is a concomitant in all causation.

(2) There is such a permanent element found in Force, since the doctrine of Conservation of Force has been established by the converging evidence of all branches of physical science.

(3) Therefore experience proves that Force is the all-sufficient First Cause of the material universe and its changes, since the doctrine of materialistic evolution is true.

This is certainly sufficiently sweeping to suit any "advanced thinker." The author seems conscious of having reserved his strong point for the last. He brings his power of "analysis," to bear,—and his friends insist that he is the master of analysis. His array of confirmatory or buttressing arguments seems absolutely overwhelming. The prosyllogisms and episyllogisms marshalled in solid phalanx almost cover up the essential propositions. What is the strict logical value of it all? Is the structure a granite castle, or a house of cards?

(1) The halting form of the major premise vitiates the argument. It is admitted in its very statement that such a permanent element, as he has been considering, cannot be a sufficient cause. If that be so, what room for further argument on the point? It is assumed that a concomitant of a thing is to be identified with its cause. Consciousness always accompanies memory, but is it therefore identical with memory? Note of this distinction would have saved no less a man than Sir William Hamilton from great confusion in his "Metaphysics." Mill had still greater need of caution. Suppose that, so far as Mill's experience shows, a small boy's new clothes do always accompany the boy; are they, therefore, to be considered either a concause or as the first cause of the boy?

The phrase, "with some justice," is a touch of that "invariable variability" element, or of what one has called "philosophic trimming," of which this great logician finds it necessary to avail himself so frequently. If this permanent eternal element always accompanying all causes or changes may with some justice be called the First Cause, it is pertinent to ask with how much justice? Especially is this question pertinent, if, as Mill admits, it is "not sufficient of itself to cause anything!"

But note further Mill's, "may be the first cause." This innocent "may be" turns up before the logician reaches his conclusion, as a relentless "must be," when we read: "This it is to which apparently . . . we must assign the character of First Cause;" and again, "the First Cause can be no other than force."

The entire procedure requires no ordinary logician. That which cannot be a sufficient cause for anything, may be with some justice termed a first or universal cause—in fine, after another shake of the juggler's hat, must be accepted as the sufficient First Cause of the material universe!

(2) Mill finds such an insufficient-sufficient, first and universal cause and non-cause, in eternal force.

Just a little before, experience was found establishing, on the basis of its infinite "don't know," the eternity of matter; here it is found establishing on the same basis the eternity of force.

The latter conclusion is logically as worthless as the former. What scientific warrant has Mill for planting himself on this infinite ignoramus, and pronouncing force eternal? Even if it were so, it would, as we have already seen, be utterly and forever impossible for him, on his unscientific hypothesis of knowledge, to know it.

The logician plants himself on the doctrine of the Conservation of Force, "the last result of physical inquiry, derived from the converging evidences of all branches of physical science." Now if this doctrine be true, and if it include as true that the *quantum* of force or power in the universe is invariable, that all force or power is one, and that all the changes in the universe depend upon the amount and collocations of this one force, it becomes evident at once that very little room is left for theism.

Is this doctrine, of which Mill, Spencer & Co. make so much, a doctrine established by all science?

Two leading British scientists, in a preface to the remarkable joint production already referred to, after complaining of the utter ignorance of their critics concerning what is meant by force conclude thus:

> In addition to what we have said on the subject in the text, we would now only mention that the sole recorded case of true persistency or indestructibility of force which we recollect having ever met with, occurs in connection with Baron Munchausen's remarkable descent from the moon. It is, no doubt, a very striking case; but it is apparently unique, and it was not subjected to scientific scrutiny.*

Faraday tried to discover experimentally what might be correctly called Conservation of Force. He was not satisfied with the mode of statement of Newton's law of gravitation, according to which the attraction of two bodies is said to vary inversely as the square of their distance from one another. As the attraction at twice the distance decreases to one-fourth of what it was, what becomes of the three-fourths that have disappeared? With all his skill he reached no result.†

Strictly speaking, force has had "one, and only one, definite, scientific sense since the publication of the *Principia*." It is im-

* The Unseen Universe, preface to Fourth Edition.

† Tait's Recent Advances.

plicitly contained in Newton's first law of motion, and may be given as follows: "Force is any cause which alters or tends to alter a body's natural state of rest or of uniform motion in a straight line." It must be understood, however, that the word "cause" in this definition does not imply the objective existence of force. Force, in its proper sense, is "a pull, push, weight, pressure, etc., and can be measured, in the vernacular of engineers, as equivalent to so many pounds weight." It does not properly mean "work done by force," nor is it equivalent to the modern term "energy." Confining force to its strict scientific use, the Conservation of Force is an utter absurdity, and the use of the phrase by evolutionists shows a want of clear scientific knowledge. Obviously every push, pull, pressure, must be a transient event. Or, if the doctrine be understood as including under force "the work done by force," that is in no proper sense of the word persistent or indestructible. It may take a thousand different forms, or be utterly destroyed.

But suppose force to be used in a loose and unscientific way for energy. The doctrine of the conservation of energy—originally suggested by Newton (as was almost everything else of which certain noisy experimental physicists of this age boast) and developed by Rumford and Davy, Colding and Joule, Helmholtz and Thomson, and others,—is a very different thing from the Conservation of Force; in fact, it annihilates that doctrine. As gold, lead, oxygen, etc., are different kinds of matter, so, according to this modern view, sound, light, heat, etc., are now ranked as different forms of energy. Energy has been defined as "the power of doing work in whatever that power may consist."*

Now even if it were demonstrated that there is always the same quantum of energy in the universe, that may be shown to be the poles apart from the proposition that the quantum of force is always the same. For energy exists in two forms—potential energy or energy of position, as in a wound-up spring or weight, as in a clock, in a bent bow, or in gunpowder; and kinetic energy, or energy of motion, as in running water, or the falling avalanche. The activities of the material universe may be said to result

* Recent Advances p. 53.

from the transformation of energy from one of these forms into the other. Now the ablest of physicists have shown that the availability of energy for the performance of work depends upon the unequal distribution of heat ; that at each transformation of heat-energy into work a large portion is degraded or dissipated, and less of it available for any future transformations ; that, in other words, the tendency of heat is towards equalization.* The potential energy of the universe will at length be transformed into a practically useless state of kinetic energy, and uniform temperature will prevail throughout the mass. That is, the force in the universe—the push and pull of Professor Tyndall—is constantly lessening in quantum, and will at last practically reach zero. The history of the material universe is, in short, the history of the fall from the highest form of potential energy to this practical zero of potential energy, and has been brought, by mathematical calculation, within definite and narrow limits—say within ten or fifteen millions of years at the utmost from the side of the past, and perhaps less from the side of the future.† Force in the material universe must inevitably perish.

What then becomes of Mill's scientific idol? It is but a poor foundation on which to build his large superstructure of a first and universal cause. "Push" and "pull" are very poor material out of which to construct a universe without a Pusher and a Puller.

Has the second assumption of Mill any better scientific basis? Do "the converging evidences of all branches of physical science" show that all forces are but forms of this one material force, and that any one of them may be transformed to any other one? The ablest scientists in the different spheres involved must, of course, be in the best position to judge of this doctrine of the unity of force, and the appeal must be to these men.

Almost twenty-five centuries ago Parmenides of Elea taught in substance :

> That which truly is, is without origin and indestructible, a unique whole, only begotten, immovable, and eternal ; it was not and will not be, but is, and forms a continuum.

* The Unseen Universe, p. 127. † Recent Advances, p. 167.

Dr. Buchner, who in this late age announces this doctrine as a wonderful modern discovery, assures us that now :

> The naturalist proves that there are no other forces in nature besides the physical, chemical, and mechanical.

Dr. Elam—certainly a most competent authority to speak from the point of view of chemistry—responds to this in the name of exact science :

> Once for all, it cannot be too clearly understood that this claim is utterly without foundation. No vestige of what can fairly be considered proof of the doctrines of materialism has ever been offered. Now, as two thousand years ago, they rest only upon arbitrary assumption and conjecture.

He protests against the extreme form of the theory of heat, which uses the term in what he characterizes as :

> The non-natural sense, which is now so fashionable, as being synonymous with all motion, all action, all affinity, all change in molecular arrangement of every kind. . . . It may be very philosophical to consider all forces as one, and this one mechanical, and call it heat ; but such hasty generalizations tend but little to any true advancement of science.*

It should be noted that Professor Tait and the scientific physicists of the higher order do not hold that the various forms of energy are identical. Faraday, a no less competent authority on electricity and kindred subjects, devoted much time for twenty years to an effort to show experimentally that gravitation is in some way related to electricity, magnetism, and the other forces, but without the least result in favor of any such relation.† Dr. Lionel Beale, the authority in biology, assures us that—

> Correlation is the "abracadabra" of mechanical biology. . . The phenomena formerly supposed to be due to 'differentiation' are now regarded as the work of correlation. . . . But as yet no operation characteristic of any living being has been explained upon any physical principle. . . . Not the shadow of proof in favor of the analogy supposed to exist between life and other forces has yet been adduced.

Dubois-Reymond, who has given a large part of his life to the investigation of the connection of thought with the brain, and who is all the more competent as a witness for the reason that the desire to prove the identity of molecular movement and consciousness has been a moving-spring in his investigations, reaches the conclusion that—

* Elam, Man and Science. † Jevons, Principles of Science, p. 586.

There is and must forever remain an impassable chasm between definite movements of definite cerebral atoms and the primary facts which I can neither define nor deny, I feel pain or pleasure, I taste sweetness, smell a rose-scent, hear an organ-tone, see red, together with the no less immediate assurance they give, therefore, I exist.

These authorities close the circle against Mill 'sassertion. Even the so-called mechanical forces are neither identical nor convertible. The so-called mechanical, chemical, vital and mental forces are in no materialistic sense one. If the term correlation is used to express the idea of harmonious interdependence and interplay of all forces, we accept it. There is such a relation brought about by the correlating will of the Governor of the universe. But if in place of this meaning, the scientific jugglers introduce the convertibility, identity and essential unity of all the forces, then, in the name of clear thinking and exact science, we enter a protest against its use.

Mill's further assumption that all the changes in the universe depend upon the "amount" and "collocation" of this one force must, of course, fall to the ground with the doctrine of the unity of force. It may not be amiss, however, to ask, Whence the "collocations," including as they do all inorganic forms, all plants, all human life and activity? They certainly need to be accounted for. Are they due to chance? Or is this "Protean Force," versatile as St. Patrick—who, according to Carlyle, swam across the Irish Channel with his head in his teeth—able to get under itself and lift itself over this chasm of "collocations?"

(3) Turning to the conclusion of the argument—a conclusion that, as Mill seems to feel partly conscious, swings loose from the premises—we find it resting at last on the assumption of the truth of materialistic evolution. The great logician would have us believe that the converging evidence of all exact science has demonstrated the truth of this antique-modern hypothesis.

The assertions of advanced evolutionists are so confident as to demand a somewhat careful examination. What is evolution? Who are the proper scientific authorities to decide upon its truth or falsity? What, as a matter of fact, is their decision?

Herbert Spencer, "the apostle of understanding," will define the term for us:

> Evolution is a change from an indefinite, incoherent homogeneity to a definite, coherent heterogeneity, through continuous differentiations and integrations.

What does this mean? With men of exact science "differentiation" and "integration" have a very important and definite signification; but manifestly Mr. Spencer has no conception of any such meaning. Is the definition simply a blinding mass of large words in *ution*, *ation* and *ity*? A keen critic recently translated it into English:

> Evolution is a change from a no-howish untalkaboutable all-alikeness, to a somehowish and in-general-talkaboutable not-all-alikeness, by continuous somethingelsifications and stick-togetherations.*

We think the translation brings out the precise scientific import in the most intelligible form. But suppposing that the definition has a meaning which the scientists apprehend, or, at least, that there is a hypothesis of materialistic evolution which may be definitely stated, according to which the existing universe, from the molecule to the man, has been evolved from the original fire-mist—who is to be the authority in deciding whether this hypothesis deserves to be accepted as exact science?

The scientists may be allowed to answer the question, provided they will do it on sound common-sense principles. One of the most competent of them has given a satisfactory answer:

> That which is properly called physical science is the knowledge of relations between natural phenomena and their physical antecedents, as necessary sequences of cause and effect; these relations being investigated by the aid of mathematics—that is, by a method in which processes of reasoning, on all questions that can be brought under the categories of quantity and of space-conditions, are rendered perfectly exact, and simplified, and made capable of general application to a degree almost inconceivable by the uninitiated, through the use of conventional symbols. There is no admission of any but a mathematician into this school of philosophy. But there is a lower department of natural science, most valuable as a precursor and auxiliary, which we may call scientific phenomenology; the office of which is to observe and classify phenomena, and by induction to infer the laws that govern them. As, however, it is unable to determine these laws to be necessary results of the action of physical forces, they remain merely empirical until the higher science interprets them.†

*Kirkman, Philosophy without Assumptions, p. 292.

†Recent Advances, pp. 348, 349.

The scientist of the first order is "the skilled artificer with his plan and his trowel"; while the one of the second order is "the hodman" who "hands up to him the requisite bricks and mortar." To the first order belong such men as Newton, Helmholtz, Sir William Thomson, and Clerk Maxwell; to the second, such men as Darwin and Tyndall, and Bastian and Haeckel and Buchner. Manifestly they only who are of the first order, or who approach it, are competent authority in matters of exact science. What have they to say on the subject?

Not one of them can be found to pronounce the hypothesis of materialistic evolution, exact science, or science of any sort, unless it be "science falsely so-called."

Dr. Elam declares it to be without shadow of proof. St. George Mivart, the most accomplished naturalist in England, has pronounced it a "puerile hypothesis." Professor Agassiz, in the last sheets to which he put his corrections, subjected it to the most pitiless and destructive criticism. Professor Virchow of Berlin, perhaps "the foremost chemist on the globe," a man, according to the London *Times*, "opposed to every species of orthodoxy, and altogether innocent of faith," in his great address at Breslau, in reply to Haeckel, declares it to be little more than the famous and long since exploded doctrine of *generatio equivoca*, and affirms that all real scientific knowledge has proceeded in the opposite direction. Still more recently, in his "Quarterly," he attacked the extravagances of advanced Darwinism even more vigorously, styling the circles of materialistic evolutionists "bubble companies."

We close the circle of testimony with that of Professor Tait, in which he gives the scientific estimate of the pretentious sciolism engaged in blowing the evolution bubble:

> On the other hand, there is a numerous group, not in the slightest degree entitled to rank as physicists (though in general they assume the proud title of philosophers), who assert that not merely life, but even volition and consciousness are merely physical manifestations.*

He lays violent scientific hands on the pretentious experimental science of the day, and the advanced evolutionism of Tyndall & Co.:

* Recent Advances, p. 25.

It gives itself airs, as if it were the mistress instead of the handmaid, and often conceals its own incapacity and want of scientific purity by high-sounding language as to the mysteries of nature. It may even complain of true science, the knowledge of causes, as merely mechanical. It will endue matter with mysterious qualities and occult powers, and imagines that it discerns in the physical atom "the promise and potency of all terrestrial life." *

The only conclusion possible from all this is that the testimony of all exact science, instead of establishing the hypothesis of materialistic evolution, is really a unit in proclaiming its utter absurdity.

The first part of Mill's scientific argument against a First Cause is, therefore, absolutely without any scientific foundation. Experience does not and cannot prove matter eternal; rather, when understood in the proper sense, it shows matter to have originated in time, and, therefore, to need a First Cause. As little does human experience account for the changeable element in nature; that, too, requires a First Cause. In fine, evolution, in the atheistic sense, is an unscientific myth, and force can in no sense be a First Cause for anything. At no single point has Mill even weakened the argument for a First Cause by his agglomeration of obscure and false conceptions, of baseless and unscientific assumptions, and of illogical leaps to absolute and universal conclusions from conditional and particular premises.

* Tait, Recent Advances, Lecture of Force, p. 349.

WHAT WAS MAN BEFORE HE WAS?

[Read before the American Institute of Christian Philosophy, July 14, 1892.]

By Richard Abbey, of Yazoo City, Miss. :

[The writer prepared this paper to be read before the Institute, but departed this life before the Summer School assembled. It was read by the president of the Institute, who has long known Dr. Abbey, and regarded him as one of the most acute and penetrating thinkers in America.—*Note of Editor.*]

DEBATES without a question and proofs that prove nothing are by no means very uncommon. This class of logic is frequently illustrated by certain writers examining into the origin or antiquity of Man. Science and revelation are our sources of information. The former is very voluminous, the latter very laconic. One difficulty in comparing these two classes of testimony is, that they are not found to testify on the same points. The Bible states as a mere unexplained fact that God formed or created man, but is rigidly silent as to any mode of doing it, while science testifies solely as to the manner in which man came, whatever may have been the prime agency in producing him. So there is no necessary conflict. To explain this controversy shall be the business of this paper but not to take side with either party.

Everything has its antecedence. To trace it, if it can be done, or as far as it may be done, is the business of science. Nothing is absolutely new ; or if it is, we have no faculty to conceive it. To say of anything, that it had or had not an absolute beginning would be the same thing to us, for absolute origination is wholly unthinkable. The attempt would involve the absurdity of thinking about nothing. Animal antecedence—and I suppose vegetable—may be conceived of as physical or ancestral. But exactly where these two things differ, or whether the difference is merely seeming and not real, are questions in infinitesimalism that, so far as I know, science has not undertaken to inform us about.

The essence of procreation has, I believe, not been clearly discovered. Certain it is that it must be, in part at least, physical; and the farther it may be traced, even through only a dozen or half a dozen generations, it diffuses almost quite indefinitely throughout the three great natural kingdoms. And as to anything like a distant ancestry, there could be no more kinship than between a stone nowhere and a certain leaf on the other side of the globe ten thousand years ago.

Some scientists trace human antecedence upward through distant animal races or species. This question or theory is purely scientific with which, as mere historic fact, the theologian as such has no concern, for, as above stated, the Bible is entirely silent as to any mode or way in which man came into being. It states only that God did it, with no teaching or intimation as to how it was done. Still it is open for anyone to look into this theory of animal ancestry without denying it. The meaning may not be always understood.

It will be more convenient to go no further back in this line of heredity than the monkey from which or through which it is said we descended. But first let it be distinctly noted and remembered, that anthropology is the science of man, not of something else before man existed. A thing existing is one thing; its possible antecedence is another.

If we descended from a monkey ancestry it must have been in one of the two following ways, for it is very certain the great monkey kingdom was not involved in the man-making enterprise, for it is here now in all the fulness and wildness of utter brutehood.

Then, first: Away somewhere in remote antiquity, some one full-blood female monkey gave birth to a full-blood man child, and, about the same time the same or another gave birth to a full-blood female child, and thus the human race began. This is conceivable, and if asserted, it must be disproved on strictly scientific grounds, for we must not forget the silence of the Bible as to any mode of human beginning.

But no scientist will admit this mode of human origin. Why not? Because, he says, it is unnatural. Natural science furnishes no precedent for such radical and sudden change.

Very well, then, second: There is but one other conceivable way in which the thing could have come about. This was the way: Away somewhere in high antiquity, some one monkey family or tribe, or possibly more than one, began by most likely almost or quite imperceptibly slow degrees, to separate, disunite or switch off from the main stock. It was a secession or withdrawal from monkeyhood proper, becoming, generation after generation, less and less brute-like and more and more manlike, until, in sufficient time, the offshoot became, as we see him now, a separate race, and we call him Human. This is certainly also conceivable.

And, if this was the way of it, then explanation on the following points is necessarily required. Any hypothesis must be self-supporting. And so,

First, Was it ever known in any other department of nature, that an entirely new race of animals was produced in this way? These secessionists must have kept themselves personally distinct and separate from the regular monkey tribes with absolute sexual pureness. Any family or tribal admixture during many centuries would have frustrated the plan. This is not a case of race-improvement. The great monkey race had nothing to do with it. Neither was it a case of general improvement in the secession, for in several respects it was a very serious loss, a detriment which his successor, mankind, suffers to this day as we will see presently. This certainly needs explanation.

Second, What could have set on foot this man-making enterprise in the first place? As things were then seen, it promised nothing, and threatened everything. And so far as concerns animal life, as things have turned out, it is by far the greatest disaster that ever befel the world. With suicidal intent or no intent, this illegitimate off shoot of a great animal nation sets on foot a new and therefore unheard of race of animals the most inhuman, selfish and bloodthirsty conceivable. The world was then well inhabited; everything was doing well; the beasts grazed in every valley and gambolled along every hillside; the fowl occupied every sunshine and the fish swam in every lake and river at least with as little social molestation as now. In this state of universal peace and plenty a new race is introduced,

not by some foreign or universal potentate, but by one of the home races themselves. And this new race at the outset asserts and enforces universal dominion over all animal life, even the monkey himself, and with most relentless and remorseless cruelty, tyrannizes and terrorizes over every living thing, rapaciously slaying, eating or harnessing into perpetual slavery every denison of earth. And a renegade monkey did it! It may be so, but certainly it needs explanation. It looks unnatural.

Third, Another seemingly inexplicable thing to be accounted for in this world-transforming enterprise is, that in raising up this new and powerful ruler he should undergo such great degeneracy as is obvious. This is not by any means a case of development or improvement, as many seem to suppose, but of degeneracy. Every animal power then possessed, except instinct, which will be looked at in a page or so, has undergone great loss even to the extent of about a full half of its entire value. Men are two to four times as large as monkeys and, size for size, have half their strength and one-tenth their agility; and as to power of endurance, hunger, exposure, care of young, gestation, delivery of young, ability of young to take care of themselves, etc., we do not possess ten per cent. of the ability of the race from which we have deteriorated. A human child is almost or quite helpless for several years. The mother's care must be constant, while a monkey six months or a year old takes care of itself. If in springing from limb to limb he should fall ten feet into a river, the careful mother would scarcely turn round to see on which side he swam out. How with the human mother? A two-year-old monkey, or one old and decrepit, will go to the top of a standing tree in the same time and same safety as a human would reach it if it were lying on the ground. Whence this great degeneration? And a monkey did it.

We talk glibly of the "inferior animals." Which is the inferior? Have we not lost a full half or more of the entire physical constitution of our animal ancestors? Man is the slowest, clumsiest and most helpless animal on the earth. Without some entirely new power which did not formerly exist, and which could not have been anticipated in this monkey enterprise, man as a race could not survive the next decade of years. Man needs food

every day, and must have it well cooked with fire. He is subject to many diseases and accidents not known to his ancestors; he must be carefully covered with thick covering day and night, lest a gentle sunshine or pleasant morning frost cause him to perish. Young monkeys would grow fat and be healthful where our stoutest young men and women would perish. This well-known degradation and natural inferiority must have a cause, and it is the duty of science to show it to us laymen. The world needs the explanation. Preaching evolvement into better conditions does not furnish it.

Fourth, The two and only great animal powers of mind by which life is sustained and reproduced, are instinct and reason. But for these two faculties, each acting in its own peculiar and exclusive domain, animal life would soon become extinct. They are the moving springs of all motives and give start and progress to all incentives. The former belongs exclusively to brutes, and the latter exclusively to men. These functions are primary, original and furnish solely the means of procuring a livelihood and of prolonging life. Take instinct from brutes and the brute would soon perish in the midst of plenty. And deprive man of this new and indefinable power, reason, and the world will soon relapse into the condition in which man first found it. Man would perish. And although in most, if not in all things, the life of man and of beast depends mainly on the same things as well as a like use of them, yet there is not known the least likeness or similitude in these constitutional functions. Man has no use for instinct. Brute has no use for reason.

I am aware that there are a number of monitions or incentives that occasionally stir to quick action or induce to choice that are common to man and brutes, and which are sometimes loosely called instinct, using the term in a low and diluted sense. But such impulses in man never reach to instinct proper, and in brutes, if carefully traced, will be found to result from mere habit or from memory, which it is not unreasonable to suppose may be perfect or nearly so.

Take a domestic cat, six months old, that had never been six rods from the house, put him in a bag and turn him loose in the woods ten miles away, in the night, and he will be home in

the morning. That is instinct. There are two ways to find an exact water-level at two given points on two sides of a hill, two miles apart. A skilled human engineer, with sufficient learning, instruments, and some help, will establish it in a very few days. That is reason. And a two-year-old beaver that had never seen the other side of the hill, will go straight to it at once, and build his dam to an inch. Instinct is intuitive; its knowledge is not learned. The highest degree of knowledge, so far as we can measure, is inherent in brutes. They do not learn; they merely repeat by force of habit.

On the contrary, reason begins at the lowest point of knowledge above absolute imbecility, and rises by a process called learning, a hair's breadth at a time, indefinitely. It is never complete. Every man dies with his knowledge half finished.

Now, there was a time when man did not exist; even though he came down through the monkey; *man* did not exist; and although science may not be able to put its finger on the exact period of transition when manhood preponderated over brutehood, there must have been such a period, for, as we are told, brutehood grew into, or in some way became manhood. Man did not exist, and so, reason did not exist. The world was as full of instinct then as now, and by it the world was governed, and now the world is largely governed by reason.

So it is important that we be informed when, where and how this new and wonderful power got here. It was as new in the world then as would now be the introduction of a new race of animals with absolute vision, absolute hearing or physical power, or any other utterly unknown endowment. This new animal has so completely revolutionized the world that he now governs it with a rod of iron and without a rival. A reasoning animal was as unknown, unlooked for and undesirable then as a ubiquitous race or a race of ten-foot giants would be now. By no possibility could reason be inherited from any living animal race then more than now. No animal now, the most sagacious or well trained, gives the least indication of even the lowest degree of reason. Who would look among monkeys now for reason rather than among the more sagacious animals, such as horses, dogs or elephants? Ancestors cannot impart to progeny that which

they do not themselves possess. Neither can instinct grow into reason. It might as well be supposed to grow into some unknown power, or that reason could grow into instinct. And so it may well be inquired, not only how reason got into the world, where it came from and who introduced it, but for what purpose was it sent? Who wanted it? Why was it either sent or suffered? It unhinged, disturbed and disorganized the affairs of a quiet and peaceful world. It was a bold and violent usurper, forcing his invasion by fire and sword!

Fifth, Another vitally important matter that presents itself right here, and which requires explanation, is this: Not only did this monkey family in the course of its procedure in acquiring humanity become the great patron and possesser of this new power we call reason, but they lost their own great native power of instinct. How could that be? What power or authority deprived him of it? Or did he, or how could he voluntarily relinquish it? No monkey can do it now even if he desired to do so. Every animal except man is now in the constant exercise of instinct. By it he lives, breathes, eats, sleeps and enjoys life; without it he would die very soon. This was formerly always the case with every living creature from the mite to the mastodon. Why and how this one exception? Is there anything in nature that even looks in such a direction? Or if it be said that he received reason in lieu of his instinct, the question arises, Who conducted the negotiation? And on the whole, did he make a good bargain? He could not have been a voluntary party to the exchange, for he could not know what he was getting in exchange. His instinct was life, health, being and everything to him. And he lost it!

Every-day observation shows clearly that all animal propensity, proclivity, disposition or determination is moved by instinct or reason separately and distinctly. They have no conjoint action. Reason thinks. Instinct acts.

To the foregoing argument that one side of this popular controversy holds that man is the progeny of a seceding monkey tribe, it may be replied, "Not so; the theory called evolution does not confine itself to monkey ancestry. Formerly there

may not have been an animal answering to the modern monkey, and so the monkey-succession argument fails."

The plea, minus the conclusion, is readily accepted. Monkey origin is stated here merely in the sense of animal ancestry of any kind, known or unknown. If man did not grow from a quadrumanous animal, then let it be bovine, feline, canine, or any other. The theory and teaching is that mankind is the product of some pre-existing forms of life that possessed the power of instinct and not reason. If that is not the hypothesis, then man was absolutely and independently primordial—essentially the same from a beginning. There can be no question about his origin unless there was an origination. If the argument is not that he emanated from some prior and some other form or forms of life, then what is it? I take the teaching as I find it.

I now ask the reader to pause a moment and see what position we have reached. He will see that I have made no argument about anything. I have affirmed nothing, denied nothing, neither have I taken side in this lengthy controversy, but have been silently following the teachings of those who hold their peculiar views touching the mode of human origination. Where I met with trouble in reconciling this teaching with itself, I explained the difficulty briefly and asked for further information.

We have seen, as is agreed on all hands, that man is a newcomer and not of earth's original inhabitants. The world was well inhabited, and all conceivable demands of nature were supplied under a general system of animal instinct.

In this state of affairs there seemed something in the air, or whispered by the moon, or dreamed by the spirits of the deep, to the effect that an entirely new kind of inhabitant of earth, greatly inferior in most respects and as greatly superior in some others, would, in some way, be greatly useful. But useful to whom or how, nothing ventured a conjecture. No general betterment of the world could be conceived of. Everything was best as things then were. The grass grew, the trees yielded fruitage, the breezes kept the air in motion, and day and night, sunshine and season performed their rounds. Increase and multiply was the great law of nature. Where this new animal was to come from, or what was to be his calling, or his relation to the old pro-

prietors, were questions too profound to be either asked or answered.

But at length, as we are told, "Some ancient member of some anthropomorphous sub-group gave birth to man," as herein before explained. So the great monkey kingdom divides into two races. From a point of divergence they continued to diverge. The old, regular stock pursued its natural course and occupies its proper place in the forest to-day. The seceding branch pursued a most unnatural course. It changed into a new and utterly unknown race which in this short period, perhaps not over one or two hundred centuries, has produced widespread havoc and disaster among the world's old, rightful and legal proprietors. A revolution seemingly as unnatural as it is unaccountable.

It looks impossible that such parentage could produce such a progeny. Monkeys, like other brutes, are born with mature knowledge, but its human offspring comes into the world in most abject ignorance. His personal poverty and helplessness are deplorable. His limbs are of no use to him. He has ability to neither eat or drink, and seems fit for nothing but to die and that very soon. And yet in some unaccountable way he soon becomes invested with unlimited dominion and wields a sceptre of universal control, with an utterly fabulous and tyrannical will that knows no bending.

Thus far, I believe, I have been successful in an honest attempt to present this question of the mode of human origin as its advocates represent it, only suggesting some difficulties necessary to be removed in order to its completeness as a theory. Nor have I suggested the impossibility of removing them.

And then, to carry the investigation into a somewhat different field, let it be supposed that these difficulties are all satisfactorily removed, and monkey origin is an acknowledged theory, and does account for and show the mode of man's origin. How does the case then stand as between the skeptical scientist and the polemical theologian? Who is gainer and who loser?

Aside from the partisans in this quarrel, the mere intelligent Christian turns to his skeptical friend and says: "If your theory is correct you have done the Church good service; you have told us what we did not know before, viz., HOW GOD MADE MAN.

The Bible teaches merely that God made him, or created him, with no intimation as to any mode of doing it. Let the four or five seeming difficulties, as herein specified, be cleared up, and then we will thankfully acknowledge our indebtedness for the information. Meanwhile we must be content with our old creed and hold the fact only of a divine creation and be content to be ignorant of the mode."

Let us now turn for a few minutes to our friends, the polemical theologians in this controversy. I am not able to see the theological ground of objection to monkey origin, or any other mode of origin for man, or indeed for anything else. The Christian creed touching man's origin, is very brief and very simple, As well as it can be formulated into the English language it is in these words :

"God created man in his own image, in the image of God created he him, male and female created he them."

To that nothing essential must be added or subtracted. Mode is not alluded to or implied either here or elsewhere. Slight modifications in form, in familiar speech, here as elsewhere, are allowable where thought is molded into words, but this formula must remain substantially unchanged. Touching divine actions of any kind the Christian has no creed relating to any temporal or mundane surroundings such as geography, time, horticulture, skill, manipulation, handicraft or anything tangible or visible. Above all, he must steer clear of anthropomorphism. Moreover, it is implied that the making of man was not an absolute creation ; "of the dust of the ground" implies antecedence of some kind.

Therefore as Scripture mentions no mode of human origination, how can we deny any particular, alleged mode however apparently false such mode may be ? There is no possible way of disproving a false mode but by producing the true one.

So the Christian has no creed touching mode, manner or way of creating, or of any divine acting, nor of any outward material, history, phenomena or circumstances relating to the same. God is Spirit, not matter, intangible, invisible, absolute, not phenomenal. Anthropomorphism was indignly scouted from Christianity in the fourth century, and ought not to be revived in the nineteenth. Our ideas of God are abstract, not concrete.

So where there is no clear mental concept, descriptive language cannot have a liberal meaning. Hence in the hundreds of cases in Scripture where the inspired writer would inform us of God doing something, allegorical or some other figurative language is a necessary resort.

And so, many theologians, failing to discriminate carefully between the liberal and the figurative language of early Genesis, lead skeptically inclined men into the error of supposing that a visible mode of man-making is presented to the reader, when nothing is intended to be clearly taught but the fact of divine agency. The fact that God made man, is one thing the way, if indeed there was any way about it, is another. If we believe the fact, we do so solely on authority without other testimony. And in like manner, if we disbelieve the fact, we do so without either authority or reason.

Monkey ancestry is one of the forty conceivable ways in which man may have originated, so far as we know. But most assuredly it cannot be presented even as a hypothesis to be inquired into until each one of the four or five specific difficulties connected with it, as hereinbefore stated, shall be clearly explained. Nothing is easier than to set up a theory of origin that cannot be overturned. How are you going to deny it? Suppose I say the first pair grew on a tree. To say in reply that God created them would not deny it, for in such case the tree theory would only show how the creation was performed.

Just so of the monkey theory or of any other. If true, then that was God's method of creating. And who cares? Nothing is easier than to state a thousand things equally incapable of denial or of proof.

Let it be repeated then and emphasized that the question of monkey origin, or any other particular mode of human origin, does not relate to the question of fact whether God made him or not, but to the method how he came. And then certainly the former is the only question in the premises that the mere Christian can be interested in. The Christian says God created man, and the skeptical geologist says he is of animal ancestry. Very well; whether this latter statement is true or not, it certainly does not contradict the former. Then why the theolo-

gian, acting as such, should pitch into the controversy at this point, and join in the heated discussion of a question not theological in its nature is not easily seen from a logical point of observation.

Man's antecedence, whatever it might be, is a scientific and not a theological question. Suppose, at the first step, it was literal "dust," or "clay"; it is the business of science, not religion, to examine the dust, if it can, and chooses to do so, and tell us where it came from, and what was its antecedent, and so on. Who objects to it? Or if it was animal antecedence, let him trace that if he can, and so put the globe and its furniture under the most infinitesimal chemical analysis. Who objects?

But the theologian has to do only with man as man, and not with something else that possibly may have anteceded him. We go no further back than the man we see, our religious or irreligious man—the anthropological man. We are not chemists, nor geologists, nor archæologists. Our business is confined to the religion of mankind.

When men of science or any other men infringe upon the words or plain teachings of Scripture, then we are in place to interpose a peremptory objection. But we have nothing to do with speculations about things that possibly might or might not have existed away, away in the realms of high antiquity ages and ages before man appeared on the earth. Some years ago the Church undertook to teach astronomy and failed; later it undertook to teach chemistry and failed. Better to stick to our calling and be content with the impossibility of a clear and rational understanding of infallible teachings necessarily put sometimes in symbolical language.

So we see that in these years past these contestants have been debating about a divine method rather than a fact.

From the foregoing considerations it follows:

First, That the natural foregoing or antecedence of man, or of anything else, is legitimately in the keeping of natural science and not of religion.

Second, Therefore when men, in the pursuit of physical science, began to speculate about something true or untrue they imagined, away in dateless antiquity, may have had some agency

in a future introduction of a rational or reasoning animal upon earth not contradicting the words of Scripture, the theologian in his proper vocation had no right to interfere.

Third, All that scientists can possibly do or pretend to do touching man's antecedency is to point out certain natural phenomena or processes leading to a then future manhood ; and then, to suppose that these exact processes, whatever they may have been, were not divinely intended and calculated to lead to and produce and install man, as we now see him, is a simple, atheistic gratuity and assumption quite destitute of reason or excuse.

Fourth, Therefore the question of fact whether God created man or not, is not debatable. Testimony, pro or con, cannot be conceived. The mode how is the only open question ; and, as divine actions are not phenomenal, it does not seem plain that such arguments have a very good claim to a much higher position than a katydid dispute.

The skeptical scientist has proved, admitting his facts, that God, under that or some other name, made a monkey and instructed him how to make a human race.

In conclusion, There are, in fact, three popular theories of man's origin ; first, that he grew naturally and without divine direction from certain primordial forms of life. Secondly, that he was divinely manufactured, on a certain day, at a certain locality, out of certain material ; and thirdly, that God created him.

SHOP AND GIRLS.

[Read before the American Institute of Christian Philosophy, July 18, 1892.]

By Prof. J. H. Hyslop, Columbia College, New York.

IT is estimated that there are about 150,000 saleswomen and children in the State of New York. Of these 50,000 are found in New York City. Of the latter number 20,000 are under 16 years of age, and of these 5000 are under 14 years, making 15,000 between 14 and 16. The average age of the 30,000 saleswomen is 18 years. A saleswoman is rarely employed after she is 30 years of age. In the first-class houses of New York City the saleswomen, unless they become heads of departments, are not retained longer than five years; in the second-class houses they may be retained longer. The reason in both cases is the fear that they will think they have a claim upon the firms for better wages. In some cases, it seems, a rule is established for the dismissal of saleswomen at the end of this limited period. The average wage of both saleswomen and children is $4.50 per week. The lowest limit for saleswomen is $2 per week, and for cash-boys and girls $1.50 per week. This is the rate for New York, and it is about the same for Brooklyn. It is lower for the smaller cities throughout the State. One-half of the saleswomen in New York City do not exceed $4 a week. They are employed generally to work from 8 A.M. to 6 P.M., and are expected to give extra time without receiving therefor any additional remuneration. "In the majority of the stores all over the city saleswomen and children are kept after 6 o'clock to arrange stock, the time varying according to season from fifteen minutes to four hours. For three or four weeks previous to the holidays these women and children remain until 11 and 12 o'clock without supper or extra pay." They must often work amid unwholesome sanitary conditions. In many cases they must work in basements poorly ventilated until they faint. In the coolest days of summer these places are never below 90 degrees. The toilet ar-

rangements in many of the stores are of the very worst, if the report on the condition of working-women is to be accepted, and are fit subjects for investigation by the Board of Health. They are often at inaccessible heights, and as saleswomen are generally prohibited the use of the elevators, they must climb long flights of stairs in order to reach them and the cloak-rooms. In some cases no provisions are made to alleviate thirst, and water must be obtained from the attic. Sometimes cash girls are kept after 6 o'clock in order to sweep certain portions of the store, and in some stores must pay for the use of their aprons. Fines are imposed for tardiness and various sorts of delinquencies—not an undesirable measure if only it be justly administered. But this rule being entirely in the hands of the superintendent, and as he is likely to be disciplined for any laxity of administration, the poor saleswomen are as often unjustly as justly fined. In one store employing 1200 in the busy season $3000 fines were collected in one year. In another averaging 1200 the year round, and 1800 in the busy months $6000 fines were collected in a year. This was on Broadway.

In one fashionable house saleswomen are not allowed to leave the counter, except for lunch, between 11 A.M. and 3.30 P.M., and if a saleswoman has a customer when the lunch hour arrives she is obliged to remain and wait on the customer, and the time so consumed is deducted from the lunch time. The fines often amount to the full salary of the saleswoman. "In some stores if the sales do not reach the required amount for a certain number of days the saleswomen are dismissed; and in one store, if the goods called for were not in stock, they were obliged to try and force something else on the customer, and were reprimanded if they failed."

The law requires seats to be provided for the saleswomen. "In a few places one seat is provided at a counter where fifteen girls are employed, and in one store seats are provided and saleswomen fined if found sitting!" In many cases the health of the strongest breaks down after two years under this regulation and the poor sanitary conditions often accompanying such a policy.

The wages of one-half the saleswomen do not suffice to

provide a decent living. This sum, we have said, does not exceed $4. A case is cited of one woman who averaged $3 a week; she paid $1.50 for her room. Her breakfast consisted of a cup of coffee; she had no lunch at noon, and could get but one meal a day, and that in the evening.

This story could be extended indefinitely and be made more heart-rending than we have indicated, if we told all, or if we described the incidents collected by the Working-Women's Protective Society. The facts cannot be read or pondered by any justice-loving man without feeling a sense of indignation as strong as the hatred of a slave for his master, or as a freeman's hatred of a tyrant. The very blood boils at the heartless outrages committed upon a helpless humanity, and all that one class may reap the spoils wrung from the weakness of another. It is the old story of the strong robbing the helpless. The penalty of weakness, it seems, is to do all the work and to bear all the suffering of the world. They seem to have no rights which the powerful are bound to respect. They are mercilessly crushed to pieces under the wheel of a commercial juggernaut, sacrifices to the idleness and luxury of their inhuman masters who sit smilingly on the ruins of virtue and humanity, and victoriously resist all efforts to obtain simple justice for their victims. The picture is only such as the sympathetic have described in all ages as the perpetual moan of heart-stricken millions who toil unrequited at the wheel of labor while their masters are at their revels, squandering their thousands in needless luxury or travel which brings no culture or utility with it. Mr. Lowell saw the situation and described it with a moralist's as well as a poet's feeling:

> Some were made to starve and toil,
> Some to share the wine and oil,
> We are told:
> Devil's theories are these,
> Stifling hope and love and peace,
> Framed your hideous lusts to please.

Could Mrs. Browning's "Cry of the Children," or Hood's "Song of the Shirt," have described a more unfortunate class and their conditions? Will the everlasting wail of pain and sorrow

that rises from the low, patient multitude of women and children ever be heard by humanity ?

The conditions which we have described indicate the problem to be considered. What is that problem ? Here is the question that is quite as difficult to answer as the problem itself is to solve. The popular mind thinks that it knows very distinctly what the problem is, and most of those who are interested in it, and of those who are the victims of the present order of things are quick to believe and assert that insufficient wages are the cause of the whole matter. This means that if higher wages were given the evils which are deplored in such strong language would not exist. But we must remind the impetuous that this conception of the matter is not so well assured. We wish it were. We are by no means anxious to cool the moral indignation which is disposed to color the injustice to working-women with the language of damnation, nor to pacify the conscience of their injurers by insinuating that the fault is mainly in the working-women. Employers with the seared conscience of a devil and a politician combined too often like to avail themselves of every possible excuse in behalf of their interests, and hence endeavor to conceal or obscure their own responsibilities behind the blame of others, or to stifle remorse and humanity by indulging every available *tu quoque* against the defenceless. We do not desire to offer them any occasions for subterfuge. Their too frequent embodiment of Shylock removes them far from any consideration at our hands. But nevertheless at the risk of indicating to them a resource for self-complacency and self-defence, even if it be only in the doubt about the accuracy of the popular judgment in the case, we must assert that this judgment is not so well founded as we could wish it to be. No one questions the insufficiency of the saleswomen's wages in fully a half of their numbers, or that better wages would not remove some of the evils so palpable to all students of the question. If this were all to be accomplished the problem would be a very simple one. But, however much better wages might put the saleswoman above the need of charity or the condition of poverty, they might produce evils which nature and civilization regard as worse than poverty or even death, while they in the end influence population in a way to produce

all the poverty which they were intended to remove, in addition to the evils considered as worse. Higher wages for saleswomen are undoubtedly needed, but other things are needed quite as badly, and in many instances no one can furnish these wants except the sufferers themselves.

Let us ascertain the elements of the problem. The first is better wages, as already stated. The second is the willingness or the ability of the person employed to render an equivalent of their wages. The third is a policy which will keep the proper ratio between population and natural resources, or land, economically speaking. The fourth is a means of supplying a motive to work which shall take the place of the struggle for existence, or which shall mitigate its evils. The fifth is the establishment in the general consciousness of the idea of social responsibility and a criterion of its extent. The sixth is the elevation of the standard of living among those whose competition degrades the unfortunate. The seventh is the creation of higher moral ideals among the lower classes, whose vices are as much the cause of the evils complained of as low wages. The eighth is the repudiation of the ordinary standards of life which measure its ends in terms of happiness rather than in obedience and perfection, or adjustment to law and environment.

Perhaps there are other factors in the problem, but these eight are sufficient to show its great complexity. The various elements are so related to each other that the desired results of improving the condition of shop-girls cannot be attained with the attainment of any one condition, but require the realization of two or more of them at the same time. They may also be related in such a way that, human nature being what it is in given instances, the attainment of better wages may defeat a more important end which the order of the world has in view. Whenever this is the case we are not justified in concentrating our efforts upon the establishment of a system which defeats the higher moral ends of nature and providence. Let us examine these assertions in the light of the concrete facts with which we began.

We stated that one-half the saleswomen of New York City, and this is 15,000, do not exceed $4 a week for their salaries. To make the injustice of this as strong as possible, considering

that they must depend wholly upon this sum for self-support, we have only to know what the cost of living is. The cheapest rates of rent in the city for suites of two rooms are in the Gotham Court tenements, where the rent is $4.50 per month. These are tenements built for the very poor; for such as are not employed usually in the places held by sales clerks, and hence are exceptionally cheap. But these rates make it tolerably certain that suitable lodgings will not often be attained for saleswomen for less than $6 a month, or $1.50 a week. This would leave $2.50 a week to those who receive $4 for their board and clothing and other necessary expenses. It requires no argument to show the insufficiency of such wages. Must we insist, then, that the only remedy for the evils incident to the existing policy is an increase of wages? Undoubtedly they would remedy certain evils. The saleswoman could live more comfortably. But is comfortable living the only thing that we are obliged to consider in this problem? Is this end to be attained at the expense of others, or by means that ultimately promise more evil than the present expedient removes?

It is proper to remark by way of caution that we cannot judge the case at all until we know the reason that the rate of wages is not higher for the 15,000 persons mentioned. It may be the competition of an over-supply of wage-earners. It is said that if the 20,000 children under sixteen were removed from competition that wages would rise sufficiently to support the saleswomen. But a moment's reflection shows that these children must be supported either out of the wages of the saleswomen or out of the wages of others, while the production used in the present dividends would be diminished, or a larger number of persons must be thrown upon public charity. Again, the low wages may be due to the fact that the saleswomen are already provided with a home, so that the $4 a week is so much addition to the family income, directly or indirectly. It is this rate, because the person finds this sum equal to seven or eight dollars under circumstances where three or four dollars would be absorbed in rent and other expenses. It will be apparent, therefore, that until we know the circumstances determining the rate of $4 we cannot say that it is an unjust amount. It will be only

that portion of the 15,000, who must depend upon the $4 for their entire support, that are unjustly treated in their wages. No figures are shown telling what this proportion is, and hence it is clear that the nature of the case must be kept in suspense until more definitely known. We cannot lay down any policy about their right to higher wages until we know whether the rate they receive is entirely voluntary or not. To say that every person shall receive a sum equal to the cost of living is to interfere with the freedom of contract and to reduce to poverty one class that we may relieve another. That is, we should be demanding that those who are able to take $4 a week should not be allowed to do so, but that they must be required either to take more, in which case the cost of goods would be greater, and hence less sound to society for paying others, or not to compete with those who need work, in order that their wages may be equal to the cost of living. In either conception of the case, perfect freedom of contract is not supposed.

Now I do not deny the ideal propriety of limiting the freedom of contract, if it is abused to the detriment of society, but in limiting it we might produce more evil than we relieve. Experience shows the importance of this principle and unless the practical policy we recommend can avoid setting aside this maxim, that policy will be very questionable. As long as we grant the right to accept wages below the cost of living we have no means of preventing rates which fall cruelly upon those who have no supplementary resources to fall upon. We have to choose between a system which will limit the freedom of contract and one which results in considerable injustice to those who are not free. This choice, however, is restricted to those conditions in which we do not know definitely the persons who are merely supplementing the family income and those who must support themselves. If we knew definitely who are compelled to accept insufficient wages because the competition of the more fortunate reduces them to these terms, we might then endeavor to contrive a policy which would grant freedom of contract to all who are partly supplied with the means of subsistence, and which would at the same time relieve the less fortunate in this respect of the influence exerted by this heartless competition. The boarding-

houses, of which there are a large number in New York, and similar institutions in other cities exactly supply this want. The objection to them, which has some force, is that they are institutions of charity and avail either to retard and prevent promotion and increase of wages or discourage the feeling of independence and self-help. While this is true, they are better than a policy which limits the freedom of such as we have mentioned. What we require still is a means of securing better wages for the helpless after abandoning charity, and until that can be done we must be content with the assistance of such institutions as put the unfortunate on a level with the fortunate.

These observations make very clear the necessity of farther investigation into the circumstances of saleswomen in order to distinguish between two separate classes of them. The 15,000 in our account are composed of those who do not require to earn all their means of support and of those who do require it. Until we have ascertained the latter class we are not even assured of the injustice of the present system, much less of any feasible means of raising the rate of wages. The same report informed me that three-fourths of the saleswomen either earned their own support or contributed to the support of others. Those who did the latter were either partly supported from the family income or received sufficient wages for their own support. In the latter case there is no demand for higher wages that requires to be respected, and in the former no policy can be adopted without interfering with the freedom of contract. But in regard to these three-fourths we are not informed as to what proportion of the saleswomen must earn their own support ; possibly none of them are so circumstanced. But until we do know this our figures are deceiving, and we have not the proper data upon which to construct a definite and practical policy of action.

I must repeat that this opinion does not conflict with the fact that many saleswomen are unjustly treated, and that they ought to have better wages. I would not only admit but would assert that shameful injustice is done in thousands of instances. But what I am contending for is the fact that the solution which looks to the general raising of their wages is not the correct one, unless this result can be attained without conflicting with the

other important factors which we have mentioned as entitled to consideration in the problem. Undoubtedly the wages of those who are unfairly treated and who are not in a position to drive a fair bargain ought to be increased ; but the problem is to do this without producing more evil than exists under the present system. It may be possible to contrive a means to that end, but it will probably be in a direction different from that which expects to raise the general rate of wages or to modify the motives of the employer.

Prior to the consideration of this question it may be worth while to notice a few ethical matters which are too often neglected in this problem. We are constantly told that vice and crime are the inevitable consequences of the low wages received by the classes under notice. No doubt some of it can be traced to this source, but if we mean by our conclusion in such cases that vice and crime are the necessary outcome of poor wages, and better conduct the result of good wages, we are deplorably mistaken. Where the moral character is strong the matter of wages does not affect conduct one way or the other. In fact a great deal can be said in favor of the view that poverty is more conducive to the virtues than riches. Riches may confer respectability, but they cannot produce character. So poverty may reduce a man's social standing, but it cannot weaken his character. Indeed we often find the superior virtues to be characteristic of the poorer communities and of those who receive the lower grades of wages. The great clamor of the present day is against the unduly large wages of the wealthier class, and we certainly do not find them especially famous for virtues of any kind. There are exceptions enough, but as a class they can hardly be surpassed for selfishness, lying, intemperate use of their money in self-indulgence, and indifference to the world's suffering. As to their sense of justice, a man who has worked long among both classes in practical charities remarked to me, and I would agree with his judgment, that if we want strict justice done in any case we should fare infinitely better if we had to go to the poor than if we resorted to the rich. Increase of wages is not necessarily followed by an improvement of moral character, but too frequently by greater indulgence in vice and waste

of resources. Statistics in England seem to show that increase of wages generally means a greater surplus for use in the purchase of distilled drinks, and not in the necessary comforts of life. It is even apparent in much of the labor agitation of the day that the motive is much less one for the attainment of higher culture than it is for greater means to satisfy lower appetites. The envy is not of those who are aiming at the highest moral ideals, but of those who have the greatest opportunities for enjoying pleasures, generally of the lowest kind, even when covered by the cloak of respectability. Higher wages are wanted for the indulgences and gratifications they will purchase, not for strengthening the will to follow the path of duty or to withstand the buffets of fortune. In short it is, or ought to be, a truism that, grant the poor all the wages we may wish they had, we are not assured of any results except that they will be nearer on a level with those who have no economy to practice and no desires to repress.

Again, I do not wish to be understood as implying that unjustly treated saleswomen should not receive adequate wages, or as asserting that none of them would be morally the better for it, but as criticising the perpetual assumption that the first condition of solving the problem presented by their circumstances is the attainment of better wages. I should say without reserve that justice in the matter should not be denied, and that we ought to contrive a method of giving them better rewards for their services, even if it results in no moral improvement. They have the same right to enjoy the comforts of life as the rich who gain their means and advantages more by the use of the power they possess than by the righteousness of their principles. But in the solution of this problem we aim, or ought to aim, to improve as well as gratify the sufferers of misfortune, and also to see that we do not produce upon the next generation more pain than we remove from the present one. Hence I must contend that much as we should agitate for the increase of wages, we should also see that the attainment of this end is neither the primary object to be had in view, nor the most important one to be gained. In fact, unless we have first secured a moral character in the claimant it may be questioned whether we have a right to interfere

with the stern pressure exerted by the struggle for existence to gradually weed out the unworthy. This may seem a cruel judgment, but it is meant only to convey the hint that other methods than the financial improvement of the poor are first to be considered in the solution of the problem before us.

It is to be remarked still farther that the perpetual consideration of this question from the point of view of increased wages for saleswomen tends, from the assumption regarding the person who shall pay them, to make us think that the employer is to blame for the whole evil incident to the circumstances described in our figures. But we have shown that the partly supplied wants of some of the 15,000 in New York City, an indefinite part of them, are sufficient to cut down the remuneration of all others not so well situated. The blame for the existing condition of things must thus be distributed, and when we consider the influence which the competing power of such persons can exert upon the cost of production and the price of goods, the employer might often absolve himself of all responsibility for the insufficient wages he gives by showing that he must give these or none at all. If this be the case, it is as vain as it is unfair to ask impossibilities of him. No doubt there are enough cases where the whole responsibility rests upon the employer, but we must determine this fact before we propose a method of solving the problem. In fact, it may be questioned whether the employer or producer is ever any more or as much responsible as the consumer. We are apt to blame him alone for the unjust wages of saleswomen. But he may plead a twofold extenuation in his favor. The first is the competition which reduces prices of goods and the wages of service, so that he has no alternative in the matter but the course chosen. Not all employers can give the same wages for the same work. These must be determined by various circumstances, distance from the market, the productivity of labor, etc., while the cost of living might be the same in different conditions. The second plea of extenuation might be that if the consumer did not first demand the cheapest possible prices there would be no temptation to offer them by reducing wages, which are often the only modifiable factor in the case. Indeed, I am inclined to think that the whole responsibility for

the injustice to saleswomen and poor laborers generally *rests primarily upon the consumers.* They purchase where they can get things the cheapest, and no more stop to consider the consequences to the wages of saleswomen than do the employers. When we look at it frankly their course in the problem is the usual one in the history of mankind. They want everybody except themselves to practice the virtues of justice and self-sacrifice. They demand that the shopkeeper pay better wages, but they do not want the price of goods to be altered. They want to see justice done, but do not wish to make the sacrifices which will effect it. The shopkeeper must do all this. But see how quickly they change their tack and sympathies when their responsibilities are pointed out. They are quick to defend their right to get goods where they find them cheapest, and have not consistency or insight enough to see that the shopkeeper has the same right to get his labor where it is cheapest. If the latter right be denied, the denial carries with it a denial of the former right. In fact, the plainest truth to those who are honest enough to confess it is, that the very first step to a reform in the wages of saleswomen is the willingness of the consumer to pay prices which make good wages possible. If we are not willing to do this we must keep silence about the duties of others. People who live in glass houses must not throw stones. How absurd it is to go wherever we can buy at the cheapest price, and then make liberal subscriptions to charity organizations to support the 11 per cent. of the poor whose earnings are insufficient! Thousands will pay their washerwomen a niggardly price for their services, spend ten dollars a week for the theatres, and then hand a good sum in church collections over to the aid of the poor. This is a fair sample of the rationality of the multitude. They can see the mote in their brothers' eyes, but not the beam in their own. They are anxious to repair the evils of injustice provided they do not have to make the reparation themselves.

Here, then, is an opportunity for the consumers to see that unjustly paid labor shall receive its dues. They can see, first, that they pay prices for their goods equal to the cost of production and distribution including fair remuneration for labor; and, second,

that they patronize only those who are disposed to be just to their employees. This will be a test of their sincerity and consistency in the matter. There is too much maudlin sentimental sympathy in modern times that delights to put all its virtue in *feeling* right about this problem, and doing nothing that is effective, especially if it costs some self-sacrifice. But we propose in this method a policy which does not interfere with the freedom of contract, and which aims to bring moral pressure to bear upon the very points where it is needed. The consumers may thus refuse to share the responsibility for the evils of low wages. At present they are fully as much, perhaps more, to blame than the employer, because he relies for the success of his policy upon the cupidity of his customers. There is no escaping this accusation, and I deem it absurd to leave this consideration out of the problem. I am perfectly aware, however, that there are difficulties attending the practical working of the method I have proposed. They may be insuperable difficulties, and hence I am not suggesting the method with any confidence in its extreme feasibility, but only to indicate the absurdity of making the employer bear the whole responsibility of the present evils, while the consumers are equally or more to blame than he. I wish to indicate that no solution of the matter is possible which ignores this factor, and we shall perceive the difficulties very distinctly when we learn the fact that after all the consumer and the employer are one and the same person. The two terms simply define the same person in different relations, so that we often find the contradictory attitude of a man exacting from his servants all that competition between them will enable him to do, and then gratifying his humanitarian sympathies by large donations for charity. The solution of the problem has to grapple with this condition of things, so that however much we may think that the tyranny of the employer is responsible, we shall find in the end that we shall not get rid of the existing evils by any policy of organization or punishment of the employer until we have equally overcome the cupidity of the consumer.

We are often told that a thorough organization of the shop-girls will effect a remedy by preventing the competition with each other that keeps down their wages. One way to diminish

this competition is to declare it illegal for children under 16 years of age to engage in labor properly belonging to shop-girls. This would undoubtedly raise the rate of wages, but would it solve the problem, if it succeeded also in correspondingly raising the cost of living? We have already pointed out how the exclusion of the 15,000 children from competition with shop-girls would only change the point of incidence of the evil, and would not remove it. Organization of the shop-girls themselves to resist the tyranny of the employer is another and different expedient. I admit frankly that it will accomplish something, and it is certainly a desirable measure as a preventive of much injustice. But, justifiable as it may be and is, it is another thing to suppose that it is a sufficient solution of the problem involved in the case. In the first place how is organization going to meet the questions involved in the individual right, I do not mean moral right, but the undoubted civil right, to accept such wages as meet their needs? If it discriminates between those who are entirely and those who are only partly self-dependent, how will it determine sufficient wages for the former class without involving resistance from the latter on the ground that equal services deserve equal rewards? Or if it determines the rate of both classes on the basis of services and their equivalent in wages, how will it prevent such a distribution of products as only shifts the incidence of poverty to other sufferers, and how will it prevent such an increase in the price of goods as diminishes the demand for them, and therefore their production, so that laborers are actually thrown out of work in one place to increase the wages of others?

These are questions which have to be considered as well as the immediate objects of organization. Organization we must have for defensive, and possibly for offensive, purposes, but it will not ultimately solve the problem. Its policy must be supplemented by the moralization of the whole community, by its instruction in regard to the rights of certain individuals, and the duty of others to respect those rights in all their dealings. This is only to say that consumers have as many obligations to pay just prices for their goods as laborers have rights to just wages. There can be no solution to the problem of shop-girls and their wages which does not recognize this fact, and which does not aim

to determine the conduct of buyers as well as organize the efficiency of saleswomen and their rights. I might go on and show that no policy can be successful which does not fix a proper ratio between population and natural resources, because the larger the number of persons among whom the goods of the world are to be divided the smaller must be the portion which each one can receive. The larger the divisor, the smaller is the quotient, and we know that the limit of natural resources is much narrower than the possibilities of population. Now we also know that the growth of population is more or less proportioned to the improvement of laborers' income up to a certain amount, and this increase of population only avails to enlarge the divisor into the dividend of wealth with the effect of bringing the quotient down to the limits of subsistence. In other words, a policy which only increases population when relieving the needy reproduces the condition it was intended to remedy, and the fact shows how careful we should be about adopting expedients which are only of a temporizing nature.

The same can be said of any policy which ignores the value of the struggle for existence. I know that this principle put into practice does not seem to be an ethical one ; and only represents the survival of the strong. As embodied in the doctrine of evolution the principle is the very antithesis of humanity and morals because the social organism is nothing less than an attempt to protect the weak against the strong, while the struggle for existence enables the strong to have their own way. But in spite of this there is one effect produced by the operation of this law which ethical principles must recognize and respect. It is the only force which, man being what he is, can restrict population on the one hand, and compel a man to earn his bread, on the other. Any policy, therefore, which relieves this pressure, or diminishes the motives to prudence and to the greatest effectiveness of labor, avails only to make matters worse in the end, either by diminishing the dividends of production or by shifting the evils of the present system from one class to another. Increase of wages, and organization with that in view, only produce this very effect unless more radical remedies are employed at the same time.

Let me say again, in conclusion, that I have no intention of condemning the measures adopted to secure justice for saleswomen. I fully approve of them. But I do not believe them sufficient to accomplish what is expected of them, and I criticise the optimistic hopes of those who are engaged in developing such schemes, because I am confident that the enthusiasm for them is certain to obscure the more important features of the problem. I believe the measures involved in the increase of wages and of the comforts of life are second and not first in the order of importance. This is what I have been trying to show when illlustrating the responsibility of consumers for the existing condition of things, and implying by it that the first step in reform is the moral regeneration of those who are responsible. Besides, again, what is the use of increasing wages unless there is guarantee that they will be used, when gotten in the interestof higher ideals? On both sides, therefore, on that of the wage-earner, and on that of the wage-payer and the consumer we must regenerate the moral character in order that one may use his resources rightly, and the others be quite as scrupulous in conforming to the laws of justice. When this has been accomplished we shall then either not require such measures as the friends of saleswomen are advocating, or they will be rendered more effective than at present. But the first step in all cases is the moralization of the individual, and any scheme of improving the condition of labor which leaves this consideration out is doomed to failure. Of course this is a truism which every Christian and man of sense knows, but we are forgetting it to-day in our enthusiasm for multiplying the machinery of organization, and for regenerating man by supplying him with the comforts of life. But this moralization of man, of which I speak, is a very complicated and difficult problem, and I have no cut-and-dried method of doing it to propose. I am interested only in indicating the point of view which must always be assumed and reckoned with in the consideration of incidental methods. The latter are commendable enough provided they are not thought to be sufficient. By incidental methods I mean, trades-unions, knights of labor, societies for the protection of laboring women, organized charity, etc. These are necessary, but they are not

a cure of the evil. They may even make it worse, unless we moralize the human will at the same time.

Let us enumerate some of the conditions to be fulfilled besides employing methods for raising the wages of saleswomen and laborers generally. First, we require to respect more highly certain forms of labor which, although more necessary than others, are poorly paid, because skill, intelligence and respectability desert them for other fields. The manner in which the majority of mankind distinguishes between various kinds of labor gives moralists very good reasons for considering the race a collection of fools or knaves, and the judgment is not far wrong. Second, every man should be willing to pay a *just* price for what he buys, and not to purchase it at a price which involves a loss to the producer. At present we run wherever we can get our goods at the cheapest account without once giving the consideration for the needs of others which we are asking for ourselves. Third, every one engaged at labor should render, and be glad to render, an equivalent for the wages received, and the employer should see that he acts as fairly and returns as much in wages as he exacts in work. If he does not do it, the reason is either because he preys upon the importunities and necessities of the unfortunate, or because the struggle for existence and the ratio of population to natural resources have made a man's needs and the fertility of his labor unequal. In the latter case adequate wages are impossible. The physical and economic conditions in such an emergency are exactly those of a famine where no amount of labor will supply one's wants. The good-will of the employer can accomplish nothing here, and hence only when the labor of the servant returns a profit to the business can he be expected to consider the relation between wants and the amount of work done. But, nevertheless, we must exact of him the moral character which will respect the principles of justice. Fourth, every man, laborer or employer, lender and borrower, owner and renter, must be willing to do his share of the world's work. This is only a summarized form of the three previous conditions. To pay a fair price for what we buy, including the payment of fair wages, and to render an exact equivalent for what we receive, is to do in some form a part of the work necessary to supply the productions

of the world. Until every man contributes by work, positive productive work, material or spiritual, and acts fairly in the distribution of what is produced, there will be no solution of the problem we are considering. No one saw this more clearly than Christ, although He did not express it in our modern social and economic language. But He taught the moral principles which we have only to adjust to economic conditions in order to perceive their relevancy and the insufficiency of any method of reform which ignores them. The primitive Christian community practised them, and it was only when its members departed from its faith that St. Paul had to say: "He that will not work shall not eat." This rule will condemn more men and women than it would be pleasant to specify, and it may condemn absolutely every individual of the human race because, although they labor, they may not do it willingly and conscientiously. Unless it is done willingly and conscientiously the heart is there that will lie and cheat, and it will be hopeless in such a case to rely upon the mechanical means of organization and rhetorical rant about wages for regenerating the world. The readiness to work will be accompanied by the will to do one's share of the work necessary to sustain the existing ideal. Unless this does exist we shall have nothing better than the present system, which is nothing more nor less than a society in which every one is endeavoring to get the most possible in return for the least possible work. As long as this is the principle regulating life there is no cure for the evils of poverty and low wages. We may as well make up our minds to this and begin our reforms with a method that will modify the human heart and character in the one respect which is essential to the solution of the problem before us, even after population has been restricted within proper limits. The magnitude of both these questions may well appall us, but they cannot be solved, if we expect success in the main object under consideration. The work will have to be carried along many lines at once, but we cannot stop short of the moral reform of human character, not of one particular class, not of the shop girls, but of everybody else, yourselves and myself, as consumers as well as others who may be producers.

That the problem is, first, the limitation of population which

decreases wages, other things being equal, in proportion to its own increase, and second, the establishment of a universal willingness to render work equivalent to benefits received, is well illustrated and proved by personal inquiries into the condition of things in New York City. In the first place, inquiries of several persons at the head of the working-girls' movement showed to me very clearly that the majority of them were indifferent to organization in their own behalf because they were not expecting to make a life-work of employment. It was only the older among them who, having given up the prospects of married life, found it important to endeavor to improve their condition and wages. But the majority in all cases expect some time to enter marriage and accept low wages as a make-shift for the time and until they can obtain support through marriage. Now, here is the general disposition to get a living without work, to depend upon others, as perhaps is universal in mankind, or nearly so. The labor that is given to the world under such circumstances is not given voluntarily, but either under the smart of compulsion or with the hope of means to compete more effectively in the matrimonial market.

Now, let me say that I am not condemning nor insinuating the condemnation of any particular class or individual. I am only stating a fact which is a cause of existing evils and which must be resolutely faced by every one. If this problem is to be solved we must remove the fact of which I have spoken. Otherwise we must put up with the consequences.

In the second place, attempts to cheapen the living of shop-girls, whether by boarding-houses or by cheap lunch-counters or soup-kitchens, I am told, only develop a tendency on the part of employers to reduce wages. They have actually been found to make inquiries at soup-kitchens in regard to the cost of living with a view to diminishing wages. If this is not done in so direct a way in all cases, we know that the effect is always the same. It is that cheaper living never, in the long run, improves the condition of the wage-earners, unless restrictions can be put upon the growth of population. There is the alpha and the omega of this problem, and it is useless to consider it from any other point of view. There is injustice to be remedied by organization and by any other legitimate and available means. I would de-

fend all reasonable efforts in this direction with more than ordinary earnestness. But unless we effect some limitations upon the growth of population, inspire a universal willingness to do one's share of the world's work, and reconstruct the ideal of the majority of men and women, which is life in a city, we may as well wring our hands in despair and let the devil make a bedlam of things. This will appear a despondent prospect. It is, however, not intended as such. I am endeavoring to emphasize the only practical way out of the difficulty. The trouble with present efforts is that they ignore this one vital question of the inborn impulses of men which can render nugatory all the current methods of regenerating the world. If I am asked what method I propose in place of those I repudiate, I can only reply one of two things. Either we must remove the cause of the evil we deplore, or we must resignedly accept the consequences. That cause can be removed only by the regeneration of human character, and for this we have no other means than those which have been employed in the past. We require only to be content with the very gradual nature of the process. But if we refuse to consider this point of view as the only one from which to expect a solution, I, for one, have no methods to propose by which to alleviate the lot of unhappy man. One solution has been given: "Do unto others as you would have them do unto you." If men will not accept and practice this principle, they must endure the consequences. The sad feature of it, however, is that the world's suffering for sin seems to be so vicarious.

"PHILOSOPHY AND PHYSICAL SCIENCE."

[The above is the title of the inaugural address, delivered March 1, 1892, by Mattson Monroe Curtis, M.A., Ph.D., Professor of Philosophy in Adelbert College, of the Western Reserve University. The extracts below will, we believe, be appreciated by our readers. ED. CHRISTIAN THOUGHT.]

I TURN to consider the bearing of philosophy upon the physical sciences. In so doing I will preface my remarks by a few general and provisional propositions.

I. No discipline has any claim to be called an exact science unless its principles are either self-evident or capable of demonstration.

II. According to the generally accepted ideal theory, the data of physical science are the products of mediate perception and are therefore disqualified for exact knowledge unless the medium between the external world and consciousness is represented by a clear and exact equation.

III. Physical science, so far from being restricted to observation, experiment and reasoning based solely upon them, is in its main principles and features metaphysical and speculative.

IV. The physical sciences resting upon hypotheses and making their advance by the means of new hypotheses are in reality not sciences but merely hypothetical disciplines.

V. Psychology shows that the so-called physical sciences are extremely defective as regards the phenomena of the respective objects with which they deal.

VI. The personal equation in experimentalism is considerable enough to engender doubt as to the probability of a science of nature in any one of its departments. . . .

I shall endeavor to make my position clear by putting myself in the place of the physical scientist. How does he, as scientist, begin? He begins by assuming or hypothecating a series of principles without which he can not take the first step in investigating external phenomena or in constructing physical theory. He postulates as true and valid:

I. The trustworthiness of present consciousness and of memory; the reliability of the simple canons of thought as contradiction, identity and excluded middle. These are held in common with the logician.

II. The existence of an ego or thinking subject and of a non-ego or an external, extended material world.

III. That external phenomena are in reality what they appear to be.

IV. The uniformity of external nature and of her laws.

V. The mobility, impenetrability and measurability of matter.

VI. The universality and validity of the law of inertia and of causation.

The physicist accepts these principles as ultimate and reliable, although some of them have been contested by men like Boscowich, Berkeley, Hume and Clerk Maxwell. Mr. Huxley tells us that the fundamental principles of physical science "are neither self-evident nor are they, strictly speaking, demonstrable." Mr. Leslie Stephen remarks: "The controversy as to the uniformity of nature is one of those upon which my own mind is not so clear as I could wish, and in regard to which dogmatism is inadmissible," and Jevons declares, "if there be such a principle as the uniformity of nature it is liable to exceptions." This most fundamental hypothesis of physical science is precisely the one most called in question.* If it is true that physical science rests upon questionable hypotheses, upon principles open to rational doubt, upon principles that are neither self-evident nor demonstrable, how can we speak of physical science at all unless we fall into the error of confusing science or knowledge with faith or opinion? Moreover, if physicists make a division between subject and object declaring the reality of an ego and of a non-ego, one has a right to ask *why* it makes such a division, and *how*, with this separation, is the ego to get at the non-ego, making it an object of knowledge? The validity of a discipline cannot be greater than the principles upon which it is grounded.

It appears to me that from this standpoint, in connection with what we have said of the ideal theory, we can see the baseless-

* Huxley, Advance of Science, p. 33. Stephen, Mind Apr., 1880, p. 167. Jevons, Logic, p. 217.

ness of the Mechanical Theory of Life. It assumes that all the hypotheses respecting the non-ego are true and valid, then the ego by a curious mystical performance changes place with the non-ego, which is immediately regarded as the ego from which and according to which it is declared that everything in heaven and earth is governed mechanically or by physical laws. All freedom is denied to man not because he is not conscious of freedom, but because the hypotheses made respecting the external world require *necessity*. How the mind can interpret itself by something not itself; how the material non-ego, which is the mind's own creation, can give laws to its creator is something quite beyond my comprehension. Mechanism, like materialism, is suicidal. It is a child of unpardonable error and is even a greater absurdity than Bentham's doctrine of positive rights, which, as Spencer points out, supposes a thing to be obtained by creating an agent, which creates a thing, and then confers the thing on its own maker. This mechanical materialism puts an end at once to all philosophy and science unless one can show how man, the result of physical forces, can frame a theory of physical forces and of himself, and how it is not nonsense to counsel these human products of physical forces to conform to the laws of nature.

Not only are the foundations of physical disciplines hypothetical, but they make their advance by means of hypotheses, and from the sphere of the transcendental sweep wide out into the realm of the transcendent, believing and dogmatizing beyond the range of human observation and experiment. Bacon charged against the Scholastics that they anticipated nature by unverified hypotheses and did not depend solely upon the facts of observation. It was the opinion of Bacon, and he has a large unsophisticated following at the present time, that no metaphysical principles should be introduced into explanations of nature, and that observation alone should be relied upon. Surely this is not the way of physical science. The history of invention and discovery and of physical principles in general does not support the Baconian "*knowledge is power*," so much as the anti-Baconian *speculation is power*. Bacon's view of method was not new. The old Greek physicians who professed to employ experience alone to

the exclusion of generalization, analogy and reasoning, calling themselves empirics, *οἱ ἐμπειρικοι*, had already been taught the foolishness of this hope. Yet this delusion still lingers among the rank and file. The way of the Scholastics which Bacon reviled is the way of physical science. It is Anselm's way, "*Credo ut intelligam.*" Stumpf notices that "some naturalists of the present day speculate more than all the philosophers put together," and Huxley remarks, "anyone who has studied the history of science knows that almost every great step therein has been made by the 'anticipation of nature,' that is, by the invention of hypotheses"; and Jevons adds, "physicists certainly do investigate the nature and consequences of forces which nowhere exist."* When Mr. Tyndall in his famous Belfast address says, "Believing as I do in the continuity of nature, I cannot stop abruptly where our microscopes cease to be of use. At this point the vision of the mind supplements that of the eye. By an intellectual necessity I cross the boundaries of experimental evidence," when Mr. Tyndall said this, he was casting aside Baconian induction *in toto;* he was reproving the idle superstition that physical science has nothing to do with speculation; he was indeed uttering the deepest truth of human nature and claiming in the name of truth her whole domain. The human mind can no more keep out of speculation, ontology, metaphysics, than it can keep out of itself; it cannot shut itself up to the mere data of sense, of observation, of experiment, nor to reasonings conditioned alone by these data. It is an erroneous supposition that physical scientists must or do take the advice, perhaps improperly credited to Newton, "*Hypotheses non fingo.*" Newton himself repudiated it in practice. Had he not done so his position would not be in the front rank of great speculative minds. As a matter of fact the physical scientist is involved in metaphysical principles from the beginning to the end of his work, and hypotheses so far from being forced upon him

* Stumpf, Tonpsychologie, Bd. I., s. 336. Hamilton's Metaphysics, I., 54. Wundt, Essays, s. 3. Huxley, Advance of Science, p. 34. Jevons, Principles of Science, Chap. XXX. On the nature and use of hypotheses see Zeller Plato, s. 150. Aristotle, Anal. Post. I., 2. Ueberweg, Logic, p. 506 Mill, Logic III. 14:5. Jevons' Logic, p. 114; Principles of Science, Chap. XXIII. And especially Wundt Logik, Bd. I., s. 401–409.

are, many of them, his own voluntary creations. According to the so-called scientific method is there any obligation whatever, any necessary grounds in observation and experiment for accepting the reality of the existence of atoms and molecul which no man has seen at any time, or for accepting as facts the nebular hypothesis and the theory of conservation of energy, or for receiving the theory of the existence of an all-pervading ether, or of the doctrine of biological evolution as applied to man? All these theories are hypotheses resting upon hypotheses. No valid proof can be urged for the truth of any of them, while some, if not all, seem to conflict with observation, experience or reason. Upon these grounds the best supported of all, the atomic theory, is sometimes questioned by men of science. Professor Cook tells us in his "New Chemistry" that "we must begin by believing in molecules. . . . Deny the existence of the molecule," he says, "and the New Chemistry can have no meaning for you and it is not worth your while to pursue the matter further." But chemistry and physics put alongside this hypothesis another, viz.: that in all changes of matter the sum of the material atoms remains the same. It is difficult to find any vital connection between these hypotheses and observation and experiment. The hypothesis of the existence of an imperceptible, luminiferous ether filling all space, and upon which rests the wave or undulatory theory of light is open to the difficulty of accommodating this universal matter to universal gravitation. Yet vibrations of light and heat are as remote from observation as are atoms and molecules. On what ground naturalists maintain a metaphysics of physics and repudiate all other metaphysics has neither been explained nor understood. The inconsistency of such a position is not less evident than the illogical attitude toward general ontolgy. There is not a principle of physical science that does not contain a metaphysical element or that does not fall back upon the idea of substance, which idea cannot be ignored by the consistent naturalist. To affirm that physical science is sufficient in itself without the aid of speculation or that its foundations are not hypothetical and metaphysical, or that it has an existence independent of philosophy is akin to the disparaging logic of Pat, who attributed endlessness to his rope on the ground that the end had been cut

off. Such, for instance, is the senseless claim of the Positivists, that science deals only with secondary causes; a claim which Comte himself utterly failed to realize. When DuBoise Reymond closes his discussion of the seven problems, not with Ignoramus but with Ignorabimus, he is not only a prophet of hopelessness to science and denying the most intrepid and irresistible force in human nature, but he is violating our hopes that are based solely upon human progress in the past. History does not allow us to say that what we do not know cannot be known, nor ought science, from its own records, to inculcate any such disposition as is here manifested. Another physicist of equal eminence has spoken more wisely on this point: "The danger to society," says W. K. Clifford, "is not merely that it should believe wrong things, though that is great enough, but that it should become credulous and lose the habit of testing things, and inquiring into them, for then it must sink back into savagery." The human mind refuses to anchor either on secondary causes or on Ignorabimus. Philosphy is more hopeful of the future of science than either of these expressions would indicate. The noblest characteristic of the human mind is its yearning for truth. It insists upon its right to ask and to search for causes and it cannot rest before this fog-bank of the Positivists. The secondary hypotheses to which we have referred are merely crutches for our weakness, and considering their character as well as the history of such hypotheses, we cannot be sure that they will not give way as scores of others have done, even after centuries of credence, as in the cases of the geocentric system and the corpuscular theory of light. Before the discovery of Uranus and Neptune one might have been regarded an ignoramus who disputed that all the satellites went in one uniform direction around the planets, yet the satellites of Uranus and Neptune contradict the conclusion of all former observation by moving in an opposite direction to the satellites of all other known planets. *Argumentum a particulari ad universale non valet* is the sober conclusion of observation and experiment and of all reasoning founded solely upon them. It appears to me that physical science, in some important features at least, so far from resting solely upon observation and experience, is so much given to speculation as to ignore observation and experience in some cases.

NOTE ON THEISM.*

By Prof. Noah K. Davis, University of Virginia.

"How can one be calm when he is called on to prove the existence of God? But let us reason gently, smothering our indignation."—Plato in the *Laws*, 888 *a*, Ste.

HYPOTHESIS plays an important and prominent part in scientific investigation. It is an approved feature of the inductive process, not merely legitimate, but often necessary. Much of physical science is built up on hypotheses that have not been established, as the dielectric hypothesis in electricity; and some of these hypotheses, from their very nature, can never become demonstrated theories, as the atomic hypothesis in chemistry. Nevertheless they are held with great tenacity by scientists, and by many are lauded as an invaluable part of the sum of positive knowledge. It is certainly an error to mistake hypothesis, which is mere supposition, for theory, which is demonstrated truth; but it is clearly legitimate and strictly logical to use hypothesis in an inductive search after truth, and to hold a good hypothesis firmly even where the procedure falls short of demonstration.

Newton made an hypothesis respecting the cause of celestial motions. First, he assumed a *vera causa*, that is, a cause known to be by proof apart from the hypothesis. Second, he proved that his hypothesis fully explained the facts. Third, he proved that no other hypothesis could possibly explain the facts. By this third step, what before was merely hypothesis became demonstrated truth. It is one of the few cases in which hypothesis has logically passed into theory.

The undulatory hypothesis of Huygens, or Young, explains with wonderful precision, and power of prediction, the phenomena of light. The proof that no other hypothesis will explain the facts is lacking, and therefore, even were there no rival hy-

*At a Symposium held on the evening of the 9th of July, 1891, at the Summer School, there was a discussion of the question: "Of all your reasons for accepting theism, which seems to you most trustworthy?" This article was contributed by its distinguished author, and would have appeared a year earlier but for one of those mysterious accidents which occasionally occur in the best regulated offices. Our readers will see that it belongs to that class of things which will "keep."

pothesis, it were still an hypothesis and nothing more. But it is imperfect even as an hypothesis; for the cause supposed, the luminiferous ether, has not been shown to be a *vera causa*.

The development hypothesis has had a brilliant history, and won many zealous adherents. It is as old as Anaximander. What Darwin did for it was to assign a cause, natural selection combined with heredity, and to prove that this is a *vera causa*. But the hypothesis is imperfect, for it does not fully explain the facts.* Much less can it claim to be exclusive, while in fact it has rivals. Says J. S. Mill: "Mr. Darwin has never pretended that his doctrine was proved." †

These things are said and these cases cited to indicate the actual logical basis of a large part of physical science, and to justify our using the same logical method with all strictness and legitimacy in other inductive investigation.

When we look abroad on the world of nature and of history we behold a bewildering multitude, a vast complexus of facts and events. It is the resistless nature of the human mind to seek an explanation of phenomena in their causes. The agnostic limits himself to a narrow field, ignoring others. The liberal mind inquires into the origin of this world of phenomena. Only two hypotheses have been offered, that of an infinite regressus of causes, and that of a personal first cause.

The former is set aside by the crucial fact that it does not even pretend to give the explanation sought, but merely pushes it back and away out of reach, in effect denying that it is attainable. This is essentially an agnostic view.

The hypothesis of a personal first cause remains. It will be granted by all candid minds that it fully, completely and sufficiently explains all the phenomena, and so has this prime mark of a legitimate and good hypothesis.

It has the second mark in that a person is, beyond question, a *vera causa*, *i. e.*, a cause well known to exist independently of the hypothesis in question. Every person knows himself and his fellows to be causes, original causes, creators or builders of new things from materials at hand. We do not now claim more for the hypothetically posited personal first cause.

* See Prof. Conn's admissions in his Evolution of To-Day, p. 117, *sq.*

† Logic (8th Am. ed.) p. 355.

Could we go further, taking Newton's last step, and prove strictly that no other hypothesis can possibly explain the facts, then this hypothesis would become a theory, a logically demonstrated truth. It has in its favor that no rival hypothesis is proposed, but this, in strictness, is not sufficient; there must be direct proof that no other can explain the facts. We shall not attempt here to offer this proof, and so the personal first cause is, in so far by this logical procedure, simply hypothetical. But the hypothesis is strictly legitimate and scientific.

It satisfies the logical and scientific requisites of hypothesis more completely than does the hypothesis of a luminiferous ether; for it posits a *vera causa*, while the latter does not.

It is likewise better than the development hypothesis; for it explains all the facts, while the latter does not. Moreover, it has no rival, while the latter has.

Standing on the same inductive basis as the sciences of light and natural history, with the excellences of both and the defects of neither, how can physicists and naturalists reject theism? Were there no other proof, is it not at least entitled to rank with these approved sciences? Only the wilful agnostic can say no. Bacon, the founder of induction, says: "It is true that a little philosophy inclineth man's mind to atheism, but depth in philosophy bringeth men's minds about to religion; for while the mind of man looketh upon second causes scattered, it may sometimes rest in them, and go no further; but when it beholdeth the chain of them confederate and linked together, it must needs fly to Providence and Deity." * Is not reduction to unity scientific procedure? Else, why the search for an element of the elements, and the speculations on unity of force? Shall we be content to rest in "second causes scattered"? Shall we not rather seek to unite them in a common source?

La Place, when asked by Napoleon why he made no mention of God in his "Mécanique Céleste," replied: "Sire, I had no need of that hypothesis." The astronomer may not, but the man and mankind have great need of that hypothesis. The questions it is proposed to answer are too momentous and far-reaching to be set aside. Said Voltaire: "If there were no God (though all

* Essay xvi.

nature cries out that He is) it would be necessary to invent Him." Upon this hypothetical basis let Him stand so long as the physical sciences stand.

We have taken very humble ground, leaving the higher positions to abler hands, and have treated the subject with reverence, but merely as a question of cold logic on a single line of thought. The unity of the Deity, that He is more than a demiurge building the world out of matter already at hand, that He is infinite in glorious attributes, are points not touched in this note. It only posits hypothetically a personal first cause. As initiative and a simple attendant upon other proofs, this seems to be reasonable, and likely to be helpful.

WHAT WE SUPPOSED ALL INTELLIGENT PEOPLE KNEW.

[Printed in *Christian Advocate*.]

By Rev. J. M. Buckley, D.D.

A GREAT hue and cry is made about certain discoveries of scholarship in Bible study. No doubt some discoveries are new, and some of these are valuable as well as surprising. But a skeptical writer in a magazine places in the list of things which he thinks are to undermine and overthrow orthodoxy, facts with which every well-educated minister and a great multitude of laymen have been familiar since their childhood.

We supposed that all well-instructed persons knew that the Bible consists of sixty-six books, communicated to God's people at different intervals, for about one thousand five hundred years; that the following books, which are not to be found in the world, are quoted in the Old Testament;

1. The Book of the Wars of the Lord (Num. xxi. 14).
2. The Book of the Covenant (Exod. xxiv. 7).
3. Jasher (Josh. x. 13; II. Sam. i. 18).
4. Acts of Solomon (I. Kings xi. 41).
5. Book of Kings of Israel (I. Kings xiv. 19; eighteen other places in Kings; also II. Chron. xx. 34, and xxxiii. 18).
6. Sayings of the Seers (II. Chron. xxxiii. 19).
7. Chronicles of Kings of Judah (I. Kings xiv. 29; and twelve other places in Kings).
8. Book of Samuel the Seer (I. Chron. xxix. 29).

9. Book of Nathan the Prophet (I. Chron. xxix. 29 ; II. Chron. xix. 29).
10. Book of Gad the Seer (I. Chron. xxix. 29).
11. Chronicles of King David (I. Chron. xxvii. 24).
12. Prophecy of Ahijah the Shilonite (II. Chron. ix. 29).
13. The Visions of Iddo the Seer against Jeroboam the son of Nebat (II. Chron. ix. 29).
14. Book of Shemaiah the Prophet (II. Chron. xii. 15).
15. The Book of Iddo the Seer concerning genealogies (II. Chron. xii. 15.
16. The Story of the Prophet Iddo (II. Chron. xiii. 22).
17. The Book of Jehu (II. Chron. xx. 34).
18. The Acts of Uzziah by Isaiah (II. Chron. xxvi. 22).
19. Three Thousand Proverbs of Solomon (I. Kings iv. 32).
20. One Thousand and Five Songs of Solomon (I. Kings iv. 32).
21. History of Animal and Vegetable Kingdoms by Solomon (I. Kings iv. 33).
22. Prophecy of Jeremiah torn up by Jehoiakim (Jer. xxxvi.).

Some of the above may be duplicates, and one or two others names for books in the Bible.

That there are no original manuscripts in the world, those having worn out or been destroyed or lost in the earlier ages ; that the translators were in the habit of adding words in the English version to make the sense clear, and that these are generally but not always placed in italics ; that the manuscripts from which the translations are made differ among themselves upon certain points ; that there are various passages upon the meaning of which scholars have differed ; that the writers of the New Testament sometimes quote the Old Testament from one version, and at other times from another ; that the Septuagint, Greek translation of the Old Testament, is the one most frequently quoted in the New Testament ; that the Old Testament belongs to a dispensation preliminary, incomplete, and in some instances faulty, owing to concessions to the weakness and ignorance of man ; that the government of the Hebrews was neither a democracy, autocracy nor an ordinary monarchy, but a theocracy, in the history of which the laws and wars, defeats and victories, conquests, migrations, captivities, lapses from the true faith, science, geography, botany, agriculture, weapons, implements, hygienic practices, natural phenomena, miracles, prophecy, and practical religion are mingled together, making the Bible not merely a book of religion, or of any other one thing, but a cyclopedia of Jewish history, manners, life, government, philosophy, and religion, we thought

that all Protestants intelligent enough to read the Bible and fortunate enough to have a good commentary knew. Also that Moses did not write the account of his death and burial; that some books in the Old Testament are merely to preserve the general maxims and state of morals; other books, like Esther, to give an account of a crisis in Jewish history; Ecclesiastes, to show the folly of human philosophy and of human life as experienced by a voluptuary; and that divine miracles of deliverance and punishment to a considerable extent (but not exclusively, as some feign), took the place of the doctrine of immortality as an impulse to right living in the old dispensation.

We further supposed that it was generally understood that the dispensation of the patriarchs found them at a low estate, and consented to many things not compatible with the highest principles of truth or the purest service of God; that Moses, while inspired of God to establish the dispensation of which he was the head, used his own judgment on a great variety of matters, and even that of his father-in-law, Jethro, when it seemed reasonable in his eyes; that the temple services and worship derived all their importance from their utility as means; that the Bible itself declares these things, and teaches us that some portions are literal and some figurative, and sets us upon using our best judgment to ascertain which; that the New Testament expressly declares that "if that first [covenant or dispensation] had been faultless, then should no place have been sought for the second."

We supposed that all well-informed persons knew that the canon of the Scriptures, by which is meant the authoritative decision of what books should be held inspired, was decided by men of authority in the Church; that some Christians have doubted whether some of the books should have been included, as Luther doubted whether the General Epistle of James belonged there; but that the weight of judgment, Roman, Greek and Protestant, accept these, while the Roman Catholics include the Apocrypha as authoritative, and the Protestants do not accept it.

Finally, we imagined that no one believes that all parts of the Bible were of equal authority upon Christians; and that only what is found in the New Testament, and what in the Old agrees with it, is binding upon the present age, though the Old Testa-

ment was binding absolutely upon all to whom its revelations were communicated.

All these things are expressed or implied in the writings of John Wesley, and are abundantly set forth in Clarke's "Commentary"; all of them the writer heard preached in his youth in Methodist pulpits by the bishops, pastors, and professors of Methodism. Yet it appears that a few in the Church and many unbelievers think that the publication of these facts and others like them is going to be fatal to Christianity.

John Wesley said that some of the Psalms of David are "not fit for the mouths of a Christian congregation"; but that does not show that he did not consider them fit for the age in which David lived, or that he did not believe David was inspired to write them.

There are now and always have been a thousand questions of criticism which are matters of opinion, and whichever way they are decided can make no serious difference to anybody, provided the investigation be carried on reverently, the results treated reverently and without dogmatism or arrogance, without attempting to impose them either upon churches or individuals, and, provided it be maintained that the Bible contains an authentic record of the only personal, supernatural revelation made by God to man, and that this record furnishes the only true standard of faith and practice; that what is not taught therein is not necessary to salvation; and that the only saving truths are to be found therein.

But, as that great scholar, Canon Liddon, showed in his sermon on "The Worth of the Old Testament," most of the important books in the Old, including Genesis, Exodus, Leviticus, Numbers, Joshua, Judges, Kings, Chronicles, Job, Psalms, Proverbs, Isaiah, Jonah, Habakkuk, Daniel, Amos, Zechariah, Hosea, Micah, Joel, Malachi, and others, are quoted in the New under such circumstances as to make those who believe in the inspiration of the New Testament accept that of the Old.

The labors of all the scholars of the world, hostile and friendly, fail to cast discredit upon any passage essential to the great doctrines of Christianity. The controversies concerning these doctrines do not turn upon differences in the translations of these passages. Points upon which differences exist, even the most serious, are of

such a nature that if every controverted word were stricken out, the great principles both in the Old and New Testaments would appear as luminously and as unmistakably as they do now. That substantial unity exists in the midst of such circumstantial variety, both in the contents of the Bible and in the manuscripts, forms one of the strongest proofs of the vividness, comprehensiveness, and fidelity of the original revelations.

He whose faith cannot endure a knowledge of these facts has not as yet come to that true faith which finds its chief support in the correspondence between his inward experience of saving grace and the description of the means, attributes, and effects of saving grace in God's Word.

MONTHLY MEETINGS.

By the Secretaries.

October, 1892.—At the first monthly meeting of the American Institute of Christian Philosophy for 1892–93, held October 4th, in Hamilton Hall, Columbia College, the president being in the chair, the devotional services were conducted by the Rev. Dr. A. W. Sproull, of New York. After the adoption of the minutes of the June meeting, the following names of new members were read by the secretary:

New Life Members.—Ethelbert D. Warfield, LL.D., President of Lafayette College; Carlos Martyn, D.D., Newark, N. J.; William LeRoy Broun, President of the Alabama Polytechnic Institute; G. R. W. Scott, D.D., Andover, Mass.; Rev. S. G. Law, the Chaplain of the Tombs, New York.

Transferred to Life Membership from Annual.—Rev. Joseph Cook, Boston, Mass.; D. S. Gregory, D.D., ex-President Lake Forest University, and managing editor of the Standard Dictionary, New York; Mr. Marion J. Verdery, New York.

New Annual Members.—John Jay, Katonah, N. Y.; John Gillespie, D.D., Corresponding Secretary of the Presbyterian Board of Foreign Missions, New York; Samuel J. Carroll, D.D., Stockton, Cal.; Alfred Porter Putnam, D.D., Concord, Mass.; Rev. Edward Herbruck, Ph.D., editor *Christian World*, Dayton, Ohio; Herbert B. Turner, A.M., LL.B., New York;

Leroy M. Vernon, Syracuse, N. Y.; Rev. Cornelius R. Blauvelt, Ph.D., Corresponding Secretary American Society Comparative Religion, Nyack, N. Y.; Milton Valentine, D.D., LL.D., Chairman Faculty of Theological Seminary Evangelical Lutheran General Synod, Gettysburg, Penn.; Rev. Lewis Powell, Nashville, Tenn.; Andrew B. Happer, M.D., D.D., President Christian College, Pekin, China; Lemuel H. Murlin, S T.B., Vincennes, Ind.; J. W. Jones, M.D., Tarboro, N. C.; Prof. E. D. Shimer, Jamaica, N. Y.; Samuel Binion, M.D , New York; Solomon F. Forgeus, A.M., Chaplain Industrial Reformatory, Huntingdon, Penn.; Charles W. Kennedy, West New Brighton, Staten Island, N. Y.; Rev. David W. Couch, Flatbush, L. I.; Wilson Franer, D.D., Sing Sing, N. Y.; J. H. Crum, D.D., Terre Haute, Ind.; Rev. Edward C. Acheson, A.M., Ph.D., Middletown, Conn.; Rev. Arthur Copeland, A.M., Penn Yan, N. Y.; Samuel Horace Blakeslee, Director of Conservatory of Music, Delaware, O.; Rev. Joseph L. Davies, A.M., Utica, N. Y.; William H. Thomas, A.M., Wilmington, N. C.; William McLatchie, New York; Rev. William D. Parr, A.M., D.D., Elkhart, Ind.; Miss Georgia L. Leonard, Washington, D.C.; Mrs. Frances E. N. Bagley, Detroit, Mich.

Rev. Dr. Arthur Mitchell, Secretary of the Presbyterian Board of Foreign Missions, read a paper on "The Providential History of America." The subject and paper were discussed by Rev. Dr. G. L. Spining, Prof. D. S. Martin, and Mr. L. W. Serrell.

At the monthly meeting of the Institute, held on the evening of November 1st, 1892, in Columbia College, the President being in the chair, the Rev. John B. Drury, D.D., of New York, conducted the devotional exercises. After the reading and approval of the minutes of the last meeting, the following list of new members was announced:

Arthur Mitchell, D.D., New York; Edward McSweeney, S.T.D., Professor Mt. St. Mary's College, Emmettsburg, Md.; John Burns Weston, A.M., D.D., President "Christian Biblical Institute," Stanfordville, N. Y.; Wilbur Leroy Davidson, A.M., D.D., General Agent Sunday-school Union M.E. Church, Cincinnati, O.;

George W. Paul, Brooklyn, N. Y.; Edgar W. Youmans, Jr., Brooklyn, N. Y.; Rev. C. M. Cobern, Ph.D., Ann Arbor, Mich.; Isaac M. Dyckman, New York; George U. Wenner, A.M., D.D., Editor *Der Sonntagsgast*, New York, and Mrs. O. J. Squires, Lansingburgh, N. Y.

The Rev. C. R. Blauvelt, Ph.G., of Nyack, N. Y., Corresponding Secretary of the American Society of Comparative Religion, read a paper on "The Spencerian Theory of the Religion of Israel." The discussion following the lecture was conducted by President C. F. Deems and Mr. S. H. Wilder. A vote of thanks was presented to Dr. Blauvelt, and a copy of his paper requested for publication in CHRISTIAN THOUGHT.

ABOUT BOOKS.

[In this department we shall make mention of recent publications, especially those in the line of our studies. There will not be space for extended review. The name of the book, its publisher, and its price when known, together with a brief statement of its drift, will probably meet the demands of our readers. Any book mentioned will be sent post-paid, on receipt of price, by WILBUR B. KETCHAM, 2 Cooper Union, New York.]

—Prof. W. Wood, of the University of New York, has collected opinions and suggestions from over two hundred living men of science, letters and action on how to make life beautiful. They present ideals of a beautiful life with counsel for its attainment. It might well be called the gospel of culture. It is a modern symposium at which many of our best scientists, educators and thinkers take part. Those who desire to perfect the individual and the race physically, mentally and morally will here find much to help them. Seneca says: "He that lays down precepts for governing our lives and moderating our passions obliges humanity not only in the present but in all future generations.' If this be true, Prof. Wood has laid thousands under a debt of gratitude. The book is amply illustrated with portraits and autographs, and makes a beautiful volume of over 600 pages. It is sold by agents and published by E. B. Treat, No. 5 Cooper Union, New York.

—Thos. Whittaker, Bible House, publishes "Early Bibles of America," by John Wright, D.D., rector of St. Paul's Church, St. Paul, Minn. Accounts are given of Bibles that were printed

during the existence of the British-American colonies. The book is not only bibliographic but also biographic. It has notices of the men who were engaged in the production of these books. In a number of cases fac-similes of title-pages are given. It will be valuable as a book of reference. It contains much information which we confess is new to us and very interesting.

—The Rev. L. W. Munhall is well known as a very useful evangelist. He has brought out a book entitled "The Highest Critics *Versus* the Higher Critics." The object of the book is to help those people in the Church of God who have not the time, as some have not the ability, to go deeply into biblical criticism, or who may have been shaken by the assumption which finds its expression in such phrases as "no cultured person believes the Bible to be unerring," "we have outgrown the faith of our fathers," etc. This will be a useful book for the family and for Sunday-school teachers.

—"Through a Glass Darkly" is the title of a small volume by the Rev. J. H. Timbrell, published by Palmer & Hughes, New York, with introduction by Dr. L. R. Dunn. It is an ecclesiastical study of I. Corinth. xiii. chapter, and is a treatise upon the higher spiritual life. Some passages are quite eloquent. The whole work is done in a fair and scholarly manner, and the volume makes profitable reading.

—"Christian Worship, an Historical Sketch," is the title of an article lately published in the *Lutheran Quarterly*, and republished in the pamphlet form. It is from the pen of Dr. G. U. Wenner, New York City. It is written with scholarly carefulness, and is valuable for reference as to the original Christian modes of worship and their modification through the centuries.

—"An Introduction to the Science of Thought" is the title of a pamphlet of 84 pages by S. S. Hebbard of Viroqua, Wis. It contains a treatise designed to demonstrate that all thinking is a relating of cause and effect, and to show that every perfect thought, from the simplest to the most complex, contains two elements related to each other as cause and effect, and that whenever either of these elements is suppressed, thought thereby becomes vague, one-sided, and fatally defective. In this syn-

thesis, the author holds, the very nature of thought consists. He believes that this simple principle will put an end to the chief disputes which have distracted human speculation. To verify his principle the author examines self-consciousness, perception, space, concepts, science, morality, art, Pagan civilization and Christian civilization, and believes that they can all be explained on the principle stated. He does his thinking with both care and courage, and his little book will probably have a greater effect on philosophical studies than many a larger volume. It is a very valuable contribution to the science of thought.

—"My Septuagint" is the title of a book very beautiful in its printing and binding, fit in those respects for the table of a prince or princess, or even of an American lady or gentleman. Of the value of its contents the editor of CHRISTIAN THOUGHT cannot speak, as he wrote it; but he can tell that it contains essays, addresses, hymns, poems, stories, and therefore must have great variety. Some of these have never been published before. The preface is short enough to quote: "The name of this book probably suggested itself to my mind, because what it contains has been written since the seventieth anniversary of my birthday." Published by the Cassell Publishing Company, 104 Fourth Avenue, New York. $1.

CHRISTIAN THOUGHT.

MAN'S RESPONSIBILITY FOR HIS BELIEFS.

[Read before the American Institute of Christian Philosophy, July 13, 1892.]

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THIS is our subject—and a momentous one it is—old but ever new and pressing. Three words are prominent and are intimately related—man, responsibility and belief.

Man—what is he? He is a creature of God. But matter is God's creation. Man and matter, however, are different. True, there is active power in matter, as there is action in man. Matter obeys a law; obedience to it is the necessity of its being. Man's action is not due to a law which must be implicitly obeyed. Man is created, we assert, a free moral agent. We are not now engaged in reasoning; we simply give common definitions. Man has the endowments of self-consciousness, conscience, reason, choice and will.

The gift of will, the employ of conscience, the faculty of reason, the power of choice imply that man has a higher and more spontaneous existence than matter.

He is, certainly, as is matter, connected with a law, but as a steward, not as a tool, is he bound, and not necessitated to obey it. There is a moral obligation, but no imperative and abstract necessity determining his action.

The conception of man's free will leads at once into a realm where the powers of the ablest divines and metaphysicians have been tasked, but into it we cannot enter far, though it is necessary to make certain observations.

The will as well as the style is the man. It is scarcely needful to say that the free agent is one who, according to the

teachings of his reason, can adopt or not adopt a line of action presented. He has power to choose between different motives and impulses which call for action. It is this power which we name freedom of the will, and this is essential to constitute moral action and consequent responsibility.

The second emphasized word is responsibility. As is well known, this is of Latin derivation, the root of which is the verb *respondeo*, to answer. Responsibility denotes answerableness, and intimates power to discharge obligation. Power and obligation seem to be indissolubly joined.

The third marked word is belief. This includes that which has moral character—that which demands choice, reason, affection and will. Man has something to do with his beliefs since these press themselves upon him.

Is man responsible for his beliefs?

This is the question of questions, involving all others which have to do with man's relation to his Maker.

Acts are the logical results of beliefs. A man is and does what he believes. If one is responsible for his beliefs, he is by consequence responsible for his acts.

Is man responsible for his beliefs?

This is the pressing question. We cannot let it alone. It will not let us alone. Within our limits let us endeavor to meet it squarely and fairly.

I. Responsibility for beliefs is taught by Nature.

When her laws are violated, penalties are inflicted. Nature says to man:

"I hold you responsible for your transgressions against me. You should have known my laws. They are secrets only to those who will not study them. I punish you for the crime of ignorance."

If man is "merely developed protoplasm or transformed solar force, if virtue and vice are the different arrangements of molecules," as some affirm, then man is not responsible for infractions of Nature's laws, but he suffers all the same for the breach. Nature is inexorable in her demands, and deals with man as a responsible being of some kind. It is confessed that man is endowed more superbly than the bird or beast, and yet more than the

rest of creation he suffers at Nature's hands when he rebels against her authority. Her government is framed on the ground that all must conform perfectly to her, else all must suffer. There is no exception. Louis XIV. once said to his confessor, "I am a sinner, no doubt, since you say so; but the good God will think twice before He casts out such a great prince as I." Louis might have such an opinion—founded on his self-admiration or God's over-forbearance towards greatness, but the same opinion of Nature would be quickly changed the first time he came in conflict with her, and he would find that the beggar and the king are treated alike as regards her caresses and her lashes.

The scientist * tells us this after his analysis of Nature's realm. The poet, who oftentimes gets clearer and wider conceptions of Nature, states to us in refined language his really awful discoveries of nature's consumings as well as kisses. She is indeed a mother to her loyal children, but a fury to the disobedient. The scientist and poet, both students of Nature, though approaching her for different ends, agree in saying that she deals out severest justice to any rebel in her realm, while upon the loyal she bestows her sweet embraces.

II. Law, as crystallized by government, teaches in clearest language that man is responsible for his acts, for his intents as traced back from the act or the attempt. Thus law holds one responsible for his beliefs, as belief, intent, attempt and outward act are all involved.

* Prof. Huxley said to the working men of London, "Suppose it were perfectly certain that the life and fortune of every one of us would one day or other depend upon his winning or losing a game of chess. Don't you think that we should all consider it to be a primary duty to learn at least the names and the moves of the pieces; to have a notion of a gambit and a keen eye for all the means of giving and getting out of check? Do you not think that we should look with disapprobation, amounting to scorn, upon the father who would allow his son, or the State which allowed its members to grow up without knowing a pawn from a knight? . . . The chess board is the world, and the pieces the phenomena of the universe; the rules of the game are what we call the laws of Nature. The Player on the other side is hidden from us. All we know is that His play is always fair, just and patient. But, also, that He never overlooks a mistake, or makes the smallest allowance for ignorance. To the man who plays well the highest stakes are paid, with that sort of overflowing generosity with which the strong shows delight in strength. And one who plays ill is checkmated, without haste, but without remorse."

What judge would say to a convicted criminal, "You are guilty according to the evidence, but you are not blameworthy. I know your belief is that it is perfectly right to take a superfluous portion of another man's property. It is a bad belief for you, since it causes you trouble. It grieves me, compelled as I am by law, to pass sentence upon you and cause you to be imprisoned for that which is the natural result of a belief you cannot control. The law has a penalty for your act, and I must obey its requirements, but personally I think you are innocent of all wrong and ought not to suffer. Your deed is not a sin, or a crime, but only a misfortune. You followed your tastes, as you had a right, and you endeavored to realize happiness, but you were a bad calculator. Your tastes and calculations caused you embarrassment, since you did not make the right combinations. You should have shown more astuteness"?

Would such a judge be permitted to disgrace the bench? "If a villain is sufficiently astute to avoid detection," as Row finely shows, "he need fear no qualms of conscience: all that he has done has been that he has done as best he could to realize what, according to the light which was in him, he considered to be his own greatest happiness, and this he has succeeded in accomplishing. The means by which he has effected it are a pure matter of indifference, and when a successful life of crime has come to a termination this philosophy assures him that his sleep of unconsciousness will be equally undisturbed as that of a Howard or a St. Paul. Truly, if these principles represent the reality of things, the holy, the good, and the self-sacrificing are of all men the most foolish and the most miserable." *

Our legislation, laws, courts and jails are all founded upon the belief that man is responsible for his acts and, therefore, his beliefs. This belief is at the bottom of our liberties. "We are free, able to choose our ends, yet under obligation; owing allegiance to law, which bids us choose, not as we please, but as is right." †

Responsibility is at the very basis of morals. It is in the very nature of things. Out of it sprang laws and all restraints.

* Living Papers on Present Day Themes, C. A. Row, vol. v., essay 30.

† The Evidence of Christian Experience, p. 66.

Law, as well as Nature, does not excuse man when he acts contrary to it, because the criminal considers vice and virtue a peculiar arrangement of matter, and that he has nothing more to do with the one or the other than with the size of his frame or the color of his hair. Law says to the man, "Vice is a crime. It is the product of your free act, and for its expression in violation of statute you are held responsible. You must suffer for abusing your freedom." Legislation looks not alone at the external act, but at the motive of the agent.

The external act may be a foul crime or an accident. It is the intention which defines the act and puts it in the proper category. The intention involves freedom. The whole matter may be summed up as follows: "No freedom, no responsibility; no responsibility, no obligation; no obligation, no sense of duty; no sense of duty, no morality; no morality, no distinction between right and wrong," and we may well add, no law, no government —universal confusion.

III. Let us now look at man himself and see if responsibility for belief and act is not the very part of the nature bestowed upon him.

Experience assists us in our work. By it we find that good and right actions fit best in man's constitution, that they tend to man's happiness and harmony, and that they are in agreement with the thought of a God.* These are called the threefold cord binding the whole system of actual things with man.

It is theory pure and simple that does not come within the range of consciousness, which maintains that atoms, from which all things are evolved, have the power, when in combination, of intelligence and self-determination, of which they are destitute when out of combination. Now such atoms must have been self-existent, or if they had a beginning some Being must have originated them.

Natural religion carries us from effect up to cause. When a sufficient cause is reached, reason says: "Stop—you have gone to the utmost demanded. There is no necessity for further

* Rückert says:

"Wer Gott nicht fühlt in sich und allen Leben-kreisen
Dem werdet Ihr Ihm nicht beweisen mit Beweisen."

movement in the line of causation, since a sufficient God is an efficient God." Such fits in with the proper demands of man s nature. The idea of God is a necessity of thought. Man is so constituted that he demands some self-existent Being. Reason asserts that a Power above has control of man. Man feels he is dependent upon Him. Even Spencer * admits that "though the absolute cannot in any manner or degree be known in the strict sense of knowing, yet we find that its positive existence is a necessary datum of consciousness ; that so long as consciousness continues we cannot for an instant rid it of this datum, and that thus the belief which this datum constitutes has a higher warrant than any other whatever."

Thus it is held that the necessary idea of the absolute demands the actual existence of the absolute.

Human reason recognizes a higher reason. No one can reject a Supreme Being on the assumption that reason cannot be trusted any more than the testimony of the senses can be rejected on the supposition that these are always delusive.

Man says : "I am conscious of some one, upon whom I am dependent beyond mere mechanical force and higher than mere sensation with its aversion to pain and appulse to pleasure. I am conscious of being a person and not a thing, a machine. I, like Descartes, think, therefore I am ; † I can distinguish the self from the not self and realize in all my mental ongoings the Personality above all. I know I can act or refrain from acting. I am conscious of being free, and that I am not compelled by a physical necessity." The pronoun I has wrapped up in it that from which comes the idea of moral obligation. Charles Kingsley ‡ speaks thus of the I : "A very short word, for in our language there is but one letter in it. A very common word ; for we are using it all day long when we are awake, and even at night in our dreams, and yet a very wonderful word, for though we know well whom it means, yet what it means we do not know and cannot understand, no, nor can the wisest philosopher who ever lived ; and a most important word, too, for we cannot

* First Principles, p. 98.

† Cogito, ergo sum.

‡ Westminster Sermons, p. 165.

get rid of it, we cannot help thinking it, cannot help saying it all our life long from childhood to the grave. After death, too, we shall probably be saying that word to ourselves, each of us, forever and ever. If the whole universe—sun, moon and stars—and all that we ever thought of or can think of, were destroyed and became nothing, that word would probably be left, and we should be left alone with it. And on what we meant by that little word would depend our everlasting happiness or misery." This little, but big I, this conscious personality it is which differentiates man from all other animals. Man knows he is a self-determining being—that he has reason, affection, intuition of universal principles—power of choice, and also of unifying knowledge, freedom of will, a moral and religious nature, and the capacity of knowing and loving God.*

These are the constants of human consciousness.

Dr. Johnson, in speaking of man's freedom, said: "He knows it, sir, and that is the whole of it." Man knows he has the primary conditions of responsibility. This is the testimony of experience, the universal belief of civilized men. Man has capability of understanding, obeying, and also of rejecting the right. He cannot reject what does not exist. In man's refusal of God there arises from his constitution a protest against an impersonal force, "A living man must have a living God."

We are shown that "necessitarianism is the belief of the speculator only so long as he continues in his study; but the moment he enters the active world he feels himself compelled to think, talk and act on the assumption that he is a free agent, and the doctrine that man is a machine is felt to be a practical falsehood." † "If man is not a moral agent," says Isaac Taylor,‡ "and if his fear in this respect does not immeasurably transcend that of the sentient orders around him, how came he to talk as if he were a moral agent? If, in regard to a moral system, he is only a brute of finer form, born of the earth and returning to it again, whence is it that in respect of virtue and vice, of good and evil,

* H. B. Smith's Christian Theology: "There is an intuition of the unseen, a feeling of dependence, a sense of law above time and the world, the awe of judgment, the longing for immortality."

† Living Papers, by Row, p. 49.

‡ Nat. History of Enthusiasm.

the dialect of Heaven rolls over his lips? Whence was it and how that he stole the vocabulary of the skies?"

I ought to do the right; I ought not to do the wrong, are echoes from the depths of man's constitution which proclaim his responsibility to a Higher Power. "Ought is native to the soul." When consciousness rises to moral law, conscience shows itself. Man, there, recognizes more distinctly authority, which to him is a grand source of moral obligation. The divine will proclaims through conscience the eternal law of right and places obligation upon man. Man has a feeling of the "categorical imperative." Duty rises so plainly and presses so closely that it is recognized as an integral part of man's constitution. It is even recognized by those who deny any ought, when they tell us we ought not to recognize the sense of duty. The perceptions of conscience are as real as those of vision or of sense, and show us that there is a right and wrong in action.

Conscience does not tell a man whether he is good or not. When he chooses and does, then conscience tells him whether his intentions are good or bad. It tells a man whether he has tried to do his best, whether he has acted according to knowledge, lived up to his light, or whether he has suppressed evidence, or put out the light. Conscience accuses or excuses him.

The untutored savage recognizes the close relation of knowledge and light to responsibility. Parkman * gives a specimen of Indian reasoning. At the height of a severe pestilence among the Hurons, one of the tribe said to a Jesuit priest: "I see plainly that your God is angry with us because we will not believe and obey Him. Ihonatiria, where you first taught His word, is entirely ruined. Then you came to Ossossané, and we would not listen; so Ossossané is ruined, too. This year you have been all through our country and found scarcely any who would do what God commands, therefore the pestilence is everywhere." After promises so hopeful the father looked for a satisfactory conclusion; but the Indian proceeded: "My opinion is that we ought to shut you from all the houses and stop our ears when you speak of God, so that we cannot hear. Then we shall not be guilty of rejecting the truth, and He will not punish us so cruelly."

*Jesuits, p. 138. Note.

This is Indian reasoning and is often white man's reasoning, and there is no true reason in it, though the statement is a confession of responsibility for not living up to the light. True reason recognizes conscience, which speaks out in clear and emphatic terms : "You are as guilty for suppressing truth and light as for rejecting them."

Choice, wherever the freedom of the will is expressed, is somewhat different from volition, the executive power. An animal has volitions, but makes, we believe, no choices. An animal is compelled by instincts and impulses, but man is impelled by motives.

Man's volitions are the logical outcome of his choices, and by consequence he feels that he is responsible for what is wrong in his volitions. He is conscious of bringing the will into exercise, of forming his beliefs. The will is great in forming character, which is moulded by thought and belief ; therefore for the proper employ of the will, which is under his control, man is responsible. It is the employ of the will which gives the permanent choice, and this it is which gives fixedness to life. "Circumstances and motives," says Birks,* "persuade but do not compel. There is real liberty, but it is not the liberty of pure indifference or the power of deciding without any motive and reason whatever. The self which determines is the deep and hidden ground of the creature's whole being ; and, as it is good or evil, decides the weight of the motives themselves and the practical result of the circumstances out of which they arise."

The will is not in bondage to temptations or motives that it must fall. If it fall it is the result of choice and not of compulsion. That it may fall is a conclusion to which all have come, but that it is compelled by a necessity without, or capricious impulse within, is against all experience and reason.

We fully admit the strength of lower impulses, and also that there are modifications of responsibility so far as character is influenced by conditions determined by a higher power, and so far as action results from habits or tendencies independent of choice, and which have not come into the realm of the will ; but it is also seen that man has the power within limits of modifying his char-

* Difficulties of Belief, p. 84.

acter, and so far as this power extends is he responsible for the modifications. He is responsible for not resisting evil tendencies, impulses and formed habits resulting in weakness, which renders man incapable of self-control. Row * presents the example of the habitual drunkard. "Such a character may be said in a certain sense to have ceased to be a free agent, and yet he is justly held to be responsible. His responsibility, however, accrued at an earlier stage, when, contrary to the dictates of his conscience and moral sense, he yielded to his evil impulses and thereby destroyed his power of self-control. In such a case all that is necessary for the believer in human freedom to contend for is that it was once in his power to refuse to gratify his evil appetites; and that if a man has formed a habit which has become irresistible, he is responsible for all the consequences which were in his power to have foreseen" Milton, the poet,† in a passage of great power shows the same truth. Delilah endeavored, before Samson, to palliate her crime of treachery by throwing the blame on him, and by referring to her own weakness and the like.

Samson replied:

"How cunningly the sorceress displays
Her own transgressions, to upbraid me mine!
That malice, not repentance brought thee hither,
By this appears: I gave, thou sayest, the example;
I led the way: bitter reproach, but true.
I to myself was false, ere thou to me:
Such pardon, therefore, as I give my folly
Take to thy wicked deed, which, when thou seest
Impartial, self-severe, inexorable,
Thou wilt renounce thy seeking and much rather
Confess it feigned. Weakness is thy excuse
And I believe it; weakness to resist
Philistian gold; if weakness may excuse,
What murderer, what traitor, parricide,
Incestuous, sacrilegious, but may plead it?
All wickedness is weakness: that plea, therefore,
With God or man will gain thee no remission."

* Living Papers on Present Day Themes, p. 10.

† Samson Agonistes, p. 124.

We see, therefore, that the complex constitution of man—as well as nature and law, holds man responsible alike for his beliefs and acts. We have reached highlands of thought, but not the mountain.

There true human philosophy, fearing to enter the cloud, trusts herself to the guidance of heavenly wisdom.

IV. Guided to the height of God's Word, we desire to know what its message is in reference to man's responsibility for his beliefs and to see whether this revelation of God to man does not agree with the testimony of nature, law and the constitution of man. Let us learn some of the lessons of the Bible in reference to our theme. It does not come within our limits to enter into any extended argument to prove the genuineness and authenticity of the written Word. The Bible comes to men with peculiar force. It has the witness in itself. It is self-evidential to the Christian. "Christianity," says Coleridge, in a well-known passage, "finds me in the lowest depths of my being, as no other system can. It meets there my direst needs." Stearns * also maintains that "the Christian, who feels the full power of the evidence of experience, finds in the Bible one of the strongest proofs for the truth of Christianity. Led himself by the Spirit of God, he is sure, as he reads this Book, that the same Spirit was active in its composition. It is to him the rule and standard of Christian truth and practice. By it he corrects the one-sidedness of his own Christian experience. To it the Church goes, that it may test and reassure its beliefs by this primitive record of the Christian life. Read in the light of a personal experience, the Bible shows itself to be the most wonderful book, or collection of books, the world has ever seen. It carries its evidence with it."

The Bible supplies man's illuminated reason, the demands of true philosophy, in naming One who controls all things, even the disorder of a sinful world, in giving One who will enforce the laws of right and meet the demands of justice; but, going farther, in presenting One who can overcome evil by good and restore man to himself, his fellow-men and to his God. The Christian philosopher sees the reasonableness of the biblical system. He finds that its mysteriousness does not make it irrational. The lover of na-

* Evidence of Christian Experience, p. 321.

ture is not unreasonable in his love because nature has its mysteries. His educated reason finds that mystery is not opposed to reasonableness. The Christianly illuminated reason finds the Bible the most rational of books, in accord with the highest intellectual, moral and spiritual principles. "Christianity," as Fisher well says,* "does not charge reason itself, but unregenerate reason, with incapacity to discern the things of the Spirit. Regenerated reason finds nothing contradictory to itself, or uncongenial in the Christian system."

The Bible gives us explicit testimony in reference to man's responsibility for his beliefs. According to it God made man, indeed, in His own image, but other than Himself. God is a person, and man is a person. This the Bible affirms with force and variety of phrase. It is the eternal enemy of any form of pantheistic philosophy, though this may use its terms and play the friend. Pantheism has ever appeared, like Judas, with a kiss and with a "Hail, Master!" And though Hegel's philosophy, with its boast of absolute and final truth, is dead, Baur, as a founder of a school, is dead, and Carlyle is dead, and Emerson is dead, and the pantheistic attack against Christianity has been met in the past, still this form of error is again showing its head, and planning its attacks, and using the watchwords of Scripture to destroy all distinctions between the natural and the supernatural, to do away with the distinctive Christian doctrines by giving them a naturalistic explanation, and by undefined language, obscure statement, loftily stated nothings, downright dogmatism at times, to force men into a fog, and then into emptiness, where one sustains no relation to God as a person, and has no responsibility to any one. Man is simply "part and particle of God." The Bible has nothing to do with such immanence as makes duty, truth, obligation, purity evanescent. It comes to us as a divine message and speaks authoritatively. It has been tried in many ways, been thoroughly tested, and, we believe, has been proved true. It turns round and says to man, "I propose to test you. I lay down rules and enumerate principles by which you must square your life!"

The Bible tells even the pagan world that it is responsible for its beliefs. It judges the heathen by the light and knowledge

* Grounds of Theistic and Christian Belief, p. 352.

received. "For the wrath of God is revealed from heaven against all ungodliness and unrighteousness of men who hold the truth in unrighteousness. Because that which may be known of God is manifest in them, for God hath shewed it unto them. For the invisible things of him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead; so that they are without excuse." * Again, "For as many as have sinned without law, shall also perish without law; and as many as have sinned in the law shall be judged by the law." †

One of our eminent divines,‡ in speaking of the brutalized and degraded, who seem to so many to have passed the limits of responsibility, says both in agreement with the soundest philosophy and the Bible truth, "Not one of these millions of individuals has been necessitated by Almighty God, or by any of God's arrangements, to do wrong. Each one of them is a moral agent equally with you and me. Each one of them is self-willed and self-determined in sin. He does not like to retain religious truth in his mind, or to obey it in his heart. Go into the lowest haunt of vice and select out the most imbruted person there; bring to his remembrance that class of truths with which he is already acquainted by virtue of his rational nature, and add to them that other class of truths taught in Revelation, and you will find that he is predetermined against them. He takes sides with all the depth and intensity of his being with that sinfulness which is common to man, and which it is the aim of both ethics and the Gospel to remove."

Though deep in his trespasses and sins the imbruted man is thus found to be responsible for his beliefs.

The Bible tells man that God, as the moral Governor of the universe, knows our secret thoughts and can judge our opinions and beliefs. He searches man in many ways—by conscience, by memory, by the faults and sins of others, by His Spirit and by His Word, so quick and powerful.

The Bible clearly and emphatically states that belief in God

* Romans i. 18, 19, 20.

† Romans ii. 12.

‡ Shedd, Sermons, p. 93.

—in the truth—is a duty and that unbelief is a deadly sin. God commands man to believe Him and on Him and in Him. He enforces His commands by the highest sanctions that can be attached to His law. He names rewards and punishments for disbelief or disobedience.

When we study God's character and the nature of His commands we find that He does not demand impossibilities. He requires of man no more than he can do. He attaches moral character to belief and unbelief.

He deals with man, talks to man, reasons with man, gives evidence to man as if he were a free, responsible, accountable being. The language of God's Word in reference to belief and unbelief is in agreement with the principles of true philosophy. Man is responsible for his beliefs and acts because nothing unreasonable is demanded of him. "An insane murderer is no more a contradiction than a disabled sinner."

In view of the exercise of faith in reference to temporal matters, to mathematical axioms, to philosophical postulates, is it not right to say that unbelief in reference to spiritual matters is irrational? Unbelief is also inconsistent since man unhesitatingly exercises faith in reference to the affairs of life, and it is criminal since the testimony in favor of the Bible is of a higher and more satisfactory kind than that in reference to things on which man acts in this life.

Evidence alone does not determine belief, it is proper discernment of evidence; it takes the eye to behold the sky studded with stars. The power of discernment depends largely on the inquirer. Hence there must be accountability—answerableness. There is surely culpability in not collecting and weighing evidence. Man knows that by an exercise of will he can resist the truth, and shut out evidence which would help him to form a right belief. The will and conscience are closely allied. Conscience tells him of the unfairness and wickedness of suppressing evidence. The heart is also joined to the will. What a man loves that he is—and he chooses what he likes the best. The will, conscience and heart thus hold man responsible for shutting up the truth in the closed Bible and shutting out the truth from his mind and heart.

If one has not examined evidence is he not guilty of willful

neglect? No one has a moral or intellectual right to refuse testimony in favor of the Bible, which promises so much and claims to be so exclusive. If one has examined the evidence and then rejected the Bible he must, in intellectual fairness, give good, strong and sufficient reasons for the rejection, and not thrust it aside, impelled by some whim or animosity forced by the Bible's plain condemnation of his sins. Many a bitter judgment of the Book is a true judgment of the man himself. The Bible, as the law, holds man accountable for the bad results of his ignorance, when ignorance could have been avoided by study and a proper approach to the truth.

It is a fact attested by experience, as well as affirmed by the Bible, that a man's habits influence opinion. If a man blink his moral sight by sin of any kind, such an immoral bandaging will blind the intellect. Inclination will rule the mind. Sin in the heart becomes the source of error in the head. We have had illustrations of a marked character to show that a break in morals floods communities with intellectual perversities. When the heart is corrupted the mind becomes perverted. Man builds up a belief in accordance with his depraved wishes.

Is he not responsible for his belief thus produced? It is not lack of evidence but of will which has made him what he is, and that will is under the control of perverted affections.

There is such a thing as moral dementation before intellectual doom. A man under such a penalty practises sin because he loves it. Is he not responsible for the perversion of heart, intellect and soul? "This is the condemnation, that light is come into the world, and men loved darkness rather than light, because their deeds were evil. For every one that doeth evil hateth the light, neither cometh to the light lest his deeds should be reproved." *

The Lord Jesus stakes the character of His mission on this issue, that evidence in reference to Him was strong enough to convince the honest, and that with holding of assent to His teachings did not arise from want of light, but from a perverse will ruled by a corrupt heart. "And ye will not come unto me."

Jesus said of His enemies during His earthly ministry, "If I

* John iii. 19, 20.

had not come and spoken unto them they had not had sin, but now they have no cloak for their sin. He that hateth me hateth my Father also. If I had not done among them the works which none other man did they had not had sin, but now have they both seen and hated both me and my Father." * They were guilty because they rejected and hated Christ without a cause. They shut out light and thus the truth was hidden.

Do not many to-day repeat the sin of the early rejecters of Christ?

They are criminal because they refuse to look at Him when He shows Himself. There is no cloak for their sins. Many, notwithstanding their rejection of the Light of the world, have the audacity to say: "We live up to our light and this is all that can be expected of us."

Yes, they may live up to their light, because it is darkness, but they do not live up to the light within their reach, and thus they are responsible for their unbelief and disobedience.

When a student at the Andover Theological Seminary I knew a young man who had a morbid dislike of sunlight. When the sun was shining without he would darken his room and light his little lamp. There was the sun ready to stream into his room, if he would only let it, and drive away the darkness, but he preferred the dimness.

Many shut out God's sun, Christ and the Bible, and light their own little tapers and candles, and then say "We live up to our light." Such are without excuse, since Jesus is willing to dissipate the darkness of their lives.

Others say "We are not church members; we are not under covenant obligations to live correct Christian lives. If we were professing Christians something in reference to belief and spiritual exercises could be justly demanded of us."

Is there no obligation resting on such? Has not Christ come and spoken unto them? Has not the Bible been written for them? Has not Christ died for them? Has not the Gospel been preached to them—the offers of salvation made to them? They are without excuse.

Many say "We do not attend Church services; we are not

* John xv. 22.

held responsible for rejecting what we never hear, for disbelieving what we never saw."

Are not the churches open to them? Is not the Gospel near them? They cannot take a paper and read it without seeing something concerning their duty. They cannot walk along the streets without learning something of their privileges. They are living in an age when art, science, literature, music, and all true work are closely allied to Christianity, and they cannot move in any direction without hearing calls to duty and privilege. The Sabbath bells ring out invitations; the orderly processions of people on the way to church are powerful teachers. Because a man stops his ears when one warns him of danger will not prevent the fall. Because one shuts his eyes and makes no effort to escape, when he finds the boat in which he sits moving rapidly towards the falls, is no reason why he should not be destroyed by the fearful plunge. Because a man will not go to church, will not listen to the truth, cannot prevent him from receiving the penalty of ignorance. The air is full of divine sounds, invitations, entreaties and warnings. Light direct from the throne of God is strong enough to reach every darkened heart. Man is guilty before God, before reason, and before conscience for shutting out the light.

We have seen that the pagan and the imbruted know more than they put into practice, and are thus guilty before God. What must be said of those who live in Christian America, where Bibles are almost as free as water, and where houses, dedicated to God, are in every hamlet, village and city?

There are degrees of responsibility. The condemnation of those who reject the great light and spurn the great privileges will be the heavier since their knowledge was the clearer and fuller.

It will be more tolerable for Tyre and Sidon in the day of judgment than for Chorazin and Bethsaida. The men of great intellects and culture will incur the greater penalty if they reject the truth. Napoleon I. said: "Men like me do not commit crimes." Yes they do, and most fearful ones, too, because they sin against great light and determine to sin against full knowledge of its consequences. "That servant which knew his

lord's will and prepared not himself, neither did according to his will, shall be beaten with many stripes. But he that knew not and did things worthy of stripes shall be beaten with few stripes. For unto whomsoever much is given, of him shall be much required, and to whom men have committed much of him they will ask the more." *

But it is asked: "If beliefs necessitate actions how can we account for the upright conduct of some who do not believe in Christ? Many of them are amiable, loving, true and honest." Where are such found? Generally in the midst of Christian society. Are they not indebted to Christianity for what they are? Christianity benefits them, though indirectly. They are under its restraining influences. Take away the churches, close the Bible, remove the men of whom we speak to some place where Christian influences could not reach them, and we should see these persons in their true state. They get life from Christianity, and without it they would be as bad as the heathen. They are parasites for the most part, feeding on the vitality of Christians. Look at these atheists in their native dress. Read their description in the first chapter of Romans. See them in Corinth, in Ephesus, in ancient Greece as well as Rome, and you will find them amid pollutions which their philosophy and culture, art and politics failed to remove.

We thus see that man's responsibility for his beliefs is attested by nature, law, the constitution of man and the Word of God. All the lines converge at the point of responsibility. Our subject has its solemn and its blessed side. Man is not the sport of chance, of circumstances, of passion, of selfish and brutal men. He cannot shift his responsibility upon nature, or hereditary laws, or upon the inconsistencies of professing Christians. Man is more than a "mere fact," more than a reed, since in Pascal's phrase "he is a reed that thinks." He is a fact that wills, chooses, acts, a fact that is held responsible and a fact that should be obedient to God in order to move in the sphere of duty and safety, and is not a fact given over to blind fate or fatuity. If he is a reed and no more, then he is too weak for binding with

* Luke xii. 47, etc.

motives, and is forceless against any assault and cheaper than the dirt that buries him at last.

> Unless above himself he can
> Erect himself, how mean is man.

How can a load be lifted unless the pulley be put above the point where the load is to be placed? How can man be lifted to any moral, commanding height unless the point of attachment be fixed above humanity? Guidance, strength, holiness, must come from above.

Man is no mere machine, with no will and no faculty of choice, but a being of great importance in the sight of God, because made in His likeness. God has entrusted to him great concerns. Upon his faithfulness depends, in great measure, the progress of the world. To him is given work which is for the glory of God. With power to do, with light to see, with knowledge to direct, with motives to induce, with promises to hearten, man must incur a fearful penalty when he refuses to obey God's commands.

With the strongest evidence to form belief in God and Christ he must, indeed, be a self-determined sinner to reject the testimony. Responsibility in reference to repentance and belief, as to honesty and truthfulness, rests on the same basis: the right of God to command and the ability of man to obey. It is not for man to quibble in view of the solemn and terrible consequences of disobedience and disbelief and talk about decrees invalidating responsibility. God's sovereignty in salvation belongs to moral government, but His sway is not that of mere omnipotence. It is not, then, for any man to stand still and say "I will not move until God compels me."

Dependence upon God for salvation is a truth. Salvation comes from God, but man must take it and work it out. The Holy Ghost does not give power to repent. He influences the will and so convicts man that if he yields he does repent. The offer of the Holy Spirit is a gift of mercy to guilt.

God's sway over the soul has been termed unique. "It is that of infinite power regulated by infinite integrity. The perspective of the system is so adjusted that the spectator shall look through the natural to the moral disclosures of the divine glory. He sees, not unlimited force driving before it an insensate thing,

but infinite Holiness swaying a free mind, through all the sinuosities of its choice, by the delicate, intricate and balanced working of moral laws." *

The power which God exercises over man is that of right and not of might. God cannot, by reason of the very constitution given to man, compel him to be holy by an absolute necessity. He will show all men that He, the Judge of earth, has done right.

No one will blame God if he is lost, but must charge himself with accomplishing his own destruction. God will judge all. God will be judged. He will vindicate all His acts. He has already done all that He can do to save every man. He has nowhere in His Word declared that He leaves any one to himself to save himself by some blind chance. On the contrary, in spite of man's freedom, of his ability to choose or refuse the truth, God has spoken and acted in order, if possible, to lovingly induce man to make Him his choice and thereby reach the highest manhood and the fullest liberty of a child.

He has given him the help of the best possible moral system, has instructed him from without, from nature, and government, and enlightened him from within by his intuitions, and through conscience has given him foreshadows of the divine judgments of holiness and sin. He has generated motives to loving obedience. Not only in the pages of the Scriptures, but in history and in the experiences of the good and bad He has given persuasions to holiness and dissuasions from vice.

Look at the inducements, allurements, teachings and prayers which focus themselves upon man, when he, in the employ of his freedom and opportunity, places himself where they can influence him. Even the unseen helpers, the ministering angels, are interested in him and stretch, as it were, "a cordon of holy sympathies around him."

Calvary looms up before him, and the bleeding Son of God looks at him pleadingly. The Holy Spirit strives with him, nature, law, man's complex constitution, all unite in forcing upon him responsibility to a power other than himself, higher than himself, and the Divine Word joins the chorus and names that power—God. Everything has been done which could be

* Prof. Phelps' Bib. Soc., vol. xxiii., p. 664.

done to save him, and if he is lost it is he himself and no one else who is his destroyer. The lost soul is a spiritual suicide.

THE SPENCERIAN THEORY OF THE RELIGION OF ISRAEL.

[Read before the American Institute of Christian Philosophy, November 1, 1892.]

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ACCORDING to the theory of religion which Mr. Herbert Spencer expounds at great length in the opening chapters of his "Principles of Sociology," all religious conceptions and observances are traceable to low superstitious forms, from which the higher and purer forms are evolved by a process of natural development.

The germinal idea, from which all other ideas of the supernatural are evolved, is held to be belief in a ghostly double of the living as well as of the dead. This Mr. Spencer regards as the earliest form of the idea of a dual personality—the savage counterpart of the civilized concept of a mental entity; and from this primitive ghost-theory, it is supposed, all subsequent notions of the supernatural, with the correlated religious rites, have been evolved.

The idea of the ghostly power of the living superior—father, husband, master, or chief—gives rise to the notion that the same power is retained, in an intensified form, after death; and hence, the superior, who has been feared and propitiated by gifts and personal services during life, will be more intensely feared after death, and gifts will be offered at the grave and services will be rendered which are supposed to be pleasing to the departed spirit.

This notion, as it becomes expanded, involves a conception of an ever-increasing group of spirits to whom worship must be rendered. Besides the nearer superior—father, husband or master—to whom homage is due from members of the household, there is subordination of all the members of a tribe to the chief, and veneration is due from all the survivors of a tribe to the spirit of the departed chieftain.

As one generation succeeds another, and societies advance in social and political organization, and especially as groups of tribes become consolidated as the result of war, there will be a further expansion, not only of the family and tribal groups of ancestor-spirits, but new groups will be formed along lines indicative of rank. The ruling class will be regarded as entitled to special posthumous honors which are denied to the ruled, and the victorious race—with limitless gradations—will assert a higher claim to ghostly homage than is allowed to the conquered people.

Deification will result from the tendency to exaggerate the character and achievements of a remote ancestor to such an extent as to obliterate all trace of human qualities. Ultimately, it is claimed, by a purely natural development, there will appear a pantheon of deified ancestors, with diversities of rank corresponding to the relative position held during life, or of the tribes over which they are supposed to hold sway. In the latest development a single deity is conceived of as supreme over a host of subordinate deities.

It is affirmed that only in comparatively late stages, when civilization has become advanced and industrial activities are prominent, is there anything approximating to monotheism. And this late stage is reached by the gradual elimination of the grosser and more material conceptions, and a refinement of religious rites, consequent upon the influence of civilizing agencies.

From this outline of Mr. Spencer's theory, it will be seen that the order of religious development proceeds from veneration of the human superior to that of the apotheosized superior; then to that of the supernatural hero, whose human attributes have been lost and whose superhuman feats have given rise to conceptions of a correspondingly superhuman nature; and that, in all cases, polytheism is antecedent to monotheism. It need scarcely be added that, in this theory, there is no place for any intuitive idea of the supernatural nor for supernatural revelation. Perhaps no single term can better describe Mr. Spencer's view of the development of religious thought and worship than that which he uses as the title of the chapter in which he gives a summary of his argument, viz.: "the religious idea" (Ecclesias-

tical Institutions, chap. i.). Religion is, from first to last, according to Mr. Spencer, the evolution of an idea.

He contends that the Hebrew religion is to be placed in the same category with all other religions, and that the hypothesis which he offers in explanation of the heathen systems is the only one which will account for the origin and development of the Hebrew faith and worship.

Before examining the grounds upon which he bases his conclusion, it may not be amiss to dwell for a moment upon the attitude which is assumed with reference to this inquiry.

In speaking of ancestor-worship in general, Mr. Spencer says: "It is said, however, that ancestor-worship is peculiar to the inferior races. . . . And the suggested conclusion is that these superior races" (Indo-European and Semitic) "who, in their earliest recorded times, had higher forms of worship, were not, even in their still earlier times, ancestor-worshippers. That those who have another theory to uphold should thus interpret the evidence is not unnatural. Every hypothesis tends to assimilate facts yielding it support and to reject adverse facts. But that adherents of the Evolution-doctrine should admit a distinction so profound between the minds of different human races is surprising. Those who believe in creation by manufacture may consistently hold that Aryans and Semites were supernaturally endowed with higher conceptions than Turanians. If species of animals were separately made with fundamental differences, varieties of men may have been so too. But, to assert that the human type has been evolved from lower types, and then to deny that the superior races have been evolved, mentally as well as physically, from the inferior, and must once have had those general conceptions which the inferior still have, is a marvellous inconsistency. Even in the absence of evidence it would be startling, and in the presence of contrary evidence it is extremely startling" (Principles of Sociology, i., 289).

If we bear in mind this frank avowal of a partisan bias, we shall not be surprised to find abundant illustration in his argument, of the assimilation of supporting facts and the rejection of adverse facts, which he affirms is the tendency of every hypothesis.

In support of the claim that the origin and development of the Hebrew religion was similar to that which is alleged to have marked other religions, he affirms:

I. "The plasma of superstitions amid which the religion of the Hebrews evolved, was of the same nature with that found everywhere. Though, during the early nomadic stage, the belief in a permanently-existing soul was undeveloped, yet there was shown belief in the reality of dreams and of the beings seen in dreams. At a later stage we find that the dead were supposed to hear and sometimes answer; there was propitiation of the dead by gashing the body and cutting the hair; there was giving of food for the dead; spirits of the dead were believed to haunt burial-places; and demons, entering into men, caused their maladies and their sins. Much given, like existing savages, to amulets, charms, exorcisms, etc., the Hebrews also had functionaries who corresponded to medicine-men—men having 'familiar spirits,' 'wizards' (Isa. viii. 19) and others, originally called seers, but afterwards prophets (I. Sam. ix. 9), to whom they made presents in return for information, even when seeking lost asses. And Samuel, in calling for thunder and rain, played the part of a weather-doctor—a personage still found in various parts of the world" (Ecclesiastical Institutions. p. 695). Sundry parallelisms in traditions and religious usage are cited, as strengthening the analogy.

II. "Under the common title, Elohim, were comprehended distinguished living persons, ordinary ghosts, superior ghosts or gods. That is to say, with the Hebrews, as with the Egyptians and numerous other peoples, a god simply meant a powerful being, existing visibly or invisibly. . . . Out of these conceptions grew up, as in other cases, the propitiation or worship of various supernatural beings—a polytheism. Abraham was a demi-god to whom prayers were addressed. . . . That the belief in other gods than Jahveh long survived is shown by Solomon's sacrifices to them, as well as by the denunciations of the prophets. Moreover, even after Jahveh had become the acknowledged great-god, the general conception remained essentially polytheistic; . . . the angels and archangels of

the Hebrew pantheon are said to fight in Heaven when the peoples they respectively patronize fight on earth."

III. "Seeing, then, that Jahveh was originally one God among many—the God who became Supreme—let us ask what was His nature as shown by the records? Not dwelling on the story of the garden of Eden (probably accepted from the Accadians) . . . we may turn to such occasions as those on which Jacob wrestled with Him, and on which 'the Lord spake unto Moses, face to face, as a man speaketh unto his friend.' These, and many kindred statements, show that, by the Hebrews in early days, Jahveh, 'the strong one,' 'a man of war,' having been originally a local potentate (like those who even now are called gods by the Bedouins), was, in after times, regarded as the most powerful among the various spirits worshipped; the places where sacrifices to Him were made being originally high places (II. Kings xii. 3), such as those habitually used for the burial of superior persons; as they are still in the same regions. . . . Moreover, this 'God of Battles,' whose severe punishments, often inflicted, were for insubordination, was clearly a local god—the 'God of Israel.' . . . The command, 'Thou shalt have none other gods but me,' did not imply that there were none other, but that the Israelites were not to recognize their authority. . . . Along with the limitations of Jahveh's authority in range, went limitations of it in degree. There was no claim to omnipotence. . . . We are told that, 'though the Lord was with Judah,' He 'could not drive out the inhabitants of the valley because they had chariots of iron' (Judges i. 19). That is, there were incapacities equalling those attributed by other peoples to their gods."

"Similarly with intellectual and moral nature. Jahveh receives information; He goes to see whether reports are true; He repents of what He has done . . . He describes Himself as jealous, as revengeful, and as a merciless destroyer of enemies. He sends a lying spirit to mislead a king, as Zeus does to Agamemnon. . . . He hardens men's hearts that He may inflict evils upon them for what they then do. . . . He acts as did the Greek gods; from whom bad impulses were supposed to come, and who were similarly indiscriminate in their revenges."

IV. Hebrew forms of worship are shown to exhibit analogies which are thought to strengthen the argument. Thus: "Jahveh was supposed to enjoy the 'sweet savour' of the burnt offerings, like the idol-inhabiting gods of the negroes. Associated with the belief that 'the blood is the life,' this, either poured on the ground or on the altar, according to circumstances, was reserved for Jahveh, as with the ancient Mexican and Central American gods. . . . As the Egyptians and as the Greeks, so did the Hebrews offer hecatombs of sheep and oxen to their god. . . . To the Hebrews it was a command that unblemished animals only should be used for sacrifices, and so among the Greeks, a 'law provided that the best of the cattle should be offered to the gods,' and among the Peruvians it was imperative that 'all should be without spot or blemish.' . . . Dancing was a form of worship among the Hebrews, as it was among the Greeks and among various savages. . . . As by the Hebrews, Jahveh is represented as having in the earliest times appeared to men in human shape, but not in later times; so by the Greeks, the theophany frequently alleged in the Iliad becomes rare in traditions of later date" (Ecclesiastical Institutions, pp. 696–701).

We have devoted so much space to this summary, given in his own words, in order that we might the better exhibit Mr. Spencer's method of dealing with the scriptural narrative, and also that the weakness of his argument might be more apparent. In regard to some of his positions, serious rejoinder is uncalled-for. To state them, in his own words, is to suggest the obvious reply.

The unfairness of Mr. Spencer's method is apparent upon the most superficial examination of his citations from the Old Testament narrative. Broad generalizations are based upon a miscellaneous collection of facts, gleaned from the history of all periods, and representing social and political conditions of the most diverse character. There is no attempt to discriminate between conceptions and customs that may fairly be regarded as original and others which are most naturally considered as derivative, between that which is native and that which is a foreign importation. It is constantly assumed that all that is indicative of advancement is traceable to the influence of adjacent civilizations,

while the influence of contiguous barbarous or semi-civilized societies, in effecting a lowering of the national character and religious life is totally ignored. Furthermore, it is gratuitously assumed that contact with the civilizations contemporary with the early periods of Jewish history must have been uniformly elevating, leaving out of view the fact that, along with considerable development in political and social forms, there was exhibited a religious condition which cannot be regarded as even relatively high. In Egypt, for example, the lowest forms of animistic worship were prominent at the time of the Exodus. The justice of this criticism will be more apparent upon a closer examination of the argument.

It will be impossible, within the space at our command, to notice all the points urged by Mr. Spencer in defence of his theory. We must be content to group together under several general heads the main positions which are claimed as established.

I. The assertion that there are traces of ancestor-worship in some of its forms among the Hebrews, and that therefore the development of the Hebrew religion must have been from early forms similar to those of ancestor-worshipping races is not proven.

1. The fact that cutting off the hair and gashing the flesh—customs which, among some savage races, indicate subordination to and propitiation of the spirits of dead ancestors—appear in the record as Hebrew customs, is not conclusive (Principles of Sociology, i., 267, 292 ; ii., 65, 71, 73). For

(*a*) In so far as these mutilations have any religious significance, it cannot be shown that they represent essential rites, common in the early history and evolved from the native Hebrew faith. It is a striking fact that the evidences of mutilation appear, not, as we should expect, in the earliest patriarchal times, but at a period when considerable advance had been made in social and political organization. Notwithstanding Mr. Spencer's assertion to the contrary (Prin. of Sociol., i., 272), there is no proof that the barbarous funeral rites of pagan races were primitive Hebrew customs.

(*b*) Nor do the laws cited (Deut. xiv. 1 ; Levit. xix. 28, etc.), prohibiting such rites, necessarily imply that they were commonly

practised. It is, to say the least, as reasonable to suppose that they were issued as solemn warnings against a tendency and temptation to which the Israelites were exposed by reason of their proximity to tribes with whom they were universal practices.

(*c*) While it is admitted that mutilation of the person, as a religious act, did occur in the later Hebrew history, it is quite clear that some of the examples cited by Mr. Spencer do not imply worship of a deity, but only extravagant expressions of grief. It is inconceivable that the fourscore men whom Ishmael slew (Jer. xli. 5) shaved their beards and cut their flesh as ritualistic acts (Prin. Sociol., ii., 65) under a system which explicitly forbade such mutilation. It is much more reasonable to suppose, with Dr. Geikie, that "the destruction of the nation and the sanctuary had overwhelmed them with grief" (Hours with the Bible, vi., 103), and that they expressed their sorrow after the manner of their heathen neighbors. Examples might be given (*e.g.*, Isa. xv. 2) to show that intense grief was often indicated by these mutilations. But

(*d*) Whatever view may be held as to the prevalence and import of these customs, the plain, explicit prohibitions of Hebrew law, and the denunciations of the prophets, show that they were a foreign and wholly unauthorized importation from contiguous heathen nations, and in no sense to be regarded as rites pertaining to the Hebrew religious system.

2. The claim that since there is an analogy between "presents of eatables made to gods and the presents of eatables made at graves to the dead, as being both derived from similar presents made to the living" (Prin. Sociol., ii., 93), therefore the presentation of meat, bread, fruit and liquors to Jahveh must have had a kindred origin, rests upon a purely artificial analogy which does not warrant the inference drawn from it. There is ample evidence that the offerings referred to had a meaning totally different from that implied in similar offerings to heathen deities. Even in the earliest times the offerings of the Hebrews imply a symbolism wholly unlike that which is the basis of all heathen religions.

(*a*) Stress is laid upon the fact that "on making an offering

of first-fruits to Jahveh, the sacrificer is required to say that he has not 'given aught thereof for the dead'" (Deut. xxvi. 14), (Prin. Sociol., i., 292). But, clearly, the most natural interpretation of these words is that which refers them to expenses incurred for funerals, not, as Mr. Spencer holds, to offerings made to the dead. "This was the strongest possible protestation that he" (the worshipper) "had dealt faithfully in the matter of tithing and consecrated things and in charities to the poor. He had not allowed himself to divert anything to other uses, not even by the most pressing and unforeseen emergencies" (Thomson: Land and Book, i., 149). But, whatever the words may mean, it cannot be shown that any custom to which they may be supposed to refer was primitive and native, expressing the essential form of Hebrew religious thought. The words themselves imply a strong prohibition.

(*b*) It is said that the Hebrews were very much like all other races of a primitive type, in respect to the belief in charms, incantations, etc., and that, therefore, their religious development must have been similar.

Admitting, as we must, the prevalence of magic in some form in all periods of Hebrew history; admitting, furthermore, that it is impossible to decide in what respect the belief and practice was original and in what respect it was derived from surrounding nations, it is important to note that in some particulars the Hebrew attitude was wholly unlike that of other nations. With the Chaldeans, Babylonians, Egyptians and Negroes the magician was a religious functionary, and the arts of magic were closely allied to the religious system. With the Hebrews, on the other hand, there was no such connection. The patriarchal influence was positively exerted in opposition to this belief (Gen. xxxv. 4), and the Mosaic law expressly enjoined: "There shall not be found among you any one that maketh his son or his daughter to pass through the fire, or that useth divination, or an observer of times, or an enchanter, or a witch, or a charmer, or a consulter with familiar spirits, or a wizard, or a necromancer" (Deut. xviii. 10–11).

A more comprehensive prohibition can hardly be conceived, and it is in entire harmony with the prophetic utterances; in-

deed, notwithstanding the prevalence of magical practices, "the whole spirit of the Old Testament excludes the idea on which they rest" (Schaff-Herzog Encycl., Art., "Amulets"). And yet, in the face of this testimony, Mr. Spencer asserts that wizards were Hebrew functionaries. It would be equally sensible to say that clairvoyants are Christian ministers, merely because they ply their arts in a land where Christianity is the prevalent religion.

II. Since the common term for god (Elohim) was applied both to gods and men, it is affirmed that originally it meant only a superior man; that the idea of a single supreme deity was evolved by gradual stages from this simple primitive conception; and that in an early stage the worship of various supernatural beings appears, succeeded at a later period by the worship of the one national god Jahveh.

In regard to this view it is to be said:

1. While it is undoubtedly true that the title Elohim is applied sometimes to men, at other times to heathen deities, and in still other cases to the God of the Hebrews, this fact alone does not justify Mr. Spencer's conclusion. Admitting this variety of usage, it remains to be shown which was the earlier, and in regard to examples of a diversified usage in early times, it needs to be shown that a fair discrimination was wanting. It is further needful to have clearly settled the relation of Elohim to other titles. Mr. Spencer bases his argument upon this one title, but this is manifestly a radical defect, inasmuch as the varied usage claimed for it cannot be shown with regard to the title Jehovah, "a name which is never applied to a false god, nor to any other being except one, the Angel Jehovah, who is thereby marked as one with God" (Smith: Old Test. Hist., p. 24).

In support of the argument from the title Elohim, it is alleged

(1) That, inasmuch as Semites of the present day use the term god as a title for rulers, the ancient Hebrews may be supposed to have used it in a similar way. The only evidence of this alleged fact is a reference to Palgrave's narrative of travel in Arabia, a reference from which a wholly unwarranted conclusion

is drawn, but which is made to do service in several parts of the argument. Mr. Spencer says: "Nor do only races of inferior types deify living men. Palgrave exemplifies deification of them among the Semites as follows: '"Who is your God?" said an Arab traveller of my acquaintance to a Mesaleekh nomad not far from Basra. "It was Fadee," answered the man, naming a powerful provincial governor of those lands lately deceased; "but since his death I really do not know who is God at the present moment"'" (Prin. Sociol., i., 389).

The inference drawn from this incident is that it is a common custom among the Semites of the present day to designate their rulers as gods, and hence, "that the existing idea of deity is no higher than that which other races have shown us" (Prin. Sociol., i., 405). How far Mr. Spencer has fairly represented Palgrave in the quotation just given will appear by examining the entire paragraph from which it is taken.

Palgrave says: "They were barbarous, nay almost savage fellows, like most Sherarat, whether chiefs or people; but they had been somewhat awed by the grandeurs of Hamood, and yet more so by the prospect of coming so soon before the terrible majesty of Telal himself; for such a prince, of however small account in European ideas, is, if I may be allowed the expression, a very God Almighty for a Bedouin. 'Who is your God,' said an Arab traveller" (etc., as quoted by Mr. Spencer). "My readers (who may, perhaps, remember a parallel saying in North Wales, namely: 'When G— dies, Sir Watkin will succeed him') will, I hope, excuse the apparent irreverence of the story. But the Bedouin, poor fellow, was not irreverent in meaning, though incorrect in phrase" (Narrative of a Year's Journey through Central and Eastern Arabia, i., 87).

Now, what is to be inferred from this passage? Clearly, nothing more than this: that with some rude and ignorant nomads, the tyrannical power of a successful chieftain has excited such fear that they apply to him the same name that they apply to deity. It is not asserted, nor implied, that no distinction is made in thought between the supernatural and living beings so designated; nor is it affirmed that the custom alluded to is a common Semitic usage. Indeed, precisely the opposite may be fairly in-

ferred. Hence, when Mr. Spencer says: "The question is, whether the ancient Semites had an idea not only absolutely unlike all other races, but absolutely unlike that of their modern kindred" (Prin. Sociol., i., 405, 406), we need only say that the testimony of Palgrave (upon whom he seems to rely entirely) is wholly opposed to his interpretation of the usage of the modern Semites.

Palgrave says: "These wanderers must not be taken for a true sample of the Arab race, or for its genuine type; they are only a degenerate branch of that great tree, not its root or main stock." "The Bedouins have receded to the utmost limit of barbarism possible among Arabs . . . they bear the same relation to the rest of their countrymen that a wild-crab offshoot below does to the thriving and fruit-laden branches above" (Palgrave's Narrative, i., 34–36). Palgrave's account of the social, and especially of the religious, condition of the Bedouins, only serves to emphasize the statements which we have quoted.

And it is from a solitary incident, related of one of these degraded people, that Mr. Spencer deduces his conclusions as to the modern Semitic belief, which must, he infers, be the same as that of the ancient progenitors of the race. This is about as reasonable as it would be to take the statement of an ignorant frontiersman in the wilds of the far West as a fair expression of the belief of the citizens of Boston or New York.

(2) But it is upon such basis as this that Mr. Spencer builds his theory of the conception of God held by the patriarchs. Since modern Bedouins use the term God as descriptive of their rulers, and since, in the Hebrew Scriptures, Elohim is applied to men and heathen gods as well as to Jehovah, therefore it is clear, according to Spencerian reasoning, that Abraham had dealings, not with the Supreme Being, but only with the local chief of the land to which he was driven by force of circumstances. "The new territory he migrates to, the story represents as made over to him; and the question is: Was Abraham dealing with a terrestrial potentate or with the Power by which planets gravitate and stars shine? The words applied to this giver of territory are expressive simply of superiority. Elohim, in some cases translated gods, is applied also to kings, judges, powerful per

sons, and to other things great or high . . . Even the more exalted names find their parallels in those of neighboring rulers. . . . By thisbeing,who bears titles such as are borne by terrestrial potentates, Abraham is promised certain benefits to be given in return for homage. When he complains that the promise has not been fulfilled he is pacified by renewed promises. Finally, a covenant is made. Abraham is to have 'all the land of Canaan,' while the giver is 'to be a god unto him.' The supposition that such an agreement was entered into between the First Cause of all things and a shepherd chief would be an astounding one were it admissible; but it is excluded by the words used. The expression 'a god' negatives the conception on either side of a supreme universal power. If, however, instead of supposing that 'a god' is here used to mean a supernatural being, we suppose that it is used, as by the existing Arab, to mean a powerful ruler, the statement becomes consistent" (Prin. Sociol., i., 406–407).

In regard to this account of Abraham's life, and especially of the character of the exalted Being whom he worshipped, we remark:

(*a*) It is objectionable in that it implies that the common title by which the God of Abraham was known was Elohim. In the chapter from which Mr. Spencer's account of the covenant is taken, Elohim is indeed the usual title; but even this chapter begins with the statement that "Jehovah appeared unto Abram" (Gen. xvii. 1). In the chapters preceding, narrating Abram's wanderings, his faith and worship, and the divine promises to him, the title descriptive of his God is, almost without exception, Jehovah. And the same may be said of a large part of the subsequent narrative. Indeed, so common is this usage that, taking account of the entire history of the patriarch, the use of Elohim may almost be said to be exceptional. Of this fact, however, Mr. Spencer gives no hint. We are well aware that the school of destructive critics upon whom Mr. Spencer relies would readily explain this singular silence; but it is to be remembered that these critics do not represent the accepted results of biblical research, but rather extreme opinions which, to speak mildly, are still in dispute. The argument, therefore, which

rests upon the conclusions which these critics claim to have reached, is weakened by the uncertainty of the hypothesis which underlies it.

(*b*) A further defect in Mr. Spencer's account of the patriarchal faith and worship is the gross misrepresentation of the nature of the relations which, according to the scriptural narrative, Abraham sustained to the God he served, and of the covenant expressive of these relations. With his usual aptness in broad generalization, Mr. Spencer alludes to promises of certain benefits in return for homage rendered ; and to a contract by which right to the land was given in consideration of loyal service. That this was only a contract between two men is proven, according to Mr. Spencer, by the fact that the Lord only pledges Himself to be "a god" to Abraham. This latter point, which is stated with so much assurance as unanswerable, is really only an exhibition of astonishing ignorance, and deserves no reply.

Turning now from Mr. Spencer's misrepresentation of Scripture to the original we find that the "certain benefits" promised to this aged and childless man are the birth of a son who shall inherit the entire land, now made over to the father, a gift which shall be handed down generation after generation to descendants who shall at length become "as the dust of the earth" (Gen. xiii. 16). And this promise is signalized by a new name—Abraham —to express the fact that he is to be the father of many nations. We challenge Mr. Spencer to produce any analogy to this, of promises and contracts between human chieftains. If the God of Abraham cannot be regarded as divine, then we must conclude that the whole narrative is fictitious.

2. The charge that various gods are recognized in the Hebrew narrative, and that even after Jehovah was commonly worshipped He was regarded as only the national God, is based upon unsupported assumptions. That heathen deities were called gods does not prove anything more as to recognition of their divinity than does the analogous usage of Christians in our day when speaking of the idols of the heathen.

Nor is admission of the fact that other deities were worshipped inconsistent with the assertion that the worship of Jehovah was monotheistic and the only worship that can reason-

ably be held to be distinctively Hebraistic. Without undertaking to examine in detail the evidence of a definite Hebrew religious cultus, it will be sufficient to refer, in a general way, to the impression commonly made upon the unbiased reader of the Old Testament Scriptures, that there is a marked discrimination ever apparent between the worship of Jehovah and that of all other deities. The worship of other gods—very prevalent at times—is constantly referred to as an alien worship. And it is opposed not only because it is expressive of foreign modes of religious thought and worship, but because it substitutes a false for a true worship. Whatever view may be taken as to the claim of Jehovah to exclusive homage in early times, there can be no question that a fair reading of the narrative implies the fact of such exclusiveness. The endeavor of the patriarch Jacob to suppress the worship of heathen gods (Gen. xxxv. 2–4) is an instance of this positive opposition to heathen worship. And this antagonism to all heathen forms in the patriarchal age is the more remarkable because it is found at a time when the heathen systems were exhibiting the worst features of which we have any account; and when the small tribe of Israelites were peculiarly susceptible to foreign influences (cf. Geikie: Hours with the Bible, i., 236–9).

But, omitting notice of the evidence of a distinctive Hebrew faith in the period immediately preceding the Exodus, it is especially important to remark that the charge that the recognition of Jehovah, in the formative period of the Hebrew state, involves only belief in Him as a national deity, is opposed to the plain statements of the Hebrew law. Mr. Spencer finds in the command, "Thou shalt have no other gods before me" only a prohibition of acknowledgment of the authority of rival deities, not a denial of their existence. But, in opposition to this view, it is explicitly affirmed, "The Lord he is God; there is none else beside him" (Deut. iv. 39). The same truth is asserted in similar terms in many other places. These statements clearly exhibit the formal faith, and the entire subsequent history shows that however prevalent idolatry became in times of national degeneracy, it was always regarded as inconsistent with the Hebrew religious faith, and was always opposed by at least some of the people. Even in the dark days when Ahab filled the land with

all manner of corruption, there were seven thousand who had not bowed the knee to Baal (I. Kings xix. 18). The stern denunciations of the prophets and the energetic reform instituted by Josiah, furnish additional and conclusive testimony to the normal antagonism between the worship of Jehovah and that of the heathen gods.

(1) For the assertion that Abraham was a demi-god to whom prayers were addressed no evidence is offered; and the reference to Ewald's conjecture that such worship may have been customary (a conjecture based upon a comparison of Isa. li. 1, 2, with Isa. xlviii. 1, and of Isa. xliii. 16, with Isa. lxiv. 7) does not supply the needed testimony. But whatever the value of this learned guess, it is strange that Mr. Spencer should fail to notice that Ewald affirms that such homage "is opposed to the strict Mosaic religion, and at least could not have issued from it" (Ewald's Hist. of Israel, i., 295). But it is needless to argue such a point as this. The testimony of Scripture is strongly against Mr. Spencer's view. "In the Bible, Abraham is always a man, and nothing more. There is no confounding of the divine and human" (Geikie: Hours with the Bible, i., 260). Constantly referred to, and held in honor as the great father of the nation, worship is paid, not to Abraham, but to the God of Abraham.

III. It is claimed that the *nature* of Jehovah, as exhibited in the Old Testament narrative, plainly shows that the Hebrew conception of deity was not unlike that of other peoples, and hence must be held to have had a similar origin. This similarity, it is affirmed, is revealed in various incidents, in epithets descriptive of their God, and in the ascription to Him of human characteristics and conditions.

It is unnecessary to examine the several specifications of this charge in detail. The answer to one is an answer to all; some of them have, indeed, been treated in earlier parts of our work. The whole claim may be summed up in a single sentence, namely, in the presence of anthropomorphism in the scriptural account of the divine character. The argument is simply this: Anthropomorphism, crude and gross, appears in all pagan religions; it is also found in the Hebrew records; therefore all religions are alike in origin, development, and general character.

But the question is really not so simple as Mr. Spencer conceives it to be. In point of fact, there are two questions to be considered: 1. Is anthropomorphism, in itself, considered a final test as to the character of a religion; or in other words, does the use of anthropomorphic terms imply the negation of high spiritual conceptions? And, 2. Is the quality of the anthropomorphism the determining test?

1. In respect to the first question, it is freely conceded that the external analogy which Mr. Spencer asserts, does exist. God is spoken of in terms applicable to human thought and action, and the same fact is true of the descriptions of heathen deities. But we affirm that such usage does not conflict with the intelligent belief in a pure, superhuman and supernatural personality. It needs no argument to show that such a personality, if described at all, must be described in terms of the human personality, simply because no other terms are available or would be intelligible. And such usage no more involves limitation to the strictly human sense of the terms employed, than does the precisely similar usage to which scientists are continually obliged to resort to express their thoughts. The Duke of Argyle has pointed out, with remarkable clearness and force, the inconsistency of scientists in refusing to admit the validity of anthropomorphism in matters pertaining to the realm of the spiritual, while continually using terms as truly anthropomorphic, in recounting their investigations in the realm of the natural. He very justly contends that terms such as "natural selection," "spontaneous generation," "adjustment of relations," "adaptation of functions," etc., are as really anthropomorphic as are those employed to describe the divine character. In all terms of this kind there is an inevitable, indeed necessary, personification of nature or of natural force, in language intelligible to human consciousness. We have said that this is necessary, and it is not misleading; why then may not the similar usage of scriptural and Christian writers be equally free from erroneous implications? "Man is a part of nature, and no artificial definitions can separate him from it. And yet, in another sense, it is true that man is above nature—outside of it; and in this aspect he is the very type and image of the 'Supernatural.' The

instinct which sees this image in him is a true instinct, and the consequent desire of atheistic philosophy to banish anthropopsychism from our conceptions is dictated by an obvious logical necessity" (Argyle: Unity of Nature, p. 183).

That God is conceived anthropomorphically does not involve any such inference as Mr. Spencer and his school insist upon. The idea "is not only consistent but is inseparately connected with that sense of limitation which . . . is one of the most remarkable and significant facts of our mental constitution. . . . We can have no difficulty in conceiving all our powers exalted to an indefinite degree. And thus it is that although all Goodness, and Power, and Knowledge must, in respect to quality, be conceived of as we know them in ourselves, it does not follow that they can only be conceived of according to the measure which we ourselves apply" (Unity of Nature, p. 185).

But the strongest proof of the position which we assume is to be found in the history of the religious experience of devout men, from the days of Old Testament saints down to the present. The Agnostic scientist may declare that the anthropomorphic terms found in the Scriptures clearly prove that the conceptions must have been gross and devoid of all spirituality; the facts, however, show precisely the opposite; clearly attested, as they have been, by words and acts and the general tenor of saintly lives. We feel warranted in concluding, therefore, that the mere presence of anthropomorphism does not serve to establish a fair parallelism with heathen systems.

2. To our second question: Is not the quality of the anthropomorphism the determining test? a most emphatic affirmative response is inevitable, upon anything like a fair comparison of the Old Testament account of the God of the Hebrews with available accounts of heathen deities. But it is to be observed that we insist upon a fair and full comparison, based upon the Hebrew records, not upon Mr. Spencer's interpretation of them. It must be admitted that if Mr. Spencer has correctly stated the Hebrew belief, he has proved the analogy between the Hebrew deity and those of other nations. It is just here, however, that we join issue with him. We contend that his interpretation of the records is seriously inaccurate. Limiting his survey to one

side of the divine character as revealed in the Scriptures, and exaggerating the attributes exhibited, he has presented a grossly unfair view. We unhesitatingly affirm, that anyone who will read the narrative which recounts the divine dealings with the patriarchs, who will calmly consider the aspect of Divine Providence set forth in the story of Joseph, of the bondage, and of the exodus, and can find evidence only for such a God as Mr. Spencer describes, must be regarded either as a very superficial thinker, or as so biased by prejudice as to be incompetent to weigh evidence. Throughout the entire history, there is abundant proof of gentleness, mercy, loving provision and watchful care. The dominant thought is not, as Mr. Spencer conceives it, a grudging giving of protection in return for an obedience which is the normal fruit of fear, but rather the steady unfolding of a plan, the central thought and controlling impulse of which is divine benevolence.

And a careful examination of the law which was regarded as the expression of the Divine Will only serves to emphasize this view of the divine nature. The provisions for impartial justice, for the protection of the oppressed and helpless, for the restraint of the lawless passions of the strong and vicious, for mitigation of the condition of the slave; all show, not a God who is cruel, blood-thirsty, and eager only for the exhibition of subordination on the part of his devotees, but rather a God of justice, mercy, and love. Apparently unconscious that the statement is in conflict with his theory, Mr. Spencer admits, in an earlier part of his work, that "the ethical codes of heaven and paradise, while reflecting the code of a people in some respects barbarous, reflect the code of a people in other respects morally superior. Justice and mercy enter into the moral standards of both lives (as expressed by the prophets, at least) in a degree not shown us in the moral standards of lower men" (Prin. of Sociol., i., 194).

The limitation to the time of the prophets is unwarranted, but even with this limitation the frank admission just quoted is antagonistic to Mr. Spencer's view of the Hebrew deity, for the ethical code and the conception of the divine Being are inseparably connected. This is clearly shown in the comprehensive declaration of the divine character made in connection with the

announcement of the great ethical code which is conceded to be superior: "The Lord, the Lord God, merciful and gracious, long-suffering, and abundant in goodness and truth, keeping mercy for thousands, forgiving iniquity and transgression and sin, and that will by no means clear the guilty" (Ex. xxxiv. 6, 7). This conception of the divine Author of the ethical code cannot be separated from the code itself.

Now, it is to be noted that it is in this aspect of the divine character which Mr. Spencer sedulously ignores, that the marked contrast between the Hebrew religion and all others is most strikingly apparent. A minute comparison is unnecessary. No intelligent, fair-minded man, of average attainments, will find it difficult to detect the immense superiority of the Hebrew conception of deity over all others, even the purest and noblest. The anthropomorphism of the Bible is drawn, not from crude, base, sensual views of man, but from man at his best estate, from an ideal far beyond any existing specimens, an ideal which inevitably suggests the superhuman. Of no other religion is this absolutely and uniformly true. Are we not then warranted in asserting that the anthropomorphism of the Bible does not establish a legitimate analogy to other religions because the character of the anthropomorphism is radically different?

IV. It is claimed that analogies are found in Hebrew forms of worship, which justify classification with other religious systems.

It is unnecessary to dwell upon this point. The analogies pointed out are purely superficial, and assume the point to be proved, namely, that similarity of external forms implies similarity of meaning. It is not enough to say that sacrifices of animals were as common among the Hebrews as among Greeks, Egyptians, and others; and that circumcision was not a peculiarly Hebraic institution. The question to be answered is: Did these religious forms have the same meaning in all cases? We have already shown that the Hebrew conception of God was singularly unlike that of other nations; and that the ethical code, which was indissolubly joined with the religious code, was in marked contrast. It might therefore be reasonably presumed that a like contrast would be found in the interpretation of the religious rites. This presumption is fully justified by a fair and

comprehensive examination of the sacred records. Such an examination fully warrants the assertion that this point in Mr. Spencer's argument is as little entitled to acceptance as are those which precede it.

We have thus far considered the various grounds upon which Mr. Spencer bases his theory, and have found no reason to regard them as conclusive. It remains only to add a general objection to the whole hypothesis.

V. If Mr. Spencer's hypothesis of the origin and development of religion is correct, it is impossible to account for the facts which are plainly brought to view in the Hebrew history.

If the invariable course is from deification of the human hero to the exaltation of the supreme hero to a position of authority over all subordinates; if the conception of relations to the living ruler determines the conception of relations to the deified ruler and to the supreme God; if "the divine man, as conceived, had everywhere for antecedent a powerful man as perceived" (Prin. of Sociol., i., 409); if the thought of the supernatural originates from and is moulded by the human conditions—then it is impossible to account for such a conception of God and of human relations to Him, as is plainly set forth in the Hebrew Scriptures. Such a conception could not have arisen in accordance with the natural development, which is held to be universal, for the reason that the conditions for such development did not exist.

Mr. Spencer says: "Ascribed characters of deities are continually adapted and re-adapted to the needs of the social state. During the militant phase of activity, the chief god is conceived as holding insubordination the greatest crime, as implacable in anger, as merciless in punishment; and any alleged attributes of milder kinds occupy but small space in the social consciousness. But where militancy declines and the harsh, despotic form of government appropriate to it is gradually qualified by the form appropriate to industrialism, the foreground of the religious consciousness is increasingly filled with those ascribed traits of the divine nature which are congruous with the ethics of peace; divine love, divine forgiveness, divine mercy are now the characteristics enlarged upon" (Ecclesiastical Inst., p. 831).

But it was not during a period of national development char-

acterized by industrialism that the Hebrews were told of a merciful, gracious, long-suffering, forgiving Lord, whom they were to love with heart, soul, and strength. On the contrary, the conditions which, it is held, are essential for the evolution of these traits, and hence for their ascription to the deity worshipped, did not exist. Nor does it avail to say that these sentiments, belonging to a later age, have been interpolated in the earlier records; for at no time covered by the Old Testament narrative were the conditions other than those appropriate to militancy, according to Mr. Spencer's use of that term. If, with Wellhausen, we assign the Jehovistic code and legislation to the pre-prophetic age, that is, to an indefinite period prior to the earliest written prophecies, we have the inconsistency of a code presenting mild and peaceful sentiments and appropriate only, according to the evolutionist, to an industrial order of society, written at a time when the militancy of the nation was most marked and predominant. Or if, again, a post-exilian date is assigned, it will be equally difficult to account for the facts in the case; for, although it is conceded that the militant characteristics of the nation were largely modified after the exile, yet it is clear that such milder features as existed were too recent—the Spencerian theory demands long periods for evolutionary changes—to affect the prevalent conceptions and formal belief: at all events, to the extent indicated in the religious code and Mosaic legislation. We feel justified, therefore, in asserting that at no time could ordinary evolution, on Spencerian principles, have produced such results as are plainly exhibited in the Hebrew records. The point upon which we here insist is sufficient, of itself alone, to discredit the whole theory. The religion of Israel could not have existed, in the form and as expressing the faith presented in the Hebrew Scriptures, if it had been a development such as Mr. Spencer claims to be universal.

In conclusion, we have only to say that the only rational substitute for the imaginary account which we have been opposing is that which finds in the Hebrew faith evidence of a divine revelation, and in the Hebrew history evidence of divine providential care, exhibiting divine mercy and grace as well as power.

THE LABOR PROBLEM: CAUSE AND REMEDY.

[Read at the Summer School of Christian Philosophy, July, 1892.]

By William O. McDowell, Newark, N. J.

THE United States of America was created by a civilization different from that with which we are in contact to-day. The conditions existing in America in 1776 were that of farming communities with village centres, each little community being a thing to itself. The village was the location of the shops of the blacksmith, wheelwright and shoemaker and the other mechanics that were necessary to a farming community. These with the village church and school-house, the grocery and the public house, made up the centre of the life of the community. The news was the gossip of the neighborhood, the interchange of thought among themselves, the newspaper from the distance was a rarity and that which it brought had been secured by mail, slowly gathered by the stage coach and the sailing ship. The village mechanic bought his raw material, added his labor and sold his product. He was his own capitalist. The apprentice entered his shop, learned his trade, married the daughter and continued the industry. Out of this civilization came the Declaration of Independence of the United States of America, the creation of constitutional government of earth, that fine division of power between the executive, the legislative and the judicial that has not only lasted a century, but has stood every test that has come from the growth and progress and change in the last one hundred years.

Into this condition of affairs came a great revolutionist. It was the mechanic with his invention of the steam-engine. No longer was the horse to furnish the power for transportation. No longer was the wind to control the commerce of the world. No longer was the strength of a man's arm to furnish the power for manufacturing industry. The village life was destroyed by

the steam-engine and the life of the great cities, railroads, steamships and telegraph conditions came in its place. Around a steam-engine with its necessary power must gather all the shoemakers from the little villages, and the other mechanics were compelled to follow in the same path. The statesman, called upon to meet this new condition of affairs, legislated in such a way that it became possible for the many small mechanics to come together in a great co-operative institution, and they named the organization that they thus legalized a corporation. Into this co-operative institution the small mechanic could combine his capital with others, add his labor to theirs, and thus they could together avail of all the advantages possible from mechanical progress.

You naturally ask why is it that to-day the proprietors of the manufactories and railroad industries and of other great co-operative institutions are not composed of the many workingmen of small means that thus gathered in the past to create these corporations. How is it that we have to-day Fifth Avenue and Five Points, a Jay Gould, an Andrew Carnegie and a labor question? I answer that the responsibility for this condition rests at the door of the American statesman and the American teacher. They have not legislated or instructed so as to keep up with the progress that has been made by the American mechanic. Why? Because, due to the neglect or incompetency of the American statesman, the Government, in dealing with these co-operative institutions that it has authorized and created, has failed in the very first essential of governmental duty. What is the first and greatest duty of the Government? It is to protect life and property. The laws governing the protection of life and property have come down to us through over 1800 years, ripening until they are as we find them to-day. The mechanic who invented the steam engine compelled the statesman to create and recognize a new kind of property that is a part interest, a share interest in the necessary great co-operative institution that had to be in order that the necessary plant should be created, and in order that the power of the engine and the economies coming from modern machinery and the co-operation of labor might be availed of. Had the statesman

so legislated as to protect to the natural owner this kind of property, we should have in America to-day no colossal fortunes, no conflicts between owner and workman.

It is said that in the lifetime of one man living to-day, by Wall Street processes and legal legerdemains, the earnings of 100,000 heads of families have been "thimble-rigged" into his hands to be a curse to the country, to him and to his children, and a menace to American institutions, whereas, could it have remained in the hands of those who produced it, as it would have done, if the statesmen of the last half century had legislated so as to protect this kind of property from the vultures, and thus kept up in their part of the work with the march of progress compelled by the American mechanic. Thus in the place of this single colossal fortune there would have been 100,000 happy homes, the heads of the families educating their children with the results of honest labor availing itself of the benefits of the progress from improved machinery, and strikes and lockouts and battles with Pinkerton's mercenaries would not disgrace the pages of American history.

You ask the question, "Wherein has American statesmanship failed in dealing with this problem?" When under the law the village mechanic sold his little shop and belongings and brought the proceeds to place them with other mechanics in the great co-operative institution that thus commanded the means to avail of the steam engine and machinery, it was the duty of the Government to stand at the point of union and see to it that every man received for his money invested exactly what every other man received. In other words, that in the organization of railroad or manufacturing companies for co-operation, the Government should see to it by its own officers, that there was no watered stock. What does honest capital require in connection with its investments? Absolute honesty between man and man, and that the security issued for the money invested should represent in fact what the law of to-day requires, one hundred cents on the dollar to be paid into the treasury for every share issued. What does the gambler require in order that his business shall particularly prosper? It is uncertainty of value in the security that is issued. You will all bear me out in the statement that

the one thing above all others that is stamped upon the so-called securities as evidence of part ownership in a corporation to-day is "uncertainty of value." What it has been originally issued for, or the intrinsic value of the property behind it that goes to give it value, is something that no man can find out. The village mechanic under these conditions that are permitted by the American statesman is invited to join with others in creating a corporation. The custody of the company's business information is exclusively in the president and board of managers.

In issuing the securities, this board of officers will sell some, possibly, for par in cash, issue others for patents, evade the law that required actual value behind the stock. Then they keep the books and control all the knowledge. If the company prospered and they wanted to buy stock, rumors were given out that influenced every man holding to sell at any price he could. If, on the other hand, they desire to sell the stock every information given out is of a kind that influences to purchase, and by this means the management uses the co-operative institutions to pump from the pockets of the many until they have all. And what is the result to the country? It is that the most unscrupulous man in the community has become the largest property owner, and the deserving mechanics were gradually robbed of their all and they became but laborers, and, worse than that, semi-slaves to a man or men who had secured their monopoly of control by unscrupulous and gambling methods. Soon the owner of the great corporation found that woman's dexterous hands and nimble fingers in attending a machine were quite as serviceable as that of the best trained mechanic. Woman's labor at less cost took the place of man's. Soon it was found that the child, more active than the mother, at less wages, could take her place. The result of all this is our labor problem. We have strikes, we have lockouts. We have so-called war between capital and labor. We have all the various phases of this question. These are the mere irritation on the surface. The disease rests deeper, and the man above all others who is responsible for this condition is the American statesman who has failed in his duty. Read every political platform and you will find absolute neglect of this all-important question.

The American public teacher has also failed in his duty in allowing this condition to exist and continue.

You ask how can governmental supervision remedy this condition? I answer by exercising in all of these co-operative institutions that the Government is responsible for creating such a governmental supervision as compels honesty between man and man, and sees to it that every person in interest has exact information as to corporation affairs, not colored information furnished by designing officers for their personal advantage. Wherever power to create a co-operative institution under our laws is lodged, the same governmental power in creating should see to it that such a supervision is had by the Government as to compel on the part of every officer of every corporation absolute honesty.

In another class of co-operative institutions, that of finance or banking, we have had, since the passage of the national banking act, such a governmental supervision as that which I recommend over all corporations, the power in connection with the work being lodged in the office of the comptroller of the currency. When application is made for the organization of a bank under the law, the representative of the comptroller stands by at the point of birth and only issues the charter when the money at one hundred cents on a dollar is paid into the organization. No watered stock is ever possible. Again, during the whole history of the organization, he stands in supervision. The organization is constantly examined, the statements verified by personal examination by the officers of the Government. The result is there is no watered national bank. There is no selling short or long, or gambling in national bank stock, and some years ago I was told by the then comptroller of the currency, that the stock of the national banks of the United States was held in a majority of cases by persons owning $2000 and less.

What a contrast this presents to the position of the railroad and manufacturing companies of the United States. To-day you can travel upon all the different railroads in the United States, and shaking hands with every employee, you will not be able to touch the hand of a man who has a dollar of money invested in the company for which he works. Between such employees and

gambling, speculative unscrupulous owners there is a natural conflict that will not end. The same rule will apply to manufacturing corporations of America. Had such governmental supervision as is suggested, existed at the time when the steam-engine compelled the creation of co-operative institutions, and you should now go through the same experience, you would not be able then to touch the hand of an employee who would not be a part owner in the corporation for which he works. Where should the accumulations of the workingmen be invested in order that he may reap the greatest advantage from his savings? I answer, "In the company for which he works." Under the corporation law of America every corporation has a right to make its own by-laws not in conflict with National or State laws.

One of the first by-laws that would be made by a corporation organized with such a governmental supervision would be one that made it the law of the organization that no man should work for it unless he was an owner in it, excepting such young men as took the place of the old apprentice. Whenever an employee of such a company failed to do his full duty as a workingman, the company would have the power to discharge him, and when he left the factory he would carry with him a payment for the value of his stock as it stood that day on the books of the company and the stock so parted with would be available to be taken up by a more industrious and more acceptable workman. Every man in such a factory would be interested in making the goods turned out of such a quality as would hold the trade for the company; he being his own capitalist, the question of hours of labor would not trouble him as now. The early effort in life on the part of a young man would be to save enough money to own a share in the company for which he worked, and the effort to aid him in accomplishing this on the part of parents and friends would take the place of the co-operation given in times gone by to the apprentice seeking to learn his trade. Owning such a share, he could legally hold any office in the company, a direction would be given to his ambitions, and he would be well started on his career. Suppose that alongside of such a railroad or factory another company is started by a capitalist depending upon hired labor. You will bear me out in the statement that

it could not live in competition with the company where every man's heart was in his work, where he was not only the laborer, but also the owner.

America's workingmen cry out to-day most earnestly to the law-making powers of the land, insisting that such a governmental supervision of all corporations shall be at once established that the smallest owner in any corporation shall be protected in his ownership by the fullest knowledge of affairs, and as against watered or manipulated stock, the representatives of honest capital and the representatives of honest labor stand side by side pleading and demanding this governmental supervision in the interest of the future, not only of our country, but of humanity. It is a fact that although for years the advantage of mechanical progress has been to the stock gambler and the unscrupulous, to-day honest capital is ninety per cent. of the capital of the country. The gambling interest does not control more than ten per cent.

Give us this governmental supervision and such a wave of prosperity will come to America as has not been dreamed of by the human mind. Our railroad and other corporations will appeal for the development of the country to the ninety per cent. honest capital in the place of, as now, depending upon the ten per cent. gambling capital. In urging this upon my fellow-countrymen I am not asking you to try an untested experiment. The value of this governmental supervision and its form is known to you. It has been subjected in connection with our national banks to a practical test of over thirty years. Most earnestly do we hope that the legislatures in the different States where boards of railroad commissioners now exist, will enlarge the duties of its boards so as to include under their care all corporations created by the State, and that they will add to the officers of the board a new one to be called the comptroller of commerce, with the same duties and powers in his field of duty that the comptroller of the currency now exercises in connection with the national banks. That in a State where no such board exists, that one will be created at the earliest possible moment.

We would also urge upon the Congress of the United States that it so amend the Interstate Commerce law as to give the

commissioners authority over every corporation, the supervision of which is given by the constitution to the National Government. Then that by an amendment it will create the national office of the comptroller of commerce with the same power over all corporations under the control of the Interstate Commerce Commission that is exercised by the comptroller of currency over our financial corporations. A joint meeting between the comptrollers of commerce from the different States and the national comptroller of commerce would enable them so to define their relationship to each other and their methods of co-operation, that such a thing as watered stock or dishonest management undiscovered for any length of time would be impossible in the United States. When this condition is a fact, we will have not only solved the labor question, but also the greater question of making the workingman his own capitalist.

HADESIAN THEOLOGY; OR, THE GOSPEL ACCORDING TO SATAN: AN INSIDE HISTORY.*

[Contributed to CHRISTIAN THOUGHT.]

BY PRINCE DIABOLUS.

Translated from the Hadesian vernacular by Theodore F. Seward, founder of the Brotherhood of Christian Unity.

(Note by the Author.—It is of no consequence to the world how it happens that I, Diabolus, a prince of the royal blood, and member of the reigning family in Hades from time immemorial, should now choose to appear as a friend and ally of those whom I have hitherto persecuted. It is sufficient to say that my kinsman, Satan, has incurred my deepest jealousy and hate, and after long consideration I have decided upon this plan as calculated to wound, spite and injure him more than any other. Having been associated with him in all his secret councils, I know that there is no part of his kingdom in which he takes such entire satisfaction as in this world, and especially in certain phases of its church history. To expose his machinations and give a clue to his plans and methods will, therefore, if my hints are acted upon, foil and disturb him more than anything else that could be done.

I am aware that my revelations will not at first inspire as much confidence as if they came from another source. I do not expect the statements of an enemy to be accepted as if they came from a friend. But my words can easily be put to the proof. It is for those whose interests are affected by my revelations to investigate the subject, and decide whether or not my statements are borne out by the facts. —PRINCE DIABOLUS.)

WHEN the earthly mission of Jesus was ended by His death on the cross, Satan was more discouraged and downcast than he had ever appeared to be before. His faithful adherents, Mammon, Moloch, Baal, Dissimulus and others, gathered around him and strove to cheer him out of his despondency.

"What can that handful of ignorant disciples do," they said, "against the wiles and arts by which we have ruled the world so long?"

Satan answered with a groan of despair: "You only show your blindness. I see now more plainly than ever before why I should be your ruler. My sagacity penetrates to the innermost depths where you see nothing but the surface. This Man, who proved Himself to be more than a man by resisting my tempta-

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tions, which had never before been known to fail, has succeeded in planting the seeds of love and truth in the world, and I know well that, however unprepared the human race may seem to be, these seeds will remain in the soil and grow and increase till our kingdom is crowded out altogether, and I shall not have one faithful follower left in that world where I have reigned so long."

"But, your majesty," said Dissimulus, "you know how I have always succeeded in misleading men by directing their attention to words and phrases in the Scriptures, and thus causing them to forget the spirit and meaning of the truth itself. Is there nothing in that line that I can do with the teachings of Jesus?"

"Alas! no," said the discouraged monarch. "They are so plain and simple that even a little child can understand them. There is one sentence alone that would annihilate my hopes if not another saying had been recorded. It is this: 'God so loved the world that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth on him might not perish, but have eternal life.'"

As Satan repeated these words he was excited into a perfect paroxysm of rage. He scowled at us with an expression I had never seen on his face before, and shouted, "Get out of my sight, you worthless crew. I never want to look upon your faces again." We all slipped out of his presence with what grace we could, and for many years Hades was a region of utterly hopeless despair.

After a long period Dissimulus ventured to approach his imperial majesty again. "Your Royal Highness," said he, "I have something most important to say to you. Our prospects are growing bright once more. Certain Apostles have been writing letters to the people which are read with great interest, and are even beginning to be regarded as inspired. However that may be (I know nothing about such matters) I see in these letters many expressions that will serve my purpose admirably. If I can only induce the people to set a higher value on the Epistles than on the teachings of Christ, my work will be easy."

At that Satan broke out into a greater rage and fury than ever. "What stuff and nonsense is this?" said he. "Do you think the people on the earth are nothing but a pack of brainless

idiots? Are you trying to make me believe that they will esteem any instructions above those of the one they regard as the Son of God, or God Himself? Get out of my sight and stay in the dark caverns where you have been hiding these many years."

But this time Dissimulus stood his ground. "Your Royal Highness," said he, "knowing full well how unreasonable my plan would appear, I waited till it began to bear fruit before I presumed to bring it to your notice. I can now assure you that the Epistles are already studied and discussed more than the Gospels. By my artful suggestions in connection with certain texts, I have led thousands to believe that being a Christian does not depend on what they do, or what they are, but on what they think. The consequence is they are having all sorts of controversies and contentions over doctrines and creeds, and forgetting what their Lord said about the cup of cold water, and that love to God and man is the only test of discipleship. They—"

Before he could finish his sentence, Satan astonished us by an exhibition of excitement and a departure from his usual dignity of demeanor, such as we had never before witnessed. He leaped down from his throne, seized Dissimulus around the waist and danced with him up and down the spacious hall till they were both out of breath. As soon as he recovered himself sufficiently to speak he said, "You priceless jewel of a servant! Henceforth you shall reign second in my kingdom. You have done what Mammon, Moloch and the whole company of my field-marshals would not have even dreamed of doing. I can see what this will lead to as plainly as if centuries had already passed and the work had been accomplished. The writings of the Apostles would have done the cause of that hated Jesus an incalculable amount of good and no harm if they had been received and used only as commentaries on His teachings. But when they are put first they give room for endless discussion and dissension. Go forward with your work, brave Dissimulus. Set the people to fighting over predestination, reprobation, original sin—anything and everything that will lead their minds away from the plain teachings of their Master."

Of the sects, creeds and controversies that resulted from this plan I do not need to speak. There were Sabellians and anti-

Sabellians, Pelagians and semi-Pelagians, Arians and Socinians, an infinite variety of head-beliefs and metaphysical distinctions, with only here and there a few simple souls who held to the plain doctrine of practical obedience to their Lord, never suspecting that they were the only light-bearers there were left in the world.

But I must not fail to make one point clear, as a matter of justice. That consummation of diabolical ingenuity, the proof-text, was not invented by Dissimulus, but by Satan himself. Only his mighty intellect could have conceived the plan of beguiling the religious leaders into the idea of supporting their various doctrines and systems by individual sentences from the Bible rather than by the spirit of its instructions. The theologians failed to realize that any scheme or vagary of the human mind, from perfectionism to Mormonism, could be defended from the Bible by this plan. The most serious result of the device was that it finally led to a complete misconception of God's character. The Bible teaches that He is love and that His Son came to the world as a revelation of that love, yet the Christian Church gradually became possessed with the idea that God is wrath, and that Christ came to placate His wrath, or to suffer the consequences of it.

When people began to persecute each other in the name of Christ, it is needless to say that Satan was in his happiest mood. He and his followers were kept very busy during the period of the Inquisition, encouraging the leaders, and assuring them that their course was eminently right and proper; that the God of love is never so well pleased as when His servants employ the instruments of hate, and that hate is the natural outgrowth of love. How many gay times we had among ourselves, laughing over the delicious inconsistencies of the Christians.

When Luther appeared we were smitten with something like a panic. Satan called a meeting of his wisest counsellors to consider what course of action could be pursued. The discussions were intense and exciting, but no practical plan for meeting the danger could be suggested. All agreed that nothing could be more injurious to our cause than for people to think for themselves instead of blindly accepting the instructions of the priests.

But, as usual, it was Dissimulus who first discovered a ray of hope. "What good will it do the people to think," said he, "unless they think correctly? I believe I can mislead them through their own doctrine of justification by faith. I will beguile their leaders into making a kind of a watchword or theological war-cry of the expression 'faith alone.'"

"Nonsense," said Moloch. "You must have some basis of reasonableness in your plan, or you cannot expect to exercise any influence. One of their own apostles says that 'faith without works is dead.' How can you persuade the people that there is any efficacy in a thing that is dead?"

However, as no one else had a plan to offer, it was agreed to do the best we could with this one. The result was a delightful surprise to us all. Under the guidance of the shrewd Dissimulus we succeeded in mystifying both the clergy and their followers. We led many of them to believe that faith is merely an exercise of the mind or an emotional experience, and that doing had no part in their salvation. We led them to think that righteousness as spoken of in the Bible is only a theological term, and does not refer to "rightness" of life. How we managed this in face of the saying of Jesus, "If ye love me, keep my commandments," I do not know. But manage it we did, and millions of people lived and died in Christian lands without knowing that being a Christian is nothing more nor less than obeying the teachings of Christ.

Making religion a question of head belief rather than of the heart and life led naturally to a vast increase in the number of sects, with every conceivable variety and shade of doctrine. Some of the sects were so small that we younger spirits often spoke of them as insects. But, whether large or small, they all served the one purpose of giving predominance to the letter of the Scriptures, with a corresponding neglect of the spirit.

And thus it happens, as a result of our combined plots and plans, that the Gospel as interpreted by Satan still has more power in the world than the Gospel according to Jesus. Many evidences of the truth of this statement could be given, but it will be sufficient if I merely give a catalogue of some of Satan's favorite amusements.

1. Attending service in a fashionable church. He says that the incongruity between the edifice, the dress and spirit of the congregation and the life and teachings of the One they profess to worship affords him a degree of entertainment that would astonish those worthy people if they only knew of it.

2. Visiting the Stock Exchange and the marts of trade. His majesty says he has no keener pleasure than seeing a pious church member deal in "margins." I am not sufficiently versed in earthly affairs to know the meaning of that expression, but Satan seems to understand it perfectly. Sharp bargains, "corners," "deals," and all crooked business transactions interest him so much that they are never consummated without his taking an active part in them. Yet he sees things as they really are, and knows well that the sinners are not all among the rich, nor the saints among the poor.

3. Attending church fairs. This is one of his majesty's favorite recreations. He says "a minstrel show is a solemn feast when compared with a church fair." To see a company of Christians eating oysters and ice-cream for the glory of God and the payment of a church debt always puts him in good humor. He calls it his "light comedy."

4. All other Satanic amusements are as nothing compared with the delight afforded him by a heresy trial. Here our royal leader is seen at his best. It often takes a long season of plotting and scheming before he succeeds in bringing one of these affairs to a culmination. But after a trial for heresy is once inaugurated, Satan considers that his part of the work is accomplished. He is entirely indifferent as to the result, knowing that the injury done to religion is practically the same, whether the trial fails or succeeds.

No doubt many of my readers will be disposed to say, "Your statement of the case is very one-sided and unfair. To gain a more hopeful view of the condition of the religious world we have only to look at the vast amount of activity and religious work among the churches." But they little suspect what my knowledge of unseen influences enables me to reveal. A large share of this boasted activity is a part of Satan's own plan. The fact must be borne in mind that it is his aim and purpose to oc-

cupy the attention of professing Christians with external matters in order that they may be led away from the real things of the Spirit—the kingdom within. He therefore does all in his power to excite discussions of forms and ceremonies, church government, doctrinal differences in creeds, probation after death, and a thousand other secondary matters. For a long time these discussions fully served his purpose. But the awakening of individual thought began to have its effect, and it was necessary to introduce a new distraction. This he very ingeniously compassed by his "activity" and "benevolent" scheme. Most Christians would far rather give a tenth of their income, or teach in a mission Sunday-school, than try to bring their lives into conformity with the teachings of Jesus. And so we now see a great hubbub of business in the Church. Satan is painfully aware that this is not all froth or heartless form, but in many cases a genuine and self-sacrificing labor of love. But it serves him a most important purpose in distracting attention and giving thousands of people an opportunity to deceive themselves.

On the whole, Satan is well satisfied with the outlook for his kingdom in the world. He says he is content to have Christian nations send missionaries to the heathen if they will also send rum and opium as they are now doing. He is willing that rich people shall give very generously to religious objects if they will get their money by dishonest, unjust, or even doubtful methods. He is willing that the churches shall be as active as they please if they will follow the ways of the world instead of the teachings of Christ. He is much pleased with the custom of requiring members to subscribe to a creed which they either cannot understand or do not believe. It encourages the spirit of equivocation and duplicity which is the very corner-stone of his kingdom. He likes to have people worship God devoutly on Sundays when they serve mammon faithfully the rest of the week. He approves of the pity with which the "saints" look down upon the drunkard and the harlot if they will forget that Christ's condemnation of covetousness and self-righteousness was a thousand times more severe than that which He manifested toward the degraded and the fallen, whom, indeed, He did not condemn, but gave them sympathy and help.

It must by this time be evident to my readers that one object of this revelation is to show that many mortals are entirely deceived as to their own spiritual condition. The Gospel according to Jesus says, "Love God. Love one another. Keep the commandments. The kingdom of Heaven will then be formed and established in your own souls." The Gospel according to Satan says, "Believe, and you will be admitted to Heaven when you die." The former interpretation leads to simplicity, purity, truthfulness. The latter leads to mixed motives, self-deception, and a low standard of spirituality, and is a means of wrecking innumerable lives.

I do not pretend to deny the doctrine that those who believe in Christ will go to Heaven when they die. But, writing from the other side of the veil, I can bear testimony that the doctrine, as it is often taught, works more harm than a complete falsehood could do. Satan is far too wise to put forward a transparent lie in furtherance of his designs. His method is to present a partial truth with a sufficient admixture of error to create a false impression, and so to confuse issues that people will think they are following the truth when they are in reality following their own inclinations. What better illustration of his shrewdness could be found than this plan of persuading the children of men that belief alone will give them "a title clear to mansions in the skies"? After that idea is once established in the mind, no amount of instruction or exhortation to morality and uprightness of life can remove the impression that conduct is of secondary importance, and has but little practical relation to the life beyond the grave. "Heaven is heaven. Those who succeed in entering will be happy. Belief is a magical key by which entrance may be effected." This false logic, for which the instructions of your Lord and Master do not give a particle of justification, is the fruitful source of nearly all the evils that have crept into the Church, and the cause of the look of blank astonishment on the faces of church members, as I have so often seen, when they awake on the other side and find themselves in our society instead of in the happy Canaan where they so confidently expected to go.

But I must not be understood as wishing to convey the idea that Satan is entirely satisfied with the prospects of his kingdom

in the world. On the contrary, there are many developments at the present time which disturb and alarm him to the last degree. His discouragements, however, do not arise from elements in your history that are most apparent, nor from those in which you, perhaps, take the most satisfaction. It is as true now as when the words were first spoken by your Master, "the kingdom of God cometh not with observation." It is not in the bustle of outward activities that Satan perceives the danger which causes him uneasiness and gloomy forebodings, but in the growth of a truer conception of religious life. There are many who are beginning to realize the fallacy of the "faith alone" theory. They see that it is not derived from the teachings of Jesus, but is the outcome of a man-made theological system. They see that true "believing" is "receiving"—that the Christian must believe in Christ as a plant believes in the sun, by receiving and assimilating its light and life. They see that the emphasis which has been placed upon the need of spiritual birth has led people to overlook the equal necessity of spiritual growth. They see that the value of any deed to the soul of the doer depends upon the spirit with which it is performed. They see that the words "deny thyself" do not refer to specific acts, but to a complete change of attitude, a renunciation of the self-principle, and accepting God in Christ as the source of all life and happiness. In other words, men are turning their attention from outward appearances to inward realities; from external acts, forms and creeds to the real life of the soul. They see that destiny is not fixed by an arbitrary decree of God, but is an inevitable result of character, and that character does not depend entirely upon the decision of a moment, but is a process of growth as described by the Lord Himself—"first the blade, then the ear, after that the full corn in the ear."

Satan understands well that his power over the world will be greatly weakened, if not entirely lost, when the truth is universally accepted that Heaven and hell are not merely definite abodes of happiness or misery, but are the results of man's own choice. If he chooses good, he becomes a child of God, and the divine life—that is, Heaven—begins in his own soul, He will afterwards go to Heaven because he belongs there. If he

chooses evil, he rejects God and draws to himself all evil powers and influences, and gravitates to our kingdom by his own inward proclivities.

Shall I tell you what we Hadesians think of your little planet? It appears to us like a vast lunatic asylum, an abode of endless delusions and hallucinations. These delusions seem to us most strange and unaccountable because they are in opposition to your own positive knowledge. For example, you know that your life on the earth is limited to a certain number of years, at the most, with a possibility that it may be terminated at any moment. Yet you plan and work as if that brief span was an eternity. You deny yourselves and live the life of slaves to hoard up money and goods to be enjoyed—when? It is a moment that never arrives. Yet still you go on in eager pursuit of these phantoms of your own imaginations. Even when you become what you call Christians, and profess to choose the heavenly life in place of the earthly life, you still cling to your old delusions. If this were not the case, would not your thoughts, interests and plans centre upon the world in which you expect to remain forever? When you anticipate a journey to a foreign land you do not fail to make a suitable preparation for it. You seek information concerning the characteristics of its inhabitants. You study their language and customs. If you meet others who are going to the same country, you hold earnest conversations with them on the subject, comparing views and giving and receiving information. When are groups of Christians found talking about their future home in the same natural way?

It is but just to confess that I and my associates do all in our power to keep you from treating religion rationally and naturally. If a company of Christians are disposed to introduce religious conversation, we try to lead it into unprofitable channels; into talk about external matters—the need of a new organ; the prosperous condition of the Sunday-school; whether a certain newly-arrived family can be induced to attend your church, the history of the latest heresy, etc., etc. Our sole object is to leave you with the impression that you have been engaged in a religious conversation when you have no more touched the things of the Spirit than if your talk had been of business or housekeeping.

The ease with which you yield to our wiles and fall into our snares is a perpetual surprise to us. Yet the reason is not far to seek. Thinking it is your Christian faith that is going to save you instead of your Christian life, you try to get as much pleasure out of the world as you can and still gain admission into Heaven at last. This great fundamental delusion is the source and fountain of nearly all the others. It has led to the wide prevalence of worldly principles and policy in the Church, and is the direct cause of the numerous defalcations among professing Christians.

To us Hadesians the most unaccountable of all your delusions is that which leads you to cling so persistently to the idea that church membership is of the nature of an insurance policy or title-deed which is bound to secure you a residence and citizenship in the heavenly land after you leave this world. If there is any one danger that your Lord and Master tried especially to guard you against it is this. He told you plainly that not all who say, "Lord, Lord," shall enter the kingdom of Heaven, that the first shall be last and the last first, and warned you in the most solemn manner that the tares and the wheat would grow up together, and that one could not be distinguished from the other. Yet in all my attendance upon your church services (and I go very often for purposes of my own) I have rarely heard a preacher speak of the converted and the unconverted, the saved and the lost, the sheep and the goats, without implying that the former are all in the Church and the latter out of it. And then usually follows the exhortation, "Oh! you unhappy goats, why will you not come over into our fold and become sheep?" But when the goats compare the lives of many of the sheep with the standard left them by their Shepherd—a life of self-denying labor for the poor, the hungry, the naked, the prisoner, they perceive so little difference between those who are in the fold and those who are out of it, that many of them can perceive no advantage in the change. For themselves, they prefer to remain genuine goats rather than add to the list of spurious or self-deluded sheep. "By their fruits ye shall know them."

As a member of Satan's kingdom, I am obliged to concede that the churches are a tremendous power in resisting and over

coming that kingdom. But I can also state positively from my knowledge of inside history that they will never do their full work while they give the prominence to creeds and doctrines that they now do. Let them put Christ first and doctrines second and all His followers will be drawn together by a natural law of sympathy. The Church will become one in spirit, and Satan's power will be broken and gradually destroyed.

This singular message from an inhabitant of the lower kingdom is now completed. I do not ask nor expect gratitude for an act which is performed only in a spirit of revenge. Diabolus rebuking worldliness in the Church is Diabolus still. It is a part of the Hadesian policy to do good when it will bring evil to our enemies. If I succeed in robbing Satan of the smallest share of his influence in the world, I shall be content.

SENSATIONAL PREACHING.

[Contributed to CHRISTIAN THOUGHT.]

BY REV. DAVID J. BURRELL, D.D., MARBLE COLLEGIATE CHURCH, NEW YORK.

IN the divine economy it has been determined that preaching —the foolishness of preaching—should be the instrument for the conversion of the world. Why not the sword? Because God's thoughts are not as our thoughts. When earthly kings resolve on conquest we hear the marshalling of the hosts, the sound of the hammer in the shipyards, the trumpet blast. But when God goeth forth, conquering and to conquer, He gathers around Him a company of fishermen and other humble folk and bids them go armed only with the "Sword of the Spirit," which is the Word of God.

When Jesus stood in the midst of His little group of followers, none of them rich or learned or influential, and said, "Go ye into all the world and preach the Gospel to every creature," princes and priests did not tremble, for none dreamed that in the fulfilment of that prophetic command all thrones and oracles should be overturned and the cords of the tabernacle of Jesus should be extended from the river to the ends of the earth. Yet so it is. This foolishness of preaching is in reality the very wisdom and power of God. The truths of the Gospel rightly presented must of necessity find their way to heart and conscience. What need of adventitious helps or resorts to sensationalism, so-called, save to that which rests in the intrinsic power of the truth? They are ruled out.

First, sensational themes; that is, such as have no immediate bearing on the soul's eternal welfare.

Second, sensational methods; the methods of a mitred mountebank who plays

> "Such tricks before high heaven
> As make the angels weep."

Third, the sensationalism of mere rhetoric; choice words, rounded periods with no practical helpfulness in them, no message from the Throne.

"Water, water, everywhere!
And all the boards did shrink.
Water, water, everywhere,
And not a drop to drink!"

Fourth, the sensationalism of heresy. The cheapest popularity in these times is to be won by repudiating the symbols which were solemnly espoused in the ordination vow. The crowd runs together to see a man strike his mother in the breast. A breach of common honesty in the pulpit will win immediate applause from those who are not in cordial sympathy with truth and righteousness. But the man who resorts to this sensational device is neither a worthy minister nor an honest man.

The Gospel is in itself sensational to the last degree, if it be worthily preached. Its truths are tremendous in their import and take hold upon the innermost fibres of the soul. Dulness in the pulpit is intolerable. It can only be accounted for on the assumption that the preacher has not apprehended his theme. "Why is it," said a clergyman to David Garrick, "that you draw the multitudes while I preach to empty pews?" "Because," replied the actor, "I set forth fiction as if it were true, while you preach God's truth as if it were fiction." We in the ministry need to be more and more drenched by the reality of spiritual things. When the saintly Summerfield was dying be said, "Oh! now if I could return to my pulpit but for an hour, how I could preach, for I have looked into eternity!" Would that God might give us clear eyes to see those things which, being unseen, are most real and eternal. How we could preach! No need then of adventitious helps. We should be able to set forth burning thoughts in breathing words and bring our people face to face with the solemnities and profundities of the Gospel of Christ. In our seminary course we were taught to divide truth under three heads, to wit: Theology, Anthropology, Soteriology. These comprehended the sum and substance of the Christian System. Each of these divisions of doctrine has in it such possibilities of interest and conviction that we who preach them are

without excuse if they do not find their way to the centre of the hearts of men.

I. *Theology*, that is, the science of God

God!! A great word. A word of three letters only, but of infinite dimensions; easy to say, but how difficult to apprehend! Our work is to bring Him near to the hearts and consciences of the people, to make Him real. It is ours to declare the contents of the Name.

1. *The essential God.* Try to define Him. Here is the best definition that ever was formulated: "God is a Spirit (what is spirit?), infinite (what is infinitude?), eternal (eternity!), unchangeable (how can we grasp immutability?), in his being, wisdom, power, holiness, justice, goodness and truth." We attempt to simplify the great mystery, and behold a new mystery is in every word! Turn your telescope towards the farthest nebula in infinite space, and lo, from far yonder comes back the word, "Canst thou by searching find out God?" Turn your microscope upon the last reduction of life, protoplasm, primordial germ, and out of that comes a faint whisper, "Canst thou by searching find out God?"

2. *God personal.* It is ours to bring God near to the people. Sir John Franklin relates that when trying to persuade a tribe of Esquimaux of the divine presence and interest, the chief answered, "There may be a God, but He surely knows nothing about us. Behold our poverty, our rude homes, our tattered garments! Behold yon icy crags! There may be such a being as you mention; but if so, He is afar off." It devolves upon us to let the people know that God is a real personality, with eyes to see our pain and sorrow, with a heart to pity, and mighty arms to help.

3. *God paternal.* It was observed by Madame de Gasparin that if Jesus had done nothing in His earthly ministry but to teach men how to say "Our Father, which art in Heaven," that would have been abundant compensation for the vast outlay involved in His dwelling among men.

Thus to declare the infinite, eternal and unchangeable One is surely a work that should enlist our utmost enthusiasm and insure us against the least possibility of dulness. Our "call" is

like that of Moses. He was in the wilderness of Horeb, a fugitive from his people and from duty. While following Jethro's flocks amid the solitudes he saw the acacia bush on fire. He drew nigh, wondering. The flames leaped through the bush, yet not a leaf was shrivelled, not a twig was burned! A voice said, "Draw not hither; put off thy sandals; the place whereon thou standest is holy ground." He reverently bowed his head. It had come at last—his call to the ministry. "I am the God of thy Father." He was afraid to look or to utter a word. "I am come down to deliver my people. Come now, I will send thee." "Who am I?" he cried, "that I should go?" "I will be with thee." "What is thy name?" "Go say unto them, Jehovah (I Am That I Am) hath sent me!" He went. He gathered the elders and told them about Jehovah. He assembled the people, and with signs and wonders showed that Jehovah is God. He made his way to the Egyptian court and presented his demand: "Thus saith Jehovah, Let my people go." And Pharaoh replied derisively, "Jehovah? I know Isis, I know Osiris, I know all the gods of Egypt; but who, pray, is this Jehovah?" Moses said, "I will declare Him unto thee. Thou believest in the Nile-god, in the holy Scarabæus, in the Frog-headed One, in Apis, in the divine Leek, in all forms of adorable life. Jehovah will prove himself the master of all thy gods." He waved his rod, and the Nile was a rolling torrent of blood. He waved again, and frogs came up from the water side into their ovens, their kneading troughs, their bed-chambers. Once more, and the air was full of gnats and beetles. They should have enough of Scarabæus! Again, and a murrain fell upon the cattle; lo, Apis was put to shame! Again, and destruction rained down upon their fields and gardens. Once more, and the homes of Egypt sent forth a mighty wail for the dead. "I Am That I Am" thus proved Himself the Lord of Life and of Death. And Pharaoh bowed his head, convinced that Jehovah is the God.

This is our commission, to let rulers and people know that Jehovah reigns and will have His way among the children of men.

II. *Anthropology*, that is, the science of man.

We do not know ourselves. It is a true saying, "The proper

study of mankind is man." It devolves upon us to make the people see themselves, not "as ithers see them," but as they are and as they appear in the clear sight of God. In so doing we shall find ourselves at no loss for material to enchain the attention. There is no room for dulness here.

1. We are to throw upon the canvas the picture of man as God created him. He breathed into his nostrils the breath of life, and man became a living soul. He made him a little lower than God. Here he is under the trees of Paradise, heart full of happiness, head erect, conscience clear as the sunlight. He has kingly dominion over all the creatures. What a splendid heritage is his! What a glorious outlook is before him!

2. We are to throw upon the canvas another picture—man exiled from Paradise, sent out into a wilderness of toil and sorrow, his head fallen on his breast, his heart full of shame, his conscience smitten with remorse. Lost and ruined; on his brow the word Ichabod—the glory hath departed!

3. We are to throw upon the canvas another picture—a spectre black as midnight—Sin.

It was sin that wrought the awful calamity. Sin digs every grave. Sin has unsheathed every sword that has ever been flashed upon a battlefield. Sin has desolated homes, corrupted social life, and ruined governments. Sin bloats the face of youth and scars its beauty with foul traces of lust and inebriety. Sin dethrones the proudest intellects and sets the maddened soul on fire of hell. Sin sharpened the dagger that pierced the heart of the Only Begotten Son of God.

It is easy to preach smooth things. The multitudes demand them (Isa. xxx. 10), but we must not turn aside. "Cry aloud, spare not; lift up thy voice like a trumpet and show the people their sin"—sin, and death following after. Not sin in the abstract, not sin floating in the air like the breath of a pestilence or exhaling like miasma from the slums, but sin abiding in human hearts and making itself manifest in human lives—sin in you and in me.

So the call came to Nathan, "Go show David his sin." The king had committed a dreadful offence. He had murdered Uriah and taken Bathsheba to wife. He had kept his crime in his own

breast, but his soul was troubled. Over the blue skies, where once he loved to read the divine glory, was written—Murder! The winds that whistled round his palace shrieked—Adultery! In the watches of the night he saw in letters of fire on the dark walls of his chamber—Uriah! And when he knelt in prayer, voices called to him from the corners of his closet—Bathsheba! In the temple the hosannas and hallelujahs of the great choirs had an undertone like a wail of sorrow reminding him of his dreadful sin. The court preacher entered. After a respectful salutation he laid before the king a case for judgment, a trifling affair, yet worthy of the royal attention. "A poor man had one little ewe lamb. It was dear as a daughter, ate of his food and drank of his cup. His rich neighbor had many flocks and herds, but when his hospitality was needed he spared to take of his own possessions and seized upon the ewe lamb." Thus far, when the king interrupted him, "As the Lord liveth, the man that hath done this thing shall surely die!" The moment has come. A sermon is a thrust. Draw thy blade, O prophet of the Lord! "Thou art the man!" The iron enters into David's soul; he sees himself stripped of purple and ermine, a sinner before God. Up the winding stairway he staggers to his closet on the house-top, the face of Uriah staring into his—a cold, resolute, brave face. He reaches his closet, and from every nook and cranny the filmed eyes of the dead Uriah are gazing at him there. He kneels—listen at his door: "Have mercy upon me, O God, according to thy loving kindness; according unto the multitude of thy tender mercies blot out my transgressions. For I acknowledge my transgressions; and my sin is ever before me. Against thee, thee only, have I sinned and done this evil in thy sight."

This is the tremendous fact which we are to declare to our people; we have all sinned and come short of the glory of God. In our brain, our conscience, our heart, is the black plague spot. To preach this as it ought to be preached is of necessity to touch men at the very core of their being. If we did not apprehend the truth in its reality we should preach it with such effect as when Jonathan Edwards spoke of "sinners in the hands of an angry God," when men and women cried out and clung for sup-

port to the pillars of the church. No need of adventitious helps to win attention. No room for dulness here, if only we have ourselves realized the exceeding sinfulness of sin (Rom. vii. 13).

III. *Soteriology*, that is, the science of salvation.

This is the third link in the Gospel chain of reconciliation with God. The substance of the Gospel is perfectly comprehended in three startling truths:

1. The *Incarnation.* Great is the mystery of godliness—God manifest in flesh. We are to stand at the threshold of the stable in Bethlehem and bring to the knowledge of our people this wondrous adumbration of Deity. Here are heard the songs of angels, the laughter of children, the joy of those who have been groping for the Infinite. Here all the sons of God are shouting for joy.

2. The *Atonement.* All souls are asking, "What shall we do to be saved?" All are desiring to know how man may be reconciled with God. We preach the redemptive glory of the cross. We cry, "Look and live!"

A poor demented creature, a fisherman's wife, came to the minister with her hands full of wet sand, saying, "Oh my sins! as the sands of the seashore for multitude, as the sands of the seashore!" "Where did you get it?" said he. "Down by the beacon." "Go down by the beacon and put it there. Dig deep and pile up as high as ever you can. Wait until the tide rolls in." She went down by the beacon, heaped up the sand, and stood waiting. She watched the waves as they crept higher and higher until they swept over her sins, and then clapped her hands for joy. It was a pantomime of the glorious truth. The tide, the crimson tide rolls in! Under the cross we preach the gospel of redemptive love. The tide rolls in: "It cleanseth me, it cleanseth me; oh praise the Lord, it cleanseth me!"

3. The *Resurrection.* Life and immortality brought to light. The darkest night the world ever saw was when Jesus lay in His sepulchre. The Sun of Righteousness was eclipsed. But the brightest dawn was when He broke the bands of death and ascended upon high and took captivity captive. Here at the open sepulchre we stand pointing to the open heavens whither He has gone. Lo, yonder the keys of death and hell are at His

girdle, and the seal of divine indorsement is put upon His mediatorial work. Here is comfort for all who mourn. Here is courage for all who tremble before the King of Terrors. Here is the triumph of heavenly grace.

Oh! What splendid opportunities of enchaining the attention and capturing the hearts of men! We stand as did the sentinel upon the wall of Orleans when reinforcements came. The walls had been breached and shattered, the people were reduced to the last extremity. The old priest Anianus was praying in their midst. From the ramparts came the cry, "I see the rescue of the Lord!" It was a cloud far yonder on the hills. Nearer and nearer it came. "I see the glistening of spears, I see the waving of the Gothic banners!" The cloud drew nearer; it was the squadrons of Theodoric. It is the function of the ministry to stand thus upon the outer ramparts of death and announce the rescue of the Lord. Banners are waving, the shields of Heaven are aglow with morning light, Heaven is opened, hosannas and hallelujahs are all around us.

These are the glorious things which we are commissioned to declare. Dulness here? Nay, God forgive us that we go dull-eyed and heavy-hearted to such stupendous tasks. Oh, for the baptism of fire! For if the things which we declare are true at all they are awfully and eternally true. And so may the Holy Ghost enable us to declare them; for Jesus' sake. Amen.

THE YEAR AMONG THE CHURCHES.

THE year just closing has been marked by more controversy than usual, which may be taken as indicating not so much theological unrest as a struggle for wider limits of toleration. We can here only give the events of the year, reserving all comment, such as we have from time to time freely given. The Higher Criticism, which already has many advocates in this country, is resulting in many changes in the theories of the inspiration of the Bible. Dr. Briggs set forth some of the conclusions of the Higher Criticism in his inaugural address in Union Theological Seminary two years ago, and Professor Henry Preserved Smith, Lane Seminary (both Presbyterian institutions), published a pamphlet the present year in support of Dr. Briggs's position. Professor Smith has been on trial before the Cincinnati Presbytery, and has been found guilty and suspended from the ministry. The trial of Professor Briggs resulted in his acquittal. The case of Professor Briggs, and that of Union Seminary, which refused to respect its veto of the appointment of Professor Briggs, has been again before the General Assembly occupying more attention than the report of the Revision Committee. The General Assembly disapproved the decision of the Presbytery to dismiss the complaint against Prof. Briggs, and the Presbytery was directed to place him on trial. No understanding was reached with the Directors of Union Seminary. The latter have since declared the compact of 1870 abrogated, thus placing the Seminary, so far as the vote of its directors can do so, in the same position of independence it occupied prior to 1870, so that it is no longer under the control of the General Assembly. The Assembly received the report of the Committee on Revision of the Westminster Confession, incorporating certain changes which had been suggested by the Presbyteries, and submitted the revised Confession, in thirty or more overtures, to the approval or disapproval of the Presbyteries.

The old controversy among the Congregationalists respecting

Andover Theological Seminary came to an end with the decision of the Board of Visitors that the complaint should be dismissed. In dismissing the case the Visitors recognized the right of the complainants to make complaint, asserted the power of the Visitors to hear and determine it, and intimated that they will faithfully perform their visitatorial functions. The policy of the American Board has been the subject of continued discussion. An effort was made at the annual meeting in Chicago to change it, but it failed; and a resolution was adopted without dissent that the Board still requires the rules adopted at New York and Minneapolis to be applied with liberality and faithfulness. The Board, however, decided to introduce a change in the manner of selecting corporate members. State and other Congregational associations are to be allowed hereafter to send to the Committee on Nominations names of persons from which the Committee shall select enough to fill three-fourths of the vacancies. A proposition that all applicants for missionary service should be appointed if, with other suitable qualifications, they accept the creeds of their respective churches and the fundamental doctrines of the Burial Hill Declaration and the Congregational Creed of 1883 was rejected by a large vote.

There has been much of public interest in the way of controversy in the Roman Catholic Church within the year. The public school question has been a matter of general discussion in the Catholic press and by Catholic prelates and others. This discussion clearly indicates that there are two distinct parties in the Church: One is against the public schools, first, last and all the time, and the other is in favor of them where parochial schools of suitable grade cannot be provided. The latter party, of which Archbishop Ireland is the leader, believes in providing religious instruction out of school hours for such Catholic children as attend the public schools. There was a sharp discussion on the subject at the recent meeting of the archbishops in this city, at which Mgr. Satolli, the Papal Legate, was present, and set forth a policy in substantial harmony with that of Archbishop Ireland. The Cahensley programme, which caused so much discussion in Roman Catholic circles last year, and which looks to the preservation in this country of European linguistic and national char-

acteristics, was revived in a meeting of German-American priests at Newark, N. J. The outcome of this meeting was the arraignment of Father Corrigan, of Hoboken, by his bishop for reflections upon himself and other Catholic dignitaries in letters severely criticising the Cahensley meeting. There is, however, to be no trial, Bishop Wigger having withdrawn his charges. The chief event comes at the close of the year. It is the restoration of Dr. McGlynn to his ecclesiastical standing in the Church. He had been suspended for insubordination and disobedience, and this suspension was confirmed at Rome. Now Rome takes the initiative and reinstates him.

There have been several important ecclesiastical conferences during the year besides those which are held annually. The Pan-Presbyterian Council met in Toronto in the fall, and had a quiet and successful meeting. The Methodist General Conference was held in Omaha in May last; it elected no new bishops, passed no legislation of a radical character, but voted at the closing session to submit the form of a proposition to amend the Constitution which, if approved by three-fourths of the annual conferences, would shut women out of the General Conference; if not so approved, they would be admitted. This proposition has been sharply denounced as a parliamentary trick.

The basis which had been arranged for what was called a Federal Union of the Reformed (Dutch) Church and the Reformed (German) Church, and which had been enthusiastically ratified by the General Synod of the latter, was not so ratified by the General Synod of the Dutch Church. Whether this failure amounts to a rejection of the plan is not clear; but it was a great disappointment to those who are anxious to have the union consummated. There has been an approach during the year toward the organic union of the two chief colored Methodist bodies, the African Methodist Episcopal and the African Methodist Episcopal Zion Church. The basis of union has been agreed upon and is to be submitted to the vote of the members of each Church and to the annual conferences.

There is little of importance to say concerning religious movements in other countries. The friendly attitude of the Pope toward the Republic of France has been emphasized the past

year by the action of the French archbishops. The death of Cardinal Lavigerie, recently, was a great blow to the Catholic interests in Africa, which he did so much to advance. No controversy of moment has disturbed the Presbyterian Churches in Scotland, or the Church of England. Perhaps no event in England attracted more general attention than the death of the renowned Baptist preacher, Charles H. Spurgeon.

In foreign mission fields there have been encouraging advances, particularly in India, where the number of baptisms weekly rises into the thousands. Those interested in the great missions in Central Africa were profoundly pained at the interruption of the mission of the English Church Missionary Society in Uganda. A collision occurred between the native Catholics and the native Protestants. The Catholics charged that the Protestants were blamable for it; but Captain Lugard, the representative of the English Government, insists that the reverse is true. It was thought at one time that England would probably abandon the province, but this proposition is not to be carried out.

There have been some notable revival meetings in this country during the year; but it is quite probable that the additions to the Churches have been fewer from this cause than in many previous years. One of the most notable evidences of change in the life of the Church is the growth of young people's societies. Nearly every denomination now has its Christian Endeavor Society, its League, its Brotherhood, or some other form of organization for its young people. The General Convention of the Christian Endeavor Societies, held in this city in the early summer, was a most remarkable demonstration of the success of the young people's movement. More than 30,000 members of the Christian Endeavor were in the city in attendance at the Convention.—*Rev. H. K. Carroll, D.D., Editorial in the Independent.*

A LETTER FROM DR. DEEMS.

[Just before Dr. Deems, the President of the Institute, was ill, he prepared the following letter regarding the work of the Institute.]

To the Members of the Institute:

THE officers have more confidence in the stability, and more encouragement as to the usefulness of the American Institute of Christian Philosophy than ever before. There is more call for the literature which it produces, antagonistic to all forms of wrong thinking, than ever before. It has more members than at any other time in its history. Its endowment is larger than ever before. It has about 550 members. It has $15,000 of endowment from which it derived last year $600. Its outlay consists of $1 a month to the janitor of Columbia College, the expenses of the monthly meetings and the summer schools, correspondence, clerical services and the printing and mailing of CHRISTIAN THOUGHT. There are neither rents nor salaries. Everything is expended in the production and distribution of our literature.

But we all know that whatever runs itself runs down. We must occasionally "Stir up" one another's "pure mind."

Will you not take just a few minutes to study this circular letter and think whether there may not be some points at which you may help the Institute?

We desire to enlarge our field, and most respectfully and earnestly request you to give us a little assistance.

1. From your acquaintances select a few men and women who may be induced to become members. Each name helps; each fee encourages. Send the names and addresses to the corresponding secretary, and he will make the nomination in your name. In the meantime you speak or write to them. It would not be difficult to increase the membership by wholesale nomination, but here, as elsewhere, "hand-picked fruit is best."

2. Look over the programmes of our summer schools and the numbers of CHRISTIAN THOUGHT and then make us suggestions.

Specially tell us what subjects you think it would be timely to discuss, and give the address of any person competent to prepare suitable papers. Have you heard anything in our line lately which impressed you? Who prepared it?

3. The calls upon us from mission fields are growing. We are sure that we can do much good in Japan, in China, in India, and in other parts by supplying awakening thought with the papers of the Institute. Letters from abroad give us that assurance. We have formed a separate fund for that purpose. In response to our call we have received $50 from several friends of the Institute, which donations have enabled us to respond to a few calls, and to send bound volumes of CHRISTIAN THOUGHT to India, Turkey and Japan.

4. Think what a power one of our papers, by setting a growing mind on right track of thought, may be in such a country as Japan. Can you not send a few dollars to this fund? A few days ago a circular letter was sent to several missionary societies asking how many sets of CHRISTIAN THOUGHT could be placed to advantage in the various fields represented.

Dr. E. K. Alden, Secretary of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, writes: "We can wisely distribute, we think, ten copies of the eight volumes—a most generous offer which we and our Missionary Educational Institutions will highly appreciate. We will send them, or as many as you are able to provide. The places selected are our institutions at Kyoto, Japan; Tangcho and Foochow, China; Jaffna, Ceylon; Pasumalai, Madura; Ahmednegur, West India; Harpoot, Aintab, Marash and Marsovan, Turkey."

Rev. Joseph B. Clark, Secretary of the American Home Missionary Society, said: "I have in mind ten of our younger colleges at the West that would esteem it a great favor to count in their small libraries a set of CHRISTIAN THOUGHT. This may seem to you a large demand. These colleges are Rollins College, Winter Park, Fla.; Olivet College, Olivet, Mich.; Drury College, Springfield, Mo.; Gates College, Neligh, Neb.; Doane College, Crete, Neb.; Yankton College, Yankton, South Dak.; Fargo College, Fargo, North Dak.; Whitman College, Walla Walla, Wash.; Re field College, Redfield, South Dak.; Wash-

burn College, Topeka, Kan. Any favors in this direction will be thankfully received by us and highly appreciated by these institutions."

Dr. H. L. Morehouse, Secretary of the American Baptist Home Mission Society, said: "While I am not authorized to speak for any institution, yet I am quite sure they would be very welcome at Des Moines College, Des Moines, Iowa; at Ottawa University, Ottawa, Kan.; at Grand Island College, Grand Island, Neb.; and at Richmond Theological Seminary, Richmond, Va., a school for the education of colored ministers in the South. I am confident, however, that they would appreciate the proposed addition to their library if it is practicable for you to make the grant."

Rev. E. F. Merriam, Corresponding Secretary of the American Baptist Missionary Union, suggests the following Baptist Theological Seminaries where CHRISTIAN THOUGHT could be sent: Insein (near Rangoon), Burma; Ramapatam, India; Yokohama, Japan (soon to be removed to Tokyo); Hamburg, Germany, and Stockholm, Sweden, and the Baptist College at Ougole, India.

Rev. W. A. Newbold, General Secretary of the American Church Missionary Society, said: "We appreciate the value of such a gift, and would be careful in presenting a moderate request. If you can spare two sets we would keep one set for the general use of our society, and would send the other to our new mission in Brazil, concerning which we enclose information. If a third set could be added we would send it to our mission in Cuba; in both of these we have young men in training for the ministry, and we believe that such literature would be of great use to them. As the English language is much used in both places, and many of our missionaries are from this country, there is no obstacle in that direction. Whatever you may see fit to send to our office will receive our attention and be gladly received."

The set of eight volumes will be sent to any one of these boards, or to any particular institution named, if any of our friends desire to send the money necessary to cover the actual

cost of the books. Contributions to this Missionary Fund may be sent during Dr. Deems's illness to the Rev. John B. Devins, Corresponding Secretary of the Institute, at 4 Winthrop Place, who will acknowledge the gifts and forward the books as rapidly as paid for. The eight volumes, cloth bound, sell for $12.

MONTHLY MEETINGS AT COLUMBIA COLLEGE

By the Secretaries.

December, 1892.—The monthly meeting of the Institute was held on the evening of December 6, 1892, in Hamilton Hall, Vice-President Alex. Mackay-Smith in the chair. The devotional exercises were led by Dr. Mackay-Smith. A paper was read by Mr. C. B. Spahr, of the *Christian Union* on "The Honest Treatment of Debtors." It was discussed by the Vice-President, and the Rev. J. H. Edwards. A vote of thanks to the author was given, and the paper requested for publication in CHRISTIAN THOUGHT. The following new members were reported: Rev. J. S. W. Dean, A.B., A.M., S.T.B., Ph.D., Hastings, Neb.; Rev. Benjamin Franklin Kidder, A.B., A.M., Ph.D., New York; Rev. Marion Winfield Hissey, Boulder, Col.; Rev. Wilbur C. Madison, A.M., Greeley, Col.; Edward North, L.H.D., professor of Greek in Hamilton College, Clinton, N. Y.; William Paxton Burris, Ph.B., professor of schools, Bluffton, Ind.; George E. Bemis, publisher *Teachers' World*, New York; Mr. Frederick Blume, New York.

January, 1893.—The monthly meeting of the Institute was held on January 3, 1893, in Hamilton Hall, Dr. R. S. MacArthur being in the chair. The devotional services were conducted by Rev. John H. Edwards of New York. Dr. MacArthur, in opening the meeting, referred in touching terms to the illness of Dr. Deems, the founder of the Institute, and its president from the beginning. The speaker and the president came to New York about the same time; they were frequently in each other's home, and occasionally exchanged pulpits. Dr. MacArthur paid a fine tribute to the absent president, speaking of his splendid work in

the Church of the Strangers, the Institute of Christian Philosophy and in the city and in the country in general. A resolution of sympathy with Dr. Deems and his family was moved by the Rev. Mr. Edwards and unanimously adopted.

The Rev. Leighton Williams, of the Amity Baptist Church of this city, read a paper on "Social Aspects of Christianity." The discussion following the lecture was conducted by Rev. John H. Edwards, Rev. John B. Devins, Mr. Stephen N. Wilder, Rev. Edward M. Deems, Mr. Mornay Williams, Mr. Harris and Dr. MacArthur. A vote of thanks was presented to Mr. Williams, and a copy of his paper requested for publication in CHRISTIAN THOUGHT. The following names of new members were read by the secretary: C. E. Mandeville, D.D., formerly editor of *Golden Censer*, Chicago, Ill.; John N. Freeman, D.D., Denver, Col.; Charles A Kinch, A.B., M.D., New York; Rev. George A. Paull, Bloomfield, N. J.; Byron A. Brooks, A.M., Brooklyn, N. Y.; Rev. Arno C. Gaebelein, author of "German Literature," New York; Rev. C. R. Burdick, Oconto, Wis; Charles B. Spahr, Ph.D., of *The Christian Union*, New York; Charles H. Haskell, Prohibition Park, Staten Island, N. Y.; Elcharles A. Devore, B.S., A.B., A.M., Professor of Biblical Literature, Union Christian College, Merom, Ind.

ILLNESS OF PRESIDENT CHARLES F. DEEMS.

THE members of the American Institute of Christian Philosophy and the readers of CHRISTIAN THOUGHT, as well as his many othe friends throughout the land, have doubtless, with sorrow, heard of the illness which has befallen our editor and president since the issue of our last number. On Saturday, December 17th, while writing on his sermon work in his study at 4 Winthrop Place, Dr. Deems suddenly dropped his pen and was unable to write more.

It was at first hoped that Dr. Deems's trouble was nothing more serious than "penman's cramp," and it was thought that a season of absolute rest at the Dansville Sanitarium would bring him complete restoration. At first the trouble extended no fur-

ther than the right hand, and sitting in his pulpit chair the doctor preached at the Church of the Strangers, Sunday evening, December 18th.

Wednesday evening, Dec. 28th, Dr. Deems's trouble became decidedly worse, so much so that by morning he had lost the use of his entire right side, and was unable to talk or walk or use the muscles of that side. At no time has he lost consciousness or the possession of his mental faculties, and at no time has he had much pain.

Prompt and capable medical attention was bestowed on Dr. Deems, and all that the best medical advice and efficient and affectionate nursing can do is being done for him.

Thursday, Dec. 29th, Dr. Deems was removed from his apartments at the New York Hotel to the residence of his daughter, Mrs. Marion J. Verdery. The opinion of Dr. Le Fevre, the family physician, is that Dr. Deems will slowly regain his speech and the use of his side, and be able to do some light work in the fields to which he has been devoting his life.

Dr. Deems's sickness is the result of overwork. He was seventy-two years of age on December 4th, 1892, and his birthday found him carrying burdens of literary and spiritual work, such as would have taxed the powers of several ordinary men in middle life. Very dear to him have ever been the interests of the American Institute of Christian Philosophy and its organ CHRISTIAN THOUGHT, and the sympathy of the members of the Institute and the readers of CHRISTIAN THOUGHT are an unspeakable comfort to him during his season of enforced inactivity.

Before Dr. Deems was taken more seriously ill he committed the interests of the Institute to the Secretary, Mr. Charles M. Davis, and the Corresponding Secretary, the Rev. John B. Devins, either of whom may be reached by letters addressed to 4 Winthrop Place, New York City. EDWARD M. DEEMS.

P. S.—A line from the sick room, to-day, says that Dr. Deems "continues to improve a little from day to day and is now permitted to see a few of his friends." J. B. D.

January 31, 1893.

CHRISTIAN THOUGHT.

THE ULTIMATE AIM OF EDUCATION.

[Read before the American Institute of Christian Philosophy, July 19, 1892.]

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IT IS an old saying that a man's hand held close before his eye will cover a mountain in the distance. It is one of the unfortunate limitations of the human mind that breadth of vision can only be gained at the cost of closeness of inspection; that to give minute attention to anything inevitably shuts out of our view a thousand other objects of equal importance. So true is this, so much are we limited by the things which thrust themselves upon us, so completely do we become absorbed by the routine of life, that those things which are ultimate and final, which are the results of tendencies, rather than the fruit of daily tasks, are soon lost sight of, and we come to think that perhaps after all there are no such things.

The fairy tale of our childhood, the poetry of our early manhood, lose all attractiveness to us. We cease to think of anything as being real which is not tangible; of anything as being attractive which is not within the experience of our bread-earning years. It may be that these things are due to the practical tendencies of our race,—the practical tendencies which have reduced our laws to a dependence upon precedent, our manners to a regard to etiquette, our beliefs to the formulas of dogma. Or it may be that all of these things are really due to a want of leisure; to the overwhelming importance of each day's task; to the necessity of working ten months before we can rest two, and then of working doubly hard those two months in the pursuit

of health, energy and stimulating ideas, in order that we may teach the succeeding ten months. The treadmill of life goes on so unceasingly that we are glad enough to adopt some sufficiently satisfactory plan for the teaching of to-day, and trust the ultimate things to the shaping of a philosophy which we deny, but at the same time actually trust, though it be but the stoicism of those who really do not care, the fatalism of those who do not know what to do, or the pessimism of those who have given up trying.

But this land of ours is too young and too vigorous, and withal too hopeful, to yield to the fatigues of a life of struggle; and it is too providentially practical to try to build a house without a plan. Of course it is easy to proceed on the idea that we are succeeding if the children advance from the primary departments to the secondary grades; if they graduate with credit at the high school and enter the colleges without conditions. And there is an additional element of satisfaction if, in the complex life of the college, where the students of so many schools are brought together, our pupils distinguish themselves. But when they are done high school and college life, when they enter into business and into professional careers, what is going to be the outcome of our teaching? What has been done for them and who has done it and why have these results been produced?

There is a tendency in this generation to reduce all educational inquiries to the category of science or of art. Science is more spoken of, but art is more practised. Science deals with the system, the regulation, the development of method; art deals with the application. Those who have developed this or that theory of the science of education have won to themselves enthusiastic followers. Happily the leaders have been, as a rule, thinkers; but in most cases those who follow have grasped only a part of the system, and have put into practice at once so much as they have grasped, or so much of what they have grasped as they have found practicable. Every schoolhouse to-day has its "theory of education"; but not every schoolhouse has its "practice of education." There is something delightfully humorous, and yet withal pathetic, in the bright young teacher who has got some distinctive feature of some elaborate

system and is heroically seeking to put it into operation, apart from its fundamental ideas, and without reference to its ultimate trend. We hear a great deal of talk about the various methods of education—about humanism, realism and naturalism ; about the various highly esteemed masters and their methods ; about Comenius and Pestalozzi and Froebel, about Milton and Locke and Rousseau, about Herbert Spencer and Comparyé and a host of others whose names are apt to be like X—equal to an unknown quantity. But there seems to be comparatively little discussion of the philosophical aspects, whether we take philosophy to mean the general study of relations, and consider the relation of education to the results to be obtained when the scholar puts his education to use as a philosophy of life, or narrow the meaning of the word philosophy, and consider the relation of education to the development of the purely mental processes of the child.

On the other hand, parents and children in a crude groping way are always after the philosophy of education. As the lawyers say, there is never an agreement between teacher and parent because the minds do not meet. They are proceeding upon the same problem from different points of view and seeking a different answer. The teacher rightly judges that his method is essential to the solution of the problem, but he insists on regarding it as an end and not as a means. Education to him is a great end ; to the parent it is only a means. Naturally enough, nearly all of the greater names in modern educational progress have not only sympathized with the parents' point of view, but they have become radical reformers all along the line of conforming all teaching to the philosophy of education. But in most cases they have become so radical that they have overturned much that they were unable to replace, and eventually have become wedded to the methods which were originally established for the very purpose of overturning any too strongly fixed method, and substituting for it the dominance of end over means.

In other words, education is worthless except as a preparation for life, and by life we mean individual life ; and so long as men are complex in nature and divergent in occupation individual lives must continue to be not merely different, but of in-

finite variety. At the same time there is a common element, a common tendency, and a common destiny. The life that is to be led is the life of a man, and education must be directed to creating a symmetrical manhood. In all cases it is safe to say that up to a certain point all should be taught the same things; it is equally safe to say that all cannot be taught the same things by the same methods, and of the things which they are to be taught the most important is not, as has been asserted by so many, knowledge of the world and the things in it, but knowledge of self and how to make use of the various elements of character which each possesses in differing degree.

A child, we are constantly told, must be taught to think. But what is it to be taught to think? How many of us can give a satisfactory definition of what thinking is, or a true analysis of the various processes essential to thought. The mind is so complex, and thought is so dependent upon the just and even action of every faculty of the mind that if some faculties are developed at the expense of others, proper thinking is impossible. Of course we know how common it is for one child to have memory developed to such an inordinate degree as to practically interfere with the proper exercise of the reasoning faculty; others will undertake to supply the deficiencies of other faculties by the use of the imagination—oftentimes at the expense of truth; while yet others, possessing really remarkable powers of penetration, and this I fancy is more common than is ofttimes understood, fail to exercise it in connection with the proper aid from the memory. This is peculiarly so in all logical processes where it is important to remember premises once obtained, and processes once performed, so that a conclusion once reached needs only to be suggested to be remembered in its completeness. This higher form of memory, memory by correlation rather than contiguity, is one of the first and best fruits of early education—an education which, however, it seems to me is too early, when properly taught, to be within the field of the schoolmaster, and belongs properly to the domain of the mother, but cannot be expected to be universal until more mothers are properly educated for this field of instruction.

Of course the second step in this first process, which is talked

about endlessly in connection with the so-called disciplinary studies, is properly appreciated but rarely succeeds in practice unless the antecedent training is adequate.

The old schools, the humanists, the classical school, and above all the Jesuit school, exaggerated, at the same time that they by their practice depreciated the value of disciplinary studies. The realist school, on the other hand, equally exaggerated and equally injured the place of knowledge of things in the domain of education. What we really want is to combine the two and to combine them in such a way as to produce the best result upon those taught.

The first thing which we have to consider in any philosophy of education is the nature of the person to be educated. In considering the nature of the child, to be practical rather than theoretical and direct rather than exhaustive, we must consider him, first, with reference to his nature—and here we may observe with old John Ascham, whose wise observations in his "Schoolmaster" never grow old, that the child is made up of two parts, body and soul, and we cannot separate them. In the second place, we must consider him with reference to his destiny. And his destiny is conditioned by his nature. There is his bodily destiny, which is mortal, and his spiritual destiny, which is immortal. But these two cannot be separated; for though he must play the part of a man in the world—a mere commercial animal, if you will—he cannot play that part without being not merely a moral being but something far more and far higher—an immortal being whose future is conditioned by his present. This nature and this destiny is the complex problem with which we have to deal, but its complexity is no excuse for its neglect.

We cannot assume, as so many do, that the destiny of man is, as Iago said, but to "put money in thy purse." Alas! too many people estimate a man by his money-making capacity, and a method by its commercial value. Mr. Carnegie reproaches colleges because they are not the high road to great commercial enterprises, and not merely is the trail of the serpent upon the man, but he is stained with the soot of the forge—too often with the more indelible stain of dishonest financial speculation. It is not that a man should not be a successful business man; it is

not that he should not be a leader in industrial enterprises that we complain of this estimate, but it is because this is made not merely an end but the *summum bonum*. What we insist upon is a clear appreciation of the fact that men must be made successful in all business and professional careers without leaving out of sight the fact that they are above and before all else to remain true to their higher destiny.

This problem with its interaction of forces, with its attractions and repulsions, presents difficulties which discourage inferior minds: but difficulties which are but a stimulus to superior minds. We may liken it to the problem presented by our solar system to astronomers. How many are the influences, the impulses, the tendencies to be calculated, balanced and determined in fixing a planet in its place! How simple is the system when we understand it; how complicated was the system when it was misunderstood! How extremely ingenious and ingeniously absurd was the old explanation, which seemed not merely a good working hypothesis but a demonstrable theory! This old-fashioned, complicated, infinitely ingenious system reminds us not a little of some of the over-ingenious systems worked out to explain man's destiny and the proper preparation for it. But how these systems fall to pieces when we at length come to see man in his proper relation to the one great Centre of the system, suffering from a tendency of his lower nature to fly off at a tangent with the centrifugal force generated in his own career, drawn aside by many a fellow-creature, making his orbit less and less a perfect circle, but still yielding to the superior power of the central luminary.

Let us hold fast to the one simple theory that every philosophy of education must regard man in the two-fold aspect of his physical and temporal, and his spiritual and eternal welfare. This is necessary not only for the pupil, but the teacher himself for his own effectiveness must also keep this fact steadily in view. Indeed the real purpose of this paper is not to deal with the problem of instruction so much as with the problem of the personal life of the teacher. If our philosophy of teaching is to be carried out and the children are to be dealt with more from the individual than the collective standpoint, the method be-

comes subordinate to the end and the most important thing for the teacher to know is the world, and to be is a man of the world.

The phrase, "a man of the world," has suffered degradation in our speech. But it has a meaning which is high and noble, and we should not suffer it to lose it. There is no future for the man who goes through the world with his eyes shut, and the first business of the teacher is to open the eyes and awaken the interest of the scholar. How he shall do this is the problem. But how can he possibly do this without he himself is awake to the problems of the world in which he lives? It is not what he teaches, but how he teaches, that determines his success, and it is not the theory which he embraces, but the knowledge which he brings to bear upon that theory which determines the success or failure of it. Minds are so different that it is not possible to require all to use the same method. The question is: Is the method, be it what it may, vitalized? does the teacher put life into it? has he any definite aim and object before him? and does he do everything with a view to that object? As it was true in ancient times that all roads led to Rome, so all theories must lead to some ultimate aim, and as it is true that while all roads led to Rome one man would travel one of those roads and reach Rome, while another travelling the same road would daily find himself further and further away from the Eternal City, so some of us upon the right road are travelling in the wrong direction.

Conviction is the first equipment of the teacher: conviction of truth. It is fashionable to-day not to be sure of anything, except perchance that it is impossible to be sure of anything. Such men are not fit to teach anybody or anything. Conviction, and conviction of the truth, and of the importance of truth to all, is fundamental.

Human nature is naturally more or less indifferent. Accuracy is one of the hardest things to inculcate, and it is impossible for any one who has not a very high regard for the overwhelming importance of truth to succeed. Approximations are so easy, and so delusive and so fatal in their tendency. The uncertain schoolmaster goes astray often on the side of dogmatism. He gets a book and he trusts that book, and while he may doubt his

own judgment he will stake everything upon a favorite book or author. Hence the next qualification in a teacher is breadth—a capacity to see the world from more than one point of view. If he does not possess this quality himself, how can he sympathize with the differing points of view which he will constantly meet with? How will he be able to weigh and determine the more complex problems which meet him in his teaching?

There is a curious tendency to misunderstand the disciplinary values of what we call the higher branches of learning. In these days mathematics in all its departments has its methods memorized rather than thought out, and as they are all capable of exact demonstration, demonstration comes to be valued as the highest argument and the original processes employed in every demonstration are neglected. Language comes to be treated in much the same way. Paradigms are learned as if they were the only correct forms and others are called irregular and treated as linguistic criminals. Their personal equation is condemned rather than commended on account of their individuality and independence. Little inquiry is made as to how and why, and even the meanings of words are dealt with in a dogmatic method which tends to make a dictionary as infallible as the Pope, instead of being, as it should be, but a standard of the temporary tendencies of a language. It is really sometimes amusing to find that a person is condemned for using a word because it is not in the dictionary, instead of the dictionary being condemned because it does not contain a word which is respectable in conduct and pedigree.

Of course the teacher, looking outward and upward at first, comes after a time to be so cumbered with much serving that he begins to look downward and inward and to be content if he can keep his school and keep along with the growth of his community. This is human nature, but like most things which are cursed with a similar connection, it is to be eliminated and reformed. Progress is the first condition of success. The teacher is not merely to keep ahead of his scholars, not simply to teach year after year the same thing, to use the same illustrations and the same anecdotes; but illustration and anecdote should be varied day by day and year by year by the inevitable influence

of a broadening mind and extending inquiry. So many of the older generation of schoolmasters were driven back upon themselves by the developments in science of this generation that they lost all touch with the progress of the world, and instead of directing the change of view, opposed all change, and destroyed their influence when the tendency of the time became too strong for the prejudice of the schoolroom. Scientific careers when they were opened up for the people ought to have met at once the eager aspiration of the schoolmaster as well as the pupil. The schoolmaster should have grasped the fact that the most thorough education was needed to fit men to continue to be leaders in these departments, and should have seized upon the opportunities of mental stimulus placed at their command, instead of practically antagonizing a great many of their patrons and students by treating these professions as of inferior dignity.

It goes without saying that Latin and Greek are as desirable as a training for a civil engineer, or an electrician, or a chemist, as for a doctor or a lawyer or a minister, because these things are taught principally as discipline and have proved themselves unrivalled in this direction. But parents, after the scientific revolution began, got the idea that they were not so indispensable, since these languages were not used in the practice of these professions as in the practice of the so-called learned professions, and the average teacher, substituting assertion for argument, awoke opposition where he should have awakened conviction, and the decline of scientific secondary training and the ridiculous inferiority of requirements for admission to scientific schools resulted.

It is the duty of the schoolmaster to keep himself posted with regard to the progress of science, and to have his nature and his mind illuminated by these things ; nor is it asking much to ask this in a generation when journals of a reasonable price bring these things within the reach of all.

But as we advance to the higher departments in which demonstration gives way to the operation of judgment, almost inevitably the secondary schoolmaster fails. His dependence on authority is apt to be fatal. "Culture" once rightly defined the process necessary for these departments. It was a training in its more literal sense, and didactic methods wholly

failed in this sphere. Culture alone describes the method by which, first, the logical judgment operates by induction ; secondly, the æsthetic judgment by the use of taste, and, generally, the judgment discriminates between the same facts under different circumstances, and finds that there is a law of variation which has equally certain results with a law of fixity. Were you to ask half a dozen critics to select for you half a dozen passages from Shakespeare of superior excellence they would very likely hit upon the same passages, and yet they would probably, after the manner of experts, provoke infinite merriment if they were to attempt to justify their judgment before a jury. Were you to ask a half dozen historians their judgment upon certain tendencies in history they would doubtless all agree, and yet those judgments might seem to be conflicting on account of being postulated on different theories which the human mind has adopted at various stages of its development. We would excuse, for instance, conduct on the part of Cæsar which we would not tolerate in President Harrison; we would applaud an act on the part of a Spartan which we would condemn even in a modern Turk.

So complex and so varied are these things that we feel oftentimes as if they were illusive, uncertain and unreliable. But these are the very things which teach us how to judge men, how to discriminate character, and how to influence youth. Young men love expansive natures—natures which are certain, sure, confident, but which are also certain that we were not made to be all alike in this world ; sure that a bright face may be as pleasant as a solemn one, and confident of the ultimate excellence of a mischievous boy, even though he may perpetrate many unwholesome pranks upon an unsuspecting principal.

The plea which I would make, and the plea which I think needs most to be made to-day, is for greater breadth in the views of the teacher—breadth which shall not sacrifice confidence in the things which are accurately and sufficiently determined, but which shall seek to include all the sympathy that the human heart can afford for all the developments of our civilization, and, since boys are to become men, and youth is the time for the acquisition of broad interests, the tendency of the schoolmaster's

influence should, as far as possible, be extended as widely as possible. One of the great virtues of the classics consisted in the broad point of view occupied by the writers of those works which have come down to us. Men who were learned in those days were acquainted almost to the degree of mastery with every department of learning that was known—and cultivated men, even so late as Bacon, could profess without lack of modesty to be the masters of all the learning of their time. Their illustrations were, therefore, drawn more widely and indicated a wider interest than is common to-day, and I sometimes think that they were greater men from the fact that their sympathies were more widely extended and, therefore, their influence more broadly felt.

The aim, the ultimate aim, the end, of all our teaching, is to make men. Let me iterate and reiterate this. Nothing is so important, after the making of Christian men, as the making of men whose lives shall be full of the power of wide knowledge and of extended interest. To move men we must above all else be interested in them. Otherwise men will not trust the tendencies of our efforts. Self-absorption, self-seeking and self-conceit are all barriers to the extension of human influence. But interest in the affairs of others—kindly, earnest, constant—is essential to all, but most essential to the teacher.

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE IMAGINATION.

[Contributed to CHRISTIAN THOUGHT.]

BY PROF. M. J. CRAMER, D.D., EAST ORANGE, N. J.

"IMAGINATION," says Lord Bacon, "I understand to be the representation of an individual thought."

"The faculty of representation, or imagination proper," says Sir William Hamilton ("Logic," p. 425), "consists in the greater or less power of holding up an ideal object in the light of consciousness." Whatever its definition may be, it is certain that it is a distinct faculty of the mind, and as such exerts a great influence upon the character and life of man. It may not only determine to a great extent his joys and sorrows, but may also enlighten or confuse his understanding, purify or pollute his heart, and accelerate or retard his activity. It may either vividly represent to him his high and glorious destiny, or remove it from his vision. It may lead him into temptation, or arm him against it; it may fire him for virtue or vice, and render his life happy or miserable. It may become the source of errors, both when it is too languid and when it is too vigorous. In the former case, the object is represented obscurely and indistinctly; in the latter, the ideal representation affords the illusive appearance of a sensible presentation. Hence arises the necessity of knowing how to regulate and govern it. This knowledge will contribute largely toward the harmonious development of the intellectual faculties, the formation of an evenly balanced character, and the happiness of the present life. We may be permitted to suggest a few hints relative to its government.

I. The imagination should not be weakened or suppressed for the sake of benefiting the other faculties of the mind. It is said that nature has produced nothing which it does not need. This is true of the imagination. In the development of man, nature is greatly assisted by this faculty. It acts an important part in his history. So long as it does not step out of its proper relation to the other faculties of the mind, it gloriously beams

forth the dignity and nobility of man ; it cannot be dispensed with in any really great human act ; it is a type of God's omniscience and omnipresence.

It furnishes the intellect with most of its materials for forming ideas and judgments. True, it derives most, if not all, images from the external world through the senses ; yet much of what is presented to the senses would be lost, if it had not the power of holding up in the light of consciousness the very image of the things after they had been removed from them.

Nor is our intuitive knowledge of such a nature that the intellect may expend its activity upon it without the aid of the imagination. A description is merely an outline of an object ; the imagination must aid us in apprehending and filling it up in order to give it a resemblance to reality. It leads the intellect from thought to thought ; and from this train of associated thought it forms enchanting combinations. Sometimes in its playful freaks lie hidden the germs of great discoveries.

Persons of refined sensibilities are invested with additional charms by a well-regulated imagination. It reveals to them the glories of an inner world, which beam forth in their countenances, and effuse themselves like a mighty stream through all their actions.

Again, by the imagination we hold fast the high aim and destiny of life ; by it we discover the means necessary for attaining to that aim.

To it belongs, in a great measure, that enthusiasm with which we must be filled in order to undertake the great and the difficult, to brave dangers and to overcome obstacles and prejudices.

If those higher things, which lie beyond the boundary of the visible world, but to which the mind believingly and longingly turns, and which the will grasps as a stronghold in the storms of life, shall have a significance at all, the imagination must present them in symbols, and invest them with a resemblance to reality. If our ideas are to influence our actions, they must be dressed in the pleasing garment of fancy. And what are the works of art but the productions of fancy—the perfect realization of the ideals of the imagination. Nor should we forget that the imag-

ination measurably widens the narrow and contracted views of life, comforts the distressed, enlightens the unenlightened, sweetens the bitter cup of sorrow and disappointment.

II. We should, therefore, take care that we enrich our imagination with none but true, beautiful and good images. The imagination cannot give what it has not received ; and yet much is required of it. The materials collected by it through the senses are not yet thought, but thought is formed therefrom. Therefore, a rich, lively fancy is a necessary condition to wealth of thought. Men with an empty imagination are as incapable of receiving instruction as of producing great thoughts. A rich fancy may frequently occasion a conflict of ideas, from which proceed great truths, successful plans and glorious results. The richer our imagination is, the better it may indemnify us against the poverty of the world, and the more easily we may find in ourselves what we seek in vain elsewhere.

The images with which we enrich our imagination should be true to nature. Fancy may enhance their beauty, but only when their nature and reality have first been perfectly secured by the senses. From the True, the Beautiful is produced ; but the True must first enter our minds undimmed before the imagination can reproduce it in its truthfulness and beauty. In the acquisition of knowledge, it is indispensably necessary that the imagination should represent the true nature and form of things. Hence neither predilection nor prejudice should be allowed to dispose the imagination either to magnify or diminish their real nature. In perfect harmony, however, with the fidelity to nature of each image is the endeavor to enrich the imagination with noble, good and pleasing images. For much of our happiness or misery depends upon the particular character and the relative kind and intensity of our imagination. "It is much less what we actually are, and what we actually possess, than what we imagine ourselves to be and to have that is decisive of our existence and fortune."

As an illustration of this remark we may adduce the example of the Roman patrician Apicius, who is said to have committed suicide when his fortune was reduced to about five hundred thousand dollars. The Roman epicure imagined that he could

not subsist on what, to men in general, would seem more than affluence. Thus we see, says a writer, that imagination by the attractive or repulsive pictures with which, according to our habits and associations, it fills the frame of our life, lends to reality a magical charm, or despoils it of all its pleasantness. The imaginary happy and the imaginary miserable are common in the world, but their happiness and misery are not the less real; everything depends on the mode in which they feel and estimate their condition. Fear, hope, the recollection of past pleasures, the torments of absence and of desire, the secret and almost resistless tendency of the mind toward certain objects, are the effects of association and imagination. At a distance, things seem to us radiant with celestial beauty, or in the lurid aspect of deformity. Of a truth, in either case we are equally wrong. When the event which we dread or which we desire takes place, when we obtain or when there is forced upon us an object environed with a thousand hopes or with a thousand fears, we soon discover that we have expected too much or too little; we thought it by anticipation infinite in good or evil, and find it in reality not only finite but contracted.

"With the exception," says Rousseau, "of the self-existent Being, there is nothing beautiful, but that which is not." In the crisis, whether of enjoyment or suffering, happiness is not so much happiness, nor misery so much misery, as we had anticipated. In the past, thanks to a beneficent Creator, our joys reappear as purer and more brilliant than they had actually been experienced; and sorrow loses not only its bitterness, but is changed even into a source of pleasing recollections. (See Sir W. Hamilton's "Metaphysics," p.459.) Hence the saying of Cicero is true, "*Suavia laborum est præteritorum memoria*"; while the words of Virgil and of the sacred penman are a consolation in present affliction; "*Haec olim meminisse juvabit*"; "all things work together for good" . . . "chastening . . . afterward yieldeth the peaceable fruit of righteousness unto them which are exercised thereby."

Hence the imagination filled with pleasant, noble and good pictures cannot fail to produce a serene and cheerful frame of life. Therefore, too, those to whom the education of the young

is entrusted, should endeavor to enrich the imagination of their pupils with true, pleasing and noble pictures. The youthful mind is susceptible of receiving impressions either of the True, the Beautiful, and the Good, or of the evil and the erroneous. Dark pictures or evil impressions are seldom eradicated from the youthful mind. A gloomy fancy poisons the fountain of the inner life, corrupts the thoughts and passions, and determines to a great extent the future destiny of the young. Hence the necessity of carefully guarding their imagination.

But here it should be remembered that it is one thing to enrich the imagination, and another thing to enrich the memory. The imagination seizes an object in its natural living reality, and interweaves the picture with its own innermost life; memory, on the other hand, receives and retains it in its cold shadowy outline. A rich fancy produces new arrangements, forms, and combinations of the pictures of objects furnished to it by the senses, while a strong memory conserves or retains only the outlines and forms of these objects. He who simply conserves in his memory the perceptions of the senses may indeed enrich his stock of knowledge without growing mentally stronger. The imagination may be enriched by an independent and varied study of the world. This should be done, not so much with a desire of merely enriching our stock of knowledge, but with all the intensity of the mind, for the purpose of forming new arrangements and combinations. But we must remember that the enrichment of the imagination is only a means to higher ends, and should not interfere with the attainment of these ends. It must not be allowed to obstruct mental activity, nor the formation of an evenly-balanced character. It should rather serve as a valuable aid to these processes. Neither the understanding nor the heart can draw much advantage from a rich fancy, if in its enrichment other faculties of the mind have been neglected.

III. Next to the enrichment of the imagination our attention is drawn to the manner of its activity. This is of the utmost importance for the culture and development of man's mind and character. Here we have to consider particularly its excitability and flexibility, its vivacity and fire, its power and boldness. Excitability and flexibility are nearly related to each other. The

imagination is excitable when it is easily incited to activity; it is flexible when it quickly enters upon and perseveringly continues the incited activity. The excitable imagination immediately forms a picture of whatever is perceived by the mind, and holds it up in the light of consciousness; while the flexible imagination passes rapidly from one picture to another, forms continually new combinations, and can with difficulty only be led back to the object of thought. An excitable and flexible imagination is certainly of great advantage to its possessor. The talent to comprehend an object in its various relations; quickly to pronounce a correct judgment, in embarrassments to find immediately the proper means for rectification; intelligibly to communicate knowledge to others, and the capacity to receive instruction from others; to assemble and put together with quickness ideas in which can be found resemblance and congruity, so as to produce surprise, joined with pleasure, called wit—all this depends upon an excitable and flexible imagination. But whenever its excitability and flexibility transcend their proper limits it becomes injurious to the mind. It prevents fixedness of attention, diverts it from one object to another, and renders the mind incapable of investigation and research. All mental efforts willbe characterized by superficiality; little or nothing great will ever be accomplished, nor firmness of character secured.

An excitable and flexible imagination cannot be acquired. It is the gift of nature. But whenever it is too strong in these particulars it may be weakened. It is of great importance to do this in order to establish a manly character. And nothing is more conducive to the accomplishment of this end than awakening a lively interest in whatever course of study we may have chosen. We must take care not to give way to mental idleness which fancy finds so agreeable, but properly use the power of will that we possess over our thoughts. Let that power energize our mental activity and control our imagination. It will thus be brought to submit to the dictates of reason without losing the advantage of its moderate and healthful exercise.

A vivacious imagination represents ideal objects in their definite individuality and relation; a fiery, in grand outlines and striking proportions. The former represents them with intui-

tive clearness, the latter in single but striking and important traits. The former tarries in silent contemplation with them, the latter rushes rapturously from one object to another. The fiery imagination is a destructive characteristic of man; the vivacious, of woman. For the projection of grand plans, the comprehension of great ideas, and the formation of sublime resolutions, a fiery imagination is necessary. Here reason should not despise its preparations, nor attempt to do without its assistance. What the flexible imagination is to the ordinary activity of the mind, the fiery is to its creative energy. Little depends upon the degree of its incalescence, more upon its living, energetic, thoughtful activity, and rapid but thorough progress. In this sense the vivacious imagination must rise to the fiery in order to reach the genius or inspiration of genuine art. Even in philosophical investigation, the indications of a fiery fancy may become useful by giving it a higher flight, or leading it into unknown regions of thought. But care is to be taken that the fiery fancy does neither dispossess reason of its right to pronounce judgment, nor utter mystic sentences for solid truth.

Generally a fiery fancy is not without danger to the intellectual and moral character of its possessor. It may prevent calm reflection, or be satisfied with superficiality, where profound knowledge is both possible and necessary. It may substitute the mere glitter for the substance of things. It may throw its possessor from the even frame of life into the wild storms of human passion, and relentlessly goad him on from misfortune and disgrace to ruin and destruction. By one tremendous effort soon flagged, it may exhaust its strength. It may soar to dangerous heights or throw itself into the mildest excesses. The fiery imagination may be kindled either by the temperament, or by one of the passions, or by a great idea. In the first instance it acts more uniformly and possesses the power of self-restraint; in the second, it falls back upon the passion and goads it on beyond control; and in the third, it throws its possessor into a momentary transport of delight, and leads him to form grand but often chimerical plans, the execution of which becomes almost impossible. Hence the intrinsic worth of that idea is to be sought in order to

guard against error and bring it into harmony with the grand purpose of life.

A fiery fancy is never to be guarded with greater watchfulness than during the period of youth. Here its fire blazes the strongest and receives the most dangerous nourishment; here it often spreads itself out over the entire being with wonderful rapidity, laying waste the fairest garden of hope and virtue. The noblest and tenderest feelings are often consumed by the fire of a wild fancy. The study of such sciences as demand the attention of reason; the reading of such books as lead to reflection; the habit of thoroughly investigating and proving all things; the careful culture of the moral faculties, and a careful preparation for the fulfilment of life's mission: these are the surest means of preventing such disastrous consequences—means, the application of which is often required, even in later years, to check a too strong imagination, and establish a solid and evenly-balanced character.

A strong imagination needs little assistance from without. Having, indeed, derived its material and first incitement to activity from the senses, or from experience, it forms its own world, and moves firmly and freely in it. Once cut loose from the senses or experience, and it soars, and lives, and acts above them, and infuses its life and strength into its grand and wonderful creations; while a weak imagination must ever recur to the senses for material, and yet it will accomplish little or nothing. Men of strong imagination are able to grasp and consider, from all sides, great ideas, and apply them to the grand purposes of life. A strong imagination is necessary to aid reason whenever important changes in the existing state of affairs are to be effected, or great reforms inaugurated. But at the same time the other faculties of the mind should be equally well developed. Without this a strong imagination leads to empty speculations or fantastic dreams. Woe to that one whose bodily and mental ener vation, superinduced by excessive luxury, has produced an unnatural strength of the imagination! It is deficient of genuine life, and will after a few spasmodic efforts soon become torpid.

The imagination becomes bold when in its strength it transcends every limit set by the reality of things. It scorns the nar-

row rule by which the senses or experience furnish it with materials for its activity. It recognizes only those laws that arise from the highest power of man, and from the idea of the infinite. Although reason is unable to follow its bold flights, because more or less fettered by the senses, yet it in turn exercises constantly a tutorship over it. It delights continually to revel in the idea of the infinite although conscious of its inability to grasp it.

A bold imagination may either lacerate the heart through a gloomy disposition, or elevate the spirit by means of a cheerful frame of mind. To the artist, when regulated and inspired by his own genius, it is of great service in forming grand and beautiful combinations. It becomes disorderly and destructive when it is the pliant tool of low and corrupt passions. Under their control it revels in regions either of voluptuous pleasures or of horrible woes. It not only contemns the law of experience—that is, the law by which knowledge ordinarily is acquired, but also the cultivation of the intellect. Through its influence true faith degenerates into superstition, and zeal into fanaticism. In every department of life it causes disorder and ruin. It robs the soul of its strength, the mind of its symmetry, the character of its firmness, and eventually brings about a general wreck of the man.

IV. Lastly, we may be permitted to point out a few rules for the government of the imagination.

1. We should take care not to allow the imagination to exercise too great an influence over the affairs of life. It should be kept under the strict control both of reason and virtue. Guided by reason, it may invest the actual state of affairs with an ideal beauty sufficient to awaken a lively interest in their management. But nevertheless we should view the world, with its wants, just as it is, and not as it appears in the decorations of a brilliant fancy.

We must not allow the materials that constitute the actual economy of the world to rise up to fancy's sight in fictitious forms, which it cannot disenchant into plain reality; but we must go about with sober, rational inspection, and ascertain the true nature and value of all things around us. We must examine with careful minuteness the real condition of affairs, and not be content with ignorance of it, because environed with something

more delicious than such knowledge in the paradise which imagination creates. There everything is as beautiful and noble as could be desired to form the residence of an angel. "If a tenth part of the felicities that have been enjoyed, the great actions that have been performed, the beneficent institutions that have been established, and the beautiful objects that have been seen in that happy region, could have been imported into this terrestrial place, what a delightful thing it would have been to awake each morning to see such a world once more!"

Once in the habit of being guided by the imagination rather than by reason, we shall sooner or later wake up to sad disappointments and bitter experiences. Neither our own condition nor that of the world will thereby be improved. But, on the other hand, we shall see the pillars of our support and contentment gradually crumbling from beneath us, leaving us an easy prey to incurable melancholy and utter hopelessness. Hence, reason and inspiration should co-operate and balance each other in the affairs of life, and improvement and success will be secured.

2. In the regions of thought and reflection also, the imagination should sustain only a co-ordinate, if not subordinate relation. It is the business of the intellect to discover and elaborate truth, so as to become a part of the furniture of the mind. It is the business of the imagination to arrange, combine, and reproduce in true pictures what the intellect furnishes. If in the process of thought we allow the imagination to be supreme, instead of clear conceptions, we shall have only indistinct images, confused impressions, and dim outlines of things. We then believe we understand them, while we have only crude notions concerning them; we imagine we are thinking, while we are only dreaming. Clear conceptions alone lead to genuine wisdom and consequent right action. The evidence that we possess true wisdom and knowledge is the power to analyze and communicate it to others. Whatever has been thoroughly studied can be intelligibly communicated. To say, "I feel how or what a thing is, but I cannot describe it," is generally an evidence that one is given to reveries.

3. We should carefully avoid reverie or castle-building. This is a kind of waking dream, and does not differ from dreaming, except by the consciousness which accompanies it. "In this

state the mind abandons itself, without a choice of subject, without control over the mental train, to the involuntary associations of the imagination. The mind is thus occupied without being properly active; it is active at least without effort. Young persons, women, the old, the unemployed, and the idle, are all disposed to reverie. There is a pleasure attached to its illusions which renders it as seductive as it is dangerous. The mind, by indulgence in this dissipation, becomes enervated; it acquires the habit of a pleasing idleness, loses its activity, and at length even the power and the desire of action" (Sir W. Hamilton).

4. Not less carefully should we avoid every one-sided tendency of the imagination. If we allow our fancy to follow some particular train of thought—to which it is so easily inclined—to the exclusion of all others, the harmony of the intellectual faculties becomes disturbed, and the clearness of the understanding dimmed. All other intellectual pursuits are rejected; the mind recurs constantly to the favorite idea, and feasts on the luscious falsehood whenever it is offended with the bitterness of truth. By degrees the reign of fancy is confirmed. Then fictions begin to operate as realities, false opinions fasten upon the mind, and life passes in dreams of rapture or of anguish. The symmetrical development of the mind requires fancy to collect, and assist reason to elaborate, whatever of the True, the Beautiful and the Good the various departments of life may furnish.

5. Finally, the imagination should be strictly kept pure from whatever is immoral and polluting. No impure picture or thought should ever be allowed to make the least impression upon the fancy. Let it never dally with sin in any of its fascinating forms. Sin is not so sweet as fancy represents. Bitter anguish, woe and ruin are its inevitable consequence. Whoever desires to preserve a pure heart must carefully watch the workings of his imagination and quickly suppress what conscience condemns. Only the pure in heart shall see God.

DRUIDISM.

[Contributed to Christian Thought.]

By Rev. A. H. McKinney, Ph.D., New York.

THE Celts were the earliest Aryan settlers in Western Europe. Their name is derived from the Greek κελτοί (inhabitants of the wood), and they belong to that great Indo-European family of mankind which spread over Europe in successive waves. At one time they occupied the greater part of Western and Central Europe, branching out to Spain, to Italy, and even to Asia Minor (Galatia). The accepted theory is, that in pre-historic times the Celts migrated from Asia to Europe, and that they were pressed Westward by subsequent migrations; but that they afterward recoiled against their conquerors, and came back as far East as Northern Italy and Spain. They thus include the Gauls of Europe and the Galatians of Asia Minor. They are divided into two main groups: the Western or Gaelic Celts, of whom the Irish are representatives, and the Cymric Celt, of whom the Welsh are the survivors. Very little is really definitely known about them, as the classic writers, in their references to them, are very confusing in the use of terms. There seems to have been three (or if we count the slaves, four) castes among them: 1st, the common people, who were sunk in superstition and ignorance. 2nd. the knightly or warrior caste. 3rd. the Druids or priestly caste. It is with the religion, of which these priests formed the hierarchy, that we have to do. Considering first the Druids themselves, we shall be able more intelligently to appreciate their system.

Philologists have not yet settled on the derivation of the word Druid. It seems to have come into literature with Pliny. This word has been derived from δρύς, an oak. Many claim that the word is Celtic, either from deru (oak) and udd (Lord) or from de (God) and rouyd (speaker). The Welsh derivation is from dar (oak) and gwydd (knowledge). It has been derived from the Saxon dry, a magician.

The Druids formed a class of priests corresponding in many respects to the Magi of ancient Persia. Many doubtful legends have been handed down concerning them. These are now being investigated, and there is no doubt that we shall soon know more of the Druids. The quickened interest in the study of Comparative Religion will do much to dispel the mystery connected with the graves and altars of ancient Gaul and Britain. However, many facts concerning the Druids have been established, a knowledge of which will richly repay the student for the time spent in becoming acquainted with them.

While the Druids formed a very distinct and exclusive class, the office was not hereditary, but was open to those who showed themselves worthy of it. The number was regulated according to population.* The candidate for initiation was obliged to prove his descent from nine successive generations of free ancestors and to secure twelve heads of families, who would become responsible for his good conduct and maintenance. A long course of study had to be pursued, and youths were known to have spent twenty years of a novitiate in order to prepare themselves for initiation. Faithfulness in study was tested in three examinations before the Druidic College of the tribe. Even then the head of the clan had the power of veto. After initiation the Druid was deterred from wrong actions by the fear of excommunication, an account of which ceremony is given further on.

The Druids were divided into three general classes, the priests, the prophets and the bards. Over all was a president who was elected for life. There also seems to have been three chief bards or Arch-Druids of Britain having their seats at what are now London, York, and Caerleon. There was also an order of Druidesses or prophetic women, who exercised great influence. There is a well-known story of one of these women foretelling that Diocletian would wear the purple after he had slain a wild boar. At times the rites of the Druidesses were of the most degrading character.

There is no difference of opinion as to the position occupied by the Druids. They enjoyed exceptional honors, and exercised

*For these facts we are largely indebted to the Rev. R. W. Morgan in St. Paul in Britain.

unbounded authority over their countrymen. As priests, prophets, teachers, bards, judges, law-makers, soothsayers, and physicians, they not only gained, but also kept within their order, all that was worth having of knowledge and influence.

There are unmistakable evidences of their learning. The British Druids had forty universities south of the Forth and the Clyde. These had at one time sixty thousand students in attendance. They studied arithmetic, astronomy,* mechanics,† botany, geography, medicine, astrology, poetry and oratory, but only for the sake of increasing their power over the common people, and not for the purpose of teaching them what they had acquired.

Just at this point is where the difficulty in reference to our knowledge of the Druids comes in. They formed an esoteric order. Although they had an alphabet of sixteen letters, little was recorded for the benefit of mankind. Their teachings were transmitted orally, just as the Iliad, the Vedas, and the doctrines of Zoroaster were at first passed down by word of mouth within the circle of the initiated. The triadic form of teaching was the prevalent one. The triads of the Welsh bards are supposed to be specimens of their verse.

There is by no means a consensus of opinion as to the place that Druidism should occupy in history. According to some enthusiastic writers‡ it was the primitive religion of mankind. Such writers claim that it was first founded by Seth in Asia. After the flood it was the religion of Jophet, who was the ancestor of Gomer, from whom the Cymry are descended. It penetrated to many parts of Europe. Plato affirmed that all streams of Greek philosophy came from the West. Hence these authors claim that the Druids of Gaul and Britain were the fountain head of Greek learning. They speak of Pythagoras, calling him a celebrated Druid, who founded a school in Italy. While many of the statements of these writers remain to be proven, it is a fact that there are many resemblances between the teachings of the Druids and those of Pythagoras. Scholars argue in favor of

* The Greek term for Druids was Saronidæ—astronomers.

† The megalithic remains of Britain and France show the progress they had made in mechanics.

‡ R. W. Morgan, *et al.*

the following theories: First, Pythagoras instructed the Druids. Second, the Druids instructed Pythagoras. Third, they both derived their teachings from a common source. This last seems to the writer to be the correct theory. However, whichever theory is adopted, Druidism is given a very early place in history. We know the date of Pythagoras' birth within twenty years.* Taking 582 B.C. for that date, Druidism is made contemporaneous with the earliest development of Zoroastrianism,† Confucianism, and Buddhism, with the probability that like Zoroastrianism it can be traced to the primitive cult.

When we seek to satisfy ourselves as to the kind of a religious system that Druidism was, many difficulties present themselves. These are due to two causes: First, most writers fail to make a distinction between the Druidism of the Continent and that of Britain. This arises largely from carelessness in quoting from classic writers. Cæsar and Strobo described the Druids of Gaul. Tacitus wrote of the Druids of Britain. Quotations from these authors are made as if they all referred to the same people. Hence the confusion. Again, Druidism, like all other religious systems, did not remain the same. What was the Druids' idea of God? Were they Polytheists? Were they Pantheists? Were they Monotheists? Both the affirmative and the negative answers to all these questions are defended by those whose researches give them the right to an opinion on the subject. We shall briefly summarize the answers given and then make what we consider a just inference from them.

First, as to the Polytheism of the Druids. If names are to count for anything, then the Druids at the beginning of the Christian era were Polytheists at least in practice, if not in spirit. Cæsar identified their chief deity, Hesus, with Mercury of the Romans. Belenus was supposed to be the Greek Apollo and the Phœnician Baal. Then there were Tenates, Terann, *et al.* Even those who contend most strongly for the Monotheism of the Druids are compelled to admit that they were Polytheists in their tendencies.

In the second place, there are those who claim that Druidism

* 586–569 B.C.

† Some writers put Zoroaster as far back as 1200 B.C.

was Pantheistic. The Druids looked upon the universe as the body of God. This belief, at first, was probably a metaphysical speculation, but it is not difficult to understand how this speculation affected the belief as to the personality of God. Just as Zoroaster's speculations concerning the origin of good and evil gave a basis for the multiplicity of gods and demons in the Persian system, so the attempt by the Druids to habitate God led to a Pantheistic theology which at times was very marked. This Pantheistic notion was farther strengthened by their theory of creation, which was that the Infinite produced the universe by germs evolved from Himself.

Amedee Thiery finds traces of two distinct forms of religion, viz.: Polytheism and Pantheism. The former was like the religion of Greece, and the latter like the mysticism of India. He claims that the two religions were at first held by different branches of the Gallic race, who afterward united, thus causing a commingling of their religious beliefs. This much must be said for the Pantheism of the Druids. It did not, like the Indian Pantheism, tend to do away with moral responsibility. On the contrary, the thought of the nearness of God tended to the development of strong character.

In the third place, there is much to be said in favor of the hypothesis that the Druids were Monotheists. Jean Reynaud contended that originally they had as high a conception of God as had the Jews themselves. They afterwards encouraged the worship of subordinate deities, much on the same principle that controls the Romish Church in reference to images. Taliesin, the Druid bard, went too far when he said: "Christ, the Word from the beginning, was from the beginning our Teacher, and we never lost His teaching. Christianity was a new thing in Asia, but there never was a time when the Druids of Britain held not His doctrines." Schaff declares that their "doctrinal system was based upon a faith in one Supreme Being. But this Monotheism of an Oriental description was singularly blended with wild Polytheism and stupid superstition, belief in Hesus, Tentates, the mistletoe, the snake's egg, etc."

Hence we infer:

First, That originally the Druids had a very exalted conception of God, and taught and practised a pure Monotheism.

Secondly, Speculation on the one hand led to Pantheism among some, and a yielding to the superstitions of the ignorant on the other hand led to Polytheism in practice, if not in actual belief.

Thirdly, Through the ages there were those who, in spite of speculation and superstition, held to the belief in the one supreme personal God, and through their influence, from time to time, attempts were made to bring the people back to the primitive Monotheism. This is paralleled in the history of Zoroastrianism and modern Hinduism.

Fourthly, When Christianity came into contact with Druidism, the good in the latter system readily united with the former, as with something which it had long been awaiting, and for which it was already prepared.

The real defect in Druidism, and the one that helped most in its yielding to Christianity, was the absence of anything like charity or love. The *lex talionis* occupied a prominent place in the system. This did much in keeping alive a clearly defined idea of right and wrong and in building up strong characters, but it did nothing toward the development of the gentler graces. The Druids' Golden Rule was: "Do not hurt your neighbor, but if he hurts you, hold him strictly accountable."

Keeping in mind the differences between the Druids of the Continent and those of Britain, the following will be a fair summary of the doctrines of the latter:

I. Monotheism. Starting with clear-cut conceptions of the personality and the unity of God, these conceptions were never wholly lost. Owing to their geographical position, the Druids of Britain were brought but little into contact with peoples of other countries, and hence were not contaminated by them. The result was that the primitive idea of God was retained with greater clearness by the islanders than by their continental cousins. Lapses, of course, occurred; tendencies to nature-worship and Polytheism were frequent, but the idea of the one supreme God never was lost, and at the beginning of the Christian era it seems to have been quite clear. The trinity of the

Druids was simply God manifesting Himself in a threefold aspect. The question may be asked: But what of the different gods worshipped? The names and traces of the worship of various gods have been handed down to us. Hesus was the type of an absolute, supreme God. Other gods, such as Belenus, had special reverence, but they were all looked upon as subordinate. The explanation of this multiplicity of gods is given above. There were at times tendencies, sometimes very strong, to Polytheism, but the reaction was always toward Monotheism. A parallel to this state of affairs is seen in the history of the Jews. A Monotheistic people, they again and again tended to idol worship, but always returned to the worship of Jehovah.

II. Creation was by a personal God. Matter was considered eternal and imperishable, but capable of all kinds of changes and combinations. A tendency to Pantheism arose from the fact that he universe was looked upon as the body of God. God permeated the universe just as the mind of man affects all parts of his body. Thus it was difficult to distinguish clearly between God and the universe. On the other hand, there was a sense of the immanence of God, which led men to seek for Him in nature and to act under the consciousness of His presence.

III. The immortality of the soul. Some claim that it was the Druids who first clearly taught this doctrine. Their system certainly gives evidence of a very early and a very marked development of this truth. Some Christian writers have expressed surprise at finding more references to the belief in immortality among the teachings of the Druids than in the Old Testament Scriptures, where one would expect to find it clearly expressed. The fact is, however, that there are in the Old Testament many references to man's continued existence in a world beyond which, if found in the writings of any ethnic religion, would be considered most wonderful.

IV. Metempsychosis or transmigration was believed in, but the doctrine was not elaborated as it is in Buddhism. Eternal life according to the Druids was one of eternal progress. Man, having fallen from his angelic state in Heaven, has risen through various stages of probation to his present state, in which he is again a free agent. Now he may choose the good, and, if he

willingly abides by his choice, at his death his soul will re-enter his former angelic state. If he prefers evil, at death his soul goes back to that probationary stage best fitted to purify it. The soul transmigrates from one body to another. It cannot be proven that the Druids believed that the soul of man entered into animals.

V. Man's freedom and responsibility were emphasized. Man had full power within himself to choose good or evil. This referred not only to primitive man but to all men. No one could claim that he was the victim of fate, as he had the power to do or to refrain from doing just as he chose. The choice once made, the chooser must abide by the consequences. He, and he alone, was responsible. This tended to develop a strong moral character. An interesting line of study would be the tracing of how far the differences in the moral character of the people of India and the people of Britain were due to the difference in their teaching respecting human responsibility.

VI. The doctrine of the fall of man was taught. The fall was brought about by man attempting to rival God in power. All were originally innocent and happy, but the fall brought man into evil. "Misery and trouble have been my condition for ages and ages since I was delivered from Annion, and separated therefrom through the hand of God and His love, endless and indestructible." *

VII. Vicarious atonement. Cæsar, referring to the Druids of Gaul, says: † "Pro vita hominis nisi hominis vita reddatur, non posse aliter deorum immortalium numen placari arbitrantur: pubiceque ejusdem generis habent instituta sacrificia." Traces of these sacrifices are found in Britain, and it is claimed that the value of an atonement or expiatory sacrifice was in proportion to the value of the life sacrificed. ‡ It is further claimed that we have in Druidism a foreshadowing of divine redemption.

VIII. Confession and penance. Guilt was expiated by voluntary confession and penance. Specific punishments were prescribed, and these had to be endured before the guilty one

* From Coelbren Rhodd, the Druidic Catechism.

† De Bello Gallico, VI.–XVI.

‡ Morgan.

was pardoned. Certain kinds of guilt could only be atoned for by the laying down of life. The Druids are open to the charge of encouraging human sacrifice.

These doctrines found expression in appropriate rites. The ceremonies among the Druids were elaborate and impressive. There was also an air of mystery about them, which was not diminished by their being held in oak woods. These rites were especially impressive during the three great festivals; the spring held May 1st, the autumn and the mid-winter. During the last-named festival the mistletoe was gathered. A priest clothed in white with a golden knife cut from the oak the mistletoe, the three white berries of which were regarded as the symbol of the Trinity. Then three white bulls were sacrificed. There are undoubted evidences that human beings were sacrificed at these festivals. Connected with initiation into the order of Druids there were other elaborate rites. The most impressive and awe-inspiring of all was the ceremony of excommunication. In the words of another * we give an account of that *poena gravissima.*

"Every tribe possessed a particular sword termed the 'Sword of the Tribe.' Neither this nor any other weapon could be unsheathed in the congress of the tribe or any congress of Druids or Bards. But when an individual was about to be excommunicated, which was never done until after a year and a day's notice, to allow the offender time for voluntary atonement, he was brought into the congress of the tribe, the sword of the tribe was unsheathed by the head of the tribe, and proclaimed to be unsheathed against the offender by name; his name was then struck out of the roll of the book of the tribe, and out of the book of his own family; the badge of the tribe was torn from his arm, his sword broken in the ground, and his wand over his head by the head of the tribe; his head was shaved, and the executioner of the tribe, with the point of the sword of the tribe, drew blood from his forehead, breast and loins, and pouring it on his head exclaimed: 'The blood of the man thus accursed be on his own head.' His forehead was then branded and he was led forth, the herald of the tribe going

* R. W. Morgan.

before and proclaiming : 'This man hath no name, nor family, nor tribe among the names and families and tribes of Britain, henceforth let no man's flesh touch his flesh, nor tongue speak to him, nor eye look upon him, nor hand of man bury him, and let the darkness of Annion again receive him.'" This sentence was read throughout the land, and the excommunicated one went from place to place, until, unable to bear the treatment that he received, he fled from the haunts of men to die in some unfrequented spot.

The Druids had many symbols. The most important of these was the white bull with horns crowned with golden stars. This symbol is said to account for the term John Bull as applied to a Britisher. Every Druid wore three rays of light worked in gold on his mitre. These formed the symbol of the names of deity. The oak was the symbol of the Supreme Being. The mistletoe was the symbol of man as creature dependent on God. In addition there were the crested wren, which was the sacred bird, the wheat, which was the sacred grain, and the trefoil, vervain and hyssop, which were the sacred herbs. The most curious of all was the snake's * egg, which was said to be produced by the saliva of a number of snakes. This formed a powerful charm. Fortunate indeed was the Druid who snatched one of these and galloped off with it, pursued by the serpents until running water stopped them.

Many comparisons have been instituted between Christianity and the religion of Eastern Asia, for the avowed purpose of showing how much Christianity has borrowed from these religions. The writer has never heard of a comparison having been made between Brahmanism and Druidism. The following comparison is made, not so much for the purpose of proving anything in reference to either religion, as to show that many points may be held in common by two religions that could have had no possible communication with each other. The only fair inference that may be drawn from these resemblances is that they point to a common primitive faith.

I. Caste. Brahmanism had four castes—viz., the Brahman or priestly caste, the Kshatriya or military class, the Vaisyas or

* Pliny declares that he saw one of these snake's eggs.

agriculturists, and the Sudras or servants. Corresponding to these we find in Druidism the Druids or priests, the nobles or warriors, the common people and the slaves.

II. The priesthood. In Brahmanism this was hereditary. In Druidism, while it was nominally open to all except slaves, practically the entrance into it was so hedged round with restrictions, that only the son of a noble family could enter the order.

III. Both orders of priests were esoteric. Knowledge was kept within the group of the initiated. The coming Druid must be taught by Druids, and as we have seen serve a long novitiate. Likewise the future Brahman was taught by Brahmans, and his discipline was for nine, eighteen or thirty-six years.* In both systems not only all knowledge, but all religion was kept within the priesthood. This in both cases was for the purpose of allowing the priests to retain their power over the common people.

IV. Lack of written literature. Nothing is more evident than the confusion of early Indian chronology and numbers. Just as unsatisfactory are the traditions in reference to Druidism. The trouble in both cases is due to the form of transmission, which was by word of mouth. The triadic form of teaching was common to both. In Druidism we have the precepts in the form of triads. In Brahmanism there are three Vedas, three ways of salvation, three objects of human pursuit, three worlds, etc.

V. Sacrifice. The development of the doctrine of sacrifice among the Brahmans was steadily downward. Starting with a somewhat high conception of the idea of atonement, it degenerated into a mere bargain with the gods. The character of the offerer amounted to nothing, if he could furnish the required number of animals. Thousands of animals were killed every day. The greater the number of the sacrifices and the more elaborate the ritual, the greater the need for a more complete organization of priests. In this manner the whole Brahmanical system was overdone.† The higher idea of sacrifice, that of atonement, was kept more clearly in view by the Druids. In both systems there are traces of human sacrifices. The bull was the chief sacrificial animal in Britain, the horse in India.

* Laws of Manu.

† Sir Monier Williams in "Hinduism."

VI. Transmigration. This doctrine so thoroughly worked out by the Buddhists was also a doctrine of Brahmanism.* The Coelbren Rhodd shows that the Druids held to the doctrine, but in a sense quite different from that taught by either the Brahmans or the Greek philosophers.

VII. The trinity. The doctrine of the trimurti seems to be vaguely expressed in the Rig-Veda, where three principal gods are mentioned—viz.: Agni, Indra, Surya. Later Brahmanism had its Brahma or creator, its Vishnu or preserver, and its Siva or destroyer and recreator.*

> In those three persons the one God was shown,
> Each first in place, each last—not one alone;
> Of Siva, Vishnu, Brahma, each may be,
> First, second, third among the blessed three.†

In the Druidic trinity God appears under the threefold aspect of Beli or Creator, Taran or Saviour, Esu (Yesu) or recreator. The resemblances between the functions of the gods of these two trinities are very marked.

VIII. Pantheism. The Hindus regarded Brahma as the soul of the universe, and looked for absorption at last into him. The Druids taught that the universe was the body of God, and looked for union with God in a personal, individual sense.

Were an attempt made to trace out all the fanciful resemblances between these two religious systems many more could be added to the above list, but it is long enough to prove that they had many theories in common. But who will claim that Brahmanism stole from Druidism, or that the Druids derived their theology from the Vedas of the Brahmans? No one, because there is nothing to be gained by such a claim.

In conclusion, let us inquire what has been the influence of Druidism. Freeman ‡ declares that the Celts have never played any great part in history, except when they have come under Teutonic or Roman influence. Hume, on the other hand, said "that no religion has ever swayed the minds of men like the Druidic." These two statements are not contradictory. Look-

* Laws of Manu.

† Quoted by Williams from Kalidasa.

‡ General Sketch of History, p. 16.

ing at history in a political sense the Celts have not played an important part, but looking at the hold that Druidism had over its followers, and then, through the Britons, the influence it has exerted in the world, one cannot but assign to it a high place of honor.

In the fifth century B.C. the laws of the Druids were codified. These are acknowledged by leading English jurists * to have been the basis of English liberty and English common law. Since this is so, it is not difficult to understand how, through the laws of England, the Druids have influenced the laws of the world.

About Christmas time, those who delight in pointing out the Pagan elements in Christianity are fond of telling us how much Christianity is indebted to the Druids, and they refer for confirmation of their statements to the mistletoe, yule log, Christmas tree and to other accessories to the "Festival of the Nativity." While we use and enjoy these relics of old Celtic and Saxon times, the fact is that Druidism was waiting for Christianity to supply the elements that she lacked. Origen, Clement, and other Church Fathers speak of the priests among the Gauls, but in such a way as to show that the early Christians knew little about, and were not affected by, the faith of the Druids.

Druidism stood as a witness for God in Western Europe, and when God's more perfect revelation was made through His Son Jesus Christ, it saw that its work was done and it became a part of that faith whose Founder gave His life, that the way to the Father might be open to all.

* Sir John Fortescue Coke, *et al.*

THE PULPIT AND THE LIQUOR TRAFFIC.

[Contributed to CHRISTIAN THOUGHT.]

BY CHARLES H. PAYNE, D.D., LL.D.,

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A CHAIN of linked logic as strong as that which binds the universe together, binds our subject upon the conscience of the Church and the pulpit.

I. The first link in the chain is the incontrovertible fact that the liquor traffic is the greatest curse of Christendom, and a stupendous obstacle in the way of the Christian Church. No array of sickening statistics is necessary to prove this proposition. The intelligent world knows the fact. At home and abroad, wherever the Church of Christ attempts to prosecute its holy mission, it is confronted by this personification of evil—the liquor traffic. The ships that bear our Christian missionaries and Bibles to save the heathen go laden with Christian rum to damn the souls which the Church seeks to save. This first link in the chain is an adamantine fact that may well crimson with shame the face of every Christian man.

II. Link second. This greatest enemy of man and deadly foe of Christ's kingdom will only be conquered by the agency of the Christian Church. It is vain to expect the devil to strike down his strongest ally. It is useless to hope that the world will undertake the overthrow of a moral evil that the Church and the pulpit hesitate to attack. It reflects honor on the Church to say that the world expects and awaits its leadership in this as in all other moral reforms, and therefore this foe will only go down before the assaults of the Church. There is no flaw in this link.

III. A third link in the chain invites our scrutiny. The Church can cope successfully with such a foe as the liquor traffic

only when its forces are thoroughly massed. A united foe, a divided Church. This one sad but truthful sentence tells the story of our long defeat ; tells the story of the heart-sickness of our ranks and the hopelessness of our cause, if we will not learn a higher wisdom and unite for victory.

There is no sadder sight on earth than to see the liquor forces rally around a common standard, irrespective of party or creed or personal relations, and mass their forces to protect any imperiled point and beat back any assault while the temperance forces are hotly contending about measures and methods, and, for the most part, practically aiding the combined enemy. Can there be any intelligent questioning of the fact that the duty of the hour is to unite all the forces that acknowledge loyalty to Christ, and march in soldierly order and serried ranks against the common foe? The Church has made a great but natural mistake, inspired probably more by false philosophy than by a faltering courage. The doctrine of individualism has been emphasized at the expense of unity. She has depended almost entirely on the power of Christian principle in the individual for the spread of Christ's kingdom—the single regenerated heart against the unregenerated world.

There is a vital and important truth here, but it is only hemispherical ; individualism needs to be supplemented and strengthened by combination and concentration—a principle equally Christian, and by no means antagonistic to its counterpart. In the development of Christian civilization and especially in a government whose laws and life are largely the expression of the aggregated opinions of the individuals composing the mass, vast increments of power will come to the kingdom of Christ by massing the units of Christian loyalty, and utilizing them for the overthrow of evil and the enthronement of right. The reign of Christian principles in the individual heart is, indeed, the basis of the triumph of Christ's kingdom in the world ; but the practical form and concrete shape which these principles take in determining the laws and forces and customs in our complex society which govern the masses of people, need direction and unification to accomplish the best results. To give this direction and so to make many-fold more practical and potent the

isolated units of Christian life, is the work of the Christian Church and the Christian pulpit. And the practicability and power of this work the Church is beginning more fully to realize. Let it but assume the leadership which is its right and its duty, and unite its scattered forces, and scarcely an evil now fortified by respectable custom and intrenched behind law, but would soon surrender to its united attack.

And this most shameless and most gigantic foe of society, the liquor traffic, is the most fitting one on which to begin this new crusade, in the name of Christ, and of all who claim loyalty to Him. The time is ripe. The call is imperative. The toleration of the liquor traffic is the greatest anachronism of the Nineteenth Century, the greatest crime of Christendom, the greatest shame of the Christian Church. Thirteen millions of communicants of the Protestant Christian Church, in this Christian Nation, and this traffic of hell unchecked. Thirteen million Christian men and women in Protestantism, and six million more in the Catholic communion, all helpless and palsied in the presence of this oligarchy of Satan. Nineteen million professing Christians and a hundred thousand Christian ministers, and the saloon, according to the New York *Times*, has more power in the politics of the country than all the churches, all the ministers, all the membership, all the colleges and schools of the Nation combined. If anything could stir the heart of the Church, it is this appalling sight. And this sad spectacle, too, in the presence of the fact that a united effort on the part of these churches would speedily overthrow this "throne of iniquity." Could not these millions of Christian people outlaw the liquor traffic if they would? Could they not stop its legal manufacture and sale for drinking purposes if they would? Could they not prevent the United States Government, and the government of every individual State from having any further complicity with this iniquity by licensing or legalizing it in any form if they would? Could they not force every legislature to put this fruitful source of crime in the category with other crimes that exist only in defiance of law, and with no respectable support, if they would? Beyond question, all this is far within the power and province of the Christian Church. Is there any question that it is the duty of

Christ's Church thus to unite to overthrow its most conspicuous and most successful foe? The third link in this logical chain is invulnerable.

IV. And now let us test the fourth link. The pulpit is the legitimate and divinely ordained agency to mass the forces of the Christian Church, and to lead them on to victory in this holy crusade against the liquor traffic. It would be stultifying to affirm that the Church could and should undertake any work in which the pulpit might not properly act its part of helper and leader. Its voice must ring out clear and strong and unequivocal, the rallying cry calling the forces of Christ to battle. To deny this function and this duty to the pulpit is to affirm that the pulpit must be dumb in the presence of society's greatest curse, must be helpless in the presence of man's greatest need, must be the slave of custom rather than its liberator.

If it be said that the pulpit should preach temperance to the individual but leave unrebuked the traffic; reform the drunkard, but spare the drunkard-maker, then you ask the pulpit to belittle its own work in the eyes of all manly men by openly confessing its puerility and pusillanimity. You ask the pulpit to rescue the sufferers from incendiary fires, but be careful to speak no word against the incendiaries themselves; to bury the slaughtered victims of drink, but be silent concerning the murderous traffic and the respectable power that fosters and legalizes it. If the pulpit were to listen to this counsel it would invite the wrath of God and the contempt of all true men. It would be shorn of its strength and robbed of its respect. No. It is the plain and palpable duty of the pulpit to discuss and to conserve every interest of society, to antagonize every wrong, to encourage whatever is right. And since the saloon is the central source of the crimes and the curses and woes of mankind, if the pulpit cannot, or will not antagonize this evil, it may as well abandon its calling and cease its high pretensions. But so long as the pulpit is called of God to be the mouth-piece of Heaven to men, so long must it fearlessly declare God's truth whether men will hear or forbear. The fourth link in this divinely welded chain of duty reveals no weakness, and fastens itself around the Christian pulpit of to-day with a grip of infinite power, binding it to the duty

of massing the forces of the Church against the death-dealing liquor traffic.

But how shall this duty be performed? Like any other duty —with fidelity, fearlessness and Christly love. The pulpit must keep before the people the true standard of total abstinence for the individual and total legal prohibition of the traffic.

It must encourage the use of all proper measures to promote the temperance cause, educational, moral and legal. It must put the responsibility for perpetuating the sale and use of strong drink where it belongs—in the family, in society, in legislatures and Congress, in politics and in the sovereign voters who make the Nation's laws. But this will awaken antagonism in the pew. So will faithful preaching always awaken antagonism. So the Master foretold; so we must expect. Preaching against the liquor traffic will cause antagonism from three sources—business interests, social customs and political affiliations. Let us not shrink from the free and frank discussion of the situation.

With the first two of these antagonisms in the pew the pulpit of to-day would acknowledge itself to have but small trouble. The ordinary minister would despise himself and be despised by his church and by the community, if he allowed his lips to be sealed for fear of offending the seller and drinker of intoxicating beverages. But the other and far larger class of hearers, those whose political affiliations make them sensitive to the utterances of the pulpit, how can the minister do his duty in this work of massing the Christian forces and not give the offence? Perhaps he cannot. But if he cannot, then the time has fully come when this unhealthy and unnatural and unchristian condition of the Church needs prompt and vigorous treatment. The disease has reached a crisis. The faithful pastor, who is also a true physician, must, with all skill, yet with all fidelity, apply the probe before the whole body of the Church becomes gangrened. This extreme sensitiveness is itself a symptom that indicates a dangerous disease. There is serious trouble somewhere when the pulpit is warned against the discussion of a subject so vitally related to the welfare of men and the progress of the Church.

Undoubtedly the one difficult aspect in the treatment of the case is this political aspect. Let us consider it dispassionately,

and without partisan prejudice, if we may hope to reach so high a state. We are told by men who think themselves honest, that this whole question of temperance and the liquor traffic should be kept out of politics. Very good; but we may as well be told that sin should be kept out of the world. The disagreeable fact is that sin is in the world. The equally resistless fact is that the liquor traffic is in politics, and it is there by its own volition. It is common to charge its presence in politics upon temperance reformers, but this is a mistake. The liquor oligarchy itself puts this question into our politics. It did this most naturally, and, considering its own interests only, most wisely. Seeing that political parties naturally want votes, and knowing that it had votes by the thousands at its command, the liquor oligarchy demanded of political managers protection and legalization for its traffic, and thus far it has largely succeeded in securing its demands.

And since the liquor men demand and obtain protection for their business, what is more natural or more reasonable than that good men should demand that the defences and protection of the law should cease? And as the liquor forces are united in their demands, what is more natural or reasonable or necessary than that patriotic men of every name, and especially Christian men, irrespective of party, should unite in demanding the legal overthrow of this destroyer of their homes and enemy of the public good?

Yes, the liquor question is in politics, and can never be gotten out of politics until the ministry and the Church unite to put it out. And they will never put it out by pious talk nor fervent prayers. In this issue, forced upon us by the enemy, votes and votes only give the ultimate decision. The liquor question will never be out of politics until forced out by the ballots of free men, emancipated from party domination.

In order to do this the pulpit has a delicate and difficult, but necessary duty to perform. Difficult, but not more difficult than some other duties from which it must not shrink. Men occupying the pew and calling themselves Christians must be made to see that there is no evil of society greater than the saloon, and no duty greater than the destruction of the saloon; that the

saloon must be outlawed; that it cannot be outlawed until a majority of voters demand it, and that this necessary majority can never be secured while men slavishly follow the dictum of the party managers who want the saloon vote.

The pulpit must preach the duty of loyalty to God as supreme above loyalty to party. This is the solemn and imperative duty of the pulpit of to-day. But we are told again that the pulpit must not meddle with politics. By whose authority, and in whose interest is this saying so flippantly bandied about? Who authorizes the pulpit to leave whatever has to do with politics outside the sphere of its discussions. Surely the Bible is not sponsor for this very convenient doctrine of unprincipled politicians who do not like to face the pulpit's opposition. But since the gravest moral questions are involved in the politics of a country like our own, it is treason to truth and to God to demand the silence of the pulpit in relation to these questions.

The pulpit must discharge this duty with skill and with love, and it must be in this, as in all its ministrations, neither an advocate nor an apologist of any political party as such. As a minister the pastor should be non-partisan, but not non-Christian. As a man he should ally himself as conscience and the Word of God bid him. But non-partisanship by no means requires the pulpit to be silent on all political questions. On the contrary, the silence of a public man like the minister is rightly construed as decidedly partisan, and is often, indeed, the most effective form of carrying out party measures. Yes, the pulpit should be non-partisan, in fact, and not in mere profession, and should not lend itself to mere party service any more by its silence than by its utterances.

But are we not in danger of falling into error concerning the relations and duty of the pulpit to political organizations and measures? Whence comes the widely prevalent sentiment that the pulpit must be dumb concerning political parties and their issues? What law of God, what principle of Christianity, what reasonable requirement of man demands the silence of the pulpit concerning any man or body of men, any society or corporation or organization whose avowed principles and open conduct vitally affect the interests of society? And what command of Christ

or what principle of ethics exempts the organization called a political party from the honest consideration, or, if need be, the denunciation of the Christian pulpit? Indeed, the political party, because it makes its appeals for popular support, is more than other organizations the legitimate subject of pulpit discussion.

The contrary position is dangerous in the extreme. If a body of men organized in any other capacity promulgates theories perilous to the community and solicits public support, the pulpit would be accounted cowardly and guilty to maintain silence. Why then, when a political organization adopts a platform that embodies dangerous principles, proposes to "frame iniquity into a law" and asks the support of the Church, should so many men suddenly demand that the pulpit be dumb concerning this matter? Shall the pulpit yield to this unrighteous and perilous demand, because a large number of party-blinded men unite to make it?

What will happen if the pulpit does heed this clamor?

Suppose a political party advocates the legalization of lotteries, the licensing of prostitution, the protection of gambling houses; the pulpit, in obedience to this imperious behest, must keep silent, and allow these abominations to blight the homes and ruin the youth that it is the pulpit's office to protect and save.

Shame on the man who makes such a senseless and dangerous demand on the pulpit! Shame on the pulpit that yields to the demand! And greater shame on the partisans and pulpits that silently surrender to the greater evil of the liquor traffic, and to the party organization that seeks to protect and fortify this iniquity by law!

One other link and our chain is complete.

V. A united pulpit will soon bring a united Church. The Christian forces will be massed, and the legalized traffic in intoxicating drink will be overthrown. Small space remains to let in the light upon this glowing hope. But light there is, and hope lures us on and courage summons us to manly endeavor. Slavery was strongly intrenched behind law, and custom and business interests and politics, but slavery went down before the voice of

courageous pulpits and the valor of brave hearts aided, as a good cause always is, by the Providence of God. The liquor traffic is possibly more strongly fortified ; but the same valor in pulpit and pew, in legislative halls and on the field of activity, will cause this stronger and more destructive foe of God and man to fall before the massed and marshalled hosts of Justice and Right.

A hundred thousand Christian pulpits united in this holy cause will bring in this millennial morn. Defections in the pew and dismissals from the pulpit may here and there occur, but when the new incumbent of the pulpit gives the same certain sound to the trumpet as did his dismissed predecessor, the contest will quickly cease, the forces will be united, and the long-looked for victory will have been won.

Our chain is complete. Its five links, binding the hundred thousand pulpits and the many-millioned membership of Christ's Church in this goodly land into a blessed unity of purpose and endeavor to destroy this ravager of human hearts and happy homes, will also bind the gloomy present to a golden future, throwing a bridge of hope across the dark chasm, and bidding the emancipated millions of a land redeemed from the curse of strong drink to pass over to a " paradise regained."

DIVINITY OF CHRISTIANITY SEEN BY ITS EFFECTS.

By the Rev. J. H. Potter, Eustis, Florida.

[Contributed to Christian Thought.]

FACTS are stubborn arguments. To wipe them out is difficult. To explain them away is not easy. They are effects. Their existence can be accounted for only by admitting a cause sufficient to produce them. And the character of the cause is known from the character of its effects "Every tree is known by its fruit," "of thorns men do not gather figs," a man is known by his life; "a good man out of the good treasure of his heart bringeth forth that which is good, and an evil man out of the evil treasure of his heart bringeth forth that which is evil." Any association of people that continually does good and not evil must be good. Any system of religion that is constantly elevating the condition of mankind, making men purer, nobler, more unselfish, cannot but be good.

Apply these principles to the system of religion taught in the Holy Scriptures, and see what logical inference is to be drawn. The Hebrews in Egypt were an enslaved, degraded, spiritless people, who seemed to prefer being let alone in bondage rather than make an effort to be free. By the influence of the truth embodied in their Sacred Scriptures, and the discipline they received in accordance therewith, they gradually came to be first among the nations, as in the days of Solomon. They were feared and respected, and their friendship sought by surrounding peoples. While the rest of the world was sunk in debasing idolatry and its demoralizing vices the nation of Israel, moulded by their Scriptures, worshipped the one God, the Creator of the heavens and the earth, and practised the virtues that elevate and adorn humanity. And in precisely the proportion they practised the teaching of their Scriptures did they rise in moral and religious character—in real superiority to their neigh-

bors in everything that constitutes true excellence. It is well known by all conversant with the facts that among the nations destitute of the Hebrew Scriptures lewdness and debauchery were not only commonly practised and approved of among the most polished of the heathen nations, but shameless prostitution and abominable impurities were introduced into their temples and made prominent in their religion and worship.

As far as the people of Israel complied with the requirements of their revealed religion they were as an oasis in the desert—a singular example of purity and goodness, whose equal was not to be found in all the earth at the time—all drunkenness and revelry were strictly prohibited. Love and reverence toward God and respect and kindness to man was the spirit breathed everywhere from their sacred Scriptures. "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself" gave character to the atmosphere in which the people lived, moved and had their being, and enabled them to stand out in contrast with neighboring nations. Their religious ethics showed their influence in prohibiting human sacrifices, which were so fearfully common among the heathen, and in softening the horrors of war, so frightful in those barbarous ages, and in defending the poor, the fatherless and slaves. The powerful influence of revealed religion, even among the Hebrews, gradually abolished slavery, while it was practised with terrible severity in surrounding nations.

The spirit of this religion is apparent in such precepts as "Thou shalt not rule over thy servant with rigor;" "Thou shalt not oppress a hired servant;" "If thine enemy hunger, feed him;" "Thou shalt not muzzle the ox that treadeth out the corn." Any animal going astray was to be returned to the owner. It was this religion quietly influencing that people that made them so much better than those about them that they became missionaries scattered among the nations, and did much to save the mass from moral putrefaction.

Every reader of the classics knows that the vilest crimes known to human nature were commended by the most celebrated writers of refined Greece and Rome. This is boasted paganism, politeness and civilization. If such were the teaching of the cultured, what must have been the mass of pagan society?

This was the kind of people the Gospel began to operate on when Christian missionaries went forth to proclaim salvation from sin through Him of Nazareth.

What must we think of the character of a religion that out of this sort of material produced the civilization of pure, noble, generous, unselfish Christian society of modern times, where the Christian religion has full sway?

Lactantius, who had been a pagan philosopher, lived A.D. 306. Giving his own experience and observation, he says of pagans, "They rob by sea and land, poison their wives for their dowries, strangle their infants and commit incest, and prostitute their bodies to unnatural lust and commit crimes too odious to relate."

With this contrast the genial influence of the Gospel in bringing woman up from the lowest degradation to be the pure, true, gentle, kind companion of man brought up by the same Gospel. There is surely enough wickedness in Christian lands, but it is all in opposition to and in defiance of the Gospel. Under the old Roman law children were considered not as persons but as things. Infants might be put to death at the will of the father. A son might be sold, imprisoned, scourged, exiled or put to death by the father, and there was no appeal to any higher power.

The influence of the Gospel, like the genial warmth and cheering light of the rising sun, has dispelled the darkness and melted the frozen severity of paganism.

The pride of the haughty lord is taken away and the fawning sycophant is taught to stand up and be a man.

The brotherhood of man was never acknowledged by the theologians of the pagan world. It is in the teachings of our Christian religion we learn that "of one blood God made all nations of men to dwell on all the face of the earth."

In pagan lands we find no orphans' homes, no home for the aged, the friendless, the poor and the insane. There the sick and the aged are carried out and left in the jungle to die. This is the kindness of the children to their parents there. It does not speak well for their religion that led them to do so. But what form of human misery has Christian philanthropy not

kindly provided for? Where but in Christian communities do we find orphan asylums, foundling hospitals, children's aid societies, homes for the friendless, houses of refuge, manual labor schools for poor children, infirmaries, houses of mercy, asylums for the insane, old gentlemen and old ladies' homes, rescues for the fallen? These humane institutions are provided and sustained in Christian communities, and it is expected naturally that they be fostered in Christian atmosphere. They are the normal outgrowth of the teaching that God is our Father and every man our brother. They come naturally from the example of Him who healed the sick, cast out evil spirits, fed the hungry, comforted the troubled, and to the poor proclaimed glad tidings of life everlasting.

Show me an infidel country that abounds in humane institutions that lift up and comfort the sorrowing sons and daughters of men.

Who provided for our sick and wounded soldiers during the late war? The Christian Commission. What country on earth not under the influence of the Gospel ever made such abundant provision for her suffering soldiers as our Christian land? You say many not Christians assisted in the good work. It was those who had been reared in Christian homes, or who had certainly breathed Christian atmosphere, and had before them Christian example and been moulded by the kindly influences of Christian surroundings. When men have been living, moving, and having their being in the wholesome air of Christian families and communities they owe a vast deal of the good they have acquired to Gospel inspiration, Gospel ideals, and quiet, unconscious influence of that sort. The contact of a Christian friend, or the wondrous power of a pious mother exerts an invisible influence ofttimes not thought of. Many uncatalogued facts stand out bearing unanswerable testimony on this point.

What has so elevated the taste and purified the morals of Christian countries and Christian communities as to make them so greatly superior to those of pagan lands, or countries that have received character from an emasculated Christianity?

Facts establish the statement that the purity of morals in a country or community is in proportion to the purity of the Gospel received and practised there.

Here is another fact that finds illustration in many localities. The desirability of a community and its rank in good citizenship is in proportion to the prevalence of the teaching and power of the pure Gospel in the hearts and lives of the people. Undeniable facts prove that good morals, refined society, correct taste and material prosperity attend Christianity in proportion to its genuineness the world over. Political freedom and civil institutions are secured and flourish best in the atmosphere of Gospel liberty. "They are free whom the truth makes free, and all are slaves beside." A felt realization of the fact that God the Eternal is my Father, and that no man is my master begets a sense of the noblest independence and the truest manhood. Its natural result is to produce self-respect and a regard for the rights of our fellowmen.

Learning and the fine arts have ever found a home among Christian people. Sculpture, poetry and painting during the middle ages looked to Italy for a refuge, because Italy contained some gospel yet. In that dark night, made so by the dense clouds of earth's ignorance and superstition, still rays of celestial light shot forth across the gloom and showed whence hope might come. They were Gospel rays.

Philosophy waited in bondage to be released by the Christian Reformation—Luther, Melancthon and Cranmer preceded Bacon, Boyle, Newton and Locke.

Wherever Christian missionaries went the character of the people was greatly changed for the better. The various tribes of Germany, all know, were amazingly improved by the Gospel. The Scythians ceased to use the skins of their enemies for clothing under Gospel influence. The Huns were able to see the difference between right and wrong in the light of God's Word. The Heruli no longer put to death the aged and the infirm, nor required their widows to immolate themselves on the tombs of their husbands. The Hungarians no longer devoured the hearts of their captives after they embraced Christianity. The Scandinavians ceased to commit suicide on principle, and their wives and slaves they no more devoted to death in honor of the deceased. The Gospel gave the Danes, Norwegians and Russians just ideas of property, and put an end to their piracy.

Those northern nations acquired the use of letters after they received the Gospel. Those cruel people of the North became social and kind as they became Christian.

Every man who has read the laws of the Emperors Theodosius, Justinian and Charlemagne or the codes of the Visigoths, Lombards and Anglo-Saxons, must venerate Christianity as the source of many just and merciful laws totally unknown to polished or barbarous pagans. The Gospel abolished human sacrifices by the Druids of England, and caused the rude Saxons to cease the butchery of their captives and of their own cowardly soldiers. Gradually the Gospel polished the manners of the British Isles, and has diffused the spirit of practical piety, benevolence and morality which has made Britain what she is to-day.

On the Sandwich Islands the Gospel abolished theft, idolatry, infanticide, human sacrifices, polygamy and unnatural crimes, and established equitable laws, administered with the consent of the sovereign, the chieftains and the people. Education, civilization, industry, public security and domestic happiness are the natural fruits of the Gospel. Contrast this fact with the well-known fruits of infidelity in France during "the Reign of Terror," when there was no security for life or property.

The evils in Christian society are in direct opposition to all the teachings and influence of the Gospel of Christ.

Thomas Jefferson said to Daniel Webster, "I have always said, and always will say that the studious perusal of the sacred volume will make better citizens, better husbands and better fathers." The tree that produces such fruit surely cannot be bad.

WHY USE THE OLD TESTAMENT?

[Contributed to CHRISTIAN THOUGHT.]

BY EDWARD C. RAY, D.D.,

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THE New Testament begins: "The book of the generation of Jesus Christ, the son of David," and ends with the word "amen." Who was David? What do Jesus, Christ, generation, son, and amen mean here? These and innumerable similar questions suggested by every New Testament page are answered only by study of the Old Testament.

A deed begins: "This indenture witnesseth." Why "indenture"? Before the days of printing a scrivener wrote out a deed twice on the same sheet of parchment, and then separated the two writings with his penknife, making indentations in the parchment by its zigzag course. One copy was held by each party to the transaction; the production of the two pieces in court at any time, and the fitting of their mutual indentations would prove their genuineness. The Old and New Testaments are indentures; the faithful witness of prophecy and history proves them authentic and genuine. Many doubters have been convinced, and many believers strengthened by the marvellous indentations of Old Testament prophecy and New Testament fulfilment; they are both by the same author, separated by centuries, but incontestably one in origin.

Mary's lovely song, the angels' song at Bethlehem, the hymns sung at the last supper, our Lord's Prayer given to the disciples, His prayer for them after the supper, and other New Testament prayers quote the Old Testament. Our Lord throughout His life expressed the joys and burdens of His heart, and in departing committed His spirit to the Father in words from the Psalms. Christian raptures and complaints ever since find fittest outspeaking in Old Testament devotional passages, which give

petitions to prayer and wings to song. They help to divine communion, and are therefore to be studied.

Jesus Christ said, "Search the Scriptures"; that is, the Old Testament, the New Testament being at that time not written. His authority is compelling. But this paper purposes, waiving the argument from authority, to show from the experience of Jesus Christ why the Old Testament should be studied. When He was a young man, just beginning life, He was exposed to such temptations as are common to young people of virile spirit, human nature and noble aims, and resisted the temptations through His use of the Old Testament. Here as everywhere He is our example.

He was offered power and riches if He would bow down and worship satan. Every young man of virile spirit desires power and riches; and every one is sooner or later and often tempted to seek power and riches by doing a wrong act. God is good and the devil is evil; he who does wrong that good may come is a practical atheist, denying the reign of a righteous God and bowing down to the devil. The temptation is often subtle and mighty; how shall it be resisted? How did Jesus Christ resist it? By quoting from Deuteronomy vi. 13, "Thou shalt worship the Lord thy God, and him only shalt thou serve." That is ideal living—testing every question by the will of God. A little child who asks always, "Is it right? Will it please God?" is greater than a world-conquering Cæsar or Napoleon who asks only, "Will it pay?" That ideal of daily life which kept Jesus Christ in temptation He found in the Old Testament. We may find it there and be kept from bowing down our manhood to evil, because we shall believe in a righteous God near by to help and reward those who worship and serve Him.

Being a-hungered Christ was tempted to use His power as a Son of God to turn stones to bread. The highest human nature has lowly daily needs, physical necessities, peremptory demands of the flesh. Hence many temptations to use the Godlike in us to get supplies for carnal needs. The preacher is tempted to give not the highest truth he sees, cut where it may, but that which will please his supporters. The artist dare not paint what God sends him, but pot-boilers. The man in journalism trims his

convictions down to suit the public. Piety is prostituted for pottage, the highest and noblest in us harnessed to a garbage wagon, the divine birthright exchanged for temporary gratifications. What can save us from such insistent temptations? What saved Jesus Christ? A quotation from Deuteronomy viii. 3 : " Man shall not live by bread alone, but by every word that proceedeth out of the mouth of God." That is the ideal food for sons of God. Bread supports the mortal flesh, God's words the immortal spirit. The immortal spirit well nourished by them triumphs over the mortal flesh.

The New Testament moves upon us for good by the power of an endless life, exalting the human spirit by knowledge of its divine kinship and eternal destiny. But for daily needs we want also food of a simpler sort. The Old Testament provides it ; saying very little about the life to come, everything about the life that now is, showing us that sin is misery, goodness happiness, now and here. The Beatitudes of Jesus Christ in the Sermon on the Mount are from the Old Testament. " Blessed" they say is the man who does thus and so and who does not do so and thus. But the word blessed means not some mysterious far-off rapture, but simply happy, fortunate, to be envied. Such, says the Old Testament, is the man who does right day by day. Perhaps some exalted prophetic souls can travel the daily dark ways without such aids, sustained by visions of coming dawns ; but for most of us there is need of the Old Testament view. It is interesting to note how often our Lord quotes or refers to the Proverbs, the book of practical, practicable and utilitarian daily right doing. Its author was not a holy man, and we would hesitate to accept his views, if he had given them on theological mysteries ; but he was the wisest man about the theory of the conduct of daily life, and his failure to observe his own precepts furnished him experience of the evils of sin which emphasizes his warnings.

A bishop addressing a class of candidates for the ministry told them that, lacking education they could obtain it in schools, lacking theology they could find it in books, lacking wisdom they could get it by prayer, but lacking common-sense there was no help for them. He was wrong ; the Book of Proverbs was given by

the Holy Spirit "to give subtilty to the simple, to the young man knowledge and discretion." It can do it; it will do it if we give it a chance. Many years ago a Sunday-school teacher had his class of nine boys learn the book by heart, over and over, again and again, until every word of it was engraved on their memories; men now, they look back with unspeakable gratitude upon the teaching which furnished them the best guidance of their lives. One of the greatest of American merchants and Christians said that his success in business, and his character were due chiefly to his daily use of Proverbs from his childhood; studying each of its thirty-one chapters on the day of the month numerically indicating it, choosing out a verse or a passage from the chapter for the day as food for the day. Weak Christians would be strengthened by such daily feeding on the words of God, conquering where now they are beaten, comforted where now they lament, believing where now they doubt, resisting temptation where now they yield.

Jesus Christ was tempted again, assailed in His noblest and highest aims. Nothing is higher than consuming desire to save and bless others; for that Jesus Christ came into the world, for that meaning to live and die. The path to success was long before Him and hard. It was, as the narrative says, in "the holy city," on "a pinnacle of the temple," that this temptation found Him; with His work below and before Him, and its difficulties apparent, He was asked to cast Himself down toward the throng in the temple courts, trusting God's explicit promise, quoted by the tempter, that angels should uphold Him; then the people would at once believe on Him, recognize His heavenly mission, accept His teaching and be saved. The temptation attacks noble minds to make short cuts to winning souls or saving society, sensational methods in the pulpit, speculation in business, compromises with compromising evils, intolerant persecution of error, and all apparently based on the Bible. God's way to success for Jesus Christ was His way for all of us and always; patient, persistent, self-denying toil; short cuts shortly cut off success. How shall we escape the temptation? How did Jesus Christ escape it? He quoted from Deuteronomy vi. 16: "Thou shalt not tempt the Lord thy God." This did not mean on Jesus' lips,

"I am the Lord thy God, and thou shalt not tempt me"; but it meant, "God's way to success must be patiently followed; I must not tempt Him by venturing into other paths." The Old Testament is a historic scroll unfolding God's even ways of providential dealings with His servants, teaching them to walk in those old paths, seeking not cataclysmic but patient success in working for their fellow-men.

Now what shall we make of it that Jesus Christ in these temptations quoted from but one book of the Old Testament, and from but one small section of that, and that a book not commonly reckoned very spiritual? It is not provable; it lies with each man's judgment to judge it; but is it not almost certain that He had been that morning studying that part of that book, and found in that daily food the strength the day required? We sit down three times daily to the table; shall we not sit down once to God's table? The experience of daily Bible students agrees with our Lord's; they find always what they need. As the differing substances of different breakfasts all furnish nourishment for the day, so various passages of the Word all supply spiritual nutriment.

Our Lord's experience in His temptations emphasizes also His word "Search, study the Scriptures." The Bible is not magical. Neglect of it will not be made up by special providence when we open it in an hour of need. He who learns it and knows what is in it will find what he needs under special stress. Many errors in interpreting Scripture can be avoided only by study of it.

One must know the context; it makes a difference who speaks. An elder said to his pastor recently: "Do you not know that satan disposes of riches and power as he pleases?" "Where did you get that amazing doctrine?" said the minister; "God is the only giver." "O, no; for did not satan say that he had the power, and would give our Lord everything if he would bow down and worship him?" "You are a good lawyer," replied the preacher, "and your friends tell me you will be a judge; but may no cause of mine come before you if you would accept the testimony of satan, the father of lies, when he is not even under oath!" Quoting Scripture is not enough; satan does that; it must be studied and understood.

In quoting Psalm xci. to our Lord, satan used a devotional passage, the outpouring of a trusting soul to God, as if it were dogmatic theology; the aspiration of a wondering spirit as if it were concrete statement. It is noteworthy that our Lord answered satan's misuse of the psalm by quoting not a devotional but a dogmatic passage. Scripture must be studied to ascertain how it is to be taken. Taking this same xci. psalm and similar passages as dogmatic truth, a number of young people a few years ago went, against all advice and without precautions or medicines, into a fever-infected region to do missionary work, trusting God to send angels to bear them up, and half of them died of the pestilence. If our Lord had trusted satan's dogmatic use of this devotional passage, and had cast Himself down, would angels have borne Him up?

Very like this is the error of taking simple passages typically. Much Scripture is typical; much is not; only study can determine which is which. Satan assumed that Psalm xci. typified Christ; Christ assumed that it did not. Almost any error can be apparently bolstered up by putting ingenious typical meanings into simple Scripture. A Bible-class teacher once spent the hour on the lesson about David and Absalom in showing how David was a type of Christ, Absalom of anti-christ; possibly; there is no proof of it, nor any disproof, nor any profit in it, if proved. Certainly the class failed to get the divine intention in that story, the warning against violation of family purity.

Another like error takes figurative passages literally. Some folk greatly pride themselves on taking Scripture literally, "believing just what it says," as they put it. That is absurd. Some Scripture is literal, some figurative; and only study can decide in each case. When Christ says "I am the door," is it literal? Not many years ago a body of devoted Christians, who make much of literal interpretation of Scripture, had long argument in their annual meeting about founding some high schools. A brother ended the discussion by quoting Paul's injunction not "to mind high things." That settled it.

It is clear that only study of the Old Testament can prepare us for the best using of it. We must search the Scriptures.

Many witnesses to the value of Old Testament study might

be cited; but one is here cited—Jesus Christ. If He needed it do not we? The ignorance of the average Christian about the Old Testament is amazing; yet many know something about it who know little of it. We read the newspapers carefully and regularly; that is good; but shall we not find a place, the best place, in each day for the Bible? We read books and study them; shall we not use the best book? All theories of inspiration, or of the canon, or of single or duplex authorship of certain books, or of their dates of composition, important as they are, must carefully be put secondary to the practical daily study of the Old Testament for daily spiritual needs.

And if the Old Testament is thus important, is not the New paramount?

And is it not a singular error of many who are not Church members, that the Bible is for Christians? They mean to study it when they are converted; as if the starving man should say, "Yes, I will eat when I am not so hungry!" By the Word of God we are born again; it is the instrument of the Holy Spirit in regeneration. People who are waiting for a revival or a cyclone of spiritual power to sweep them into the kingdom, and who may wait their lives long in vain, may find the way by daily, prayerful, obedient study of the Bible. It is for them.

REVELATION AND THE BIBLE.

[Contributed to CHRISTIAN THOUGHT.]

BY THE REV. W. J. MUTCH, NEW HAVEN, CONN.

THE constructive work which is to be done on the basis of modern biblical criticism is well exemplified in "Revelation and the Bible" (Macmillan, $2), the latest work of Rev. R. F. Horton, of London. Mr Horton has had phenomenal success as the pastor of an independent church in London, and will deliver the Lyman Beecher Lectures on Preaching at Yale Divinity School this season.

In a former work on "Inspiration and the Bible" this author has searched out and presented in somewhat popular form the facts which have been established by criticism in regard to the doctrine of Inspiration. The negative aspect which that work necessarily took, and which has been a source of trouble to so many minds, made it incumbent upon him to present this positive and constructive view of the subject. In this work he has followed in general the lines laid down by Professor Driver, in his "Introduction to the Literature of the Old Testament."

Under this view it is of course Revelation rather than Inspiration which is the subject. "By revelation is meant a truth or truths received from God into the minds of men, not by the ordinary methods of inquiry, such as observation and reasoning, but by a direct operation of the Holy Spirit. . . . In the exact sense of the word the whole Bible is not, and cannot be, a revelation, for it contains, and must contain, historical and other materials which were obtained in the ordinary way."

The method of procedure is an inductive one. He divides the Bible into a dozen sections, and analyzes out the main ideas which seem to fall within his definition of revelation. In Genesis the two striking elements of revelation are a God dealing plastically with the world, with man and with history; and a nation drawn out of remote and obscure beginnings by the will

of God, and shaped by an unceasing discipline for a far-off destiny. A noble and rational conception of prophecy and revelation is hinted at when He says: "Where men hear the voice of God and obey, they are led by a way which they know not, towards an end which they cannot surmise, and their words and deeds under this divine leading become, as it were, prophetic; the story of their lives is a revelation of God." Thus God's choice of a nation or of a person for a special service, and His providential guidance of that service becomes in reality a revelation of God and His ways.

Messianic prophecy was a revelation of the far-off destiny of the chosen nation which he calls the Summit of Revelation, Jesus Christ. The prophets caught glimpses of that Summit and by ways they knew not they were drawn toward it, and drew the people after them. The vital question about the memoirs of Jesus is not as to who wrote them, or whether they were miraculously guaranteed against error, but is it actually as Jesus said, "Lo, I am with you alway, even to the end of the world"?

Experience is proving this to be true, and therefore the revelations which those memoirs contain are of inestimable value; but the actual work of the Spirit to-day must be regarded as more important than the records long since produced under His inspiration. The New Testament grew out of Him and is dependent upon Him, and He is not dependent upon it.

The revelation contained in the Pauline letters is that of the Christ living in the human heart, and producing divine results, and the best explanation of the facts of redemption. This is distinguished as carefully as may be from what is not revelation; it is shown to be truth that came from God, and not attainable by the ordinary methods of knowledge; it is tested by that safe principle which is given in the Old Testament for the approval of prophecy, whether it comes true or not.

In a similar way all parts of the sacred writings are examined, and in them all are found more or less important traces and treasures of revelation. Upon this fact is based their character and claim of sacredness, and not upon any explicit claim which they make for themselves. All the great and fundamental truths of revelation are manifest by their own recognizance, and not by

a credential of so-called inspiration ; rather are these truths the credentials of the writings by which they are known to be inspired.

It may, perhaps, be questioned whether it is possible to separate out and define as definitely and surely as Mr. Horton professes to do that truth which is revelation in distinction from what is not ; but he has made a noteworthy effort in a direction which will be most satisfying to an increasing number of minds who are in the transition state, between the old traditional and the new devoutly rational views of the Scriptures.

CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY IN THE NORTHWEST.

[Contributed to CHRISTIAN THOUGHT.]

BY THE REV. GRANVILLE R. PIKE, FARGO, N. DAK.

ARTICLES of incorporation have been signed by representatives of North Dakota and Western Minnesota providing for an Interstate Summer Assembly at Detroit Lake. This is one of a delightful chain of lakes lying in Minnesota, some fifty miles east of Fargo, N. D., on the line of the Northern Pacific Railway. A beautiful site, including twenty-five acres of heavily timbered land, bordered by two charming lakes, has been deeded to the association. The work of erecting an auditorium, cottages and docks, and the laying out of grounds will begin at the first opening of spring.

The region is widely known as offering many attractions in the way of fishing, hunting, bathing, boating and driving ; and the Summer Schools will have the advantage of a fine nucleus for their audiences in the large cottage population sojourning there every season. Hotel accommodations are already provided, and stage and steamer lines have been some time in operation. Thus it is evident that the new venture has many and material advantages in its location. The intention is to have a series of Summer Schools, with lectures, papers, discussions, and whatever may throw light on the live questions of the day. The object of the association, as stated in its constitution,

is "to promote the interests of education in science, art and literature, and the diffusion of Christian culture." Correspondence is now in progress, arranging a programme for the coming summer.

The movement is entirely non-sectarian, and has the hearty support of all thoughtful, public-spirited citizens, who see in it a means of overcoming, in some degree, the disadvantages under which any new community labors in being remote from libraries, colleges, lecture halls, and other centres of educational influence. In addition to the intellectual stimulus afforded, it is expected that this organization will also serve the good purpose of uniting, and thus giving point and weight to the religious and moral sentiment of the community, in opposition to the moral indifference, as well as to the antagonism, both latent and outspoken, which seem always to flourish in the rank soil of new States.

Much of our work, therefore, will necessarily lie along the same lines and be, in fact, a continuation of that which the Institute of Christian Philosophy is doing. In part, at least, this association is its offspring, and it is desired that this feature of the new lake-side university shall be, as suggested to the writer recently by President Deems, under the auspices of the parent institute. It had been our hope to entice the doctor away next summer from his many engagements in the East long enough to preside over the opening session of this branch of our undertaking, and to give us the benediction of his approval and the inspiration of his presence.

In order to the widest educational efficacy of our Assembly, we shall need an "organ" for the diffusion of the literature produced in the various sections. Instead of starting a new one, how would it do to make CHRISTIAN THOUGHT the literary vehicle of this institution also? If accumulation of valuable material demand, and multiplication of subscribers justify, make the magazine a monthly. We are anxious that in this or any other feasible way, these two organizations may be drawn into close co-operation and strengthen each others' hands in their common endeavor to enlarge the horizon of humanity and to advance the Kingdom of the Blessed Redeemer.

SOME NEW THING.

[Contributed to CHRISTIAN THOUGHT.]

BY REV. ARTHUR J. BROWN, D.D., PORTLAND, OREGON.

"For all the Athenians and strangers which were there spent their time in nothing else, but either to tell, or to hear some new thing."

ATHENS! the very name conjures up a host of pleasing memories—memories of battle-field and studio, of bema and academy. It was a wonderful city, a city of spacious forums and graceful porticos, of shapely statues and magnificent palaces, of temple-crowned hills looking up to a radiant sky and away to a blue and sparkling sea. To that city we trace much of our intellectual inspiration. It has been happily characterized as one of those cities whose contributions to the world have been greater than those of empires. All Russia means less to us than that single town, whose population was never great as compared with modern cities. For there the human mind attained its highest culture. There appeared a long line of poets and philosophers, sculptors and architects, orators and statesmen, whose fame has survived the changes of more than twenty centuries and which will survive the changes of twenty centuries to come. There beauty and valor, eloquence and song, patriotism and refinement, all physical graces and intellectual accomplishments made their home. And to-day we, though of a far-distant age and land, find a reverence for the achievements of Athens compatible with nineteenth century enlightenment, and deem a knowledge of her language and literature indispensable to a liberal education.

But the city which Paul saw was not the glorious Athens of old. There was, indeed, no visible change. Outwardly, Athens was as magnificent as ever. Her public and private edifices were still numerous and costly. Innumerable statues still adorned her streets and temples. But there was an intellectual

and moral decay. The vigor of the citizens had departed. The spirit of independence had vanished. Athens was no longer producing great men or doing memorable deeds; she was simply "trading" on the memory of past glories. A Miltiades no longer led her citizens to war. A Pericles no longer guided her councils. A Socrates no longer disputed in her forums. Her streets were filled with shallow rhetoricians, who boasted of a greatness which they were not enhancing. It was a city of gossipers, of babblers, of men intellectually enfeebled and morally debased. Still "Greece, but living Greece no more."

As Paul walked the streets of this city, "his spirit was stirred in him." He saw the idolatry of the people, but he also saw another evidence of degeneracy which impressed him almost as deeply as the idolatry, and which was even more truly characteristic. It secured him a hearing, but it deprived the hearing of value. He describes it thus: "All the Athenians and strangers which were there spent their time in nothing else, but either to tell, or to hear some new thing." A manifest physical, intellectual and moral weakness was strangely blended with an intense eagerness for novelty. We ordinarily associate a desire for new things with progress, but here that desire is associated with that which is the reverse of progress.

This warrants the statement that a desire for something new is not necessarily indicative of progress. Indeed, it may be indicative of regress. It may not be an earnest desire for something better, but a mere restless, uneasy craving for change. To seek the new simply because it is the new, and apart from any consideration of its intrinsic worth, is to go backward rather than forward.

I would not disparage legitimate desire for progress. Only a bigot will assert that "That which is new is not true, and that which is true is not new." Some new things are true, and some old things are false. As a rule, too, the collective wisdom of an age has been greater than that of the age which preceded it. I am persuaded that the world is growing better and wiser. I should be sorry if it were not. God reigns. "There is yet more light to break out of His most Holy Word," more truth to be discovered in the realms of nature and of mind. Our own age has made

invaluable contributions to the stock of the world's knowledge, and succeeding ages will doubtless make other contributions equally valuable. Let reverent investigation go on. Let it be accorded the widest liberty. To hinder it were intellectual and moral treason.

But the contention now is that progress and restlessness are not synonymous terms. It is not the seeking of "some new thing" which is wrong, but the "doing nothing else, but either to tell, or to hear some new thing." Indeed, so far from being good, it is evil. It indicates a fevered condition of the system—an unhealthy and morbid state. It begets instability of character and purpose. It leads to superficial ideas and modes of thinking. It withdraws attention from the tried and settled, and directs it to the flotsam and jetsam of daily happenings, the real importance of which is hardly ever discerned till time has set them in their true perspective. I do not mean, of course, that a knowledge of daily happenings is of no value. But it is not all that is of value. Much occurred before our time which is of inestimable importance. Men need to-day, not less of the new, but more of the old, a wiser perception of its relative worth.

More seriously, this craving for something new often dupes men into the acceptance of old errors. As a matter of fact, most new things are comparatively worthless, not all, but most. Thousands of new books are being published every year, but whoever takes the time and patience to examine them will find that the really valuable books are like Gratiano's two grains of wheat in two bushels of chaff. Originality is rare. What we call originality is usually eccentricity, and eccentricity nearly always means a screw loose in the intellectual or moral machinery. If an alleged new thing proves to be really good, the presumption is that it is not as new as it was supposed to be. But it not infrequently happens that the so-called new idea is an old error. We hear much in these days about materialism as the most formidable of modern foes to Christianity. But "the materialists of our day have not advanced a step upon the system of Epicurus," who lived three hundred years before Christ. Many deny the doctrine of the Trinity, who are apparently ignorant that such a man as Arius ever existed, and that every

phase of the Trinitarian conflict was fought out in the fourth century by masters in apologetics. We are told almost daily that modern thought has shown a belief in miracles to be unreasonble, and yet there is hardly a modern objection to miracles which was not anticipated by Celsus, who lived in the second century. Multitudes have adopted the theory of Strauss regarding the person of Christ, who evidently do not know that the theory of Strauss has been repudiated in the land of his birth, and that "there is not enough left of the mythical theory of Strauss to make a fig leaf to cover the shame of modern scepticism." The majority of these people who so ostentatiously parade themselves as "advanced thinkers" are really retrogressive thinkers. So far from being originators of anything new and good, they are, as a rule, simply body-snatchers, prowling in the world's theological graveyard, resurrecting mouldering skeletons, dressing them up in new phraseology, and complacently displaying them to the world as the "latest teachings of modern science." Ever and anon, some troubled soul sends me a newspaper clipping containing an attack upon evangelical Christianity, and implores me to write an article in reply. But I usually find the article to be a rehash of arguments which have not only been refuted a hundred times, but which are no longer used even by intelligent sceptics. It is strange that some secular papers, which are conspicuously able in their discussion of secular topics, should sometimes allow their "religious" editor to convert their columns into a veritable museum of malodorous antiquities. Instead of being tempted to write an article in reply, I am more often tempted to make the request which Mark Twain is said to have made to the Egyptian guide who was waxing eloquent over a collection of mummies: "If you have any nice, fresh corpses, now, trot them out; but don't try to palm off any more of these mouldy mummies on us."

Conversely, the presumption is that the old and established ideas are true. Not always, I grant. I would not fall into the opposite error. I would not question the reality or the value of the many great achievements of the present age. But it is a fair presumption that the old is the true. This was so of Athens in the time of Paul. The past was glorious, but the Athenians

of Paul's day, with all their passion for hearing or telling some new thing, added nothing to the stock of the world's knowledge. For all that we owe to Athens, we go centuries back of those babblers. It is a recognized principle in our civil government that the opinion of the multitude is more apt to be correct than the opinion of the individual. Our thought is but the development of this principle. The accumulated wisdom of ages is more likely to be of value than the wisdom of a single generation. Dryden and Milton were contemporaries. The age in which they lived thought Dryden the greater poet, but posterity has reversed that judgment. The world now places Milton in the front rank of poets, and Dryden in the third rank. So, too, the contemporaries of John Bunyan regarded him and his work with contempt, and even Cowper, in his exquisitely appreciative tribute, said:

> I name thee not, lest so despised a name
> Should move a sneer at thy deserved fame.

But to-day the Pilgrim's Progress is considered one of the world's best books, and the most fastidious critics vie each other in their tribute of praise. When any idea or book or institution has withstood the storms of ages and approved itself to the judgment of successive generations, the probabilities are that it is based on eternal truth. This is well illustrated by the history of the Church. How enduring her power has been! Centuries have come and gone—empires have risen and crumbled, but the Church of God has remained. Revolutions which have brought ruin to everything else have only hastened her onward progress.

> Oh, where are kings and empires now,
> Of old that went and came?
> But, Lord, Thy Church is praying yet,
> A thousand years the same.

All history teaches us that progress is as likely to consist in getting back to old standards as in creating new ones.

These things need to be remembered in this age, particularly in America. A craving for the new is fast becoming a national characteristic. We have a comparatively new country; we are giving the world some new ideas and inventions of real value,

and, intoxicated by our success, we are in danger of being led into the restless spirit of the Athenians of Paul's time, who "spent their time in nothing else, but either to tell, or to hear some new thing." European observers like Bryce notice this spirit and comment upon it. There is real ground for the apprehension that we may become a volatile people, lacking in stability and weight of character.

We see this in literature, in the demand for new books, and in the neglect of old ones of tried value. "Robert Elsmere" is a case in point. The book is simply a dressing-up, in popular narrative style, of the stalest and shallowest rationalistic objections to Christianity. Great was the commotion which it excited! Dire were the prophecies of the ruin which it would accomplish in the Church! But lo, that wonderful book, which was so vociferously praised, and which was to empty all our churches, is now a drug in the market, and some time ago I saw a great stack of copies surmounted by a placard bearing the inscription "Robert Elsmere and a Cake of Soap for 25 cents," and the salesman told me that he could not get rid of the book even at that price. Go into any public library, and you will find that the new and silly modern society novels are soiled and worn by frequent reading, while the world's really valuable books stand upon the shelves unsoiled, save by the dust which has had ample time to accumulate upon them since they were last called for.

We see it in science, in the haste with which new theories are accepted and promulgated as facts. Indeed, no matter how wild a theory is, there are always multitudes who are ready to seize it, and to proclaim that all existing institutions must be reorganized in harmony with it. Some one asks, "Why is it that the majority of scientific men are not Christians?" The question is based upon a false assumption. The majority of scientific men are Christians. Our scientific men are, as a rule, the professors of science in our colleges and universities, and nine-tenths of them are, and by the charters of their institutions must be, Christians. The greatest scientists the world has known have been disciples of Christ. Witness Copernicus, Kepler, Newton, Bayle, Cuvier, Faraday, Herschell, Brewster, Maxwell, and

many others. At a recent convention of scientific men, the proceedings were opened with prayer, and a daily prayer meeting was maintained by the delegates, a large majority of whom were Christians. The greatest and best men of our own, as of the past ages, have been Christian men. Every member of the present Supreme Court of the United States is a Christian. Gladstone declares—and his testimony outweighs that of a host of others—that "neither the highest poetry nor the highest philosophy can now exist in separation from that new conception of the relations between God and man which Christianity has supplied." And he adds that of the sixty master minds with whom he has come in contact during his long public life, and who have molded the affairs of the modern world, all but five were Christians. We are sometimes told that there is a conflict between science and religion. It is a mistake. There is no conflict between science and religion. Indeed, Christianity has been the mother of all the science there is, has founded and maintained the institutions in which the science is taught, and has furnished and is to-day furnishing the men who preside over those institutions. Those who believe that the majority of scientific men are not Christians, have been deceived by the vociferous clamor of a comparatively small number of scientific men, who make up for the paucity of their numbers by the prodigiousness of their noise, and who resemble nothing else so much as the "three Tooley Street tailors" who issued a proclamation commencing, "We, the people of England." The most eminent among them is Professor Huxley. A minister's opinion of him might not be considered valuable, but listen to the opinion of the Duke of Argyll, one of the foremost thinkers of the modern world.

Speaking of Professor Huxley, he says: "Loud and confident in matters in which both he and we are profoundly ignorant, we see him hardly less boisterous in asserting ignorance where the materials of knowledge lie abundant to our hands. We have seen his canons of criticism—how rude and undiscerning; his claim for the physical science—how inflated; his own dealings with one of them—how shallow and how dogmatic." Talk about the bigotry of theology! The bigotry of some of these agnos-

tic infidels would make Torquemada turn green with envy if he could witness it. "What is an agnostic?" Burdette represents a small boy as asking, who was reading something by Huxley. "An agnostic," replied Uncle George, "is a man who loudly declares that he knows nothing, and gets mad and abuses you if you believe him. He says he doesn't know anything, but he really believes he knows everything."

We see this same craving for new things in every-day life, in the restless moving of people from place to place, in the frequency of business changes, in the small talk of society, in the rage of speculation. It seems to be the great object in life of many people to devise something novel, "something we've never had before," the utility of the thing devised being usually a secondary consideration.

And we see it especially in religion. Many people do not like the old ideas of sin and atonement, of regeneration and sovereignty. They want something new, and the minister who gratifies them is sure to have a large, though unsubstantial following. Multitudes are hurried hither and thither by their craving for change. It may be said of them, in a sense which the inspired writer did not contemplate, that "here they have no continuing city." Their religious convictions are those of the last book they have read or the last person they have talked with. They have no settled ideas of truth. They are "spending their time in nothing else, but either to tell, or to hear some new thing." People speak about the credulity of faith, but they might more profitably talk about the credulity of scepticism. Men who will not believe the plainest and most clearly established facts of Christianity, almost fall over each other in their eagerness to accept anti-Christian theories which involve ten times more serious difficulties than the doctrines of Christianity. They stand like eaglets, opening their mouths at every passing shadow or slight noise, and ready to swallow with avidity whatever may be thrown into them. Men and brethren, there is danger in this tendency. Athens was never so degenerate, never so effeminate, never so despicable, as when her citizens "spent their time in doing nothing else, but either to tell, or to hear some new thing."

Suffer me in conclusion to make two additional remarks:

First. A disposition to undervalue established ideas or institutions is a sign of a weak mind. A misconception is prevalent at this point. There are some, particularly among the young, who say that they will not accept anything which they have not personally investigated and found to be true; and they pride themselves upon that position, and deem it an evidence of intellectual strength and independence. As a matter of fact, it is simply an evidence of intellectual conceit and moral debility. Belief is normal to sense and health; unbelief is abnormal to both. He is not a wise man who assumes that all who have lived before him were either ignorant or foolish, and that wisdom appeared in the world at the moment he was ushered into it. It is sheer folly to put an interrogation point after all the truths in the horizon till you have examined them for yourselves. Has the world learned nothing in all these thousands of years? Has it proved nothing to be true? Does the endorsement of ages create no favorable presumption? Of course, investigate for yourselves as soon as possible and as profoundly as possible. Christianity does not demand blind faith. It is not afraid of examination. It has stood the questionings of nineteen hundred years, and it can probably stand yours. But pending such investigation, you will do well to assume the truthfulness of that which the world has long held to be true. A sensible man will no more refuse to become a Christian because he has not had time to investigate for himself the history and claims of Christianity, than he will refuse to become a citizen of the country in which he was born and reared until he has satisfied himself by years of study, that the institutions of that country are better than the institutions of other countries. He who declines to avail himself of an electric car, because he has not yet learned what electricity is, is not a wise man, but a fool.

Second. In this restless age we need a progressive conservatism, a willingness to accept the new when it is the true, but a holding fast to the old which has demonstrated its right to be. Why, the sublimest truths of the world are old. The sovereignty and fatherhood of God, the inspiration of the Bible, the redeeming work of Jesus Christ, these and kindred truths are not

new. This Gospel which we preach, and in which lies the hope of the race, is not a new Gospel. It has been in the world nearly two thousand years. It has been preached amid the snows of Greenland and in the jungles of Africa ; on the steppes of Asia and in the valleys of South America. It has rescued millions from selfishness and sin, from temporal and eternal ruin. It has assuaged earth's sorrows. It has given scope and dignity to human life. It has filled dying hours with joy and peace. It has been, and it is, the mightiest of agencies for the saving and uplifting of a lost and dying race. And we love it because it is old, because time has not been able to weaken it or exposure to tarnish it—because all the attacks of earth and hell have not been able to overthrow it. It stands before us after the lapse of all these tumultuous centuries, still fadeless in beauty, majestic in strength, and imperishable in vitality. That Gospel I declare unto you. I have no other. I want no other. I declare it boldly, because it has been tested by time and found to be true. I proclaim it to you as the solution, and the only solution of the problems of society and government—as the adequate instrument for the regeneration of the world, as the sure salvation of all those who put their trust in it. Yes, it is the old Gospel, the Gospel of Jesus Christ, that the world needs. It is a story of pathos unspeakable, of love most wondrous—a story fraught with sweetest music to my ears. In the hours of my soul's need, tell me not of some new thing, but

Tell me the old, old story
Of unseen things above,
Of Jesus and His glory,
Of Jesus and His love.

Yes, and when that world's glory
Is dawning on my soul,
Tell me the old, old story :
"Christ Jesus makes thee whole."

THE SPIRITUALITY OF THE MATERIAL.

[Contributed to CHRISTIAN THOUGHT.]

BY THE REV. GEORGE D. HERRON, D.D., BURLINGTON, IOWA.

MAN is spirit, as God is spirit. The physical is not an end in itself, nor has any value in itself, but is divinely meant to be the symbol and expression, the aid and the servant of the material. Matter is objectified thought. It stands as the figure of spiritual reality. The only value which physical properties have, whether bodies or bread, houses or lands, is that of helping men to communion with God and fellowship with one another. Material things have only one righteous use, and that use is the expression of our love toward God as our Father, and our love toward our fellow-men as our brothers. The creation of matter is but a step in our eternal development along the line of unity with all that is. The material stands only that man may venture his faith and grow in love. It is the currency of the realm of spirit, having no worth in itself, but valuable only as man uses it to commune with God and to serve his brothers. Matter is an usurper, a tyrant and destroyer, when permitted to rule the spirit. The material is the servant of the spiritual. The face of nature itself changes with the spiritual development.

This is the truth that needs to be heralded aloud and abroad amidst the din and strife of the servants of the tyrannic materialism that rules our times, crushing out the moral sanity of Church and State, putting madness in the hearts of men and giving blindness to their eyes, trampling beneath its feet of greed all the divine humanities and vitalities that agonize to lift the race into the freedom of eternal truth, and lead it under the power of the love of God. Man was not made to live by bread alone, but by communion with God and fellowship with his brothers. Physical comfort and material gains are not the end of life. We are the children of the skies; the brethren of Jesus; the heirs of all God is and has. What we call the getting of a living ought to be merely incidental to the fulfilment of our destiny in Christ.

Physical life is no end in itself, but a means to the end, of attaining the moral stature of the Son of God. It is just as immoral for us to make the getting of a living the object of our life, as it would have been for Jesus to make the comfort of His body the object of His life. We have no more right to keep store, teach school, till a farm, saw wood, loan money, mine coal, heal the sick, preach the Gospel, own property, use personal gifts and talents, mainly for the purpose of getting a living than Jesus had to work miracles for the same reason. Physical properties, like intellectual talents and spiritual gifts, are servants of the divine ego, the God-imaged spirit-man. The various occupations, the trades and callings of man, are so many forms of communion with God and of human fellowship. Every earthly vocation is moral, according to the morals of the kingdom of Heaven, only as it is a ministry of the Gospel.

By this truth only can we construct a Christian doctrine of property, or work out the salvation of our life, through the channels of our temporal occupations. A man's right in property does not differ from Christ's right in his body. Nothing is mine except what I use for the world. Humanity is greater than property, and social duties above all individual rights. A man has a right to own property only as he uses it as the gift of God for the salvation of men. The moral right of ownership does not extend beyond the use of property for the common welfare of society.

A man's right in ownership can be morally established no farther than he uses property as a medium of communion with God and a bond of fellowship with man. He who does not make his property a ministry of the Gospel, does not in reality own it; rather his property owns him; his spirit is the slave of matter. No man can be justified in gaining and accumulating material things, save as he uses those things as sacredly and for the same ends as Christ used His cross. Property is the human instrument for the execution of divine justice between man and man—that justice which is the manifestation of the love of God in our humanity.

By this truth of life consisting in fellowship with God and man, and by this truth alone, can we proceed to do our work in

the world, whatever our occupation, whether it concern the management of material properties or the use of spiritual gifts and intellectual powers. Christ would not use His gifts for personal ends, even in what was apparently the most innocent and pressing need. As the Son of God, He doubted not the power and timeliness of His Father's word in providing for His physical wants. It was infinitely better that His body should perish than that His faith in the fatherhood of God and the divine sonship of man should fail. He was in the world to assert righteousness as the real occupation of man, and divine fellowship as the life of man. And all earthly occupations were but forms through which man could give expression to his divine vocation. He came to declare the kingdom of God and His righteousness as the only pursuit of man, in the faith that obedience to the Word of God would naturally bring with it bread and meat for the body.

Slowly men are coming to apprehend that gain is not the end of life, and that the business of this world can be done by every word that proceedeth out of the mouth of God. Those who are willing to suffer temporal loss, rather than dishonor the spiritual Word of God, will find that Word sufficient for physical support and administration of material affairs. Every business institution ought to be a philanthropic enterprise. It is unrighteous that it should be anything else. Life is philanthropy. That existence which is not philanthropy is not life. The real worth of a railway, or a factory, or a store, or a coal mine, or a legislative hall, or a bank, or a trade, or a church, is in the fact that it is a medium for loving men; of developing their characters and drawing them into a communion with God. The business affairs of the world are not hindrances to religion, but the means of its development.

The Christian ideal is that of every earthly occupation as a ministry of the Gospel. The Christian's trade or calling, his property or employment, is his opportunity for serving his fellowmen for Jesus' sake. The love and service of man, the education of the soul and moral growth, ought to be the deciding motive by which any man should enter any occupation. How can I best fulfil all righteousness—the divine answer to this question should be the choice of a man's work in the world. There is

nothing else for which to train the youth of our time but the ministry of the Gospel, for there is no work in this world that ought not to be a Gospel ministry.

The moral obligation rests upon every business establishment, to be a sanctuary of divine communion and human fellowship, as truly as upon the loftiest cathedral or the humblest missionary chapel. Bargain and exchange, profit and loss, buying and selling, work and wages, are merely the channels through which we may touch one another's lives with a touch that shall be loving and divine, with an influence that shall be morally invigorating and spiritually uplifting. With this understanding only can any man righteously and intelligently decide what shall be his work in the world—the understanding that gain is simply the incident of our earthly occupations, and that the execution of the love of Christ and the application of the righteousness of God is all that makes work worth doing. Religion is not an emotion, but work with God.

The Christian ought to build his factory because he has compassion on the multitudes and sees in his factory an opportunity for helping men and women to bodily and moral health. The same is true of every calling. Life—all life—life in all its works, impulses and affections, in all its relationships and movements, is communion and fellowship. Life is prayer. Life is companionship with God. Life is comradeship with men. Life is unity with the truth.

That life is the largest, that life is deepest and divinest, that life is most human and vital, which has the most in common with God and humanity; which has the strongest and closest relationships; which has the surest unity with all that is loving and eternal; which bears in its heart the most sympathetic oneness with all the needs of man and the purposes of God; which strikes its roots deepest in the ground of everlasting truth and reaches all-embracing affections, farthest and widest, into the universe of love. And there is no work to which man puts his hand, no enterprise to which man applies the energies of his brain or quickness of his thought, that may not be the investiture of his life in these eternal relationships. Every occupation is man's opportunity to share in the life of God and in the life of the race. This divine conception

of all human work as a ministry of the spirit sublimes the most common-place tasks, and hallows the lowliest drudgery with a benediction that makes whoever despises its lowliness a blasphemer of God.

To doubt the spiritual use of material things, to regard any human occupation as being other than a ministry of the Gospel, is to disbelieve in the righteousness of God and deny the practicability of the truth as it is in Jesus. If we do not believe that by seeking the kingdom of God and His righteousness first, the things of the body shall be sufficiently added unto us, then we do not believe in Jesus Christ. If we have not faith that bread will be naturally, wisely, and abundantly given along the line of obedience to every word that proceedeth out of the mouth of God, we then confess that goodness is not sovereign and supreme in the universe, and that it is better to serve time than serve eternity; we declare food and raiment to be more than life, body more than soul, and assert the eternal and spiritual as the servant of the temporal and material; we degrade spirit to be the slave of matter; we declare that man does live by bread alone, and cannot trust the word that proceedeth out of the mouth of God as being sufficient for his physical wants.

Faith in the righteousness of God as practicable, social and industrial law would abolish what we understand by modern benevolence, or philanthropy, with its pride and deceit, its conceit and hypocrisy. He who administers his property for selfish ends, for personal gain, and then endows a public institution, or a missionary enterprise, with a part of his selfish gains, is in no sense a philanthropist, and has not even made an approach to justice, far less to benevolence. The philanthropy of selfishness is a self-delusion, a public hypocrisy, an attempt to bribe the righteousness of God and deceive the Holy Ghost. He who establishes a mercantile enterprise upon the basis of the Golden Rule is an incomparably greater philanthropist in fact, than he who founds hospitals for the poor out of the profits of selfish gain; for he helps to make poverty unnecessary. He who will apply the righteousness of God to the management of a great railway is a greater philanthropist than the builder of many churches or the founder of many colleges.

The great opportunities for philanthropy, that is, for loving and serving one's fellow-men, lie along the line of industrial and commercial occupations. The great business enterprises of our day are themselves the supreme opportunities for modern Christian philanthropy. The mighty brother-loving tasks to which the Spirit of God calls the genius and enterprise and self-sacrifice of the present, are the conversion of manufacture and trade into the ministers of divine righteousness; into instruments for the execution of the justice of divine love. And work done for universal and eternal ends, in unity with God and obedience to His will, for human fellowship's sake, transcends in joy and quality all work done for selfishness' sake.

MONTHLY MEETINGS AT COLUMBIA COLLEGE.

BY THE SECRETARIES.

February, 1893.—The regular monthly meeting of the Institute was held on February 7, 1893, at 8 P.M., in Hamilton Hall, Columbia College. The Rev. Dr. Edward J. Hamilton, one of the life members of the Institute, presided in the absence of the president. The Rev. Edward M. Deems, of Hornellsville, N. Y., conducted the devotional exercises. After the reading and approval of the minutes of the last meeting, the following new members were announced: Alva H. Morrill, A.M., D.D., Principal Starkey Seminary, Edgetown, N.Y.; P. H. Swift, A.M., Ph.D., pastor Oakland M.E. Church, Chicago, Ill.; M. Edward Fawcett, Ph.M., A.M., pastor M.E. Church, Mount Carroll, Ill.; James Maple, D.D., Milford, N. J.

Prof. A. G. Hopkins, of Hamilton College, read a paper on "Seneca the Reformer." The discussion following the lecture was conducted by Dr. Hamilton, the Rev. J. H. Edwards, of this city, and the Rev. Mr. Deems. A vote of thanks was presented to Dr. Hopkins, and a copy of his paper was requested for publication in CHRISTIAN THOUGHT.

The Rev. J. H. Edwards offered the following paper in view of the illness of the President, Dr. Charles F. Deems:

"*Resolved*, That the members of the American Institute of Christian Philosophy tender their heartfelt sympathy to its honored and beloved President, in view of the bodily illness which keeps him from his accustomed place among them, as well as from his many and important labors in their relations.

"The Institute takes this opportunity to express its profound sense of the invaluable service rendered to the Christian world by the Rev. Dr. Charles F. Deems, as chief founder of the Institute of Christian truth by his voice and pen. His breadth of vision, his genial and most catholic spirit and his practical ability, shown especially in drawing to his aid so many of the best thinkers and workers, have given the Institute a character and influence recognized in many lands.

"The members of this society join with the numberless friends of Dr. Deems in the earnest hope and prayer that his physical disablement may soon be removed, and that his hand and voice may long be continued in their consecrated service."

Dr. Hamilton said: "The resolutions offered by Dr. Edwards need no words from me, nor from any member of this Institute, to ensure a cordial unanimity in the adoption of them. They set forth the heartfelt sentiment of every one of us. But resolutions are formal things; and I, for one, feel impelled to say that no words, however fitly chosen, can adequately express our sense of the loss, of the calamity, that has befallen us in the illness of Dr. Deems.

"The good doctor has not only been the head of this society, he has been its heart, its life, its soul, its very being. Providence specially qualified and called him to be the founder of the American Institute of Christian Philosophy; and it may well be questioned whether any other man in our country could have done the work that he has done.

"His position in New York as pastor of the Church of the Strangers is unique. He belongs to no sect, denomination or party; he is simply an expounder and preacher of the Gospel of Jesus Christ. The most catholic and kindliest of men, he enjoys the sympathy, the affection and the confidence of all the Christian people of this city, yes, and of this land. For such has been the career of Dr. Deems, so indefatigable and so apostolic

have been his labors and his journeyings, that no living preacher (I might almost say no living public man) is so widely and so favorably known in America as he. East and West and North and South, the people have looked with interest on his genial countenance, have been won by his unaffected manners, his humorous pleasantry and his off-hand ways, and have been charmed by his sweet voice and his moving eloquence.

"But what specially qualifies Dr. Deems to be president of this society is his thorough knowledge of the ways and affairs and thoughts of men. Having himself the simplicity of a child, he is familiar with every turn and aspect of human charac er; and, continually immersed in the activities of a most busy life, he keenly appreciates the importance and has a clear insight into the merits of philosophic questions. These qualities, together with his tireless perseverance, his inimitable and never-failing tact, the readiness of his repartees, the ease and happiness of his conversational remarks, and his natural gift of simple and elegant extemporaneous speaking, have wonderfully fitted him to be the central figure in a brotherhood of Christian thinkers.

"Should Dr. Deems be now removed from our midst by a continuance of his disability, I know not what would become of our Institute. It would be very difficult to find any fit successor to continue the work which he has so grandly begun. But the earnest hope and prayer of us all have been expressed in the words of Dr. Edwards. It is that Dr. Deems may be restored to such a state of health that he may for years to come do active service as the president of our society. I rather think that this is what Providence has in store for him. A man in his seventy-third year, after such a severe warning sickness, should no longer think of exhausting and multifarious labors. It is high time that Dr. Deems should rest for a few years and be quiet and patient, that he may all the more enjoy a resumption of his untiring activities in the better world. But Christian repose never means the doing of nothing; our hope is that our beloved and honored friend has yet before him, in the care and furtherance of the interests of this Institute, a congenial and important work. May God bless our brother and give him strength still to prosecute those aims of Christian usefulness which he has pursued so long!

Especially may Heaven grant him the desire of his heart respecting the complete endowment and establishment of this Institute, so that for generations to come it may stand as the monument of his wisdom and pious zeal, and may be an effective agency in the defence and advancement of divine truth!"

March, 1893.—The monthly meeting of the Institute was held on the evening of March 7, 1893, in Columbia College, Rev. Dr. D. J. McMillan, Corresponding Secretary of the Presbyterian Board of Home Missions, being in the chair. The Rev. Aaron Lloyd of Belleville, N. J., conducted the devotional exercises. After the reading and approval of the minutes of the last meeting, the following list of new members was announced: Transferred from annual to life membership, William C. Winslow, D.D., D.C.L., LL.D., Vice-president of the Egyptian Exploration Fund for the United States, Boston, Mass. New members: Rev. Leighton Williams, Amity Baptist Church, New York; Albinnes A. Johnson, D.D., A.M., President University of Wyoming, Laramie, Wyoming; William Alexander, A.M., D.D., Professor San Francisco Theological Seminary, San Rafael, Cal.; Elisha M. Carpenter, A.M., Superintendent Juvenile Asylum, New York. The Rev. Dr. W. W. McLane of New Haven, read a paper on "The Law of Land Tenure." The discussion following the lecture was conducted by the Rev. Mr. Lloyd, the Rev. J. H. Edwards, Mr. S. N. Wilder, Prof. Edward J. Hamilton. A vote of thanks was presented to Dr. McLane for his paper, which will appear in CHRISTIAN THOUGHT.

PRESIDENT DEEMS SENDS HIS THANKS.

Dr. C. F. Deems, the president of the Institute, continues to improve from week to week. He is very grateful to all the members of the Institute for their loving messages, but as he cannot at present reply to them personally he wishes to assure them all of his appreciation of their kindness.

CHRISTIAN THOUGHT.

ANARCHY, SOCIALISM AND THE LABOR MOVEMENT.

[Paper read at the meeting of the Institute of Christian Philosophy, July 18, 1892].

BY THE HON. WALTER B. HILL, MACON, GA.

ONE of our patriotic fellow-citizens has said that America is bounded on the north by the aurora borealis, bounded on the east by the history of the past, bounded on the south by the torrid zone, and bounded on the west by the day of judgment! Truly, we have a great country. "Boundless oceans wash its illimitable shores." But great as our nation is, it has to wrestle with some questions that are as big as itself. Such a question is the labor problem. It concerns not only ourselves, but the world. It involves the interests of all capitalists—from the Rothschilds, who hold mortgages on several of the Eastern nations, to the humblest employer of "hand"; and of all laborers, from the miner, who delves hundreds of feet beneath the surface of the earth, to the sailor who "over white surges clings to the reeling mast."

Socialism has been well called the storm cloud of the nineteenth century; and while I would not conceal my conviction that the cloud is already bigger than a man's hand, I do not propose to discuss the subject from the alarmist's point of view. There is a force in society which, for lack of a better name, I would call its inherent conservatism. Too little account has been taken of this saving influence. The power and value of this inherent force do not seem to have been fully realized. It is analogous to that power by which a great ship rights herself when struck by a storm in mid-ocean. If the ship were fastened between the rocks, the force of the waves would break her to pieces, but on the buoyant and bending surges she rides safely

through their violence. So, if society and government were wedged between theories and constitutions within immovable limits, they could not stand the attacks made upon them by revolutionary agitations, but fortunately government and society are elastic; they do not break because they can bend. Society is not the old bottle into which the new wine of agitation cannot be poured without imminent danger of bursting the vessel, but a living organism with a wonderful digestive apparatus.

FORMS OF AGITATION.

There are three distinct forms of agitation which will come into our discussion—Anarchy, Socialism and the Labor Movement. These three will presently be defined. It is necessary to get a clear idea of the distinction between them, not only to prevent confusion of thought, but to avoid injustice in opinion. The only thing which they have in common, is that each protests against the existing social and industrial order.

Anarchy aims at revolution and expects it to be violent. Socialism likewise aims at changes which would be equivalent to a revolution of society and government, but desires that it shall be peaceful. What has been referred to as the Labor Movement aims rather at a reformation to be achieved by working forward through the existing order of things. The remedies proposed by these three forms of agitation are wholly different. The Anarchists think more of bullets than ballots. One of their papers, published under the name of *Truth*, says: "*Truth* is five cents a copy, and dynamite is forty cents a pound." The other two movements look to a redress of their grievances through the power of the ballot. Anarchy aims at the overthrow of religion and the family. Its advocates proudly accept the designation, "The Godless." A prominent Anarchist recently said in Chicago that his allies "were as much against organized labor as they were against organized capital." The Knights of Labor expressly repudiate all violence, and discountenance the extreme doctrines of Socialism. These differences ought to be borne in mind throughout our entire discussion.

It will be noticed that I have omitted all mention of Communism. There are two forms of Communism that have been

proposed—voluntary and compulsory. Voluntary Communism has proven a failure. There is no reason why any number of individuals should not attempt the experiment of the joint ownership of property in a community. Such an experiment is within the limits of legal right, and involves no disadvantage or danger to any other communities. About fifty years ago quite a number of these societies were started in the United States. Some of them still exist, but they have not succeeded. They remind us of the result of a similar experiment at Jerusalem, which was made shortly after, or at the time of the introduction of Christianity. The early Christians "had all things in common," and the result was that St. Paul in his missionary tours was frequently found taking up collections for the "poor saints at Jerusalem."

The compulsory form of Communism, proposing a forcible division of property among the individuals composing the State, has now no advocates. The Anarchist and the Socialist alike disclaim this doctrine. The truth is, it is not sufficiently attractive. Even Anarchists themselves expressly leave room, in the form of society which they desire, for that energy of character which will secure the prizes of life for those who are strong. They profess the dogma of equality, but evidently it is the equality defined wittily by the French writer as "the desire to be equal to one's superiors and superior to one's equals." Their ideal society is a universal free lunch, in which every man may contend freely for the biggest piece of everything, and keep it if he can.

ANARCHY.

Anarchy means the absence of rule. The object to be attained is the abolition of authority, the clearing away of all government organism. The Anarchists claim that the world will go by itself, and hence all interference in the name of law, with this automatic action of society, is tyranny. Their ideal of the social state is that described in Scripture as the reverse of good: "In those days there was no king in Israel, but every man did that which was right in his own eyes" (Judges xvii. 6).

The serious fact for us is that in this country there are, according to the most conservative estimate, about 50,000 of these

distempered cranks and diabolical thugs. They sustain about one dozen newspapers, and it is a significant fact that all of them except one are published in German.

The danger which is implied in the existence of this class of men may be inferred from some of their utterances. In a speech in London, at a public gathering, Mr. Champion said, if he "thought that the miserable system under which they lived, and all its attendant horrors, could be done away to-morrow by cutting the throats of that million and a quarter of people whot ook so much more than their share of the bounties of nature, he would, if it was possible, do it with his own hand that minute." This statement, we are told, was received with loud cheers.

One of their newspapers concluded an attack upon Mr. Hewitt with this language: "Mr. Hewitt ought to be turned over to the same recruits whose services will be paid for out of Patrick Ford's emergency fund." Their papers devote themselves almost exclusively to stirring the passions of hate. They publish the bills of fare of the rich, and advise their readers to cut them out and "paste them on the old tin coffee-pot at home." They publish long lists of the rich men of the community under such titles as this: "The Grand Larcenists of America." Danton said at the time of the French Revolution, "We defy the royalty of Europe, and we throw at their feet, as the gage of battle, the head of a king." It would not surprise me any morning to read that these Anarchists had tossed down at the feet of our social order, as the gage of battle, the head of a millionaire. I am so thankful I am not a millionaire!

SOCIALISM.

The next form of agitation mentioned was Socialism. Its doctrine is that the State should own, control and operate, exclusively of individual title and enterprise, all the means of the production and the distribution of wealth. In this system the State is the owner, proprietor and the only employer. All the citizens become its employees. Some token representing so much of labor becomes the only currency. The political organization representing this theory is called the Socialistic Labor Party. The best estimates of its strength give it only about 25,000 in number.

It will not be expected that I should pause to attempt a refutation of the doctrines of Socialism. Whatever may be said of the doctrines, it is certainly true that up to this time all the plans of the Socialists, when they have been forced into practical statement, deserve no better name than that of *fantastic schemes*. Until they propose some methods which are better candidates for the favor of this practical age, it cannot be said that Socialism has vindicated for itself a place in the minds of men.

The object of this discussion is rather to take account of whatever elements of strength may be found in these theories, so as to estimate the power they are likely to acquire in this country of free opinion and free ballot. The elements of strength in Socialism are these: first, it has a philosophy; Karl Marx's great work on capital, "Das Capital." He teaches that all the past forms of society, Slavery, Feudalism and Capitalistic Employment, have all had their usefulness in their historical evolution; that society is now ready for, and demands a further growth. He bases his reasonings largely on the accepted premises of orthodox political economy, and attempts to prove that complete State control of capital and labor (that is, universal co-operation,) is the only solution of the evils which these premises admit as existing. It is an elaborate treatise, philosophical in method and closely reasoned throughout. These very qualities, however, deprive it of adaptation to the masses for whose supposed benefit it was written.

What was lacking in popularity in Marx's, has been supplied by the remarkable work of Henry George, entitled "Progress and Poverty." Political Economy has always been called the dismal science, but he makes it glow with the electric light of genius. His style is picturesque and beautiful in every sense of the word. No man since Cobbett has wielded the pure King's English with greater power, and no man since the days of Archbishop Whateley has surpassed him in the exquisite felicity of illustration. It has been printed in cheap form and has thus been brought within everybody's reach. More copies of it have circulated in England and America than any book which has been written since "Uncle Tom's Cabin." Although didactic in

form, it resembles that epoch-making book in the fact that it proclaims the evangel of a new emancipation.

In view of the unquestionable power and the wide diffusion of this book, it has been exceedingly fortunate for the cause of conservatism in this country that Henry George is only a partial Socialist. He admits that capital is entitled to interest. He admits that the owners of property are entitled to keep it in all forms except one. His argument is that land should be nationalized.

John Stuart Mill has already lent the weight of his great name to the doctrine that the increased rental value of land in progressive communities is an "unearned increment"—a development of wealth to which no form of human endeavor or sacrifice contributes; and this unearned increase might be appropriated by the community at large. A pithy expression of the fact upon which this argument rests is found in one of the Socialistic journals:

"There was a man in our town,
And he was wondrous wise;
He stepped upon a piece of ground
And held it for a rise.

"And when he saw the people come,
He said: 'It's very plain
I must buy lots and lots of land
To hold for further gain.'

"There was another man in town,
And he was not so wise;
He stepped into a wagon shop,
And there his trade he plies.

"And when the people swelled the town,
He saw it very plain,
That lots went up, and wages down;
Yet he did not complain."

Mr. George does not stop at Mr. Mill's scheme, but boldly proposes the universal confiscation of land for public use (without tender of any compensation to the individual owner), as the panacea for those evils indicated by the co-existence of poverty and progress.

There is not time, within the present limits, to combat this

theory.* It would be a waste of logic to expend it upon a doctrine that has gained no foothold. In this country, where there are so many small proprietors of land, and where so much of the public domain is yet unoccupied and open to settlers, there is nothing in Mr. George's proposition to fire the popular heart. It is singular that a writer who has so successfully attacked some of the paradoxes of the accepted political economy, should have set up a paradox of his own which the "common sense" of the people refuses to entertain.

Socialism not only has the aid of these strong writers, but its newspaper press. One is frequently surprised at the literary skill which is exhibited in the conduct of these journals. I have only space to give one extract:

> "The Law condemns the man or woman
> Who steals the goose from off the Common,
> But lets the greater felon loose
> Who STEALS the COMMON from the GOOSE."

The second element of the power in Socialism is the attraction which it has for imaginative minds. The Socialists in France are very aptly called *Les Sublimes*, or in idiomatic English, "High-flyers." In England, one of the most distinguished Socialists is William Morris, renowned alike as one of the greatest poets of the century, a great painter, and a wealthy manufacturer. He is now devoting his entire time and his large fortune to Socialistic experiments, and the propagation of Socialistic doctrines. Minds of this character are capable of that intense sympathy and that high order of self-sacrifice, which are characteristic of heroism, and which have a magnetic power for all beholders.

THE LABOR MOVEMENT.

The characteristic feature of this movement is the attempt of the wage-workers, through the power of organization and by the indirect assistance of favorable legislation, to secure the share which they claim in the profits of wealth (the joint product of capital and labor), and to protect themselves (as well as the general public) from the power of large accumulations and combinations of wealth.

* The subject is admirably treated in an article, "Nationalization of the Land," reprinted from the *Edinburgh Review* in "Topics of the Times," Vol. I., No. 1.

The Labor Movement, likewise, has its literature. It has a central organ, and numbers not less than twenty or thirty local organs. These do not publish anything favorable to the Anarchist movement, but it must be said that they do not always draw very clearly the distinction between their own avowed principles and those of the Socialists. They publish numerous extracts from the works of Henry George, La Salle, and Karl Marx. A regular feature of these papers is the publication of those unwise and unfortunate things which the "Capitalistic Monarchs" have said. They generally have a column in which they publish such sayings as those of Vanderbilt, "Damn the public," and Jay Gould, "We ought to go back to the European basis of labor." Unfortunately, the tendency of these things is to promote the gospel of hate; but the responsibility of doing it must certainly be shared by the men whose utterances thus become the seeds of hatred among the laboring classes.

I have thus brought before you three different forms of agitation, and you cannot have failed to notice that they are extremely different in their objects and methods, and therefore very different in the danger which they involve to the general security of our American institutions. There are two portentous facts in the situation. The first is the danger that the ranks of one class may be recruited from the others, a peril involved in the fact that there is so large a number, in this country, of unemployed men. The idle brain of the honest and conservative Knight of Labor becomes a workshop for the Socialistic devil, and the idle hand of the peaceful Socialist soon consents to handle the dynamite of the Anarchist.

As to the number of unemployed men now in the United States, the estimates differ. Perhaps no estimate is more careful than that which has been made by Mr. Carroll D. Wright, the United States Commissioner of Labor. According to this, there are now unemployed in the United States 168,750 hands whose labor is connected with the factory system. There are in all 998,833 unemployed men in this country—nearly a million.

It is fearful to think how much discontent and how much danger resides in this single fact. Hunger is very fierce; it does not stop to reason; and in the case of the *bona fide* laborer, who,

on account of the existing industrial depression, is unable to find employment and who hears the cry of his children for bread, the holiest and noblest feelings of the human heart conspire to make him a lawless savage.

The other fact, to which I referred as "portentous," is the existence of a literature—in book and newspaper forms—having a wide circulation and devoted to the propagation of these movements. It has been said that one half of the world does not know how the other half lives. It may now be said with equal truth that one half of the world does not know what the other half reads. In the time devoted to the preparation of this address, I have become acquainted with a vast literature, the very existence of which I did not suspect. The man who pooh-poohs a power like this advertises his ignorance or his stupidity.

In the presence of these three forms of agitation, and the elements of strength that belong to each, the conclusion is forced upon us that we are on the eve, either of some new adjustment of the relations of Capital and Labor, which shall conduce to the best interests of each; or, of an angry antagonism of class with class, in which violence can only be put down by a strong military rule. Which shall it be? This is one form of stating the Labor Problem.

We are next to inquire into the causes which underlie the phenomena already considered. These are numerous, and many of them are occult. I can only undertake to deal with a few of the most prominent and salient causes of these social agitations.

EXTREMES OF WEALTH AND WANT.

First. The ever widening gulf between Wealth and Want—between the enriched classes and the impoverished masses.

The great characteristic of this century is a wonderful industrial progress. It has multiplied the wealth of the nations in such a way as to make the old fables of the "touch of Midas," the "lamp of Aladdin" and the "purse of Fortunatus," seem tame beside the realities. In thirty years, from 1850 to 1880, the net product of our manufactures increased from 437,000,000 to 1,834,000,000—an astonishing increase of over 400 per cent. But this wonderful industrial power, instead of lifting the masses

of men in a vertical line, like the great jack-screws which have been in some of the cities placed under immense blocks of buildings, and moving them upwards, noiselessly but surely, has seemed to strike the social mass "like a great wedge coming against its side, and has lifted the upper crust to higher and better planes, while it has cramped and pressed down to lower levels the masses beneath."

Gen. Francis A. Walker, superintendent of the recent census, and a writer on political economy, who certainly will not be accused of extravagant expression, says that the majority of laborers, the world over, do not have enough to eat:

"If cattle were not kept nourished better than are the majority of laborers in the world, it would not 'pay' to have cattle at all; it would be better to do without them entirely. Barely to keep them alive would require a large expenditure of food; to give them in addition to this only enough to secure a low grade of muscular strength and activity, would not make them worth their keep."

Mr. Rae, a conservative thinker, in his work on Contemporary Socialism, describes the condition of things in England as follows:

"No thoughtful person of any class can be contented or can avoid grave misgivings and apprehensions when he reflects that, in the wealthiest nation in the whole world, almost every twentieth inhabitant is a pauper; that, according to the poor-law reports, one-fifth of the community is insufficiently clad; that, according to medical reports to the Privy Council, the agricultural laborers and large classes of working people in towns are too poorly fed to save them from what are known as starvation diseases; that the great proportion of our population lead a life of monotonous and incessant toil, with no prospect in old age but penury and parochial support; and that one-third, if not one-half, of the families of the country are huddled six in a room, in a way quite incompatible with the elementary claims of decency, health and morality."

Surely this terrible picture can find no parallel in this country. In Mr. Carnegie's "Triumphant Democracy" he has drawn a glowing picture of the wealth and resources of our people. In speaking of the grain receipts in Chicago he says:

"In her elevators can be laid away a store which dwarfs the ostentatious garnering of the ancient Pharaohs as much as her enormous shipments outnumber the sacks of corn which Joseph's brethren carried away."

When he speaks of our live stock he says:

"Were the live stock upon Uncle Sam's estate ranged five abreast, each animal estimated to occupy a space five feet long, and marched round the world, the head and tail of the procession would lap."

Now, is it not indeed a remarkable and stupendous fact that, in a country having such resources as these, the social and industrial conditions are such as to have driven almost the entire wage-working class of the nation into organized protest against the existing order?

Hon. Wayne McVeigh, the late Attorney-General of the United States, in a recent address at the Yale Law School, used these words:

"It (Labor) may be unable to name any remedy which may not be discredited as soon as named, but it is profoundly convinced, and nothing can shake its conviction, that something is radically evil in a social and economic system which in twenty years and in a country of unexampled material prosperity, possessing empires of fruitful virgin soil, causes the mass of its citizens to sink into the condition of laborers with their hands for daily wages, while a very small minority entrench themselves more and more securely in the enjoyment of the fruits of the labors of the majority, and for the purpose only, in many cases, of living themselves, or enabling their children to live, aimless and worthless lives of self-indulgence."

It has been a hotly debated question, whether there has been —parallel with this increase of wealth, of over 400 per cent.—any increase in the rate of wages. There has been an increase in the amount of money paid, but the real question is whether or not, in view of the cost and general scale of living, there has been any relative increase in the rate of wages. Very high authorities have ranged themselves on both sides of this question. I cannot attempt to be an arbiter between their opinions; it is enough to say that the question is so far doubtful as to admit of

very strenuous debate. While there is a difference of opinion as to whether or not wages have increased, there is no difference of opinion on the proposition that if there has been such an increase, it has been by no means proportionate to the increase in the production of wealth. Even if there has been a slight advance in the rate of wages, and the most optimistic advocates have not claimed more than this, it must be remembered that the conditions of modern life are such as to make poverty more distressing and more bitter than ever before. For instance, fifty years ago the laborer would occupy a tenement room with his entire family, sometimes numbering a score of persons, and would breathe the foul air, the very description of which would disturb the hearer—certainly not in contentment, but with a sluggish and stolid ignorance as to the real evil he was suffering. But this is the day of the public school, of the universal newspaper, of the free lecture and of cheap literature, and there are very few even of the poorest laborers who could now live in the same situation without knowing and realizing the curse of circumstances like these. The same is true in regard to the question of food. Probably, it was in accordance with this idea that one of the witnesses before the Senate Committee declared the whole of this modern agitation and turmoil was caused by "too much education"! The same thought may have prompted one of the witnesses before the Committee who said that the great controversy which Labor was making in this country with Capital was not a controversy for bread, but a controversy for pie.

The whole subject is well illustrated by the remark of the old Irish lady, that she "would do without the necessaries of life if she could only have the luxuries." It is not quite so bovine to say, as may be said truly, that the necessaries of life include more things now than formerly.

The progressive improvement in machinery, which is generally applauded as an unmixed blessing, while it has multiplied wealth, has itself displaced a large amount of labor. One laborer can now, in many industries, do the work which, only a few years since, required two, or five, or ten persons.* Moreover, under

* The exact figures are given in the report of the United States Commissioner of Labor for 1886, pages 81 and 82.

the modern system, men become mere tenders of machines. Adam Bede is an extinct type. Men's wives and children are brought into competition with them in the factory. The effect upon females and young persons has been terribly injurious. The fate of the children extorted a pained cry from the heart of Mrs. Browning, which rings in the ears like Hood's "Song of the Shirt." Thus it appears that the laborer under the modern system, speaking generally, sees himself "filling the world with wealth and at the same time living in want." The tendency is toward the development of two distinct classes—the plutocrats on top, and the proletarians at the bottom. The middle class, which is the moral safeguard of every country, is diminishing; for the billionaires can crush out, by competition, the smaller capitalist and the thrifty laboring man who becomes an employer (of course upon a small scale at first) of the labor of others.

CHRISTIAN ETHICS AND UNCHRISTIAN ECONOMICS.

Second. The startling contradiction between the world's professed religion (Christianity) and its accepted political economy.

Political economy is the science of wealth. The New Testament contains very plain teaching respecting the same subject. The civilized world nominally accepts both; but the inharmony of the two is demonstrating itself with uncomfortable but unmistakable tokens. Political economy makes "entire abstraction," says its great master, "of every other human passion or motive, except the desire for wealth." It does not inculcate the supremacy of this desire, but treats it as the normal and fundamental fact in the business relations of mankind. The same desire occupies a very different status in the Christian scheme of these relations.

On the special subject of wages, political economy has what is called its iron law, known as Ricardo's law, because he first formulated it, namely:

"Wages constantly tend to the minimum at which the laboring class can live and perpetuate the race."

Contrast that iron rule with the Golden Rule of Christ's teaching, and with such a passage as this:

"The laborer is worthy of his hire."

Such is the view taken by political economy of the acquisition of wealth, that it has well been called the "Grab-all Science." Compare that view with the Christian view of property; that it is simply a stewardship—a trust. The fundamental postulate of political economy is universal selfishness. Contrast that with the doctrine of brotherhood, and with the whole trend of that altruism which is taught in the New Testament. The great axis of political economy is competition. "Bear ye one another's burdens," points toward co-operation rather than competition.

These ideas of Christian ethics have got abroad among the masses. Among them no book has circulated like the Bible. Its teachings have entered into their daily thoughts. Those who would get the benefit of the Golden Rule have not been slow to understand it, and to note departures from it in conduct. But these truths, although universally accepted, have been, with the majority of men, mere abstractions. There is an anecdote, intended to satirize the piety of pretension, which runs as follows: The proprietor of a store says to his servant, "John, have you watered the sugar?" "Yes, sir." "Sanded the coffee?" "Yes, sir." "Larded the butter?" "Yes, sir." "Well, then, you can come in and we will have family prayers." This, of course, is broad satire; yet the man who, on the Sabbath day, bends his knee in devotion, on plush cushions, to hear the teachings of the New Testament, and goes out on Monday in his factory, or mine, or railroad, to practise political economy, illustrates, it may be unconsciously to himself, that biting sarcasm of George Eliot against the arrant hypocrisy of our Christian civilization, when she said that we had the "art of accepting momentous doctrines without eccentric agitation." While the vast majority of men are practising political economy in contradistinction to the Christianity whose dogmas they accept, yet there have been some men who have lived up to the Christian standard. The political economy which John Ruskin has written has been everywhere ridiculed as fantastic. There is one way in which he has dealt sturdy blows upon the accepted system of economics—I refer to his beautiful life. Nobody can refute the logic of that.

A large portion of his magnificent fortune has been spent by him for the benefit of laboring men.

The contrast between the lives and the conduct of such men as Ruskin, Corcoran, Childs, Seney, and those of the vast majority of the wealthy people who, at least nominally, accept the creed of Christendom, has made a deep impression upon the observing minds of the world's laborers.

If I were asked to say which was the dangerous class in this country, I would look among the Anarchists for the men with the petroleum and the dynamite; I would not look among the Socialists for the acute philosopher or the earnest sentimentalist; I would not look among the Knights of Labor for the promoters of a strike; but I would point to those wealthy men who illustrate the selfish greed and pride of wealth.

A poet's vision saw this truth:

Landlords and Lawlords and Tradeslords, the spectres you conjured have risen—
Communists, Socialists, Nihilists, Rent-rebels, Strikers behold!
They are fruits of the seed you have sown—God has prospered your planting. They come
From the earth like the army of death. You have sowed the teeth of the dragon
Hark to the bay of the leader! You shall hear the roar of the pack
As sure as the stream goes seaward.

The meaning of all this is that the world has travelled just as long as it can with the Bible in its right hand and a political economy in its left hand, which are the diametrical contradictions of each other. So it is that by the universal diffusion of Bible thought, and by the object lessons which Christianity teaches in the few men who have lived up to its lofty ideals, and the many who have trampled them under foot, that has been fulfilled which was spoken of Christ by the prophet, saying, in the closing utterance of the old dispensation—the last breath of prophecy before the angels sang their overture in the listening darkness on Judea's plain: "I will come as a swift witness against those that oppress the laborer in his wages."

AN UNSCIENTIFIC SCIENCE.

Third. Political economy is not only un-Christian in its point of view, but unscientific. A high authority thus defines the creature whose feelings and exploits this science undertakes to explain and justify:

"Love of country, love of honor, love of learning, love of art, pity, honor, shame, religion, charity will never, so far as political economy cares to take account, withstand, in the slightest degree, or for the shortest time, the effort of economic man to amass wealth."

It is enough to overturn the whole system at once to say that this "economic man" is a monstrosity. It would not be safe to deny that such a creature ever existed. There have been hints of his existence. A little child once looked upon an "economic man" whose shrivelled figure was the type of his starved soul, and said, "That old man don't breathe, he just ticks." But—to the honor of the race be it said—such a being is not the average type. Why, then, should political economy base its conclusions upon a few forlorn, sporadic cases who are libels upon their kind? Would it not be just as profitable to build up a science which should formulate the laws governing the creatures of the brains of Swift and Rabelais?

Undoubtedly, the method described reduces the science to a charming simplicity. Few things does the orthodox economist, in search of a theory, take into account. If he wishes to explain a widespread industrial depression, he will tell you it is all caused by a protective tariff, forgetting that the depression exists in England, with free trade. If he is a monometallist, then bi-metallism will suffice for an explanation, despite the fact that the depression prevails equally in countries which have gold coinage only and those which have gold and silver. Mr. Wright, the Commissioner of Labor, has tabulated the causes of industrial depressions which were given in answer to inquiries of the Senate Committee already mentioned, and finds that different individuals assign as many as 157 different causes. His own bureau has undertaken to collate the various remedies which have been proposed for these troubles, and the astonishing number of 348 have been suggested. I think it may fairly be said that very few of these are trivial, and there is a deep and significant truth, utterly ignored by the orthodox political economists, in the fact that so many causes and so many remedies have been felt to be factors and helps in this problem.

There are many motives which enter into the conduct of men

with reference to wealth, in addition to the one desire to which political economy confines its investigations. It is unscientific to omit from consideration all those benevolent impulses which are grouped under the name of religion and morality; of those feelings which spring out of the social relations which men sustain to each other; of all those manifold circumstances, such as custom, inertia, local attachment; all of which affect the conduct of men.

It is unscientific to ignore the health of the laborer, his good will to his employer, the comfort he enjoys, the self-respect, the manhood, the "forward-looking thought" which his situation inspires, as practical and pecuniary elements of the utmost value in the production of wealth. When will the "economic man" learn that the human machine—the wage-worker's body—deserves, on the score of mere utility, as much care as the insensate machine of steel? Yet, employers who would not allow a speck upon an engine will rust the vital organs of their laborers in the foul air of crowded tenements. Common sense and "business principles" would no more sanction the running of complicated machinery without lubrication, than the employment of labor without the oil of good will. The wealth-producing power of the world's labor would be doubled in one day, if wage-workers could only get as good "keep" as is given to engines.

Of course the desire for wealth is the great central fact in the system of political economy, and a system which ignored that desire altogether would be the play of Hamlet with the part of Hamlet left out; but a system which studiously and rigorously ignores every desire except that, is the play of Hamlet with the part of Ophelia left out, the part of Polonius left out, the part of his mother left out, the part of the king, the part of the ghost, the part of the grave-digger, and indeed everything else left out. What would Hamlet be, stripped of every surrounding circumstance and fact that qualifies and explains his life and conduct?

THE DRINK QUESTION.

Fourth. The liquor traffic stands out as the unapproachable chief among the causes of industrial distress and social disorder, in its threefold results: financial waste, political corruption and mob violence.

It will not be supposed that the leading magazines and reviews of the time, the *Century*, the *Forum*, the *North American Review*, and the *Atlantic Monthly*, are prohibition organs, but these journals have all recently dealt with this phase of the labor question.

Every book which has been called out, by the recent pressure of the labor problem upon public attention, has dealt with intemperance and the waste of the drink habit as the most prominent factor in the whole case. Such unanimity of opinion leaves hardly any room for doubt upon this point.

The capital invested in the manufacture of alcoholic liquors employs 36,000 men. The same amount of capital invested in the average of every other business employs 135,000 men. A simple transfer, therefore, of this capital to other branches of business would create a demand for 100,000 laborers.

Take another statement based on the census of 1880. The liquor traffic pays for every $100 worth of its product, at consumers' prices, $1.93 for labor. The shoe business pays for every $100 worth, at consumers' prices, $23 to the laborer. The same average runs through every other department of business; in other words, all business gives employment to more than ten times the same labor as that to which the liquor traffic gives employment.

The annual drink bill of this nation is $900,000,000. If this amount were spent otherwise what would be the result? An old Western farmer said in reference to the supposed lowering of the price of corn, which would follow the breaking up of all distilleries, that "We should have more hogs and less hell." These millions would naturally go into clothing, shoes, stoves, etc. An additional demand for clothing means greater prosperity at the factory, more demand for labor and better prices for it. Increased prosperity at the factory means more demand for cotton and better prices for it. More demand for cotton means greater prosperity to the farmer. "So the money that goes into shoes does not stop there; it sends money to the tannery, to the man who makes pegs, and the man who makes nails. Money for stoves does not stop there; it means a greater demand for iron, and for coal, and for labor at the mines, and better prices for it."

So that, if in this country we could turn the capital which is now invested in the liquor traffic to productive uses, and if we could divert the $900,000,000 which are annually wasted in that traffic, into the consumption of goods, the whole problem of over-production and under-consumption, in this country, would be solved in twenty-four hours. It would start the music of the spindles in every idle factory. It would move the crowded merchandise out of the warehouses and off the shelves of the merchants. It would silence the cry of "hard times"; put an end to strikes and lockouts, and bring a universal blessing to the land.

The best representatives of the labor organizations have realized the vital connection between this question and the industrial depression of the times. The Knights of Labor exclude all rum-sellers from their organization. Their idea about the rum-seller seems to be that of the Great Teacher about the lilies: "They toil not, neither do they spin, and yet Solomon in all his glory was not arrayed like one of these." When they look upon his prosperity, the laborers know that it is built upon their adversity.

The financial waste is not more serious than the political corruption and municipal spoliation which have been the product of the liquor traffic, and through which the public money has become mere "boodle" for those rulers of the cities who are spawned in the saloon.

Another connection of the liquor traffic with the social agitations of the time, is in the fact that liquor has played a leading part in all the Anarchist and Socialist riots, and in all the labor disturbances. There could no more be mob violence without liquor than there could be fire without oxygen. When riots were threatened in St. Louis and Fort Worth, the mayor, by an arbitrary order, closed the saloons. There was no law for the step, but the supreme exigency of public safety demanded it.

THE GREAT QUESTION—LABOR'S SHARE IN WEALTH.

When we advance to the discussion of remedies proposed in behalf of the Labor Movement, the line of thought must follow the topics suggested in the definition of that movement heretofore given, and which is believed to be exhaustive.

The central proposition of the movement is the claim, made by Labor, that it is entitled to a share in the net profits which are the product of the joint union of Capital and Labor.

The first thing that strikes us, in regard to this demand, is that, if political economy be true, Labor must necessarily and infallibly receive, and is receiving, by virtue of the "economic harmonies" of competition, all that it is entitled to receive; it is impossible that it should be otherwise; and hence the demand is preposterous.

But the demand is made! It has produced great confusion in the camp of the political economists and those who have put faith in their schemes of the universe. It reminds one of the tremendous consternation produced in the asylum when Oliver Twist asked for more! It created a panic throughout the whole institution—the great fact that Oliver had dared to ask for more! Now, Oliver was a pauper—a pensioner on bounty. What, then, caused his demand to produce such commotion? It was the fact that Oliver had the right to ask for more! Dependent though he was, yet he had the right to demand all that the system, of which he was a part, ought rightfully to bring to him.

Here, then, is the pressure of the question. Is this claim the blind outreach of unreasoning selfishness, or is there right, justice or equity behind it? This is a debatable question; but the most wonderful thing connected with it is the fact that society and individuals have by implication, if not expressly, surrendered the position of their political economists and conceded the right of Labor to make this demand. The Senate of the United States has gravely appointed a committee charged with the duty of inquiring into the division, between Capital and Labor, of their joint products. Now, if that division is accomplished with infallible correctness (and if political economy be true, it is so accomplished) the United States Senate has appointed a committee to investigate a question which is no question at all. Labor is simply, by the accepted doctrine of the standard economist, a commodity, worth just so much in the market as it will command under competition. Now, what would be thought of our grave and reverend Senators if they appointed a committee to travel all over the country, to examine hundreds of witnesses, to

print four volumes of testimony on the question, "What is the price of potatoes?" Yet, that is precisely what they have done, if Labor has no claim except that of wages under competition!

More than this, government and the business world have recognized arbitration as a method of settling these controversies between Capital and Labor. The British Parliament has passed a law providing for it; the President of the United States, in a message, has recommended such a law; the Lower House of Congress passed a statute on the subject; business men in England, France and the United States have consented to arbitration. I seriously doubt if the tremendous and far-reaching concession involved in all this has been fully realized. If the claim of Labor for higher wages, or any other benefit not secured under free competition, does not rest upon some right or equity, what is there to arbitrate? If there is no such equity or right, the demand for labor is a cool proposition for plunder. It is as absurd as a proposition to arbitrate the price of pins, and unrighteous as the highwayman's "Stand and deliver." The only answer that could consistently be made by society to such a demand would be out of the mouths of Gatling guns. The very idea of arbitration is preposterous, unless some basis for the claims of Labor is admitted. It seems that the business world has, by indirection, conceded what it would never have conceded if stated in plain terms, as a demand of Labor for a share in the profits of its union with Capital in enterprise.

Here is a new and untrodden field of thought. I have been unable to find a single attempt to formulate the principles upon which this equity is based. There is no need in this age why any young man should feel discouraged at the thought that everything has been accomplished, and that all the problems of civilization have been solved, for here is a domain entirely new and untouched. It is virgin forest. Here are fresh fields and pastures new. If this equity shall win recognition, it will introduce a new element in ethics; if it shall be accepted by the business world, it will introduce a new element into industrial organization; if it shall ever crystallize into a right, it will make a new department in jurisprudence. Whether any of these things

will occur, I know not, but my heart responds to the truth of these eloquent words of Mr. Hewitt:

"Beyond all dreams of the Golden Age will be the splendor, majesty, and happiness of the free peoples when, fulfilling the promise of the ages and the hopes of humanity, they shall have learned how to make equitable distribution among themselves of the fruits of their common labor."

In the short time which I have had for the study of the subject, I have sent out upon the waters the doves of exploring thought, but I confess that they have come back without bringing satisfactory tokens of solid ground. While, however, dogmatism would be out of place in regard to a topic so new and so recently opened to investigation, I seem to find some footing for this equity in two admitted facts: first, the absolute dependence of Capital and Labor upon each other. They are like the bow and the cord, each useless alone. If the arrow of profit emerges, it must be because the hand of civilization takes the cord of Labor and with it bends the bow of Capital. The momentum of the arrow is the joint product of the two. Each can veto the production of wealth. As well might the foot say to the head, "I have no need of thee," as might Capital or Labor say to the other, "I am sufficient unto myself." In the very constitution of the human race, the male and female must consent to union; else the race must perish. So in the constitution of our industrial system, Capital and Labor must unite in enterprise or both will be destroyed. In this absolute essentiality of the one to the other, there is a suggestion that neither can deny to the other a common interest in the mutual product.

THE INFLUENCE OF CHRISTIANITY.

Until the time shall come when universal co-operation will be possible; as long as Labor and Capital will be divided into distinct ranks and guided by distinct interests, we must look for the gradual solution of the Labor question in the principles of Christianity.

Mr. Ruskin lately said of the Bible:

"By consultation of it honestly, on any serious business, you may always learn, a long while before your Parliament finds out,

what you should do in such business, and be directed, perhaps, besides to work more serious than you had thought of."

Pending the evolution of this problem under Providence, there are truths which Capital and Labor must lay to heart. The laborer must remember while desiring to receive his share of wealth, that he is paid out of the current expenses which Capital must advance before its return is received. He must remember, also, that the risk of loss falls upon the capitalist alone. He must remember that in this country, at the present time, while the wages of Labor may be low, the wages of Capital are likewise low. Labor must remember that the very agitations through which it seeks redress are necessarily injurious to Capital, retard investment, and thus react to injure Labor. This is not an argument to abandon them, but to conduct them with conservatism. Otherwise they may kill the goose that lays the golden egg. How easy for capitalists to take the very words of grievance out of the mouth of Labor and complain of the "alarming development and aggressiveness of the great Labor monopolies." Labor must also remember to respect Capital, by reason of the very fact that Capital is itself stored-up Labor. It must remember that the very desires which now impel the laborers of this country to demand a better state of things, are the very desires through the force of which men in the past have preserved the fruits of their labor, and have thus acquired what we call capital.

And Capital must remember the nature of its title; that it is holden upon trust, and that all uses of property, which do not recognize this truth, do but convict the owner of "larceny after a trust delegated."

It is not idle to say that Christianity can have an influence in the working out of the Labor Problem, in spite of political economy; or that, perhaps, it will be possible to convert political economy into what its name implies, the science of the homes of the people. The man who denies the power of feeling and sentiment does not distinguish himself as a practical man. On the contrary, the most practical of men have been those who have recognized, and who attempted to guide, the power of sentiment.

All political economists agree that the question of rent in England has been itself affected by the condition of the sentiment existing there between the landlord class and their tenants. Why, then, may not sentiment, which springs from Christianity, become the controlling factor in the adjustment of these Labor agitations? In proportion as a larger and larger number of men recognize the Christian doctrine which governs the mutual relations of Labor and Capital, public opinion, in favor of such conceptions, will strengthen and solidify, and finally it will be sufficiently powerful to act with compulsory force upon those who are not disposed in their own hearts to accept them as measures of right.

Last year I attended the meeting of the American Bar Association at Saratoga, and was present at a garden party at the Grand Union Hotel. The garden party was a blaze of beauty. The trees were hung with magician's lamps; the fountains, on which they shone, played like liquid rainbows. The strains of music floated like dreams of Paradise. The diamonds on the bosom of beauty flashed back and repeated the crowded loveliness of the enchanting scene. As I looked on the platform of dancers, suddenly there came into my thought the words of a great preacher—a preacher, albeit no priestly robe or consecration has been laid upon him. Suddenly the spirits of truth and terror were there amid the gay and giddy throng. And on the beautiful white sheen of satin, and the billowy folds of lace, I saw strange, dark drops of blood, dripping from the hearts of pale women and starving children who, in sooty factories and narrow attics, had made those garnitures for wealth and fashion; and with the sensuous music of the mazy waltz there mingled a low, sobbing chorus which sang, with a husky voice, Hood's song of the working-woman's breaking heart, with snatches now and then of a fierce and threatening cry from men, who shouted, "Give us bread for our children!" As these strange, dissimilar sights and sounds were interblended in the confusing whirl of the music, and the shifting kaleidoscope of the dazzling illuminations, I saw the fuse of the dynamite answer back the flash of the diamond, and I said in my beating heart: "The same question is thrown down at the feet of this century which was thrown at the feet of the first: 'WILL YE HAVE BARABBAS OR CHRIST?'"

THE CONSERVATION OF THE FAMILY.

[Contributed to CHRISTIAN THOUGHT.]

BY PRESIDENT J. E. RANKIN, OF HOWARD UNIVERSITY, WASHINGTON, D. C.

THE family came directly from the Creator. This is according to the account in Genesis, corroborated by the words of the Great Teacher Himself. When the Pharisees came tempting Him, and asking: "Is it lawful for a man to put away his wife for every cause?" He answered them thus: "Have ye not read, that he which made them at the beginning, made them male and female, and said, For this cause shall a man leave father and mother, and cleave unto his wife; and they twain shall be one flesh? What, therefore, God hath joined together let not man put asunder." Indeed, it may be said that the family is the only institution which came directly from the hand of God. It is the institution which has in itself the beginnings of all other institutions; the potentialities of the human race. It does not make much of a record in history; but a phenomenal man can usually be accounted for, not by looking at his period, his country, his political environment, however much these may have to do with him, but at his family, and especially at his maternal origin. He is most frequently the seed of the woman. It has been said by Count Gasparin that woman is the family; that is, embraces in herself and her sphere not only that endowment, but also that nourishment, that nurture, that moral and spiritual direction and inspiration which makes the family; which makes noble men and women.

The method of Sparta, taking children and youth and training them up for the State, was contrary to their first and highest interests. It was a sure way for the State to destroy itself in destroying the family. The State has not that to give which the youth of humanity requires. The same is true of the Church. This, no more than the State, is the family. Although Jerusa-

lem is called the mother of us all, it is still the families of Jerusalem that make Jerusalem possible. God began Jerusalem with a family, and insured it by parental training. And when the Psalmist says that God loves the gates of Zion more than all the dwellings of Jacob, he is speaking of Zion as a spiritual family, of which it should be said, "This and that man was born in her"; he is alluding to the new birth which makes sons of God, and to that household of which God Himself is Father; the One for whom the whole family in Heaven and earth is named.

Civilization rises or falls with the condition of the family. For the citizen is made in the family. One husband, one wife, this is the unit of the Creator; that ideal after which Christianity struggles, and which, in most Christian lands, it so largely attains. God put this flaming sword into the hands of the great Hebrew law-giver, who, though he was to have all the wisdom of the Egyptians, yet began with his own mother's early training, namely: "Thou shalt not commit adultery!" And another whom God raised up like unto Moses, a Law-giver as well, though He gets the law from Calvary—where law is sublimated and interpreted—rather than Sinai, has said: "Ye have heard that it was said by them of old time, Thou shalt not commit adultery, but I say unto you, that whosoever looketh on a woman to lust after her, hath committed adultery with her already in his heart"; a sword still more flaming, and turning every way, prohibiting the inward as well as the outward sin. And in the breaking of this commandment, thus spiritualized; in unholy admiration for a woman not one's wife, either real or affianced, and familiarity with her; in marrying upon the basis of mere physical attraction and infidelity, only so long as that attraction holds; in getting one's conception of the nature of marriage vows from French and Russian, nay, from English and American novels, and not from the law of God; in selfish and luxurious ideas of what this life is; in despising the sacred dignity and glory of motherhood; in a word, in departing from the Bible standards respecting marriage are the beginnings of danger to the family.

I set down the second danger of the family—I would say it kindly—as coming from the modern Church and its methods;

from its complicated organizations and its exhaustive social demands. The attractions which once bound the son to his home now draw him away to some more inviting centre. He leaves the atmosphere of home, where the parental eye is upon him, where the maternal wing covers him, to breathe that of young people hose moral standards are yet hesitating and unconfirmed, are yet in flux. He does not take his cue in life from those who love him best ; to whom he owes his birth, and who have prayed for him in his infancy, but from the young people, who are let loose as he is, prematurely to influence and direct each other. I shall not criticise any of these organizations. Taken separately, I should probably approve them all. But taken together, they form an aggregate against which the family finds it hard to maintain its own. It is a proverb that no woman wears such poor shoes as the cobbler's wife, and no mare is so poorly shod as the blacksmith's. It is a proverb often verified in the spiritual poverty of many a household, where the husband or wife, or both of them, yes, and their children, too, are merely temporary sojourners in their own home, because of the demands of some social, humanitarian or Christian organization connected with the modern Church. Dickens seems to us irreverent in his handling of the Jellyby family in "Bleak House." The mission in Boola-boola-Gha broke up that family. It may be answered: "These things ought ye to have done, and not left the others undone." Doubtless. But to every family the home life is first in value, and should be the first cared for. And he that is unjust in that which is least, is unjust also in that which is much. I set it down as true that to care first for the home life in any community is to care first for the Church life there; and to undermine the home life there is to do the greatest injury to the Church life. The Church itself, all the voluntary organizations of the Church—its societies and bands and leagues, its committees and boards and clubs—are no true substitute for the life of the family. For this institution, the family, is of God's making. He has set His sanction upon it as upon no other. There are many different forms of church organization, all claiming Him as their Author ; and here competing with each other. There is not one of them that can say to the family, "I am holier than thou!"

"My demands must be met whatever becomes of the family." In her "Mother and Poet," Mrs. Browning has this stanza—comparing a woman's country and her home:

> "We all
> Have been patriots, yet each house must always keep one;
> 'Twere imbecile hewing out roads to a wall;
> And when Italy's made, for what end is it done
> If we have not a son?"

She meant, "Where is the country if the home is destroyed?" So we can say, "Where is the Church if the family is gone?"

The third danger to the family comes from non-religious social organizations. In these days everything is organized. This might be called the club period. The great stores have club houses for their patrons; the great industries for their representatives; and all of the great philanthropic causes, from that of Temperance to that of Woman's Rights. Every woman wears a badge, and every man a button. It is precisely so in literary and scientific directions. A few years ago the social organizations were confined to a few secret orders. But now we have the Grand Army, and the Sons of the Grand Army, and soon the Grandsons. For one, I hope the series will never end; if the virtues are transmitted. Lately, too, the Sons and the Daughters of the Revolution. Then, too, every nationality represented here in this, our composite nation, will ultimately have its society. Nearly all of these organizations are along social lines, in which there can be no recognition of the family.

I want woman to have all her rights and immunities; and in some causes, say that of Temperance, for example, I feel more like trusting her than trusting man. Man, at any rate, has been weighed and found wanting; and I am willing to see woman step upon the platform, and show herself still a woman, as she often does, though having man's responsibilities. But, for all that, I can see that in the battle for woman's real rights there are many blows which have reached the family. Some of the best platform speakers of the present period are women—some of the most influential. And they speak for the purity of the family. And yet, when I think of the mother of Washington, the mother of Daniel Webster, the mother of Garfield, I seem to see that the

platform of the family is mightier than any other platform. Every woman who makes and keeps together one family, thus puts herself and her influence into the life of the family ; the life of the nation. She rests from her labors, and her works do follow her. I do not know as I want fewer women upon the platform, but I want more women who shall be true mothers; who are aspiring after this in the American home. The reforms which we need in society must be reforms begun in the family; or, better, the family must anticipate and prevent the evils which these reforms are seeking to remove. This is the fountain where the branch must be cast in, if we would have the waters pure.

A fourth danger to the family, and one which, perhaps, some would regard the most imminent of all, is the great ease with which a divorce may be secured, which is always the breaking up of a family. Here man often steps in to break the inhibition: "What God hath joined together let not man put asunder." But, it is asked, "Has God joined together these parties to unequal and infelicitous marriage?" The inhibition relates not to any particular marriage, but to all marriages. In the nature of things, marriage is the institution of God. It is God's idea. He has adapted man to woman, and made their union possible. And to break up this union, except for that cause which vitiates all marriage, is to put asunder what God has joined together. This is what this inhibition means. No doubt, ease of divorce is a great temptation to those who enter marriage from unworthy motives ; who see not in it something beyond a civil sanction; something divine. But upon those whose views of marriage are correct, ease of divorce can make no impression. Ease of divorce is the result of certain imperfect views of marriage. It has been secured by the demands of our civilization which entertain those views. The Saviour told the Jews that the great Hebrew law-giver facilitated the separation of man and wife, because of the hardness of men's hearts ; meaning, doubtless, women's too—though He is speaking of men putting away their wives. If men and women enter the marriage relation with the conception that it is an institution of God, that it was intended by Him to be as sacred as life itself, and to be guarded in purity and duration, as life is guarded, the thought of divorce will awaken only abhor-

rence. It is the desecration of two lives. And who will venture to say that this was not the Creator's idea? the Saviour's idea? and ought not to be the Christian idea? Marriage was intended by God to be the earthly relation, which should bear the burden of that great mystery, the union of Christ to the Church. And the prophets make frequent charges against God's people—that they are spiritual adulterers. Indeed, in the same spirit, the Apostle James wrote to the early Christians who were unfaithful, "Ye adulterers and adulteresses, know ye not that the friendship of the world is enmity with God?"

Of course the present discussion would be incomplete without some reference to those necessities of those families which require the premature services of children as wage-earners; the sociological effects of the subject. Children are taken from school, if not from the nursery, and put into the factories, to help support the household. Where there is solid character, a heritage of moral worth and integrity, this sometimes makes the better manhood. Many a widow's son on the farm, or in the workshop, has thus served an apprenticeship in life which was better than the most tender nurture. But often it is not so. The boy thus prematurely exposed has matured only in vices; has learned the ways of a man in evil. But it is certainly an open question whether the restraints and pre-occupation, which come even from premature industrial pursuits, may not be, in general, better for morals than idleness, which is the temptation of children who have nothing to do. Then, again, I regard the modern club-house, where bachelors try to find a substitute for home-life, as a confession of selfishness and meanness, and an under-valuation of the spirit of self-sacrifice in woman. This is, also, a sociological question.

In the way of remedy for this tendency to deterioration in the family, the first suggestion which seems important, is the recognition of the peril of the family. There is not a good institution nor a good movement, which does not directly or indirectly depend upon the family and make drafts upon it. Many of these institutions and movements are necessary. But many of them are in this period emphasized beyond their deserts. Let things return to their proper proportions.

The second suggestion is, that it belongs to the Christian Church first of all to protect the family. It must guard it as a man guards the apple of his eye. The pulpit must utter the voice of God on the sanctity of the family; on the duties which belong to married life; on the blessings which spring from parenthood; on the formative power of the home life upon children; on the promises of God to a well-ordered family; on the importance of the family to the Church and to the State; to society itself. In a word, the pulpit must begin to make family life the central thing; put it where God has put it. There should be, at least, one Lord's Day in the year, which is treated as Family Day; say the one preceding or following Thanksgiving Day. Then, too, Christian parents must make a rally to preserve the family, and to build up its walls that are broken down. More should be made of family worship, and family Bible study, and family society. Only the higher and better class of fiction should be encouraged in the family; only the purer literary magazines and journals.

We Christian ministers, too, need to make our practice as to re-marrying persons who have been divorced square with the strictest Christian standards. If Christ teaches that the crime of adultery is the only sufficient ground for divorce, we cannot be too careful not to unite persons whose very new marriage relations are themselves adulterous. Of course we have no power or opportunity to review the proceedings of civil tribunals and through imperfect information may often stand in doubt as to our real duty. But if we are careless about whom we marry, we shall soon not dare to preach the truth; we shall soon have the churches filled with divorced men and women, who will not listen to the truth. Ministers, and all Christians too, should dissuade those unequally yoked together from regarding divorce as the only remedy for their burdens. Adultery is no less adultery because it has been legalized. And the law of Christ is very often fulfilled by bearing the burdens of an unequal marriage. Why should we expect the family relation to be free from such trials as we find everywhere else? The Apostle asks, "For how knowest thou, O wife, whether thou shalt save thy husband? Or how knowest thou, O man, whether thou shalt save thy wife?" Ease and comforts in life are not the only ends to be sought.

Canon Farrar has this passage in his recent volume, "The Voice from Sinai." It is a fitting conclusion to this imperfect paper on the most vital of all social and Christian questions: "If we would save this country (England with him, America with us) from moral degeneracy, we must set our face against the notion that marriage is only a legal contract; against the degradation of it in the higher classes, into a mercenary falsehood; against the undertaking of it in the lower classes, rashly, unadvisedly, and wantonly, like brute beasts which have no understanding. We must set our face, too, against the criminal laxity of divorce, and the facile re-marriage of those who have once violated the holy bond. We must restore the high conception of marriage, in which even the Roman code defined it, as the 'partnership of the whole life, the participation of all rights human and divine.' We must insist on the recognition by all Christians of its holy mystery, as signifying the mystical union between Christ and the Church. We must think of it as Tertullian in one age described it, and Bishop Taylor in another, as 'one hope, one vow, one worship, one discipline; a happiness which the Church ratifies, the oblation confirms, the benediction seals, angels announce, the Father declares valid; as shut up and secured by all the arts of Heaven, by honor and reputation, by fear and shame, by interest and high regards.' And while we realize the sacredness of that holy estate of matrimony, we must abhor the heinousness of that treachery by which it is dissolved. . . . Art, literature, the conscience of mankind, the warnings of history, the experience of humanity, the Mosaic law, Christ and His Apostles, and all the genius of twenty centuries brand this sin as dastardly, treacherous and vile; and the conscience of that man must be seared as with a hot iron, who can be guilty of it, and not sink to the earth for shame."

THE HEART OF PERSONALITY.

[Contributed to CHRISTIAN THOUGHT.]

BY THE REV. J. H. EDWARDS, NEW YORK.

WHAT is the essential element of that supreme form of all known existence which we call personality? It will be well, at the outset, to consider what we are to understand by this term. In the philosophical sense of the word, personality is a comparatively recent addition to terminology. The Latin *persona* and *personaliter* were made a part of theological language by Tertullian and his successors, to express, in relation to the persons of the Trinity, the conception they found in the Greek ὑποστασις, namely, the substance underlying attributes. *Persona* came to mean the spiritual subsistence that "sounds through" the mask of external individuality. As applied to a man, the term personality, in its ordinary sense, has been described as meaning "not his peculiar traits, which may distinguish him but do not compose him; but the sum of mental and moral characteristics which make him what he is as one human being, a separate soul."

In common speech, personality and individuality are often confounded. They are not synonymous. Individual contrasts with species; person, with nature or with things. Individuality is formal, personality essential. German philosophy has developed the laws of individuation to the neglect of the deeper laws and forces of personality. This has furnished another instance of abstract ideas becoming, in a generation or two, potent social forces. The concept of individuality has been exploited in the political sphere with tremendous effect. The "rights of man," as an individual, supplied the motive stimulus of the revolutions of the last century, and have impelled the democratic movements of this. Individualism has run its centrifugal course in Church and State, till now the inevitable reaction tends towards socialistic enslavement. The evils of both extremes come from the

neglect of that which is the life-force of normal personality, and differentiates it from individuality in nature.

This essential element, which makes God to be God, and man godlike, is, in one word, love. When the inspired Apostle indited that most pregnant sentence ever shaped in human speech, "God is love," he wrote ἀγάπη without the article, because, Meyer affirms, "it is a general definition of the nature of God." In this interpretation, Catholic, Lutheran and Anglican agree. Calvin and Beza gave a more superficial exegesis, making love one of the divine attributes, instead of the very nature of Deity. This has led to a disproportionate emphasis upon the contrasted attribute of justice, which, on the other hand, rationalistic theologians, from Abelard down, have always slighted. The theology, soteriology and sociology of the New Testament are rightly balanced, because they take the principle of love as their vital centre.

Definitions of person and personality are often inadequate, because they do not recognize their elemental essence. Thus Coleridge says, "Personality is individuality existing in itself, but with a nature as a ground." But this tells us nothing of the "nature" that furnishes the content of personality. Take the standard definition of Locke, that "person" stands for "a thinking, intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking being in different times and places." This is comprehensive, but lacks the motive and emotive factors. Noah Webster improves upon it in fewer words, when he defines "person" as "a living soul, a self-conscious being, a moral agent." Prof. George P. Fisher makes the chief constituents of personality to be self-consciousness and self-determination. But Mrs. Shelley's Frankenstein had both these. The moral element is wanting in either case. Consciousness is not conscience. Will without motive is mere potentiality. What is it in the self that determines itself?

In his "Philosophical Basis of Theism," Professor Harris adds an important element, when he says, "A person is a being conscious of self, subsisting in individuality and identity, and endowed with intuitive reason, rational sensibility, and free will." This definition takes account of the central force of spiritual ex-

istence; but its catalogue of endowments does not clearly suggest that, as all the parts and wheels of an engine are useless without steam, so, without "rational sensibility," the psychological mechanism is impotent and dead. Pure intellect, Aristotle said, moves nothing.

Rosmini ("Psychology," I. i. 5) touches the ultimate truth when he asserts that, "at the bottom of the Ego is a feeling anterior to consciousness, which feeling (coextensive with the Ego) constitutes the pure substance of the soul." Is this "substance-feeling" mere protoplasmic sentiency, or is it not a freely active, intelligent, outgoing potency? Is it a quality or function of some antecedent substance, or is it, perchance, the real essence of being, immaterial, immortal because inherently active, and the self-communicating energy of all life? The problem transcends human knowledge. We cannot go behind the consciousness of sentient, transitive being, which is the background of personal existence. We know feeling, we know force, as we cannot know substance. The "thing-in-itself" forever eludes perception. Whatever it is, it must be negative, intransitive, the lifeless basis of forces which alone give it positive character or value. Recognizing this limitation of knowledge, we may yet inquire as to the nature and functions of the fundamental "feeling" which Rosmini considers the pure substance of spirit.*

The traditional idea of substance and attribute has largely given way to the scientific conception of motion and mode. Force is thus regarded as the source and sum of all that is. Atoms are not conceived of as indivisible infinitesimals of matter, but as vortices of motion. The prime postulate of existence

* "The passions are the fundamental phenomena of the human soul." "The nature of the mind is self-activity."—Descartes, in Bruno Fischer's "History of Modern Philosophy."

"Mind is composed of feelings and the relations between feelings."—Herbert Spencer: "Principles of Psychology," Part II. Mr. Spencer's "feelings" are phenomenal only; but the primal feeling given in self-consciousness is expression, not impression. It is not a caused link in a living chain of effects, but the life itself, which fills and binds together the whole chain of secondary feelings. It gives us the spiritual basis of mind, independent of matter, or, at most, correlated with it.

"Perception presupposes feeling."—T. H. Green.

"Self-consciousness presupposes a self-feeling."—Prof. William James.

being immaterial force, may we not consider this original, all-creating, all-vivifying, all-impelling potency to be that which constitutes the essence of the divine nature —love? In this view, love is not the conditioned and fluctuating emotion human beings know so well, but the primal energy, generating all, organizing all, blessing all, the force of forces, the potent *sub-stantia* beneath and behind all things. Since God is love, this fact must account for all the attributes and activities of the Divine Being. It gives sufficient ground for the pluri-personality of God, and supplies the true motive of both creation and redemption. It explains that constitution of the universe which forever conjoins love and blessedness, so that man is not deceived,

> Who trusted God was love indeed,
> And love creation's final law.

The categories of absolute being and the æsthetic categories are thus but the metaphysical diagram of Love's infinite activity. The ethical categories show love in direct action, charactered by, and proportioned to, its object.

The divine nature, however, is not undiscriminating, self-impartation. "Love Divine" is forever wise, just and holy. God unerringly knows the right, and unfailingly wills it. But He loves it first, because it is His nature so to do. Right is right, not because God chooses it, but because He loves the right with all the energy of His holy nature. All else must be wrong, however beautiful or almost good. Hence, it is impossible that God should treat the untrue, the unjust, the unclean, as He treats the true, the just, the holy. He can consistently use severity, either as chastisement or as punishment. Wise and just love to "being in general" compels Him to "make a difference," according to the character and tendencies of specific being.

Mulford rightly makes the ethical element chief in personality. We have seen what this element is in the divine nature. It is the absolute propension of that nature in every part toward concrete right and good, which implies equal revulsion from all that is wrong. How, then, can actual sin be allowed in the universe? And how can the sinner escape the rightful wrath of God? Passing by the problem of the existence of evil as insoluble

by man, but as sure to be solved aright by a God of love, we find hope of deliverance from it in the same divine nature which must forever antagonize it. Human redemption depends upon what God *is*.

The universe is built upon the principle of altruism. Nothing exists for itself alone. Try as hard as he may, no man liveth or dieth wholly unto himself. The most confirmed egoist must at last feed the worms and fatten the soil. Ahrens ("Cours de Théologie") distinguishes "person" as being that exists for itself, while "things" exist perforce for some purpose or use outside themselves. The stone has value only in its external relations. The animal has a pseudo-personality, but really exists for the rest of creation. Man finds his end in his own development and enjoyment. God, as absolute, can have no relation to the finite —is necessarily self-centred. This theory ignores free-will and the love principle. The stone and the animal are alike shut into nature, under the law of reaction. They exist for ends outside themselves because they cannot help it, and, therefore, are not ethical beings. But man is man, as God is God, only when he recognizes his relations to other beings, and gives love, gives himself, to all "in proportion to their quantity" and quality "of being."

God is the infinite Altruist. From creation's dawn He has scattered worlds as star-dust through space, expressly that He might live to bless their inhabitants. The theology which teaches that the Almighty exists solely for His own glory, taken literally, is blasphemy akin to the sin against the Holy Ghost. The highest glory of that Being whose name is Love, consists in the eternal forth-giving of the infinite riches of His divine nature; first, reciprocally, between the persons of the Godhead; and then, just as really, upon every part of creation. "Of his fulness have all we received." This is life, ἡ ζωή, the life divine, which Christ came to exemplify and communicate. Self-centred existence, ὁ βίος, the life common to animals and men, must be spent for others, "lost" for Christ's sake and the Gospel's, if we would have it transformed into ἡ ζωή, the life eternal.

The modes of Spinoza, the monads of Leibnitz, the Ego of

Fichte, and the individual of Locke, Hobbes and Rousseau are imperfect figments of the metaphysical brain. But the self-conscious, self-determining, intelligent and free personality, whose life-spring is selfless love, is the consummation of being. Infinite and self-existent, we call such a personality, God. Finite and dependent, in any world or any rank of created beings, it is godlike.

In such a personality lies the possibility of redemption. Soul is saved by soul, life redeemed by life. In a recent number of *The Charities Review* is this sentence, "The greatest power of Charity Organization is in its personality." Of that noblest saint of the mediæval age, Bernard of Clairvaux, sometimes called the thirteenth apostle, and likened to the beloved disciple, Dr. Storrs writes, "But after all, the vital explanation (of his wonderful power over men and over Europe) is in his remarkable personality." A greater than he, the Apostle Paul, was willing to impart not Gospel only, but also his own soul, to those he sought to save. Greater than all, because wholly divine, the Son of God "loved us and hath given himself for us," and by that supreme self-giving we are saved and made like Him.

The personal factor is the key to social redemption. Law without love ends in anarchy. "We owe man, man," said Emerson. All reforms not pivoted on personality must fail. Socialism without incarnate Gospel is like a splendid steamer in mid-ocean with shattered shaft; the very power which should impel it steadily and safely onward is its deadliest danger. The kingdom of Heaven will come on earth only when all men obey the two great commandments of our Lord. For selfish souls Heaven does not exist in the universe.

> Art is much, but love is more:
> Art symbolizes Heaven, but love is God
> And makes Heaven.

FAILURE OF THE STATE IN HIGHER EDUCATION.

[Contributed to CHRISTIAN THOUGHT.]

BY T. E. FLEMING, D.D., PH.D., CEDAR RAPIDS, IOWA.

THERE are three positions concerning the guardianship of education in America. 1. That the Church shall take charge of all education. 2. That the State shall control primary education, and may take part in the higher. 3. That, while the State may safely be intrusted with primary work, the higher education can only be performed by the Church. If Roman Catholic premises are admitted, the first theory is inevitable. The State has no rights, save those the Church may be pleased to bestow. But this plant is an exotic, and will never bloom on American soil. We are more immediately concerned with the second position—the relation of the State to the subject.* Ever since the days of Plato's Republic dreamers have clothed the State with fictitious powers. In this new Republic some commonwealths are experimenting on educational lines with the impossible. Let us examine.

A government of the people, and by the people, has the right to protect itself against ignorance. The Roman Catholic argument against the common schools is fallacious. It assumes that all education is a moral quantity. There is nothing moral involved in teaching the alphabet, in grouping letters, in penmanship, arithmetic, grammar, geography, or the enumeration and naming of human bones. All this the State may do, and ought to do. In elementary instruction the most ignorant Christian parent can supply the moral quantity. If the child studies geography, the devout, though ignorant, parent may press the thought that "the earth is the Lord's, and the fulness thereof"; if history, that "the Most High ruleth in the kingdom of men"; if physiology, he can reverently point to Him who jointed the human frame. When the higher education is entered

* We have such unbounded confidence in a government by the people, that it seems absurd to think of it as seeking to transcend its abilities.

upon the conditions are changed. The young man or maiden enters a realm which is practically beyond the ken of many a Christian parent. However ardently the affectionate parent might wish to accompany the child, lack of early training on lines of studentship, business cares or household duties effectually prevent the journey. Other guides, used to climbing and handling the literary alpenstocks, must lead the youth up the heights. As the parent stands beneath in the valley, it ought to be with solicitude, not only as to the passing of crevasses, but whether the summit will give visions of "the King in his beauty, and the land that is very far off"; or whether, over the ice and through the chill of scepticism, the youth shall be led up to intellectual peaks that may glitter like frost, but which are the regions of spiritual desolation and death.

The right of the State to establish universities has been controverted on the ground that it is unjust taxation of the many for the benefit of the few. Aside from the principle involved, this controversy is a waste of words, since the tax is a mere bagatelle. We do not even pause to consider whether the State has the right to foster class-education—why it should educate men to money-making in the profession of medicine, and neglect shoemaking. Nay, why the State should discount industrial pursuits, by making penitentiaries the colleges where such teaching may be found. Let it be distinctly understood that we cheerfully assent to the professional education of doctors, lawyers, etc., by the State, if it so choose; that we are ready to intrust it with primary education, and believe that it should prepare its teachers by normal training for that work. Our question is not concerning primary or professional education, but the higher, commonly spoken of as a college course. Can the State furnish this higher education? We doubt. The discussion hinges on a definition.

What is this Higher Education? If it be merely technical, a drill in arts and sciences, the digging up of Greek roots, or framing of Latin sentences, we may at once concede that the State has the ready money. But is technical knowledge a higher education? Man is body, mind, and soul. Any system that makes intellectual training its chief object cannot be true educa-

tion of a being whose highest nature is the moral. Right here the State must inevitably fail; it cannot supply the moral quantity. Its mixed elements effectually prevent. A theocratic government, acknowledging pope or king as head of Church and State, may consistently establish universities. There, religion enters into the very make of the State. Here, government rests on an entirely other basis. A single law-abiding infidel must have the same rights as any Christian. Note the result with reference to the things which make a college—namely, its faculty and curriculum. The corps of teachers must be all Christians, or all non-Christians, or some from both classes. If all are Christians, what becomes of the rights of law-abiding infidels? If all are non-Christian, a believer could scarcely do a more hazardous thing than intrust his child to their influences. Most likely, however, the professors will be from both classes. In that case the Christian teacher is necessarily trammelled by his surroundings. He is the servant of the State, and it does not undertake to supply the moral quantity. Again, Christianity does not insure personal magnetism to anybody. The non-Christian teacher may have the greater faculty of drawing students to himself, thus neutralizing and perhaps destroying the Christian effort of another teacher. If the element of personal influence is ignored we receive a curious idea of college life.

Even on intellectual lines Carlyle has well said: "How can a mechanical gerund-grinder foster the growth of anything; much more of mind, which grows not like a vegetable by having its roots littered with etymological compost, but like a spirit, by mysterious contact with spirit—thought kindling itself at the fire of living thought? How shall he give kindling in whose inward man there is no live coal, but all is burnt out to a mere grammatical cinder?" We do not need Carlyle's help to see that a college education means contact with live men, not dead books, otherwise the student might remain at home and pursue it alone. What influences shall mould the youth, though often ignored, is quite as serious a question as what studies shall engage his attention.

Let us pass from the instructors to the instruction. Never before has inexperienced youth been caused to pass through

fiercer fires of intellectual temptation. The flippant squibs of unknown and irresponsible newspaper writers, the insidious teachings of fiction, and the widely scattered cheap editions of materialistic science poison the very air. Wherever he goes the student cannot escape from these influences. What antidote will enable him to intellectually live and move and have his being without moral blood-poisoning? Can the State furnish it? We doubt again. Perhaps we can find a crucial test by referring to professional education. The State trains doctors, why not preachers? The answer is within hailing distance. It is because the State knows no religion, and consistency requires it to maintain that position in its so-called higher education. If Butler's "Analogy" or "McIlvaine's Evidences" find a place in the State curriculum, can anyone tell us by what right? If these, or similar works, are totally ignored, should Christian parents patronize the school?

We have no war to make on the study of the classics, but shall Christian youth be engaged with the bacchanalian revels of gods and goddesses in pagan mythology, to the exclusion of evidences and apologetics? The effort to run the intellectual engine without the balance-wheel of Christianity invariably ends in side-track or smash. When we descend from works on evidences to the plane of technical text-books the question meets us in another form. A razor is a useful implement, but carelessly handled will inflict wounds. If the undevout astronomer is mad, his work on astronomy may produce a theophobia with as much aversion to God as hydrophobia causes dread of water. Correct scientific statement may be a lever to lift us to God, but the same statement may be used as a bludgeon to stun the soul. There is an indefinable somewhat we call spirit or tendency. But the State knows only law, not spirit. If men obey the law, the State does not inquire how they obey. Carry this idea of spirit into text-books, and note the result. There is not a college, of Church or State, that does not use some text-books giving the teachings of materialistic science. These are valuable because they are by specialists. It will make a difference how they are handled. It must also be remembered that the boys and girls look along the lines of study that are outside of, but

parallel to, their curriculum. If text-books by Huxley or Spencer are used (and they may be properly used) it is not surprising if the youth examine other works by these same authors. Not long since scientists were content to follow their specialties and leave ethics, metaphysics and theology, to philosophers and preachers. Forgetting that their labors as specialists have unfitted them for the work, they now give us their guesses on these lines. They have so long looked at matter, weighed matter, analyzed matter, that they have given us what has been well-named, a dirt philosophy. "They add up nature to a naught of God, and cross the quotient." Thought is the brain at work, that is, matter at work—a function of the brain, and man is without a soul. Even life itself springs from matter. Let us sing the doxology :

> To homogeneous matter sing,
> Praise this each evoluted thing ;
> Praise Nebular Hypothesis
> Above all praise the link we miss.

Now the ethics and alleged metaphysics of this school of thinkers run parallel with their valuable works on special subjects. The parent may be utterly unable to supply the moral quantity, and the State cannot consistently undertake it. It is here that the Christian Church as the kingdom of light steps to the front. The citizens of this kingdom are agreed on fundamental principles. This agreement is the only foundation on which may rise an education that recognizes the spiritual equally with the intellectual. Because of this union of aim and fundamental belief among the Churches, Christianity may well assert its right to the higher education of youth, that they may not be consumed with intellectual dry-rot. Perhaps the question is raised : If the State cannot undertake the higher education, what provision is left for non-Christian families? We reply, the State having secured itself, and done its duty by them in primary instruction, may well leave them to answer their own question. That, however, does not excuse us from helping to solve the problem. We cheerfully answer : If it does not please you to patronize Christian colleges, by all means build and endow for yourselves. If matters could thus fairly come to an issue, if

there were no compromise institutions owned by the State, if Christianity and infidelity were made to stand on their merits face to face, with reference to education, it would be a glad day for Christianity. An infidel college would be a curiosity, but not half so interesting as the liberality of the people who built it.

In the enfranchisement of the mind, the primitive Church triumphed over opposition. When Julian the Apostate forbade heathen learning from the Christians, because they wounded paganism with its own weapons, they were put to the shift of "coining all the seven liberal sciences out of the Bible, reducing it into divers forms of orations, poems, dialogues, even to the calculating of a new Christian grammar," (Milton, "Areopagitica"). Modern Christianity has largest liberty and best appliances. If the higher education is indispensable, and if the State is powerless to provide it in any proper sense of the term, then loyalty to this kingdom of light demands the best effort of the ministry to secure endowments for, and enrolment of students in, our denominational institutions.

THE WEAKNESS OF AGNOSTICISM.

[Contributed to CHRISTIAN THOUGHT.

BY L. THEODORE CONRAD, B.D., M.S., LITHGOW, N. Y.

THERE is, perhaps, no anti-Christian belief that deserves the name of philosophy that at the present day, among a certain class of readers, is working more shipwreck of faith and reckless indifference to sacred obligations than does the system known by the name of Agnosticism. Mr. Herbert Spencer, the chief exponent of this belief, has written so voluminously, and many writers of less note who have espoused this doctrine, have still further developed it in its practical bearings, so that its literature may be found in the library of almost every reader. This philosophy is read by many, and it is certainly no disrespect to any—for not all readers have the time and inclination to investigate—to say we suspect it is fully understood by few.

Many readers imbibe the undesirable scepticism it teaches—for Spencer's worshipping naked existence cannot be a whit better than idolatry—without knowing anything about the foundation on which it rests. We confidently believe that, if the fallacies of the fundamental principles of Agnosticism could be clearly shown to readers as they really are, that belief would soon become a curious relic of the past, and be of no further interest in the future than to represent one of the necessary stages through which mind had to pass, in its evolution, in the progress and civilization of the race.

The object of this article is, very briefly, and hence in no sense minutely, to set forth the inconsistencies of this doctrine. The theory of this belief, unlike many others, is not supported by many fundamental principles, several of which are equally strong, but has one great central pillar upon which the whole system rests, if rest it does, and if it can be shown not to rest on this support, then truly it does not rest at all. That it has not, and cannot have, any foundation is what we hope to show.

Theism and Agnosticism need not necessarily disagree, I be-

lieve, in anything until they come to a final or efficient cause—the cause behind all other causes—the force that produces all manifestations called phenomena. Here the two philosophies take issue. Theism calls it the All-pervading Spirit, the Infinite and Absolute God. Agnosticism, on the other hand, says, there is a force behind all appearance or phenomena, but what that force is we cannot tell. We cannot name even a single attribute it possesses. All we know, and can ever know, is that it has existence. This Mr. Spencer calls the "Unknown and Unknowable."

In order to show that this first cause is unknowable, the writer, by a long series of arguments, shows that all our knowledge, of whatever source, is only relative (linked with something farther back), and that things in themselves, we can never know. Hence the name Agnosticism, from *agnosco* (I do not know); and, moreover, that the only real thing or entity there is in existence is the "unknown and unknowable." Hence we cannot avoid concluding from his view that we cannot know anything whatever, since the only thing that has existence is "unknown and unknowable."

How Mr. Spencer can know that which he argues must forever be unknowable to all thought we will let the reader decide.

Here I quote a few passages, to show how utterly impossible Mr. Spencer thinks it is for us ever to get any real knowledge of the Absolute.

On page 78 of his "First Principles" he says: "It is thus manifest, even if we could be conscious of the Absolute, we could not possibly know that it is the Absolute; and as we can be conscious of an object, as such, only by knowing it to be what it is, this is equivalent to an admission that we cannot be conscious of the Absolute at all. As an object of consciousness, everything must necessarily be relative; and what a thing may be out of consciousness, no mode of consciousness can tell us."

Again on page 81 he says: "The First Cause, the Infinite, the Absolute, to be known at all, must be classed. To be positively thought of, it must be thought of as such or such, as this or that kind. Can it be like in kind to anything of which we have sensible experience? Obviously not. . . . The unconditioned,

therefore, as classable neither with any form of the conditioned nor with any other unconditioned, cannot be classed at all, and to admit that it cannot be known as of such or such kind is to admit that it is unknowable."

In proving this point he occupies nearly one hundred pages; but let these two quotations, which fairly represent him, suffice.

When he has conclusively shown that all knowledge is relative, and that the Absolute can never be known, he reflects and sees a difficulty. He finds it absolutely necessary to use that Absolute—which he previously maintained could never be known—in order to support his theory. He sees that a thing cannot well be related without being related to something, and that there cannot be any relative knowledge without there is at the same time an Absolute, any more than there can be a positive without a negative, a long without a short, a north without a south, or a finite without an Infinite. These are correlatives that can never be separated, not even to accommodate the theory of a philosopher. In setting forth his theory of relativity, Mr. Spencer has brought to his aid the arguments of Mr. Mansel and Sir William Hamilton. But where they stop at the right place, and say that unaided human reason of itself can never know the Absolute, and so give revelation a place, he neither finds any use for revelation to supplement reason, nor is he willing to accept the only logical conclusion of their views; and so, "to save himself," as he says, "from a scepticism so complete" (and indeed a serious difficulty for him), he conjures up a very peculiar theory, by which he presumes he can convince the reader of the possibility of at once being, without any knowledge of the Absolute, and at the same time having a certain positive "undefined consciousness of its existence."

That such a theory as this is absolutely self-destructive is almost too clear to need mentioning.

How or why any philosopher should muster together two such contradictory and mutually destructive elements to patch up a theory with is certainly not easy to see. In almost the same breath he just as stoutly maintains that we have a knowledge of the Absolute as he previously argued that it must ever remain unknowable.

The quotations from page 78 and 81 show his argument maintaining that the Absolute can never be known, while considerably farther on it seems as though he had forgotten his previous statements, for he now clearly proves that we do have a knowledge of the Absolute.

"What," he asks, "must we say concerning that which transcends knowledge? Are we to rest wholly in the consciousness of phenomena? Is the result of inquiry to exclude utterly from our minds everything but the relative? Or must we also believe in something beyond the relative? . . . It is not to be denied that so long as we confine ourselves to the purely logical aspect of the question, the propositions above quoted [referring to those of Messrs. Mansel and Hamilton] must be accepted in their entirety; but when we contemplate its more general or psychological aspect, we find that these propositions are imperfect statements of the truth."

Then he says: "To speak superficially . . . there is also an indefinite consciousness which cannot be formulated."

He next bids us observe that—"Every argument by which the relativity of our knowledge is demonstrated, distinctly postulates the positive existence of something beyond the relative." To say that we cannot know the Absolute is by implication to affirm that there is an Absolute. In the very denial of our power to learn what that Absolute is, there lies hidden the assumption that it is, and this proves that the Absolute has been present in the mind, not as a nothing but as a something. In this point we heartily concur and say; no doubt it does. And if Mr. Spencer would but acknowledge it, this one admission lands him right over into Theism.

Quite certain it is that any conception of the finite or relative implies a conception of the Infinite or Absolute. Here we have come to a practical point. If a conception of the finite and relative implies a knowledge of the Infinite and Absolute, their correlatives, then the knowledge of the one must of necessity be equally clear and positive with the other. Of two correlatives, you cannot have a distinct knowledge of the one, and an imperfect knowledge of the other. Their degree of clearness is always the same. But right here Mr. Spencer's entire theory breaks

down. To hold to the relativity of knowledge and the unknowable on the one hand, and, at the same time, to admit that we have any consciousness of the Absolute whatever, is not only utterly irreconcilable, but even absurd. At first he had shut all knowledge of the Absolute entirely without the limits of thought, and, as it were, even locked the gates (which he was obliged to do to establish relativity), while now, to accommodate his theory, he again drags back this Absolute half-way across the realm of thought. But he cannot thus play fast and loose at his convenience. Either all knowledge is relative, or it is not relative, and the Absolute is either known and knowable, or unknown and unknowable. No half-way position can here be maintained, but if it were "unknown and unknowable," then we could have no consciousness of it whatever, either definite or indefinite, for so soon as it is consciousness in the true sense, it is also knowledge, and nothing less than positive knowledge.

All this Mr. Spencer very unwittingly admits, but by what psychological law this mental gymnast leaps over this impassable chasm between the "unknown and unknowable" on the one hand, and a positive knowledge of the Absolute on the other, is more than we can comprehend.

We claim that entire relativity of knowledge can never be maintained. You cannot maintain it with a knowledge of the Absolute; neither can you maintain it without a knowledge of the Absolute.

1. If you claim the relativity of all knowledge with a knowledge of the Absolute, here is a contradiction already. For the knowledge of anything that is in itself absolute, certainly never can be relative in any sense, but according to the theory you must have a relative knowledge of a being that is absolute *per se*, which means that you conceive of the Absolute under conditions, or that you only know it in part, and hence you do not know it as an Absolute at all.

2. Again, according to the theory of relativity, what becomes of the statement, viz., "That all knowledge is relative"? Is not then this itself also relative, and hence only a partial truth suffering the same discount?

But if we take the other wing of the theory, that the Absolute

is "unknown and unknowable," then so far as we are concerned there is no Absolute, and as a consequence again, no relativity. If our minds are forever confined within the limited sphere of the relative, we could not only never have the faintest idea of the Absolute, but we could never even know that we are thus confined within the relative. No more could we know this than a man confined to total darkness from his birth could of himself know that he was in the dark. The blind man cannot only not see the colors of the rainbow, but without some person having sight telling him, he could not even know that he is blind. Neither could a person know that he is deaf, without information from some one who can hear. In like manner, some beings having more senses than we, or of superior intelligence, might look down upon us from superhuman heights, and see clearly and inform us, that our minds are forever circumscribed by the limits of the relative, and that, far beyond is a Great First Cause which we can never know; but without such a revelation from a higher source, we would not only ever be ignorant of such a First Cause, but must also forever remain absolutely unconscious of our own ignorance.

Not only when examined does this central and fundamental pillar of this theory crumble, because of its self-cancelling inconsistencies, but it is equally vulnerable from view-points less important. Without further argument, we think the reader will already agree, that this pretentious doctrine is not only founded upon unphilosophical assumption and frail logic, but when carried out, its principles are so mutually destructive each to the other, that the theory as a whole is but an elaborate suicide, and to those who see all there is to it.

Nothing remains to represent the proud name of "Agnosticism," on account of which volumes have been written and faiths wrecked, but a mere myth, which flourishes under clouds of mental fog only, but when stripped of this cloak, can withstand no light, philosophic or scriptural.

THE HUMAN ELEMENT IN THE BIBLE.

[Contributed to CHRISTIAN THOUGHT.]

BY THE REV. D. W. C. HUNTINGTON, LINCOLN, NEB.

THERE is a human element in the Bible. Does any devout soul start at the thought? The Book is certainly the better adapted to its purpose for that reason; possibly it would be of little use to us were the human factor eliminated. We write in the full and unshaken belief that the Bible is a divine Book, and yet that it is not wholly divine. We are equally positive in the conviction that it is a human Book, and yet by no means merely human. May we not call it the divine-human Book? The limits of this paper disallow anything like a thorough discussion of this question; we attempt no more than the statement of a few facts in the light of which the subject may be profitably studied.

1. Before me lies a copy of our English Bible. The paper, the ink, the thread, the leather, are all the same in kind as those used in the making up of other books. The printers who set the type, the stereotypists who made the plates, and the binders who finished the book have done their work with no more of divine assistance than they have had in bringing out other publications. So far, then, there is a human element in the present form of our Bible. And if these workmen have made some mistakes in bringing out this book, their blunders must be exceedingly numerous and large to affect the contents of the volume in any way as the message of God to us. Such mistakes would be readily seen and easily corrected.

2. But this Bible before me is a translation into English from other languages. This work of translating has been done by devout and scholarly men. Quite a number of these translations have at different times been made, all agreeing in a thousand points where they differ in one, and yet the later versions being generally superior to the earlier, as having the advantage of the better scholarship of their times. All these translators have

done well; done the best possible for them; and yet none of them have claimed any measure or mode of divine guidance in their work, beyond that which all honest and prayerful men may expect in difficult and responsible undertakings. Here, then, in the matter of translating also, there is necessarily a human element, and the Bible is the better, not the worse, for that.

3. A step farther and we meet the fact that none of these translations was made from the original documents penned by the hands of the biblical writers themselves. They were made from copies of the original manuscripts, and then from copies of copies, and so on, the originals having been lost. These copyists were, doubtless, honest and faithful men. That they did their work with all the painstaking which could be asked of mortal men, is seen in the fact that, though scholars find thousands of minute variations in the many hundreds of manuscripts which they have collated, they find none of such a character as would change a doctrine of religion or darken the way of salvation. These men were human and they made mistakes, though none which in any way weakens the claim of the Bible to be the Book of God. This copying, nevertheless, is another human element in the Bible.

4. We will now assume that we have the correct text of the Bible—the text as it came from under the hands of the original writers themselves. Is there no human element in this? In this making up of the Book, do we pass by a single step from what is human to that which is in all respects superhuman? Is there no blending of life between the source of revelation and the intelligent and responsible media through whom that revelation is communicated?

Let full weight be given to the fact that the organs of these revelations were men. Not the tongues of men alone, as if by some divine mesmeric influence they were made to utter certain words or sounds, without personal freedom, or self-consciousness. That would be to liken inspired men to heathen oracles. Not the hands of men merely, by which their fingers were moved to write and punctuate according to some mysterious and mechanical control. This would be to degrade the whole idea of inspiration. It was the man who was used to record the revelations of

God—*the whole man.* The man used, not as a machine, but as a free personality, called, chosen, set apart, inspired as an agent in receiving and communicating the divine revealings. The man with his mental constitution, his education, and his spiritual condition all entering, as modifying influences, into his work. The man, with the laws of his being respected, and all his mental and moral faculties in their normal and unconstrained activity. "Whatever the prophet learned, experienced, or observed, all that he feared or hoped, all concerning which he needed counsel or information, nay, even the external events which concerned him personally, all offered so many points of connection by which the divine Word might reach him, and that Word clothed itself in forms which had a relation to the idiosyncrasy and experience of the prophet, and was reported by him according to his individual rhetorical or literary powers." * This is surely a human element in the Bible, and it is thus that we have the very Bible we need—a divine, human Book.

5. Individual peculiarities appear in prophets, evangelists and apostles, as strongly and as naturally as in other writers. Each has a style of his own, and a tendency to the frequent use of favorite words has been often noted. It is not difficult to discover in them different casts of mind, varying degrees of education, and partialities for certain classes of rhetorical figures. Instances are readily noted in which Luke's education as a physician appears to have made him specially observant of that which pertained to cases of physical disease. Of these instances Hackett well observes: "It is correct to attach to them that significancy. No other writer of the New Testament exhibits this sort of technical precision in speaking of diseases." † Habits of thought and laws of association appear in these as in other men. Commentators do not fail to note that the Chronicles reveal a priestly hand, and, if the prophet Amos had not told us that he had been by occupation "an herdsman and a gatherer of sycamore fruit," ‡ his figures of speech would have sufficiently indicated the fact. To thoughtful readers, it is plain that some of

* Oehler's Old Test. Theol., pp. 479, 480.

† Hackett on The Acts, p. 341.

‡ Amos vii. 14.

the New Testament writers were less familiar with the Old Testament Scriptures than others; inspiration did not remove this defect in their education. Events which are related in two or more of the Gospels are sometimes placed in different historical relations. If this different grouping of occurrences of which all were witnesses, is to be attributed to some definite purpose which the writers had, each for himself, then their minds acted freely and naturally. If it is to be explained by the fact that they, in recalling past events, were sometimes unable to place them in an exact order, or did not deem it necessary to do so, still their minds acted normally. Inspired they were, and human they were. So in recording scenes at which they were present, and in reporting sayings and discourses of our Lord, sometimes one omits what another mentions, and in some instances each has his own rendering of the same particular.* All this accords perfectly with the fact that they were men whose minds were acting freely and naturally. Inspiration did not give to them precise identity of view, to each an equal degree of knowledge, or to any omniscience. Referring to the different expressions attributed to the disciples as they waken Jesus in the storm,† Augustine says: "The sense of the disciples waking the Lord and seeking to be saved is one and the same; nor is it worth while to enquire which of these three was said to Christ. For whether they said any one of these three, or other words which no one of the evangelists has mentioned, but of similar import as to the truth of the sense, what matters it?"‡ It is nothing against their inspiration that some were more deeply impressed with one truth, and others with another or that one saw and heard what some other did not.

6. It is a fact in point that, in some instances of most sublime prophetic vision, the revelation of truth to the prophet is accompanied at least with study, and in others is acknowledged as given in answer to prayer. Daniel incorporates into his prophetic utterances some things which he "understood by books,"§

* Matt. viii. 25; Mark iv. 38; Luke viii. 24.

† Matt. viii. 5–13; Luke viii. 1–10.

‡ Quoted in Alford's Gr. Test.

§ Dan. ix. 2.

and the prophets as a class "enquired and searched diligently" to find out the manner and time of Messiah's coming, suffering, and glory.* It was in answer to prayer that the interpretation of Nebuchadnezzar's dream was made known to Daniel.† It was while he was praying that the man Gabriel came to "inform him, and to give him skill and understanding,"‡ and it was during another season of special prayer that a heavenly messenger came to "make him understand what should befall his people in the latter days."§ Oehler puts the case correctly when he says, "In far the greater number of cases we must evidently conceive of the state in which the prophet receives a revelation, as merely one of profound self-introversion and collectedness of mind in a state of perfect wakefulness. This prophetic state is most nearly related to communion with God in prayer."‖

7. In support of this view we may mention the well-known fact that the books of the Bible have what may be called their local and historical settings. Most or all of them appear to have been called forth by local necessity. Each book has in itself indications of the time and circumstances in which it was written. There is a geology in its composition which enables scholars to determine the historical stratum to which it belongs. The "Orientalisms," the "Hebraisms in Greek" point to the people among whom these books originated. "The literature of Greece is not more thoroughly Grecian, the literature of the age of Elizabeth is not more genuinely English, than the Old Testament is thoroughly and genuinely the literature of the peculiar people, bearing upon it the unmistakable stamp of the Semitic genius."¶ The rhetorical figures, the allusions to historical events, to domestic and social customs, to natural history and scenery, all suggest a human factor in the authorship, working as we know men's minds do now work. Scholars of eminence claim that Paul's epistles exhibit the peculiarities of dictated letters, and any careful reader will detect, in passing from the earlier to the later epistles of

* I. Pet. i. 10.
† Dan. ii. 18, 19.
‡ Dan. ix. 20–27.
§ Dan. xii. 12, 13.
‖ Old Test. Theol., p. 479.
¶ Old Faiths in New Light, p. 42.

that Apostle, an enlargement of view, and an increased spiritual elevation. By so much as he was inspired by the Divine Spirit, was he all the more truly human, and the more genuinely Paul. "The unhistorical interpretation of Scripture is as childish as an unastronomical view of the sky." *

8. The manner in which the New Testament writers quote from the Old Testament Scriptures indicates on their part the action of a free personality. Sometimes they quote from the Hebrew, at others from the Septuagint; sometimes very literally, but as frequently substantially only. They change the order of the words, sometimes the words themselves, and they apply passages as they were not originally applied.† The meaning loses nothing in their handling, for it is grasped as in the brighter light of a new dispensation, but the liberty which they take with what is not essential in the Word of God indicates at once their inspiration and their free mental activity. The biblical writers also make an equally free use of other available material. Facts which came under their own observation they relate as such. They support their positions at times by argument and by citations from Scripture and from facts. They refer to tradition, to documentary evidence, and to the word of living witnesses. Some things were without doubt taken from Jewish records, such as the genealogies of Matthew and Luke, for had any other authority than those records been appealed to, it would have been of no possible weight in support of their cause.

9. Nor do the inspired writers claim either to know or to remember everything. They do claim most explicitly to be the message-bearers of God to men, made such by the enlightening and revealing presence in them of the Holy Spirit. But they do not claim to have lost in this inspiration that which made them human, nor to have been lifted above, nor out of the normal use of their intellectual faculties. When Paul met the elders of the Ephesian church at Miletus, on his way to Judea, he told them that the Holy Ghost had testified in him that, wherever he went, "bonds and afflictions awaited him," but what particular trouble was to befall him at Jerusalem he did not know.‡ This passage seems

* Ibid., p. 78.

† Matt. ii. 18; Hos. xi. 1; John xix. 36.

‡ Acts xx. 22, 23.

to assert both his inspiration from God, and his ignorance of the future at least in one particular. It claims that he was an *inspired man.* And when in prison at Rome, he writes, declaring his purpose to send Timothy to Philippi, "so soon as he shall see how it will go with him."* At the time, then, of writing the Epistle to the Philippians, the result of his own imprisonment and trial were to him unknown. He did not recognize the high priest who presided at a meeting of the council at which he spoke; † not from want of inspiration, but from defective eyesight. His infirmity operated upon him as it would upon other men. He remembered that he had baptized several families at Corinth, and he recalled the names of three, but he adds: "I know not whether I baptized any other." ‡ The reason which he assigns for this inability to recall definitely the number of those whom he had baptized at Corinth is, that it was his call and supreme business to preach the Gospel. This had so absorbed his thought, that he had taken no pains to keep in mind the number of his baptisms. § All the more inspired was he for this forgetfulness. Possibly it was for the same noble reason that, in this same Epistle, he incorrectly states the number of those who at one time died from plague in the wilderness. The record in Numbers states that it was "twenty and four thousand," ‖ while the Apostle alludes to the number as "three and twenty thousand." ¶

10. In all this there is evidently a human element—an element running through the entire Bible. What thoughtful reader of the Scriptures can be oblivious to it? What Christian would wish it otherwise? Not in the least does it impinge upon the inspiration of the biblical writers, correctly understood. On the other hand, does it not bring the Book of God nearer to us, and does it not dispose of a running troop of objections to the divine authenticity of the sacred writings? What if there should be found errors in genealogical tables, in numbers and architectural meas-

* Phil. ii. 23.
† Acts xxiii. 5.
‡ I. Cor. i. 16.
§ I. Cor. i. 17.
‖ Num. xxv. 9.
¶ I. Cor. x. 8.

urements? What if the writers of the Bible possessed but imperfect knowledge of the earth and of science? What if copyists have blundered and revisers have fallen into error? What has all this to do with the great fact that God inspired and called men to speak and write His messages? The Christ of Christianity is the God-Man; the Bible of Christianity is the divine-human Book.

MONTHLY MEETINGS AT COLUMBIA COLLEGE.

By the Secretaries.

April, 1893.—The regular monthly meeting of the Institute was held on the evening of Tuesday, April 4, 1893, in Hamilton Hall, Columbia College, Secretary Charles M. Davis being in the chair. The Rev. S. G. Law, Chaplain of the Tombs, conducted the devotional exercises. After the reading and approval of the minutes of the last meeting, the following list of new members was announced: William P. Paxson, D.D., Superintendent S. W. department of S. S. Union, Springfield, Mo.; Edward C. Ray, A.M., D.D., Secretary Presbyterian Board of Aid for Colleges and Academies, Chicago, Ill.; Arthur J. Brown, D.D., Portland, Ore.; Rev. John Dixon Simpson, Huntsville, Ala.; Rev. A. H. McKinney, A.M., Ph.D., New York; Rev. W. J. Mutch, New Haven, Conn.; Matthias S. Kaufman, A.M., B.D., East Bridgewater, Mass.; Rev. J. H. Potter, Eustis, Fla.; Weston Flint, A.M., LL.M., Ph.D., Statistician United States Bureau Education, Washington, D. C.; Daniel W. McWilliams, Brooklyn, N. Y.; Thomas H. Lane, Pittsburgh, Penn.

Prof. E. G. Sihler, of the University of the City of New York, read a paper on "The Hopelessness of the Classic World." After the lecture the Rev. Dr. Hamilton spoke. A vote of thanks was presented to Prof. Sihler, and a copy of his paper was requested for publication in CHRISTIAN THOUGHT.

SEVENTEENTH SUMMER SCHOOL OF THE INSTITUTE OF CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.

The Seventeenth Summer School of the American Institute of Christian Philosophy will meet at Prohibition Park, Staten Island, July 6 to 12, 1893. The general theme to be presented is "The Bible and Society; the Claims of Both, and How the First Meets the Needs of the Second." In addition to the names given herewith, several leading educators have promised to attend the meetings as the guests of the Institute and will take part in the discussion, on topics especially assigned to them. The following is the daily programme:

educators have promised to attend the meetings as the guests of the Institute and will take part in the discussion, on topics especially assigned to them. The following is the daily programme:

THURSDAY, JULY 6.

Afternoon: "The Bible; Have its Claims as the Word of God been Invalidated by Science?" G. Frederick Wright, Professor of the Relations of Science and Religion, Oberlin College, Oberlin, O.

Evening: "The Bible; Have its Claims as the Word of God been Invalidated by the Higher Criticism?" Howard Osgood, D.D., Theological Seminary, Rochester, N. Y.

FRIDAY, JULY 7.

Afternoon: "Inspiration; Has the Biblical Doctrine been Invalidated." B. B. Warfield, D.D., Theological Seminary, Princeton, N. J.

Evening: "Inspiration; How Can the Doctrine be Made Helpful in the Christian Life?" David J. Burrell, D.D., Marble Collegiate Church, New York.

SATURDAY, JULY 8.

Afternoon: "Christianity; What it Promises to Man and Society; Have its Claims been Invalidated in any way?" J. W. Bashford, D.D., President Ohio Wesleyan University, Ohio.

Evening: Annual meeting of the Institute.

SUNDAY, JULY 9.

Morning: "The Great Commission; What, and to Whom, and its Claims?" D. S. Gregory, D.D., ex-President Lake Forest University and Managing Editor of the Standard Dictionary. New York.

Afternoon: "Christianity; Its Achievements and Hopes." George Alexander, D.D., University Place Presbyterian Church, New York.

MONDAY, JULY 10.

Afternoon: "Sociology; Its Definition and Content." Sylvester F. Scovel, D.D., President University of Wooster, O.

Evening: "Body and Will; or, The Relation of our Environment to Individual Character." A. H. Bradford, D.D., Montclair, N. J.

TUESDAY, JULY 11.

Afternoon: "City Evangelization; Its Needs, Methods, Results and Outlook." Rev. R. A Torrey, Superintendent of the Moody Institute of the Chicago Evangelization Society.

Evening: Ballington Booth, Commander of the Salvation Army in America.

WEDNESDAY, JULY 12.

Afternoon: "Wealth; Its Origin and Obligations." E. Benjamin Andrews, President Brown University, Providence, R. I.

Evening: "Christianity; Its Attitude toward New Social Enthusiasms and Movements." Mr. Henry George, New York.

Except in the cases indicated, the lectures are delivered in the afternoon, 3:30 P.M., followed by discussions in the evening at eight o'clock, which are generally as interesting and instructive as the lectures themselves.

To Members of the Institute all these lectures are free. To others, instead of a collection, ten cents admission will be charged for each session of the Institute, to help meet the heavy expenses. The payment of $5 secures a course ticket and membership for a year, including CHRISTIAN THOUGHT, which contains the lectures of the Institute.

Prohibition Park is near Port Richmond, Staten Island, and

easily reached from the station in New York City. You take the Staten Island boat at South Ferry, foot of Broadway (10 cents), and after a delightful ride of four miles over New York Bay to St. George, you will make close connection with the Rapid Transit railway train, which, without extra charge, will land you at Port Richmond, from which point the electric cars on Jewett Avenue will run directly to the Park. Persons wishing circulars of the Summer School and of Prohibition Park, or information concerning hotel accommodations, cottages, or the Summer Assembly meetings, which will continue in the Park for twelve weeks, should address Mr. C. L. Haskell, Superintendent Prohibition Park, Staten Island, N. Y. For information about the Institute address Mr. C. M. Davis, Secretary, 4 Winthrop Place, New York.

ABOUT BOOKS.

[In this department we shall make mention of recent publications, especially those in the line of our studies. There will not be space for extended review. The name of the book, its publisher, and its price when known, together with a brief statement of its drift, will probably meet the demands of our readers. Any book mentioned will be sent post-paid, on receipt of price, by WILBUR B. KETCHAM, 2 Cooper Union, New York.]

—"A Tiff with the Tiffins" is the title of an interesting little volume recently issued from the press of Hunt & Eaton, of this city. The author, Frances Isabelle Currie, gives the trials of a little girl of nine years, who is inspired with ambition, but is seemingly misunderstood by her dearest friends. Her little "tiff" with a neighbor's children causes sorrow at first for herself, and all the members of her family, but after the clouds, the sunshine came into her life as never before, and her sore conscience and heavy heart were healed, and better feeling reigns in the entire home. Mothers and children alike who read the book for the story, which holds closely one's attention from the first, will find underlying the fiction a great deal of practical instruction.

ANNUAL LIST OF MEMBERS OF THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.

[CORRECTED TO JUNE 1ST, 1893.]

☞There are no Honorary Members.

VERY IMPORTANT.—As our publications are mailed free to all our members, it is important that we be promptly informed of changes of address to save trouble and expense.

Any errors in this list of initials, degrees or addresses will be cheerfully corrected with thanks to those who report them.

All names are retained on the books of the Institute until notification of discontinuance. The bills for membership dues are sent to each member annually. In the meantime our publications are forwarded, and members are expected to pay all arrears which may have accrued *up to date of discontinuance.*

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1883.—Prof. Benjamin N. Martin, New York; Prof. Moses Stuart Phelps, Mass.

1885.—The Rt. Hon. the Earl of Shaftesbury, England.

1886.—Rev. Dr. J. B. Cooper, Penn.; Rev. Dr. Samuel K. Lothrop, Mass.; Prof. Julian M. Sturtevant, Ill.; Archbishop Trench, Ireland.

1887.—Rev. Dr. Daniel Curry, New York; Rev. Samuel W. Duffield, New Jersey; Rev. Dr. Roswell D. Hitchcock, New York; Rev. Dr. Mark Hopkins, Mass.

1888.—Rev. Dr. Isaac Errett, Editor *Christian Standard*, Cincinnati, O.; Bishop S. S. Harris, Mich.; Rev. Dr. A. S. Patton, Editor *Baptist Weekly*, New York.

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1890.—General Clinton B. Fisk, New York; Frederick Billings, Esq., New York; Prof. Ransom B. Welch, Auburn, N. Y.; Pres. Joseph Cummings, Evanston, Ill.; Rev. Dr. Ormond Beatty, Centre College, Danville, Ky.

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1893.—Henry Day, New York; Col. Elliott F. Shepard, New York; Rev. Dr. Arthur Mitchell, Cor. Sec., Pres. Board of Foreign Missions, New York; Ex. Norton, New York; Mrs. Theodore Irving, New York.

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